Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture

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VOLUME II

IN SEARCH OF THE DIVINE CENTRE

New York
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
1943

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I have not taken the phrase 'fourth century' in the strictly chronological sense. Historically, Socrates belongs to the century before; but I have treated him here as the intellectual turning-point at the beginning of the age of Plato. His real influence began posthumously when the men of the fourth century started disputing about his character and importance; and everything we know of him (apart from Aristophanes' caricature) is a literary reflex of this influence on his younger contemporaries who rose to fame after his death. I was led to discuss medicine as a theory of the nature of man, in Volume III, by considering its strong influence upon the structure of Socrates' and Plato's paideia. It was my original intention to carry my second volume down to the period when Greek culture achieved world domination (see the Preface to Volume I). This plan has now been abandoned, in favour of a more complete analysis of the two chief representatives of paideia in the fourth century: philosophy and rhetoric, from which the two main forms of humanism in later ages were to derive. The Hellenistic age will therefore be treated in a separate book. Aristotle will be discussed with Theophrastus, Menander, and Epicurus, at the beginning of the Hellenistic period, an era whose living roots go deep into the fourth century. Like Socrates, he is a figure who marks the transition between two epochs. And yet, with Aristotle, the Master of those who know, the conception of paideia undergoes a remarkable decrease in intensity, which makes it difficult to set him beside Plato, the true philosopher of paideia. The problems involved in the relation between culture and science, which are characteristic of Hellenistic Alexandria, first come out clearly in the school of Aristotle.

Along with the cultural disputes of the fourth century described in these two volumes, and the impact of humane civilization upon Rome, the transformation of Hellenistic Greek paideia into Christian paideia is the greatest historical theme of this work. If it depended wholly on the will of the writer, his studies would end with a description of the vast historical process by which Christianity was Hellenized and Hellenic civilization became Christianized. It was Greek paideia which laid the groundwork for the ardent, centuries-long competition between the Greek spirit and the Christian religion, each trying to master or assimilate the other, and for their final synthesis. As well as

by them, and for most people they were useless at the critical moment. It is easy to say that the cultured classes ought to have tried to bridge the gulf. The greatest man of his age, the thinker who saw the difficulty involved in building up society and the state more clearly than any other, was Plato; and Plato in his old age took up that challenge. He explained why he was unable to give a universal gospel. Despite all the conflicts between the philosophical culture he represented and the ideal of education through politics maintained by his great opponent Isocrates, there was in this respect no difference between them. Nevertheless the will to make the highest powers of the spirit contribute to building up a new society was never more serious and more conscious than in this age. But it was chiefly directed to solving the problem of educating leaders and rulers of the people; and only after that to discovering the method to be used by the leaders in moulding the community.

The point of attack has shifted. This shift, which (in principle) began with the sophists, distinguished the new century from its predecessor; and at the same time it marked the beginning of a historical epoch. The new colleges and schools took their origin from that new attitude to the problem. They were closed societies, and that fact can be understood only from their origin, which rendered it inevitable. Of course it is hard to say what influence they could have exercised on the social and political life of Greece, if history had granted them a longer time to make their endeavour. Their true effect turned out to be quite different from that which they at first envisaged; for after the final collapse of the independent Greek city-state, they created western science and philosophy, and paved the way for the universal religion, Christianity. That is the real significance of the fourth century for the world. Philosophy, science, and their constant enemy, the formal power of rhetoric—these are the vehicles through which the spiritual legacy of the Greeks was transmitted to their contemporaries and successors in the East and West, and to which, above all else, we owe its preservation. They handed on that inheritance in the form and with the principles which it got from the fourth-century effort to determine the nature of paideia—that is, it was the epitome of Greek culture and education, and Greece made its spiritual conquest of the world under that motto. From the point of view

rates appeared to be so long and closely linked to the dualistic Christian ideal, by which each person was split into two separate parts, body and soul, that he was bound to fall along with it. At the same time, Nietzsche's hatred for him revived, in a new guise, the old hatred of Erasmus' humanism for the scholastic notion that life and humanity could be reduced to a number of abstract concepts. He held not Aristotle but Socrates to be the real embodiment of the rigidly intellectual academic philosophy which had kept the European mind in chains for more than half a thousand years, and which he (a true pupil of Schopenhauer) saw still at work in the theological type of thought represented by the German Idealistic school.[2] He owed much of this conception of Socrates to the picture of the philosopher drawn by Zeller, in his then epoch-making *History of Greek Philosophy;* and that in its turn was influenced by Hegel's reconstruction of the dialectic process in which the mind of western Europe had developed by reconciling the conflict between classical and Christian ideals. Now a new humanism was proclaimed, which turned to combat the prestige of this mighty tradition. It discovered and canonized what it called 'pre-Socratic' Greek thought. *Pre-Socratic* really meant *pre-philosophical.* For Nietzsche and his followers, the thinkers of that archaic age blended with the great poets and musicians of their time into a composite portrait entitled 'The Tragic Age of Greece'.[3] In the tragic age and its works, the Apollinian and Dionysian elements which Nietzsche strove to unite were still miraculously conjoined. Body and soul were still one. In that springtime, the glorious Hellenic harmony (so weakly and poorly realized by the men of the afterworld) was still a calm mirror-surface, hiding dangerous and unplumbed depths beneath. But when Socrates brought about the victory of the reasoning, the Apollinian element, he destroyed the tension in which it had counterweighed the irrational Dionysian element, and thereby broke the harmony. He (declared Nietzsche) took the tragic view of life held by archaic Greece and made it ethical, made it intellectual, made it an academic corpse.[4] All the idealizing, moralizing, and spiritualizing vapour into which the energies of the later Greeks dissipated themselves was spun out of Socrates' brain. He had been considered by Christian thought to be the utmost possible limit of 'Nature'

THE SOCRATIC PROBLEM

The most elementary fact we can grasp is not Socrates himself, because he wrote nothing, but a number of works by his pupils, all written about the same time. It is impossible to say definitely whether some of these were published during his lifetime, but it is highly probable that they were not.[5] There are obvious parallels, often pointed out, between the origins of the Socratic literature and those of the earliest Christian tradition about the life and teachings of Jesus. As with Jesus, it was only after Socrates' death that his influence on his pupils grew into a definite picture of him. That overwhelming experience made a deep and violent break in their lives. Apparently it was under the impact of the catastrophe that they began to write down what they knew of their master.[6] And then the portrait of Socrates, which had hitherto been fluid and mutable, began to grow rigid, and its features to be fixed for his contemporaries and for posterity. Plato even makes him tell the jury, speaking in his own defence, that his followers and friends will not leave the Athenians in peace after his death, but will carry on his work as a relentless questioner and adviser.[7] The programme of the Socratic movement is contained in these words, and its influence was multiplied by the rapidly growing Socratic literature.[8] His pupils determined that the unforgettable personality of the man, whom earthly justice had killed in order to obliterate him and his words from the memory of the Athenian people, should be so immortalized that neither then nor thereafter could his warnings ever grow faint in men's ears. The moral disquietude which had until then been confined to the small circle of his adherents now spread until it affected the public at large. His thought became the focal point of all the literature and philosophy of the new century, and the movement arising from it was, after Athens' temporal power collapsed, the mainstay of its world-wide spiritual dominion.

From the remains of that literature which have come down to us—Plato's dialogues, Xenophon's dialogues, Xenophon's *Memoirs of Socrates,* and the fragments of the dialogues written by Antisthenes and Aeschines of Sphettus—different as they are in many respects, one thing is clear: the chief aim of his pupils was to re-create the incomparable personality of the master who

had transformed their lives. The dialogue and the biographical memoir are new literary forms invented by the Socratic circle to serve that purpose.[9] Both owe their existence to the conviction of his pupils that Socrates' intellectual and spiritual power as a teacher could not be dissociated from his character as a man. Difficult as it was to give a clear impression of his personality to men who had never seen or met him, it was imperative that the attempt be made. We can hardly overemphasize the revolutionary daring of such an enterprise, from the Greek point of view. The Greek's way of looking at men and human character was just as much governed by convention as his own private and public life. We can see how Socrates might have been eulogized in the manner dominant in the classical period, if we look at another literary genre which was invented in the first half of the fourth century—the encomium. This genre too was created in order to express admiration for an outstanding individual; but its only method of doing so was to assert that its object possessed all the virtues appropriate to the ideal citizen or the ideal ruler. The truth about Socrates could never have been told in that way. And so, from the study of his character, there arose for the first time the art of psychological description, whose greatest master in antiquity was Plato. The literary portrait of Socrates is the only truly lifelike description of a great and original personality created in classical Greece. Those who created it meant neither to explore the recesses of the human soul nor to engage in fine-drawn ethical investigations, but to reproduce the impression of what we call *personality*—although they had neither the concept of personality nor words to express it. Socrates' example had changed the meaning of areté; and that change is reflected in the inexhaustible interest that attaches, then as now, to his character.

But his character was chiefly expressed in his influence over others. It worked through the spoken word. He himself never wrote anything down, since he held that the only important thing was the relation between the word and the living man to whom it was, at one particular moment, addressed. This was an almost insuperable difficulty for anyone who wished to describe him, especially since he used to converse in questions and answers—a form which would not fit any of the traditional literary patterns. That is true, even if we assume that some of his conversations had been recorded and could therefore be reconstructed with some accuracy, as is shown by the example of Plato's *Phaedo*. It was that difficulty which moved Plato to create the dialogue-form, the form that was copied by the other pupils of Socrates.[10] But although we can come very close to the personal character of Socrates, particularly through the writings of Plato, his pupils differed so radically from one another about the content of his conversations that they soon came to open dispute and lasting enmity. In his early essays Isocrates shows how this exhibition delighted malicious observers from outside the charmed circle, and how much easier it made the task of the 'opposition' in turning the unenlightened against the Socratics. A few years after Socrates died, the group of his adherents broke up. Each of his disciples clung passionately to his own idea of the master's teaching, and there actually arose a number of different Socratic schools. Hence the paradox that, although we have far more historical tradition about Socrates than about any other ancient philosopher, we still cannot agree about his real significance. It is true that to-day, with increased skill in historical understanding and psychological interpretation, we seem to have firmer ground to stand on. But the pupils of Socrates whose descriptions we read have so closely fused their own characters with his (simply because they could not separate themselves from his effect on them) that it is doubtful whether, after thousands of years, we can ever distil out of that compound the pure Socratic essence.

