

THE  
PHILOSOPHY  
OF  
HEGEL  
FRIEDRICH





# THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL

EDITED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION, BY

CARL J. FRIEDRICH

PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY



---

THE MODERN LIBRARY · NEW YORK

---

## CONTENTS

Preface

ix

Introduction by Carl J. Friedrich

xiii

### I

The Philosophy of History (published posthumously, delivered first in 1822), translated by CARL J. FRIEDRICH and PAUL W. FRIEDRICH

3

### II

The History of Philosophy (1805), translated by CARL J. FRIEDRICH

161

### III

The Science of Logic (1812, 1813, 1816), translated by W. H. JOHNSTON and L. G. STRUTHERS

177

### IV

Philosophy of Right and Law, or Natural Law and Political Science Outlined (1821), translated by J. M. STERRETT and CARL J. FRIEDRICH

221

### V

Lectures on Aesthetics (published posthumously, delivered first in 1818 at Heidelberg), translated by B. BOSANQUET and W. M. BRYANT

333

vii



## VI

The Phenomenology of the Spirit (1807), translated by  
J. B. BAILLIE, revised by CARL J. FRIEDRICH

399

## VII

## Political Essays

a. The Internal Affairs of Württemberg (1798),  
translated by CARL J. FRIEDRICH

b. The Constitution of Germany (1802),  
translated by CARL J. FRIEDRICH

c. Concerning the English Reform Bill,  
translated by CARL J. FRIEDRICH

523

## Notes for Introduction

546

## Bibliography

551

ment which the idea has passed through in realizing itself, the idea of freedom, whose reality is the consciousness of freedom and nothing short of it. [World history, with all the changing drama of its histories, is this process of the development and realization of the spirit. It is the true theodicy, the justification of God in history. Only this insight can reconcile the spirit with world history and the actual reality, that what has happened, and is happening every day, is not only not "without God," but is essentially the work of God.]



governments for even protecting and promoting such views as these in which "reason, and again reason, and in endless repetition reason is accused, belittled and condemned." After elaborating this complaint, Hegel concludes:]

It is, therefore, to be considered an advantage for science—and it is in fact as mentioned the result of the inner necessity of the subject—that the former philosophizing which kept evolving within itself as an academic wisdom has been put into close contact with reality where the principles of rights and duties are serious. . . . It is precisely this *relation of philosophy to reality* which is involved in these misunderstandings, and I am therefore now returning to what I have mentioned before. Philosophy is, because it is the *exploration of the rational*, by that very fact the *prehension of the present and the actual* (*Wirklichen*), and not the construction of something *otherworldly* that might be God knows where. . . . In the course of the following study I noted that even the Platonic Republic which is proverbially taken to be an *empty ideal* has essentially taken up nothing else but the nature of Greek ethics. When faced with the challenge of the deeper principle of the free and limitless personality, which to Greek ethics directly could appear only as an unsatisfied longing and hence as a disaster, *Plato* tried to aid Greek ethics against this challenge. But he could try to do this only in an outward and particular form of that Greek ethics by which he hoped to cope with the disaster, and in doing so he violated most deeply its deeper impulse, namely, the free and limitless personality. Yet he showed himself to be a great spirit in that the very principle around which his particular idea revolved was the axis around which the impending revolution of the world was revolving.

*The rational is actual;  
And the actual is rational.*

Upon this conviction rests all naïve consciousness, as does philosophy, and philosophy starts from it in considering the



What Luther began through faith, felt and witnessed in spirit, is the very same thing which the more mature spirit seeks to comprehend in a *conception*, and thus to free itself in the present and to find itself. It is a famous saying that half a philosophy leads you away from God . . . whereas the true philosophy leads you to Him. It is the same with the state. Reason does not content itself with an approximation which is neither cold nor warm and is therefore spit out; nor does it content itself with the cold desperation which admits that in this temporal existence things go badly or at best "fair to middling" and that . . . therefore one better keep one's peace with reality. It is a warmer peace with reality which knowledge provides.