The form of the Platonic dialogue was quite certainly created by a historical fact—the fact that Socrates taught by question and answer. He held that form of dialogue to be the original pattern of philosophic thought, and the only way for two people to reach an understanding on any subject. And the aim of his life was to reach understanding with the people he talked to. Plato, a born dramatist, had written tragedies before he met Socrates. According to tradition, he burnt them after he felt the impact of the great questioner's personality. But when, after Socrates' death, Plato determined to keep his master alive, he found that, in imitating the conversations of Socrates, he could enlist his dramatic genius in the service of philosophy. Not only the dialogue-form, however, owes its origin to Socrates. The fact that certain highly characteristic paradoxical utterances

occur again and again in the conversations of Plato's Socrates, and reappear in the Socratic writings of Xenophon, makes it certain that the content of Plato's dialogues does to some extent stem from Socrates' thought. The problem is how far they are really Socratic. Xenophon's records agree with Plato only to a small extent, and then leave us with the feeling that Xenophon says too little, and Plato too much. Even Aristotle expressed the view that most of the philosophy attributed by Plato to Socrates was not his, but Plato's doctrine. On that judgment he based several assumptions whose value we shall examine later (p. 23). He holds Plato's dialogues to be a new artistic form, midway between poetry and prose.[11] That doubtless refers first of all to the form, which is really that of an intellectual drama in prose. But, considering Aristotle's view of the freedom with which Plato handled the historical Socrates, we must infer that he considered the dialogues to be a mixture of poetry and prose in content as well as in form: they blend *Wahrheit und Dichtung,* Truth and Imagination.[12]

Naturally, any attempt to use the dialogues of Xenophon and the other pupils of Socrates as historical sources is subject to the same doubts and difficulties. The *Apology* of Xenophon (often dismissed as spurious, but lately accepted as genuine once more) is immediately suspect because of its obvious intention to whitewash Socrates.[13] But his *Memoirs of Socrates* (the *Memorabilia*) were long held to be historically reliable. If they were, we should be immediately freed from all the uncertainty which attends every step we make in discussing the dialogues. But recent research has shown that the *Memoirs* too are heavy with subjective colouring.[14] Xenophon knew and admired Socrates as a young man, but was never one of his regular pupils. He soon left him, to serve as a soldier of fortune in the campaign undertaken by the rebellious Persian prince Cyrus against his brother Artaxerxes. He never saw him again. His books about him were mostly composed some decades later. The only apparently early one is the *Defence*—a vindication of Socrates against a certain 'indictment'.[15] This 'indictment' was obviously a literary fiction, and has been identified with a pamphlet published between 400 and 390 by the sophist Polycrates. Lysias and Isocrates certainly wrote replies to it, but we learn from Xenophon's *Memoirs* that he took up the cudgels at the same

time.[16] It was evidently this *Defence* that first brought Xenophon (already half-forgotten as a friend of Socrates) into the circle of Socratic writers, although he was silent for many years after writing it. He later attached it to the beginning of the *Memoirs;* but its structural unity, its completeness, and its definite purpose are enough to show that it was once a separate work.[17]

Its purpose, like that of the *Memoirs* themselves, is admittedly to show that Socrates was in the highest degree a patriotic, pious, and righteous citizen of the Athenian state, who sacrificed to the gods, consulted soothsayers, helped his friends in trouble, and always did his duty in public life. The only objection to this is that, if Socrates had been simply a Babbitt, he would never have aroused the suspicion of his fellow-citizens, far less have been condemned to death as dangerous to the state. Recently, Xenophon's appraisal of Socrates has been made even more difficult to accept, by scholars who have undertaken to prove that he was writing so long after the events recorded, and that he had so little talent for philosophical thought, that he had to base his work on other books, particularly those of Antisthenes. If true, this would be interesting: it would allow us to reconstruct the work of a pupil of Socrates and opponent of Plato who is as good as lost to us. But it would reduce Xenophon's Socrates to a mere mouthpiece for Antisthenes' moral disquisitions. No doubt the hypothesis has been pushed too far; but such investigations keep us alive to the possibility that Xenophon, despite, or even because of, his philosophical *naïveté,* created a picture of Socrates which is in many features quite as subjective as we believe Plato's to have been.[18]

Such being the character of the evidence, is it possible to escape the horns of this dilemma? Schleiermacher was the first to express the full complexity of this historical problem in a single condensed question. He too had reached the conviction that we can trust neither Xenophon nor Plato exclusively, but must, like skilful diplomats, play one party off against the other. So he asked: 'What *can* Socrates have been, in addition to all Xenophon says he was, without contradicting the characteristic qualities and rules of life that Xenophon definitely declares to have been Socratic—and what *must* he have been, to give Plato the impulse and the justification to portray him as he does in

sion he received from Socrates' determined search for a fixed point in the ethical world. Plato therefore concluded that Cratylus and Socrates were both right, because they were speaking of two different worlds. Cratylus' statement that everything flows referred to the only world that he knew—the world of sensible phenomena; and Plato continued even later to maintain that the doctrine of eternal change was true for the world of sense. But Socrates, in the search for the conceptual essence of those predicates like 'good', 'just', 'beautiful', on which our existence as moral beings is based, was looking towards a different reality, which does not flow but truly 'is'—because it remains immutably and eternally the same.

(2) The universal concepts, to which Socrates had introduced him, Plato now considered to compose the world of true Being, which is remote from the world of eternal change. He named these essences, which we can grasp only in thought, and in which the world of true Being consists, the Ideas. In this he went beyond Socrates—who had neither spoken of Ideas nor assumed that they were separate from the world of sense.

(3) According to Aristotle, Socrates can be justly and indisputably credited with two things: he defined the general concepts, and he used the inductive method to discover them.[21]

If this account is correct, it makes it very much easier to distinguish the Socratic and the Platonic elements in the figure of Socrates presented to us in Plato's dialogues. Schleiermacher's research-formula need not remain an unattainable ideal, but can in some degree be put into practice. In those dialogues which the research of the last century has shown to be Plato's earliest works, Socrates is really always asking about universals: what is courage? what is piety? what is self-control? And even Xenophon, in passing, expressly says that Socrates constantly carried out enquiries of that nature and tried to define such concepts.[22] There is then, it seems, a way of escape from our dilemma: *Plato or Xenophon?* Socrates is the founder of the philosophy of abstract concepts. That is how Zeller, carrying out Schleiermacher's method of investigation in his *History of Greek Philosophy,* presents him.[23] According to this conception, Socrates was, so to speak, a modest preparatory stage before Plato's philosophy. He avoided Plato's daring metaphysical adventures, and, by turning away from nature and confining him-

self to ethical questions, showed that his real interest was in finding a theoretical basis for a new practical rule of life.

For many years this was accepted as the final solution of the problem. It was based on the great authority of Aristotle, and buttressed by sound scientific method. But it could not be permanently satisfactory, because it made Socrates into a thin and unconvincing figure, and his conceptual philosophy into a mere triviality. That was the abstract academic figure whom Nietzsche so savagely attacked. There were many whose belief that Socrates was a figure of world-shaking importance could not be destroyed by Nietzsche; and they simply lost their faith in Aristotle's reliability. Was he really perfectly disinterested about the origin of the doctrine of Ideas which he so violently opposed? Was he himself not mistaken in his account of the historical facts? Was he not governed, especially in his ideas about the history of philosophy, by his own philosophical preconceptions? Surely it was quite understandable that he should pass by Plato and go back to Socrates, and make Socrates more moderate—i.e. more Aristotelian? But did he really know any more about him than what he thought he could discover from Plato's dialogues? With these and similar questions modern research into the teaching of Socrates began.[24] Once more scholars had to abandon the firm ground on which they had built; and nothing proves the uncertainty of the question to-day more clearly than the polar differences between the various portraits of Socrates which have been worked out since. A good example is provided by the two most impressive and most scholarly modern attempts to find the historical Socrates—the great book on him by the Berlin philosopher, Heinrich Maier, and the work done by the Scottish school which is represented by the philologist J. Burnet and the philosopher A. E. Taylor.[25]

Both parties begin by dismissing Aristotle's evidence. Both consider Socrates to be one of the greatest men who ever lived. The dispute between them can be reduced to one question—was Socrates really a philosopher, or was he not? They agree that he was not, if the earlier view of him was right in describing him as merely a subsidiary figure standing at the entrance to Plato's mighty philosophical edifice. But they differ widely in their reasoning beyond this. According to Maier, the greatness

of Socrates cannot possibly be measured by judging him simply as a theoretical philosopher. What he did was to create a new attitude towards life, which formed the climax of a long and painful ascent towards human freedom, and which can never be transcended by any other. The gospel he preached was the self-mastery and self-sufficiency of the moral character. Thus he was the antitype of Christ, and of the oriental religion of redemption. The struggle between these two principles, these two gospels, is even now only beginning. Not Socrates, but Plato, founded philosophical idealism, created logic, discovered the abstract universal. Plato was a wholly different and independent person, not to be compared with Socrates: he was a systematic thinker, a constructor of theories. In his dialogues he used the freedom of the artist to attribute his theories to Socrates. It is only in his early works that he gives a picture of Socrates as he actually was.[26]

The Scottish scholars also hold that Plato is the only pupil of Socrates who could really give a sympathetic picture of his master—but they think that he did so in *all* his Socratic dialogues. Xenophon, for them, is the Philistine *par excellence,* who does not understand anything of Socrates' real significance. But he realized his own limitations, and therefore undertook merely to write supplements to other men's books about Socrates. Wherever he touches a real philosophical problem, he turns away, and contents himself with a brief hint to show the reader that Socrates was much greater than he can depict him. According to this view, the great mistake in current thought about Socrates is to believe that Plato did not intend to describe him as he really was, but meant to show him to be the creator of Plato's own Ideas, although he had nothing to do with them. Plato was not a man who could thus palter in a double sense. Some have made an artificial distinction between the early Plato and the later Plato, and have assumed that only the 'early Plato' wanted to depict Socrates' self, while the 'later Plato' used his master as a mask for his own gradually developing philosophy. This, according to the Scottish school, is inherently improbable. Besides, Plato's early dialogues presuppose the doctrine of his later and more constructive works (e.g. *Phaedo* and *The Republic*). The real truth is that, as soon as Plato stopped setting forth Socrates' teaching and began to expound his own

doctrines instead, he stopped using Socrates as the leading figure in his dialogues, and, with perfect consistency, used other persons, sometimes anonymous, to express them. Socrates was just what Plato says he was—the man who created the doctrine of Ideas, the theory of pre-existence and reminiscence, the creed of immortality, and the ideal state. In a word, he was the father of European metaphysics.[27]

These are the two extreme views of the question. In one, Socrates is not a philosopher at all, but an ethical inspiration, a hero of the moral life. In the other, he is the creator of speculative philosophy, which Plato personifies in him. The meaning of this dichotomy is simply that the old division which, apparently immediately after Socrates' death, split his disciples into opposing schools, has reappeared, and once again each school is creating its own Socrates. There are, as before, two main parties. Antisthenes denied that it was possible to know anything, and the centre of his doctrine was 'Socratic strength', the inflexible moral will. Plato on the other hand held that Socrates' pretence of knowing nothing was merely a stage on the way to discovering a deeper, more unshakable knowledge of values already latent in the soul. Each of these two interpreters once more steps forward to claim that his own Socrates is the true Socrates, with all his thought brought to completion. It cannot be merely a coincidence that the same two contradicting views should have appeared after Socrates' death and reappeared in our own day. Nor can we explain its reappearance by the fact that our evidence stems from one or the other of these parties. No: Socrates' own personality must have contained the duality which makes him intelligible to both of them at once. It is from that point of view that we must attempt to transcend the inadequacy of both views—for they are inadequate, although in a sense each of them is factually and historically justified. Although both Maier on the one hand and Burnet and Taylor on the other approach the problem on historical principles, their own ways of thinking have coloured their interpretation of the facts. Each party has felt it impossible to accept a Socrates who had reached no decision about problems which they themselves felt to be decisive. The historian must therefore infer that Socrates' own personality united the contradictions which even then or soon after his death fell apart. That makes him more interesting, and

more complex, from our point of view, but also harder to understand. He was a very great man, and his greatness was felt by the wisest of his contemporaries. How can he have been both great and inconclusive? Was he the last embodiment of a harmony which, even in his lifetime, was in process of dissolution? Whatever the truth may be, he seems to stand on the frontier between the early Greek way of life and a new, unknown realm, which he had approached more nearly than any other, but was not fated to enter.

SOCRATES THE TEACHER

The lines on which Socrates is now to be described have been set by the whole trend of our investigation. He is the central point in the making of the Greek soul. He is the greatest teacher in European history. If we attempt to find his greatness in the field of theory and systematic philosophy, we shall either concede him too much and Plato too little, or else end in disbelieving in it altogether. Aristotle is correct in holding that the theoretical structure of the philosophy which Plato puts in Socrates' mouth was essentially the work of Plato himself. But Socrates is much more than the collection of stimulating ideas which is left when we subtract the theory of Ideas and the rest of the dogmatic doctrine from Plato's picture of him. His importance lies in another dimension. He is neither the continuator of a scientific tradition nor the inheritor of an assortment of philosophic doctrines. Literally, he is the man of his time. He breathes the air of history, and is lit up by its rays. He climbed to intellectual independence and self-mastery out of the Athenian middle class, that unchanging, God-fearing, conscience-heeding stock to whose staunch loyalty its great aristocratic leaders, Solon and Aeschylus, had appealed long before. And now that stock found a voice and spoke, through the mouth of its own son, the child of the stonemason and the midwife, from the deme Alopeké. Solon and Aeschylus had once appeared just at the right moment to take over and incorporate in their own thought the germinal revolutionary ideas imported from abroad. They had so profoundly mastered and fertilized those ideas that, instead of smashing the Athenian character, they had evoked its strongest forces. And now Socrates appeared, in the same kind

of spiritual crisis. Periclean Athens, mistress of a mighty empire, was flooded with influences of many different kinds and origins; and, despite her brilliant expertness in every sphere of art and practical life, she was about to lose her spiritual foothold. Intoxicated by the exuberance of her own verbosity, she had in the briefest of moments talked all traditional values out of existence. And then Socrates came forward, to be the Solon of the moral world. For it was from the moral world that state and society were being undermined, and through it they must be saved. For the second time in Greek history it was the Attic spirit which summoned the centripetal forces of the Greek soul to combat the centrifugal—by setting up a firm moral order to counterbalance that creation of Ionian thought, the philosophical cosmos of warring natural forces. Solon had discovered the natural laws of the social and political community. Socrates now explored the moral cosmos in the human soul.

His youth fell into the era of rapid expansion after the great victory over Persia, an era marked abroad by the creation of the Periclean empire and at home by the introduction of complete democracy. The statement of Pericles in the funeral speech, that in Athens no merit or talent was refused an opportunity to display itself,[28] is proved by the example of Socrates. Neither his descent, nor his rank, nor even his appearance, predestined him to gather around him many of the sons of the Athenian aristocracy who looked forward to careers as statesmen, or to belong, as he did, to the cream of Attic society, the *kaloi kagathoi*. The earliest traditions speak of him, about the age of thirty, as an adherent of Anaxagoras' pupil Archelaus. The tragic poet Ion of Chios, in his travel-diary, recorded meeting Socrates in his company on the island of Samos.[29] Ion, who knew Athens well and was a friend of Sophocles and Cimon, adds that Archelaus belonged to Cimon's circle. He must, then, have introduced Socrates as a young man to Cimon.[30] We cannot tell whether his political views were affected by this contact with the great nobleman who had conquered Persia and headed the pro-Spartan conservative party in Athens.

In the prime of his life, he saw Athenian power rise to its height, and the greatest glories of classical Attic poetry and art created; he was received in the home of Pericles and Aspasia; among his pupils were politicians of brilliant and doubtful repu-

tation, such as Alcibiades and Critias. At that time, the Athenian state was straining every nerve to maintain the dominance it had won in Greece, and it demanded great sacrifices of its citizens. Socrates was several times distinguished for gallantry in battle. At his trial, this was emphasized in order to offset his political deficiencies.[31] Although a great lover of the common people,[31a] he was admittedly a poor democrat. He could not admire the zealous political activity of the Athenians in the assembly and the law-courts.[32] He made only one political appearance in his lifetime. He was serving as chairman of the assembly at which the admirals who had won the victory of Arginusae were (without legal precedent) condemned to death en bloc, because they had been prevented by bad weather from picking up the survivors of wrecked Athenian ships. Socrates, alone among the prytaneis, refused to put the proposal to the vote, because it was against the law.[33] Later, that might be interpreted as a patriotic act; but it was undeniable that Socrates held the democratic principle of majority-rule to be fundamentally wrong, and held, instead, that the state should be governed by the wisest and ablest men.[34] It is an easy inference that he came to this conclusion during the Peloponnesian war, when the Athenian democracy was growing more degenerate every year. He had grown up surrounded by the spirit of the Persian victory, and he had seen the rise of the Athenian empire. The contrast must have been too sharp not to create all kinds of critical doubts in his mind.[35] These views brought him the sympathy of many of his fellow-citizens who had oligarchic leanings, and later, at his trial, their friendship was cast up to him. The masses did not understand that Socrates' independent attitude was absolutely different from that of ambitious conspirators like Alcibiades and Critias, and that it had an intellectual basis which was far broader than the sphere of politics. But it is important to understand that in Athens at that time even the man who stood apart from political action was thereby taking up a political attitude, and that state problems decisively influenced the thought and action of every single citizen, without exception.

Socrates grew up in the period which saw the first philosophers and the first philosophical activities in Athens. Even without the tradition about his relation to Archelaus, we should have

to assume that, as a contemporary of Euripides and Pericles, he made an early acquaintance with the natural philosophy of Anaxagoras and Diogenes of Apollonia. We need not doubt that the account of his own development he gives in Plato's *Phaedo* is historically accurate [36]—at least when he speaks of his early interest in the physics of Anaxagoras. In Plato's *Apology,* he expressly denies having any special knowledge in that field; [37] but, like every cultured Athenian, he had read Anaxagoras' book, which (as he says in the same passage) could be bought for a drachma from the book-pedlars in the orchestra at the theatre.[38] Xenophon reports that, even later, he used to go through the works of 'the sages of old'—i.e. the poets and philosophers—with his young friends in his own house, in order to extract important passages from them.[39] So far, then, Aristophanes, when he describes Socrates as expounding Diogenes' physical theories about a Vortex creating the cosmos and Air being the basic principle of all existence, is perhaps not so wide of the truth as most people think. But how far did he incorporate these scientific doctrines into his own thought?

In the *Phaedo* he says that he expected great things when he took up Anaxagoras' book.[40] Somebody had given it to him, and had led him to expect he would find in it what he was looking for. That means that, even beforehand, he had been sceptical about the physicists' scientific explanations of the universe. Anaxagoras too disappointed him, although the beginning of the book had excited his hopes. There, Anaxagoras said something to the effect that Mind was the principle which built up the cosmos; yet as the book went on he made no further use of this explanation, but, like all the other physicists, referred everything to mechanical causes. Socrates had expected him to explain how things happened, and to show that they happened in that way 'because that was best'. That is, he thought that the rule of nature must be directed to a useful end. According to the account in *Phaedo* Socrates moved on from this criticism of the natural philosophers to reach the doctrine of Ideas; and yet, according to Aristotle's very convincing statement, the doctrine of Ideas cannot be attributed to the real Socrates at all. Doubtless Plato felt he was justified in making Socrates expound the doctrine that the Ideas are the ultimate causes of all phenomena, because he himself had gradually reached it through Socrates' investigations into the nature of the Good which is in all things.

Socrates also investigated nature in order to find an answer to his question. In Xenophon's *Memoirs* he holds conversations about the purpose which governs the structure of the universe, and tries to discover all that is good and purposeful in nature, so as to prove the existence of a constructive spiritual principle in the world.[41] What he says about the technical perfection of the organs of the human body seems to come from a work on natural philosophy by Diogenes of Apollonia.[42] Socrates could scarcely claim that the separate proofs he adduces were original: so that is no objection to our considering this conversation to be historically genuine in all essentials. If it contains borrowings, they are particularly characteristic of Socrates' way of thinking. In Diogenes' book he found what, in Plato's *Phædo,* he says he was looking for [43]—namely, the principle of Anaxagoras applied to the myriads of individual phenomena in nature. But still this conversation does not make him a natural philosopher: it only shows the point of view from which he approached cosmology. It was natural for a Greek to try to find in the cosmos the principle which he held to be the basis of order in human life, and to derive it from the cosmos. We have already pointed that out several times, and now find it proved once more in the case of Socrates.[44] Thus, his criticism of the natural philosophers indirectly proves that, from the very beginning, his interest was directed to problems of morality and religion. There was really no period in his life devoted to natural philosophy, for science could not answer the question which was in his heart, and on which everything else depended. Therefore, he left it alone. The unerring directness with which he always moved towards his goal is the sign of his greatness.

His lack of interest in natural philosophy has often been emphasized by Plato, by Aristotle, and many others since. But there is another aspect of that fact which is easily overlooked. Xenophon's description of his attempts to trace a purpose in the universe shows that his approach to nature was the very reverse of that followed by the early scientists. It was anthropocentric. His deductions all started with man and the structure of the human body. If the facts he cited were really taken from Diogenes' book, then that helps to confirm the point—for Diogenes was not only a natural philosopher, but a famous

doctor; and therefore in his system (as in those of some others of the later physicists, for instance Empedocles) human physiology occupied a far greater place than in any of the older, pre-Socratic natural systems. This was bound to stimulate Socrates' interest and to suggest novel problems to him. And now we can see that, as well as his obvious negative attitude towards contemporary natural science, he had a positive attitude, which is often overlooked. We should not forget that natural science then included not only cosmology and 'meteorology', which we usually think covered the whole field, but also the art of medicine, which was just then entering (both in theory and in practice) upon the great expansion described in the next volume. Even a doctor like the author of the contemporary work *On ancient medicine* held medical science to be the *only* part of natural science that was based on real experience and exact knowledge. He believed that the natural philosophers and their hypotheses could teach him nothing, but had much to learn from him.[45] This anthropocentric attitude was characteristic of the age of later Attic tragedy and of the sophists. It was connected—as Herodotus and Thucydides show—with the empirical approach manifested in the emancipation of medicine from the cosmological hypotheses of the natural philosophers.