To say one more word about preaching what the world ought to be like, philosophy arrives always too late for that. As *thought* of the world it appears at a time when actuality has completed its developmental process and is finished. What the conception teaches, history also shows as necessary, namely, that only in a maturing actuality the ideal appears and confronts the real. It is then that the ideal rebuilds for itself this same world in the shape of an intellectual realm, comprehending this world in its substance. [When philosophy paints its gray in gray, a form of life has become old, and this gray in gray cannot rejuvenate it, only understand it. The owl of Minerva begins its flight when dusk is falling.]

But it is time to close this preface. As a preface it could only speak extraneously and subjectively of the standpoint of the writing which it precedes. To speak philosophically of a subject, it admits only a scientific and objective treatment. Therefore to the author any objection of a different sort from a scientific treatment of the subject itself must appear as a subjective epilogue and chance assertion and hence must be indifferent to him.

Berlin, June 25, 1820.



- <sup>13</sup> These problems are central to Karl Popper's *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (new ed. 1950) who sharply points up the contrast. Unfortunately, Popper has followed in the footsteps of Schopenhauer and engages in invective, where rational argument would be more in keeping with his own position. His discussion of Hegel is a travesty of what needs to be said. Cf. for Kant, my *Inevitable Peace* (1948) and the Introduction to *The Philosophy of Kant* (1949).
- <sup>13</sup> See his introduction to *Hegels Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie* (1913), p. xi. Lasson there refers to Mayer-Moreau, *Hegels Sozialphilosophie* (1910), p. 75 ff., for further authority.
- <sup>14</sup> See for this Theodor Steinbüchel, *Das Grundproblem der Hegelschen Philosophie*, esp. vol. I, "Die Entdeckung des Geistes" (1933).
- <sup>15</sup> Cf. H. Trescher, *Montesquieus Einfluss auf die Philosophischen Grundlagen der Staatslehre Hegels*, in *Schmollers Jahrbücher* XLII. X X
- <sup>16</sup> Rosenkranz suggests: "So plastic, so beautiful, so well-shaped, so devoid of all alien admixture and of ephemeral concessions Hegel never worked again." *Op. cit.*, p. 207.
- <sup>17</sup> See for this K. Rosenkranz, *Hegel als Deutscher Nationalphilosoph* (1870). The passage refers to a formulation by R. Haym, *Hegel und seine Zeit*, p. 243 (in the chapter on the *Phänomenologie*).
- <sup>18</sup> Cf. M. Heidegger, "Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung" in *Holzwege* (1950) pp. 105-192.
- <sup>19</sup> See *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (ed. Lasson) p. 74. The translation by Baillie (p. 104 of his edition) is quite misleading. Generally speaking the German word "Dieses" which lends itself to being used in the noun form, cannot when so used be rendered by the English "this" because it has no noun form. We have rendered it usually as a "particular something" for that gives Hegel's meaning of *Dieses* as a thing (or event, etc.) confronting us.
- <sup>20</sup> See Kuno Fischer, *Hegels Leben, Werke und Lehre* (1901), p. 305.
- <sup>21</sup> We are following Lasson who in his Introduction to the *Phänomenologie*, p. xciv, rightly insists, contrary to Rosenkranz and K. Fischer, that in dealing with the consciousness of actuality, Hegel means to deal with actuality itself, according to the principle of identity. But we object to Lasson's view that this confounding of the two represents "progress beyond Kant."
- <sup>22</sup> *Phänomenologie* (ed. Lasson), pp. 29/30. Cf. also pp. 32/3.
- <sup>23</sup> The problem is discussed by K. Fischer, *op. cit.* p. 310, but in such a way as to confuse the negating with the suspending; Fischer, too, seems doubtful about the third meaning when speaking of the triad of *negare*, *conservare* and *elevare*.
- <sup>24</sup> See below, p. 163 ff, for further elaboration. The sentence quoted is translated from Johannes Hoffmeister's edition of Hegel's *Vorlesungen*, p. 148.
- <sup>25</sup> The matter is touched upon, but not treated with the insight and penetration displayed elsewhere in their volume by A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Culture—A Critical Review of Concepts and Defini-*