Medical science, then, is the most striking parallel to Socrates' rejection of the high-flown speculations of the cosmologists. It shows the same sober determination to examine the *facts* of human life.[46] Like it, Socrates found that human nature, which is the part of the world best known to us, was the firmest basis for his analysis of reality and his clue to understanding it. As Cicero says, he brought philosophy down from heaven into the cities and homes of men.[47] That means, as we now see, not only that he changed its interest and the objects of its study, but also that he worked out a more rigid conception of knowledge (if indeed there is such a thing as knowledge). What the old philosophers had called knowledge was really philosophical hypotheses about the universe—which, for Socrates, means cloud-capped fantasy, gorgeous nonsense.[48] Whenever he expresses respect for its lofty wisdom, unattainable to him, he is speaking ironically.[49] He himself (as Aristotle correctly observed) always proceeded by induction;[50] and his method is akin to that of the matter-of-fact empiricist in medicine. His ideal of knowledge

was τέχνη, which was best exemplified in the art of healing, especially because that art had a practical aim in view.[51] At that time there was no such thing as exact science. Contemporary natural philosophy was all that was inexact. Therefore there was no philosophical empiricism either. In the ancient world, the principle that experience is the basis of all exact knowledge of reality was insisted upon by medicine, and by medicine alone. That is why medical science held a higher, more philosophical rank in the intellectual world then than it does now. Also, it was medical science which passed that idea on to the philosophy of our own age. Modern philosophical empiricism is the child, not of Greek philosophy, but of Greek medicine.

We must always remember Socrates' respect for medicine, which was one of the greatest intellectual forces of his day, if we are to understand his place in ancient philosophy and his anthropocentric attitude. His use of medical examples is notably frequent. And he did not use them at random: he used them because they fitted the pattern of his thinking; in fact they suited his view of his own personality, his ethos, his whole life. He was really a doctor. Xenophon actually says he thought quite as much about his friends' physical health as their spiritual welfare.[52] But he was mainly a doctor of the soul. The way in which he reasons about the physical structure of man, in his proof that the universe has a purpose, shows plainly that his teleology is closely connected with his empirical, quasi-medical outlook. It is only to be understood in connexion with the teleological conception of man and nature which was being openly acknowledged, for the first time, in medical science, and thenceforward grew more and more definite until it found final philosophical expression in Aristotle's biological view of the universe. Socrates' search for the nature of the Good, of course, was the manifestation of an interest which was entirely his own, and which he had learnt from no one else. An earnest natural philosopher of his time must have judged it to be the enquiry of a mere dilettante, to which the pure physicist's heroic scepticism could find no answer. But that dilettante's question was a creative one; and it is important for us to realize, by comparison with the medical books of 'Hippocrates' and Diogenes, that it formulated the most profound doubts of all that epoch.

We do not know how old Socrates was when he began, in Athens, the work in which his pupils' dialogues show him as engaged. Plato places some of his conversations in the first years of the Peloponnesian war—in *Charmides,* for example, Socrates has just returned from the hard campaign of Potidaea. At that time he was nearly forty; but doubtless he had begun to teach some time before that. Plato believed that the living context of his conversations was extremely important—so much so that he described it again and again with the most delightful detail. Socrates did not talk in the timeless abstract world of the lecture-hall. He belonged to the busy life of the Athenian athletic school, the gymnasium, where he was soon a regular and indispensable visitor like the trainer and the doctor.[52a] Of course those who took part in those conversations of his which were famous throughout Athens did not necessarily stand about in the athlete's usual Spartan nakedness, although they may often have done so. But it was not by mere chance that the dramatic duels of thought on which Socrates spent his life took place in the gymnasium. There was a profound symbolic resemblance between Socrates' conversations and the act of stripping to be examined by the doctor or trainer before entering the ring for a contest. Plato makes Socrates himself draw this parallel several times.[53] The Athenian of those days was more at home in the gymnasium than between the narrow four walls of the house where he slept and ate. There, in the clear light of the Greek sky, young and old daily assembled to keep their bodies fit.[54] The intervals of rest were taken up with conversation. No doubt it was often mere gossip; and yet the most famous philosophical schools in the world—the Academy and the Lyceum—bear the names of well-known Athenian athletic grounds. Anyone who had something of general interest to say which could not properly be said in the assembly or the law-court went and said it to his friends and acquaintances in the gymnasium. It was always exciting to see whom one would meet there. For a change, one could visit any one of many such institutions, private or public.[55] An *habitué* like Socrates, who was interested in people as such, knew everyone on the ground; and no new face (especially among the young men) could appear without his noting it and asking whose it was. As a keen observer of the young, he was unequalled. He was the great authority on human nature.

His sharp questioning was the touchstone by which every talent and every latent power could be tested; and the most distinguished citizens asked his advice on the upbringing of their sons.

Only the symposium, with the weight of tradition behind it, could equal the intellectual vitality of the gymnasium. Therefore Plato and Xenophon depict Socrates' conversations as taking place in both these milieux.[56] All the other situations they mention are more or less casual—Aspasia's salon, for instance, or the shops in the marketplace where people gathered to chat, or the home of a rich patron of philosophy during a famous sophist's visit. The gymnasia were the most important meeting-place of all, because people attended them regularly. They were not simply training-grounds for the body: by encouraging the contact of mind with mind they generated an intellectual heat which made them the most receptive soil for any new thought or enthusiasm. They were the place of leisure and relaxation: no special interest could survive very long there, and business could not be carried on in such surroundings. Therefore their frequenters were all the more ready to discuss the general problems of life. And they were not interested in the subject alone, but also in the intellectual subtlety and elasticity with which it was discussed. There came into being a sort of intellectual gymnastics, which was soon quite as elaborate and quite as much admired as the training of the body. It was early recognized to be what physical training had long been considered, a form of paideia. The 'dialectic' of Socrates was a perfectly individual and native type of exercise, the extreme opposite to the sophistic educational method which grew up at the same time. The sophists were wandering teachers of foreign origin, haloed with the bright light of fame, adored by a circle of devoted pupils. They taught for money. They gave instruction in special arts or branches of knowledge, and addressed a chosen public—the culture-hungry sons of the propertied class. Their long and showy lectures were delivered in private houses or improvised lecture-halls. Socrates, on the other hand, was a simple Athenian, whom everyone knew. His effects were hardly perceptible: he would start a conversation, spontaneously and apparently purposelessly, on any question which happened to come up. He did not teach, and had no pupils—at least so he said. He had only

friends, or companions. Young men were fascinated by the sharpness of his edged mind which nothing could withstand. He was for them an ever new and truly Attic drama: they listened with minds enraptured, they enthusiastically applauded his triumphs, and they tried to imitate him by examining human nature in the same way in their own homes and among their own friends. The best young minds of Athens were drawn to Socrates, and, once they had approached, his magnetic personal charm never let them free again. Anyone who tried to treat him with haughty indifference or cold reserve, anyone who took exception to the pedantic form of his questions or the deliberate triviality of his examples, soon had to get off his high horse and stand humbly on the ground.

It is not easy to find a single description which will explain this strange and complex person. With loving care and elaborate detail, Plato depicts all his characteristic ways; but seems, by doing so, to hint that Socrates could not be defined—he must be known. On the other hand, it is easy to understand why the severe historians of philosophy dismiss all these features in Plato's picture of Socrates as mere poetic decoration. It all seems to lie beneath the high level of abstract thought on which philosophers ought to move and have their being. It is only an indirect way of describing Socrates' intellectual power, by dramatically showing its more than intellectual effect upon living men. Yet, unless we realize to the full Socrates' concern for the welfare of the actual individual to whom he is speaking, we cannot understand *what* he is saying. Although the philosopher may consider that relationship unessential in the abstract, academic sense, Plato shows that for Socrates it was essential. And that is enough to make us suspect that we are always in danger of seeing him through the medium which *we* call philosophy. True, Socrates himself describes his 'activity' (πρᾶγμα—characteristic word) as 'philosophy' and 'philosophizing'. In Plato's *Apology* he assures the jury that he will never give it up as long as he lives and breathes.[57] But we must not think that he means what philosophy became in later centuries after a long process of development—a method of abstract thought, or a body of doctrine consisting of theoretical statements, which can easily be considered in detachment from the man who created it. The whole

of Socratic literature, with one voice, denies that Socrates' doctrine can be detached from his individual self.

What then is that 'philosophy' of which Plato holds Socrates to be the model, and to which Socrates professes his adherence in his own defence-speech? Plato explains its nature in many dialogues. He comes to lay more and more emphasis on the *results* of the enquiries undertaken by Socrates and his interlocutors; but he must have felt that, in doing so, he was still true to the essence of the Socratic spirit. He meant each dialogue to prove its fertility anew. But, since it is hard for us to fix the point at which his Socrates becomes more Plato than Socrates, we must try to define 'philosophy' on the basis of his most precise and simple statements. There are quite a number of them. In the *Apology,* still horrified at the colossal wrong done to Socrates and hoping to win other disciples for his master, he described the essence and the meaning of his work in the shortest and plainest form. The speech is too artfully constructed to be merely a revised version of the actual speech which Socrates made, extempore, in court;[58] still, it is amazingly true to Socrates' real life and character. It begins by correcting and disavowing the caricature of Socrates which had been created by the comic poets and by public opinion; and then there follows a thrilling profession of faith in philosophy, which Plato meant to be a parallel and companion-piece to Euripides' famous profession of loyalty to the Muses.[59] But Socrates makes his avowal in the face of imminent death. The power which he serves can not only beautify our life and alleviate our sufferings, it can conquer the world. Immediately after this protest, 'I shall never give up philosophy', there follows a typical example of his method of speaking and teaching. To understand its content, we must begin with its form—as exemplified in this and many other passages of Plato's work.

He reduces the true Socratic method to two main devices: exhortation (*protreptikos*) and examination (*elenchos*). Both are couched in the form of questions. The question-form is a descendant of the oldest type of *parainesis,* or encouragement, which we can trace back through tragedy to the epic. In the introductory conversation of Plato's *Protagoras* we can see both these Socratic devices in juxtaposition once more.[60] That dia-

the most original aspect of it. But before we investigate the character of this dialectical 'examination of men'—which is generally considered the essence of Socratic philosophy, because it contains more of the theoretic element than the rest—we must look a little more closely at Socrates' introductory speech of admonition. When he compares the existence of the business man, always panting to make money, with his own higher ideal, his comparison turns on the care or attention which men give to the goods they prize most highly. Instead of care for money-making, Socrates advises care for one's soul (ψυχῆς θεραπεία). This idea appears at the beginning of his speech, and recurs at the end.[62] But there is nothing to prove that the soul is more important than the body or external goods. That is assumed to be obvious, although in practice men do not behave as if it were. For us, there is nothing remarkable in that, at least in theory; in fact, it seems rather a commonplace. But was it so obvious for the Greeks of that age as it is for us, who are the heirs of two thousand years of Christian tradition? Socrates makes the same point in his discussion with the young man in *Protagoras*. There too he begins by saying that his young friend's soul is in danger.[63] The theme of the soul's danger in this connexion is typical of Socrates, and always leads to his summons to take care of the soul. He speaks like a doctor—only his patient is not the physical man but the spiritual being. There is an extraordinarily large number of passages in the writings of his pupils where the care of the soul is described by Socrates as the highest interest of man. Here we can penetrate to the very heart of his view of his own duty and mission: he felt that it was educational, and that the work of education was the service of God.[64] It can be properly described as a religious duty, because it is the duty of 'caring for the soul'.[65] For, in Socrates' view, the soul is the divine in man. Socrates defines the care of the soul more closely as the care of the knowledge of values and of truth, *phronésis* and *alétheia*.[66] The soul is no less sharply distinguished from the body than it is from external goods. This implies a Socratic hierarchy of values, and with it a new, clearly graduated theory of goods, which places spiritual goods highest, physical goods below them, and external goods like property and power in the lowest place.

There is a huge gulf between this scale of values, set forth

by Socrates with such confidence in its obviousness, and the popular Greek one, well expressed in the fine old drinking-song:[67]

Health is best for mortal men,
Next best is being fair to see,
Blameless wealth is next again,
Last, youth and friends and revelry.

Socrates' thought has added something new—the inner world. The areté of which he speaks is the excellence of the soul.

But what is the soul, which he calls *psyché*? If we approach the question from the philological side first, it is striking that, both in Plato and in the other Socratics, Socrates always uses the word *soul* with exceptional emphasis, a passionate, a beseeching urgency. No Greek before him ever said it in that tone. We can feel that this is the first appearance in the Western world of what we now, in certain connexions, call the soul—although modern psychologists do not consider it to be a 'real substance'. Because of the intellectual contexts in which the meaning of the word has developed, we always hear ethical or religious overtones in the word *soul*. Like his 'service of God' and 'care of the soul', it sounds Christian. But it first acquired that lofty meaning in the protreptic preaching of Socrates. Let us not ask meanwhile how far the Socratic conception of the soul influenced Christianity in its various phases, either directly or through the medium of later philosophies, and how closely it coincides with the Christian idea of soul. What we must do here is to realize what an epoch-making conception it was, in the spiritual history of Greece.

If we consult Rohde's great book *Psyche,* we shall find that Socrates appears to have no importance in the development of the Greek spirit. Rohde passes over him altogether.[68] That was partly due to the prejudice against Socrates as a 'rationalist' which he shared with Nietzsche from his youth up, but even more to the special way in which he approached his subject. Despite himself, his attitude was still Christian, so that he treated the cult of the dead and the belief in immortality as the focal point of his vast and comprehensive history of the soul in all its aspects. We can admit at once that Socrates made no essential contribution to either of these realms of thought. But

it is remarkable that Rohde never notices where, and when, and through whom the word *psyché,* soul, acquired the particular character which made it truly representative of all the values implicit in the intellectual and moral personality of Western man. As soon as it is clearly stated that this first happened in Socrates' educational speeches of exhortation, it is impossible for it to be doubted. The scholars of the Scottish school have already emphasized this point. Their work was entirely uninfluenced by Rohde's book. Burnet has a fine essay in which he traces the development of the conception of soul through the whole spiritual history of Greece. He shows that neither the Homeric and epic *eidolon,* the shade in Hades, nor the air-soul of the Ionic philosophers, nor the soul-daemon of Orphic belief, nor the *psyché* of Attic tragedy can explain the new meaning given to the word by Socrates.[69] I myself early reached the same conclusion by analysing the form of Socrates' speeches, as I have done above. It is hardly possible to understand the pattern of the Socratic exhortation without feeling the peculiar spiritual emotion which attends Socrates' use of the word *soul.* His protreptic speeches are the germ out of which grew the diatribe (the stump-sermon delivered by the travelling Cynic and Stoic preachers of the Hellenistic age), and in its turn the diatribe influenced the structure of the Christian sermon.[70] But the point is not only that a literary form was continuously handed on through various ages and uses. Scholars have often worked out the details of its transmission from that point of view, by tracing how separate themes from the protreptic speech were taken over and adapted by its successors. But the basis of all these three types of speech is this creed: 'What shall it profit a man, if he gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?' In his *Wesen des Christentums* Harnack rightly described this belief in the infinite value of the individual soul as one of the pillars of the religion of Jesus.[71] But before that it had been a pillar of Socrates' 'philosophy' and Socrates' educational thought. Socrates preaches and proselytizes. He comes 'to save the soul'.[72]

We must pause for a little here, before we can go any further in explaining, as clearly and simply as possible, the fundamentals of Socrates' conception of his mission. We must reach some critical estimate of the facts, because they directly affect our

own lives. Was Socrates' teaching a Greek forerunner of Christianity? Or did he, rather, introduce a strange Oriental spirit into Greek thought, which, through the mighty educational power of Greek philosophy, worked enormous changes in the history of the world, and moved towards a union of the West with the East? Is there not another example of the same trend in the Orphic movement, which can be traced in many different ways, in Greek religion from the sixth century on? That creed separated the soul from the body: it held that the human spirit was a fallen daemon housed in the prison of the body, whence, after death, it would wander through a long series of incarnations until it returned at last to its home in heaven. And yet, though many consider Orphism to be Oriental or 'Mediterranean', its origin is obscure; and none of its eschatological and demonological beliefs appear in Socrates' conception of the soul. It was Plato who introduced them into his mythical embellishments of the Socratic soul and its destiny. The doctrine of immortality set forth in Plato's *Phaedo* and the doctrine of preexistence which appears in *Meno* have both been attributed to Socrates,[73] but these two complementary ideas are clearly Platonic in origin. Probably Socrates' real opinion about the immortality of the soul is correctly set forth in the *Apology*—where, confronting imminent death, he leaves it doubtful what happens to the soul afterwards.[74] That suits his dry, critical, undogmatic mentality better than the arguments for immortality advanced in *Phaedo*; although it is natural that a man who thought so nobly of the soul should have pondered much on the problem even if he could not solve it.[75] In any case, he did not believe that the solution was all-important. For the same reason, he never made any assertions about the exact kind of reality to be attributed to the soul. He did not think (as Plato did) that it was an independent 'substance', because he did not state clearly whether it could be separated from the body or not. To serve it was to serve God, since he held that it was the mind and the moral reason. That was why it was the holiest thing in the world—not because it was a guilt-laden daemon-visitor from a far-off heavenly region.

Therefore there is no escape from the conclusion. All the remarkable traits in Socrates' teaching which seem to have the charm of Christian feeling are actually Hellenic in origin. They

stem from Greek philosophy; and only those who completely misconceive its character can refuse to believe that they do. The Greek spirit reached its highest religious development, not in the cults of the gods around which the history of Greek religion is usually written, but chiefly in philosophy, assisted by the Greek gift for constructing systematic theories of the universe. Philosophy is indeed a relatively late stage of consciousness, and it is preceded by the myth. But no one who has grasped the structural connexions of human thought can believe that Socrates was any exception to the law of organic development that governed the history of Greek philosophy. Analogies and preliminary stages to his teaching can be pointed out in the Dionysian and Orphic cults; but that is not because his characteristic ideas and remarks were copied from sects which can be coolly dismissed as unGreek or warmly admired as Oriental. Socrates was a hard, plain thinker: it would have been ruinous for him to admit the influence of orgiastic cults which appealed to the irrational elements in the soul. The truth rather is that these sects or cults are the only forms of old popular religion among the Greeks which really look like the beginning of an individual type of faith or seem to have a correspondingly individual way of life and form of propaganda.[76] In philosophy, the realm of the thinking mind, parallel forms either arise independently out of analogous spiritual situations, or else are due to the borrowing of words and phrases from current religious clichés, which are used as metaphors in the language of philosophy, and are thereby debased.[77]

An exceptionally large number of these religious-sounding expressions in Socrates' talk arose from the analogy of his work with that of a doctor. That is what gives its specifically Greek colouring to his view of the soul. His attitude that man's spiritual existence was part of his 'nature' was produced partly by habits of thought centuries old and partly by the fundamental structure of the Greek mind. And here at last we meet the real difference between the Socratic philosophy and the Christian soul. The only way to understand the soul of which Socrates speaks is to take it together with the body as two different sides of *one* human nature. In his thought, there is no opposition between psychical and physical man; the old conception of *physis* which stems from natural philosophy now takes in the spirit too,

and thereby is essentially changed. Socrates cannot believe that man has a monopoly of spirit.[78] If there is a place for spirit anywhere in nature, as the existence of man's phronésis shows that there is, then nature must in principle be capable of spiritual powers. But just as, because of the coexistence of body and soul as different parts of the same human nature, man's physical nature is spiritualized, so the soul in its turn assumes a surprising new reality: it becomes a *physis* in its own right. In the eyes of Socrates, the soul seems no less plastic than the body, and therefore capable of receiving form and order. Like the body, it is part of the cosmos. In fact, it *is* a cosmos in itself; although no Greek could doubt that the principle manifested in the order of these different realms was essentially one and the same. Therefore the analogy of soul and body must extend to what the Greek calls areté. The qualities which usually came under the name of aretai, 'excellences' or 'virtues', in the Greek polis—courage, prudence, justice, piety—are excellences of the soul just as health, strength, and beauty are excellences of the body. That is, they are the appropriate powers of particular parts of the soul or their co-operation cultivated to the highest pitch of which man's nature is capable. The cosmic nature of physical and spiritual virtue is simply the 'symmetry of the parts' on whose co-operation both soul and body depend. With this in mind, we can see how Socrates' conception of 'the good' differs from the corresponding conception in modern ethics. Most untranslatable of all concepts, it very readily produces misunderstandings. We can grasp its Greek meaning as soon as we think of it not as 'good' but as 'good *for* one' *: for that makes plain its relation to the man who possesses it, and for whom it is good. The Good is, in Socrates' eyes, that which we ought to will or do for its own sake. No doubt. But it is likewise the Useful, the Beneficent, and hence also the Enjoyable and Happiness-bringing—because it helps man's nature to fulfil itself.

Once we accept this, it becomes obvious that morality is the expression of human nature rightly understood and trained by knowledge. It is differentiated from simple animal existence by the fact that man has a mind and soul, without which he could not have an ethical code. But to train the soul in obedience to

* 'Goods', which in English means valuable property, has the same sense of value and utility.

that code is simply to follow the path natural for man, by doing which he reaches harmony with the nature of the universe —or, in Greek terms, attains perfect happiness, *eudaimonia*. Socrates was profoundly convinced that man's moral existence harmonizes with the natural order of the world, and in that conviction he was in full and unqualified agreement with the Greek feeling of every epoch. What is new in his thought is his belief that man cannot reach this harmony with Being through the cultivation and satisfaction of his own senses and his bodily nature (however confined it may be by social prohibitions and duties), but only through complete mastery over himself in accordance with the law he finds by searching his own soul. By thus asserting that man must strive to master the realm which is most wholly his own—the soul—Socrates added to his characteristic Greek eudaemonism a new power to resist external nature and destiny in their increasingly dangerous threats against human liberty. Goethe asked what would be the purpose of all the wondrous show of suns and planets in the cosmos, if it did not make possible the happiness of one human being. And Socrates would, on his own assumptions, certainly not have called that question 'wicked'—as it has been called by modern critics, in this age when reality and morality are no longer at one. The 'rationalist' Socrates found no difficulty in harmonizing his ethical *eudaimonia* with the facts of reality, although we are now crushed by their impact, since we are morally discordant with them. Nothing shows that better than the cheerfulness with which, on that last day, he drained the cup of poison.

Socrates declared the soul to be the source of the highest values in human life. Thereby he produced that emphasis on the inner life which characterizes the later stages of Greek civilization. Virtue and happiness now became qualities of the spirit. In making this change, Socrates was fully aware of its implications. He even claimed that the art of painting should be dominated by the spirit. Painters, he said, should not only imitate the beauty of the body but also express the character of the soul (ἀπομιμεῖσθαι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος). In his conversation with the great painter Parrhasius, recorded by Xenophon,[78a] this idea is put forward as quite new; and Parrhasius says he is doubtful whether painting can ever enter the world of the invisible and unsymmetrical. Xenophon describes the interview as if Socrates'

insistence on the soul's importance had revealed the whole unguessed and unexplored spiritual world to the artists of his day. Socrates asserts that the body, and the face in particular, is merely a reflection of the soul and its qualities, while the painter approaches this great thought with wonder and hesitation. That story is symbolic. Whatever the relation of philosophy to art at that period may have been, Xenophon certainly believed that philosophy, and philosophy alone, had led the way into the newfound land of the soul. It is difficult for us to measure the gigantic effects of this change. Its immediate result was that a new order of values came into being and was dialectically worked out in the philosophical systems of Plato and Aristotle. In that form it became the foundation for all the later cultures which have received the torch from Greek philosophy. We cannot but admire these philosophers for their amazing power of planning the structures of abstract thought in which the truth realized by Socrates could be more clearly seen and understood —so that it formed, as it were, the centre of a systematic picture of the universe, to which all else was referred. But still, 'in the beginning was the Deed'. It was Socrates' summons to men to 'care for their souls' that really turned the mind of Greece towards a new way of life. From that time onwards, a dominant part in philosophy and ethics was played by the concept of life, *bios*—human existence regarded not as the mere lapse of time but as a clear and comprehensible unity, a deliberately shaped life-pattern. This innovation was caused by the way Socrates lived; he played the part of a model for the new *bios,* the life based on spiritual values. And his pupils realized that the greatest strength of his paideia came from the change he had introduced into the old educational concept of the heroic Example which is a pattern for other lives to follow. He made himself the embodiment of the ideal of life which he preached.

We must now try to give a more detailed description of his teaching. Although Plato in the *Apology* makes him describe the care of the soul as 'the service of God',[79] that phrase really has no supernatural implications. On the contrary, a Christian would think his system very simple and worldly. To begin with, he does not think that the care of the soul implies the neglect of the body. How could he, when he had learnt from doctors of the

body that the soul likewise needs special 'treatment' both in sickness and in health? His discovery of the soul does not mean its separation from the body, as is so often mistakenly averred, but its domination over the body. However, one cannot take care of one's soul properly unless one's body itself is healthy. Juvenal's prayer, *mens sana in corpore sano,* is spoken in the true Socratic spirit. Socrates himself neither neglected his own body nor praised those who neglected theirs.[80] He taught his friends to keep their bodies fit by hardening them, and held elaborate discussions with them about proper diet. He opposed overeating because it hindered the care of the soul. His own life was run on a regimen of Spartan simplicity. Later we must discuss the moral rule of physical *askésis,* and study the meaning to be attached to that Socratic idea.

Both Plato and Xenophon give the most probable explanation of Socrates' effectiveness as a teacher—that it was due to his complete unlikeness to the sophists. They were the recognized virtuosi, something quite new in the art of teaching. Socrates always seems to be watching them and rivalling them, correcting what he judges to be their mistakes. Although he has a higher aim in view, he starts from their level. Their paideia was a mixed product, made up of elements of very various origins. Its purpose was the training of the mind; but they could not agree what was the knowledge that trained the mind best. Each of them had his own specialty, and naturally believed it to be the best suited for mental training. Socrates did not deny that the things they taught were valuable. But his summons to care for the soul implied a standard by which to judge their subjects, and certain limitations to them.[81] Some of the sophists held that the doctrines of natural philosophy were good educational material. The old natural philosophers themselves had never suggested this, although they felt that, in a higher sense of the word, they were really teachers. It was a new problem to decide whether the young could be educated by scientific study. As we have seen, it was not because Socrates did not understand the physicists' problems that his interest in natural philosophy was small, but rather because the questions he asked were not the same as theirs. If he dissuaded others from elaborate research into cosmological problems, it was because he believed their intellectual energies would be better employed on thinking about

'human things'.[82] Besides, the ordinary Greeks held cosmic matters to be daemonic, beyond the powers of mortals to understand. Socrates shared this feeling, which even appears at the beginning of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.[83] He had similar reservations about the mathematical and astronomical studies practised by the more realistically minded sophists like Hippias of Elis. He himself had been a very keen student of these subjects, and held that a certain knowledge of them was indispensable; but he believed very firmly that it should not go too far.[84] This information we get from Xenophon, who has been accused of utilitarianism and a one-sided devotion to practical subjects. Unflattering contrasts have been drawn between his Socrates and the Socrates of Plato, who says in *The Republic* that mathematics is the only real way to philosophy.[85] But the latter view was influenced by Plato's own intellectual development, which made him a dialectician, interested in the theory of knowledge; whereas, in the work of his old age—*The Laws*—where he is discussing not higher but elementary education, he takes the same attitude as Xenophon's Socrates.[86] Thus Socrates' special interest in 'human things' provides a standard of choice among the subjects which had hitherto been held to constitute culture. The question 'How far should we study X?' implies greater questions: 'What is the good of X?' and 'What is the purpose of life?' Until those questions are answered, education is impossible.

So, once again, the ethical factor returns to the focus of interest, from which it had been thrust by the sophistic educational movement. That movement had arisen from the ruling classes' need for higher education and from the new importance attached to intellectual ability.[87] The sophists had a clear practical aim in view—to train statesmen and political leaders; and, in an age which worshipped success, the clarity of their aim had assisted that shift in emphasis from ethics to intellect. Now Socrates had re-established the necessary connexion between moral and intellectual culture. But he did not try to counter the sophists' political education with an *un*political ideal, consisting of pure character-building. The aim of education could not be altered: in a Greek city-state it was bound to be always the same. Plato and Xenophon agree in stating that Socrates taught politics.[88] If he had not, how could he have clashed with

the state? Why was he condemned? The culmination of the 'human things' on which he concentrated was, for Greek feeling, the welfare of the community, on which the life of the individual depended.[89] A Socrates whose teaching was not 'political' would have found no pupils in the Athens of his day. What was new in him was that he held the heart of human life, of communal life too, to be the moral character. But that was not what made Alcibiades and Critias go to him and become his pupils. Driven by the ambition to play a leading role in the state, they hoped that he would show them how to satisfy it.[90] That was exactly what Socrates was accused of doing; and Xenophon tries to excuse him by pleading that the use they later made of their political training ran counter to Socrates' purposes in teaching them.[91] In any case, they were astounded when they came to know him better and found him to be a great man, who strove with the whole passion of his soul to find and possess 'the good'.[92]

But what kind of political education did he give? We cannot really ascribe to him the Utopian state-theory he expounds in Plato's *Republic,* for it is entirely dependent on the Platonic doctrine of Ideas. Nor is it probable that, when he was teaching, he did as he does in Plato's *Gorgias:* where he claims to be the only real statesman of his time, and says that, compared with his work, the efforts of all the professional politicians, aiming as they do at mere external power, are empty nonsense.[93] These emotional overtones were added afterwards by Plato, in his attack on the whole political tendency which had led to Socrates' condemnation. But the crux of the problem is this: why did Socrates himself take no part in political life, but give others a political education? [93a] Xenophon gives us a fine survey of the large number of subjects he covered in his political discussions—although we must utilize Plato's Socratic dialogues on the nature of areté in order to understand their deeper significance. Xenophon informs us that Socrates went into all sorts of problems of political technique with his pupils: the differences between various types of constitution,[94] the origin of laws and political institutions,[95] the aim of the statesman's activity, the best preparation for the statesman's career,[96] the value of political concord,[97] the ideal of obedience to law as the highest civic virtue.[98]

He discussed not only the administration of the polis but that of the home, the οἰκία. Politics and 'economics' (oikonomika = housekeeping) were always closely connected in Greek minds. Like the sophists (who often treated these topics) he frequently started with passages from the poets, particularly Homer, using them as texts on which to develop examples, or by which to illustrate political ideas. In those days, a man who knew and taught Homer well was called Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέτης, because he taught by picking out certain passages of the poet for praise.[98a] Socrates was accused of anti-democratic tendencies in his choice.[99] We have already mentioned his criticism of the system of election by lot which mechanized the selection of officials, and of the democratic principle that the majority is always right.[100] However, his criticism was not a party affair. The best proof of this is the unforgettable scene at the beginning of the *Memorabilia*. During the rule of the Thirty, Socrates is summoned to the government offices by his former pupil Critias, now the supreme ruler of Athens, and is ordered to stop teaching, with a concealed threat of death if he disobeys: and this although his particular activity did not fall under the general interdict on rhetorical teaching which was cited as a pretext.[101] The rulers of the city obviously knew that he would tell the truth about their misdoings just as ruthlessly as he had about the extravagances of mob-rule.

Our authorities agree that Socrates talked freely about military matters, so far as they touched questions of politics and ethics. We cannot really determine how far their evidence corresponds to the historical facts; but it is not at all unlike the historical Socrates to give detailed explanations of the best laws of war and the best military training for citizens, as Plato makes him do in *The Republic*.[102] In Plato's *Laches* two influential Athenians ask him for advice whether they should have their sons trained in the newest combat technique, and two famous Athenian generals, Nicias and Laches, are anxious to hear his opinion. The conversation soon rises to a higher plane, and changes to a philosophical discussion of the nature of courage. Xenophon gives a number of his discourses on the education of the future general.[103] That branch of political education was specially important in Athens, because there was no official military school, and the citizens elected to the generalship were

when Socrates was striving to solve the problem of morality, there appeared a new word in the Attic dialect: ἐγκράτεια, which means moral self-control, moderation, and steadfastness. Socrates' pupils Xenophon and Plato began to use it about the same period, and they used it frequently. In addition, Isocrates, who is strongly influenced by Socratic thought, had it now and then. The conclusion is inevitable, that this new concept originated in the ethical thinking of Socrates.[120] The word derives from the adjective ἐγκρατής, used of anyone having power or authority over anything. But the noun is found only in the meaning of moral self-mastery, and does not appear before this period; therefore it was obviously created to express the new concept, and did not exist beforehand as a purely legal term. *Enkrateia* is not any particular virtue, but (in Xenophon's words[121]) 'the foundation of all virtues': for it means the emancipation of reason from the tyranny of man's animal nature, and the establishment of the legitimate mastery of the spirit over the passions.[122] Since Socrates held the spiritual element in man to be the real self, we can translate the word *enkrateia,* without reading more into it than is actually there, by 'self-control', which is its direct descendant in our own language. The word contains the germ of Plato's *Republic* and of the idea on which *The Republic* is founded—the idea that justice is man's harmonious agreement with the law within his own soul.[123]

The Socratic principle of self-control implies a new freedom. It is noteworthy that the ideal of freedom, which has dominated modern thought since the French Revolution, was far less important in classical Greece, although of course the Greeks were well acquainted with it. The chief thing Greek democracy tried to secure was civic and legal equality, τὸ ἴσον. 'Freedom' was a concept with too many meanings to be useful in securing equality. It could mean the independence of an individual, or the whole state, or the nation. Of course they spoke of a free polity, or called the citizens of such a state free, to show that they were not slaves. But the primary meaning of 'free' (ἐλεύθερος) is 'not a slave' (δοῦλος). It does not have the all-embracing, indefinite ethical and metaphysical content of the modern idea of freedom, which has been penetrated and enriched by all the art, poetry, and philosophy of the nineteenth century.[124] Our ideal of freedom originated in the philosophy of natural rights. It led everywhere to the abolition of slavery. The classical Greek ideal of freedom was a positive concept from the realm of political rights. It was based on the existence of slavery as a permanent institution, in fact as the foundation of the liberty of the citizen body. The kindred word ἐλευθέριος ('liberal') describes the conduct appropriate to a free citizen, whether in generous spending, or in frank speaking (which would be improper in a slave), or in a gentlemanly way of life. The 'liberal' arts are those which belong to 'liberal' education—and that is the paideia of the free citizen, as opposed to the uncultured vulgarity of the unfree, of the slave.

It was Socrates who first regarded freedom as a moral problem; after him it was debated with varying degrees of interest in the Socratic schools. So far, there was no fundamental criticism of the social system that divided the inhabitants of one polis into freemen and slaves. That division remained. But it lost its deepest meaning when Socrates transferred the contrast between slavery and freedom into the inner moral world. A new idea of spiritual freedom now arose, to correspond to that development of 'self-control' as the rule of reason over the desires.[125] He who possessed it was the opposite of a man who was the slave of his own lusts.[126] The only importance of this for political freedom is its implication that a free citizen or a ruler can still be a slave, in the Socratic sense of the word. But that led to the conclusion that such a man was not really free, not really a ruler. It is interesting to see that although the idea of autonomy (which is used in this connexion by modern philosophers) was very important in Greek political thought to signify that a polis was independent of the authority of other states, it was not carried over into the moral sphere like those other notions. The thing that mattered, in Socrates' eyes, was evidently not that a man should simply be independent of some external norm, but that he should really be master of himself. So moral autonomy would mean, for him, to be independent of the animal side of one's nature: it would not contradict the existence of a higher cosmic law of which this moral phenomenon, self-control, would be an example. Closely connected with this moral independence is Socrates' ideal of frugality and independence of external things, *autarkeia.* It is mainly Xenophon (perhaps influenced by Antisthenes' books) who emphasizes

this;[127] Plato does not make so much of it; but it is impossible to doubt that Socrates actually preached it. The Cynic school of moralists developed it after Socrates' death, and made abstemiousness the distinguishing mark of the true philosopher. But Plato and Aristotle bring it in too, in their description of the philosopher's perfect happiness.[128] The wise man, in his independence of the external world, re-creates, on the spiritual plane, a quality of the mythical heroes of old. The greatest of them, in Greek eyes, was the warrior Heracles with his labours (πόνοι), and the heroic quality was self-help. It began with the hero's power to 'make his hands keep his head' against enemies, monsters, and dangers of all kinds, and to come out victorious.[129] Now this quality becomes a spiritual one. It can be attained only by a man who conforms his wishes and endeavours to those things which are within his power to obtain. Only the wise man, who has tamed the wild desires in his own heart, is truly self-sufficient. He is nearest to God: for God needs nothing.

Socrates expounds this 'Cynic' ideal with full knowledge of its implications, in his conversations with the sophist Antiphon—who was trying to shake the loyalty of Socrates' pupils by joking about his poverty.[130] But Socrates does not seem to have carried it to the same individualistic extremes as the Cynics did after him. His autarky does not, like theirs, imply non-citizenship, the severance of all human ties, and indifference to *all* external things. Socrates still belongs to the polis. Therefore, he includes under 'political life' every kind of community: he thinks of man as part of a family, with his place in a circle of relatives and friends—the natural smaller societies without which man could not exist. Thereby he extends the ideal of harmony from the realm of political life (for which it was first worked out) to that of the family, and proves the necessity of co-operation in family and state by the analogy of the organs of the body—the hand, the foot, and others, none of which could exist in isolation.[131] And yet he was accused of undermining the authority of the family by his teaching. The charge shows that his influence on young people could sometimes be a great danger to old-fashioned family life.[132] He was in quest of a firm standard for human conduct, which could not be supplied even by rigid adherence to parental authority at a time when all traditions were collapsing. In his discussions, current prejudices were coolly dis-

Crito to find a friend who will be like a watchdog to guard him.[138] The lonely man was frightfully insecure in that time when increasing political disharmony and sycophancy were undermining the firm basis of society and of all human relationships, even the family. But what gave Socrates mastery of the new art of friendship was his realization that all true friendships are founded, not on external usefulness, but on spiritual value. True, experience shows that there is often no friendship or good will between good men with high ideals, but oppositions much more violent than those which divide worthless people.[139] It is thoroughly disheartening to realize that fact. Men are naturally predisposed to friendship as much as to enmity. They need one another, and co-operate for mutual benefit; they have the gift of sympathy; they do kindnesses and feel gratitude. But also they strive to attain the same ends, and therefore compete with one another, whether their aims are noble things or simply pleasures; they are separated by differences of opinion; strife and anger lead to war; desire for greater possessions makes them hostile to each other; envy breeds hate. And yet friendship slips through all these hindrances and binds good men together—so that they prefer its spiritual worth to gold or honour, and ungrudgingly allow their friends to dispose of their property and their services, just as they enjoy the possessions and services of their friends. Why should a man's efforts to attain lofty political ends, honour in his own city, or distinction in its service, keep him from being friendly instead of inimical to another man who thinks in the same way?

The first necessity in friendship is to perfect one's own character. Then, one must have the gift of the 'lover' (which Socrates ironically says he possesses)—of the man who needs others and seeks them out, who has received from nature and developed to an art the ability of pleasing those who please him.[140] Such a man is not like Homer's Scylla, who grasps at men at once, so that even far away they take flight. He is like the Sirens, who lured men from a distance with their magical singing. Socrates puts his own genius for friendship at the service of his friends, in case they need his mediation in winning friends. He holds friendship to be not only the chain that binds every political association, but the real form of every productive connexion between men. That is why he does not speak of his 'pupils' (as

the sophists do) but of his 'friends'.[141] This Socratic expression later entered the regular language of the great philosophical schools, the Academy and the Lyceum, and survived as an academic cliché.[142] But for Socrates it was no cliché. He always saw his associates, not as pupils, but as complete personalities; and the task of improving the young, which the sophists professed to perform, was for him (although he despised the sophists' self-exaltation) the deeper meaning of all his friendly association with others.

It is an amazing paradox that this supremely great teacher avoided calling his own work paideia, although everyone regarded him as its most perfect embodiment. Of course the word could not be permanently shelved: Plato and Xenophon use it incessantly to describe Socrates' activities and his philosophy. But he himself thought that contemporary educational theory and practice had made the word too heavy for him to use.[143] It either claimed too much or meant too little. Therefore, when he was accused of corrupting the young, he explained that he had never claimed to be trying to teach them[144]—meaning, to subject them to the professional training given by the sophists. Socrates was not a 'teacher', but he was constantly 'in quest' of a true teacher without ever finding one. What he always found was a capable specialist, who could be recommended in this or that field;[145] but he could not find a *teacher,* in the full sense of the word. A real teacher is a rare bird. True, everyone claims to be assisting in great works of paideia: poetry, the sciences, the arts, the law, the state, the sophists, rhetors, and philosophers, and even every honest Athenian citizen who helps to maintain law and order in the city imagines he is doing his best to improve the young.[146] Socrates does not believe that he himself understands that art. He is only surprised that he is the only man who is corrupting the young. He measures the great pretensions of others by a new conception of paideia, which makes him doubt their validity; but he feels himself that he too is beneath his own ideal. And so it becomes apparent, behind all this genuine Socratic irony, that Socrates has a far higher idea of the real teacher's task and its difficulty than any of his contemporaries.

His ironic attitude to his own teaching helps to explain the

apparent paradox that he both maintains the necessity of paideia and rejects the most earnest efforts of others to produce it.[147] Socrates' educational love, his *erôs,* falls chiefly on exceptional young men, who are fit for the highest intellectual and moral culture, for areté. Their quick intelligence, their good memory, and their eagerness to learn call for paideia. Socrates is convinced that such men cannot attain all they want to and at the same time make others happy unless they are properly educated.[148] There are some who despise knowledge and rely on their own talents. To these, he explains that they are exactly the ones who most need schooling—just as the best horses and dogs, who naturally have the finest breed and temper, must be sternly controlled and disciplined, while, if untrained and undisciplined, they become worse than all others. Gifted natures need insight and critical judgment more than ordinary ones, if they are to achieve something suited to their abilities.[149] As for the rich man who thinks he can look down on culture, Socrates opens his eyes too, and shows him how useless is wealth employed without judgment, and for bad ends.[150]

But he is just as cutting about the cultural snobbery of those who proudly believe they are elevated above their contemporaries by their literary knowledge and intellectual interests, and are already certain of winning the greatest successes in political life. Euthydemus, that blasé youth, is a rather charming representative of this type.[151] Socrates' criticisms of his general culture find a chink in his highly polished armour: for, although he seems to have books on every possible special field, from poetry to medicine, mathematics to architecture, still he has one gap in his shelves. There is no guide to political virtue there. And for a young Athenian political virtue is the natural goal of any general intellectual education. Is it, then, the only art in which a self-taught man can speak with authority,[152] though in medicine he would be called a quack? Can a man get confidence from everyone in the art of statesmanship, not by pointing to his teacher and his previous performances, but by proving that he knows nothing? Socrates convinces Euthydemus that the calling he is preparing for is a kingly one,[153] and that no one can succeed in it without being just. In the same way as he inspires uncultured people to do something to improve themselves, so now he awakens the culture-snob to the fact that he lacks the

one essential—knowledge. Euthydemus is drawn into a cross-examination about the nature of justice and injustice, which shows him that he really understands neither of them. And now, instead of book-learning, he is shown another way to reach political virtue, which begins with the recognition of his own ignorance, and with self-knowledge—namely, with the knowledge of his own powers.

Our evidence puts it beyond a doubt that this was the genuine Socratic procedure, and that the aim of his educational passion was this same political virtue. The meaning of political virtue is shown most clearly in Plato's early Socratic dialogues. To-day these works are usually called by the name Aristotle gives them —he calls them the *ethical* dialogues.[154] But nowadays that name easily leads to misunderstandings. We do not think that 'ethical' implies sharing in the life of the community—which was its natural meaning for Aristotle;[155] in fact we often think that the essence of ethics is its separation from politics. This separation of the inner life of each individual from the community is not merely an abstraction made by modern philosophers. It is deeply rooted in our thought and ways of life. It is created by the centuries-old double standard of the modern 'Christian' world—which recognizes the severe claims of the Gospel on the individual's moral life, but judges the actions of the state by other, 'natural' standards. Not only does this dissociate two elements which were unified in the life of the Greek polis, but it changes the very meaning of ethics and of politics. This fact, more than anything else, renders it difficult for us to understand Greece: for it makes us just as liable to misapprehension when we say that the virtues Socrates discusses are 'political', as when we speak of 'ethical' dialogues. When we say that the Greek's whole life and morality was 'political' in the sense meant by Socrates and Aristotle, we mean something very different from the modern technical conception of politics and the state. We can realize that, if we only think of the difference between the abstract-sounding modern term 'state' (from the late Latin *status*) and the concrete Greek word 'polis', which vividly calls up before our minds the living whole of the human community and the individual lives organically connected with it and with each other. Now, it is in that classical sense that Plato's Socratic dialogues on piety, justice, courage, and prudence are investigations

of the nature of 'political' virtue. As we have already shown, the typical number *four,* in the fourfold canon of what are usually called the Platonic cardinal virtues, shows that the canon is a survival of the ideals of civic virtue current in the early Greek polis, because we find it mentioned as early as Aeschylus.[156]

Plato's dialogues reveal an aspect of Socrates' work which in Xenophon is almost entirely hidden by his activity in encouraging and admonishing others. That is the *elenchos,* his cross-examination and refutation of his interlocutor. However, as Plato's description of the regular patterns of Socrates' speech shows (p. 38), this examination is the necessary complement to the exhortation: it loosens the ground in preparation for the seed, by showing the examinee that his knowledge is only imaginary.

These cross-examinations always run along the same lines. They are repeated attempts to find the general concept underlying a particular name descriptive of a moral standard, such as 'courage' or 'justice'. The form of the question (What is 'courage'?) seems to show that the aim of the investigation is to find a definition. Aristotle expressly says that the definition of concepts was an achievement of Socrates,[157] and so does Xenophon.[158] If true, this would add an important new feature to the picture we have so far worked out: it would make Socrates the inventor of logic. On this was based the old view that he was the founder of the philosophy of concepts. But recently, Maier, contesting the evidence of Aristotle and Xenophon, has endeavoured to prove that it was simply derived from Plato's dialogues, and that Plato was simply expounding his own doctrine.[159] According to this thesis, Plato found the outlines of a new conception of knowledge in Socrates, and from them developed logic and the abstract concept; Socrates was only an exhorter, a prophet of moral independence. However, there are quite as many difficulties in the way of accepting this view as in believing its opposite, that Socrates taught the theory of Ideas.[160] That Aristotle's and Xenophon's evidence is only taken from Plato's dialogues cannot be proved and is not probable.[161] Our evidence is unanimous in presenting Socrates as the invincible master of the art of dialectic—conversation in question-and-answer form—although Xenophon makes less of that art than of his protreptic activity. What

This, then, is really the method of the historical Socrates. The word 'method' is not adequate to express the ethical meaning of the procedure. But it is a Socratic word, and is an appropriate description of the great cross-examiner's approach, which was natural enough to him but had been polished into an art. Externally it might easily be confused with a very dangerous cultural skill which was developed to the rank of an art about the same time—skill in winning disputations. And there are in Socrates' conversations many triumphs of argument, which remind us of the catch-arguments so beloved by the 'eristics'. We must not underestimate the pure love of verbal competition in his dialectic. Plato has given a lifelike representation of it, and we can see why rivals or contemporaries (like Isocrates) who did not belong to the Socratic school could simply call the Socratics professional arguers.[163] That shows how strongly others were conscious of the argumentative side in Socrates' method. But still, with all their enjoyment of the fun of this new intellectual gymnastics, with all their sporting enthusiasm for Socrates' sure and supple grasp, Plato's dialogues are dominated by a deep seriousness and a whole-hearted concentration on the real object which is at stake in the game.

The Socratic dialogue is not the practice of some new art of logical definition on ethical problems. It is only the μέθοδος, the 'way' taken by the logos to reach right action. None of Plato's Socratic dialogues results in the discovery of a real definition for the moral concept it has been examining—in fact, it was long believed that they ended without any result at all. But they did reach a result, although we cannot detect it until we take several dialogues together and so work out what is typical in them all. All these attempts to define the nature of a specific virtue end in the conclusion that it must be a kind of *knowledge*. Socrates does not care so much for the distinction between the several virtues —namely, the definition of each one—as for the common element they all share, namely, 'virtue in itself'. From the beginning of each talk, the tacit expectation or presumption that this will be a sort of knowledge seems to haunt the discussion: for what would be the use of expending all this mental energy on solving an ethical problem unless the questioner hoped to get nearer in practice to his goal, the attainment of good? Nevertheless, this belief held by Socrates is opposed to the opinion which has been

current throughout the history of morals. Most people have always thought that, too often, a man sees perfectly well what he ought to do, and yet decides to do what is wrong.[164] That we call moral weakness.[165] The more compellingly Socrates' arguments seem to show that areté must ultimately be knowledge, and the more eagerly his dialectic investigations are pursued with that fair prize in view, the more paradoxical this way of reaching results must seem to the dubious onlooker.

In these conversations we see the Greek faith in and love for knowledge, raised to its highest power. After the mind has compelled the various parts of the external world to arrange themselves in an ordered structure, it attempts the even bolder task of bringing the dislocated life of man under the rule of reason. Aristotle, who still held this bold faith in the architectonic powers of the mind, thought as he looked backwards that Socrates' 'virtue is knowledge' was an intellectual exaggeration; and he tried to bring it into the proper proportion by emphasizing the importance of taming the passions in moral education.[166] But Socrates' assertion was not meant to be the revelation of a psychological truth. Anyone who tries to extract from his paradox the positive meaning that we are working out will easily recognize that he disliked what had until then been called knowledge, and had been proved to be devoid of moral force. The knowledge of good which he reaches, starting from all the separate human virtues, is not an intellectual operation, but (as Plato recognized) the now conscious expression of something existing in the spirit of man. It is rooted in the depths of the soul, at a level where to be penetrated by knowledge and to possess the object known are not two different states but essentially one and the same. Plato's philosophy is an effort to descend to those new depths in the Socratic conception of knowledge and to draw out all that is in them.[167] For Socrates, it is no contradiction of the statement 'virtue is knowledge' to say that in the experience of most men knowing good is not the same as doing it. That experience merely shows that real knowledge is rare. Socrates does not boast of possessing it himself. But by proving that men who think they have knowledge really know nothing, he prepares the way for a conception of knowledge which corresponds to his postulate and really is the profoundest force in the human soul. For him, that truth (the existence of that knowl-

edge) is unconditionally established, because as soon as we analyse it by our assumptions we find that it lies at the basis of all ethical thought and action. But for his pupils 'virtue is knowledge' is not simply a paradox, as at first it seemed; it is the description of one of the highest potentialities in human nature, which was once realized in Socrates, and which therefore exists.

The knowledge of good, to which the discussion of the separate virtues always leads, is something more comprehensive than courage or justice or any single areté. It is 'virtue in itself', variously manifested in each separate virtue. But here we run into a new psychological paradox. If courage, for example, is the knowledge of good with special reference to those things which are really to be feared or not to be feared, then the single virtue of courage obviously assumes the knowledge of virtue as a whole.[168] Therefore it must be indissolubly connected with the other virtues, justice, prudence, and piety; and it is either identical or extremely similar to them. But in our moral experience there is no commoner observation than that an individual can be distinguished by the greatest personal courage, and yet be extremely unjust, intemperate, or godless; while another man can be thoroughly temperate and just without being brave.[169] So, even if we go so far as to admit that the several virtues are 'parts' of one comprehensive Virtue, we can hardly concede to Socrates that this Virtue is wholly effective and present in each of its parts. At most, we might think of the virtues as parts of a face, which has, let us say, fine eyes and an ugly nose. Nevertheless, on this point Socrates is quite as unyielding as in his conviction that virtue is knowledge. True virtue is one and indivisible.[170] A man cannot have one part of it without the others. The brave man who is intemperate, imprudent, or unjust may be a good soldier in the field, but he is not brave against himself and his real enemies, his own tyrannous desires. The pious man who faithfully performs his duties to the gods, but is unjust to his fellow-men and intemperate in his hatred and fanaticism, cannot possess true piety.[171] The generals Nicias and Laches are surprised when Socrates expounds the nature of true courage to them, and see that they have never really thought it out, realized it in its full greatness, far less embodied it in themselves. And the severe pietist Euthyphro finds himself stripped and naked in all the humiliation of his self-righteous

and vindictive piety. What people call virtue in the traditional sense is revealed as a mere aggregate of the products of various one-sided types of training—one whose elements stand in irreconcilable ethical contradiction to one another. Socrates is pious *and* brave, just *and* temperate, all in one person. His life is both a battle and the service of God. He does not neglect his ritual duties to the gods: and that is why he can show the man who is pious in that external way alone that there is a higher kind of piety than his. He has fought with distinction in all his country's campaigns: and that is why he can argue against the highest commanders of the Athenian armed forces that there are other victories than those won sword in hand. So then, Plato distinguishes between the vulgar man-in-the-street virtue and higher philosophical perfection.[172] He sees Socrates as a moral superman. But he would express that by saying that Socrates alone possesses 'true' virtue.

If we examine Socratic paideia in Xenophon's description, which we used to get a first general survey of its rich content,[173] we shall find that it seems to consist of a string of separate practical questions about human life. If we examine it as presented by Plato, the underlying unity of these questions at once becomes evident—in fact, we finally recognize that Socrates' knowledge, or phronésis, has only one object: it is knowledge of the good. But if all wisdom culminates in one knowledge, to which we are inevitably brought back by every attempt at closely defining any single human good, there must be an essential kinship between the object of that knowledge and the inmost nature of human effort and will. As soon as we recognize that kinship, we can realize how deeply Socrates' assertion that virtue is knowledge is rooted in his whole view of life and humanity. He himself of course did not establish a complete philosophical system of human nature. It was Plato who did that; but Plato believed it was already present in the thought of Socrates. All that was needed to prove that was to work out what followed from one of Socrates' favourite statements. A complete metaphysical system was latent, not only in his 'virtue is knowledge' and 'virtue is indivisible', but in his three words 'nobody errs willingly'.[174]

That sentence is the sharpest and boldest expression of the paradox of Socrates' educational wisdom. At the same time it

explains the direction in which all his energy is expended. The experience of individuals and of society, recorded in legal codes and the philosophy of jurisprudence, makes a ready distinction between voluntary and involuntary acts or misdeeds; thereby it appears to prove that the opposite of Socrates' statement is correct.[175] That distinction too is based on the element of knowledge in human activity: it passes quite a different judgment on wrongs done knowingly and wrongs done unknowingly. But the Socratic idea implies that there can be no wrongdoing with knowledge, for if there were, there would be voluntary wrongdoing. The only way to resolve the contradiction between this view and the long prevalent conception of guilt and error is to do as we did with the Socratic paradox of knowledge—to infer that he is using a different conception of *will* from the usual juristic and moral one. The two views lie on two different levels. Why can Socrates not accept any distinction between wrongdoing with and without knowledge? Because wrongdoing is an evil and justice a good, and it lies in the nature of good that it should be willed by everyone who recognizes it to be good. Now the human will becomes the centre of dispute. All the catastrophes caused by infatuated will and desire in Greek myth and tragedy seem to argue conclusively against Socrates' statement. All the more firmly does he emphasize it, and thereby at the same time he exposes the tragic view of life, and shows that it is a superficial view. He holds it to be a contradiction in itself to say that the will can knowingly will what is bad. This assumes that human will has a purpose: not to annihilate and injure itself, but to preserve itself and build itself up. It is reasonable in itself, because it is directed towards the good. This is not refuted by the countless examples of infatuated misdoing which cause human misery. Plato makes Socrates distinguish sharply between desire and will. Real will exists only when based on true knowledge of the good at which it is directed. Mere desire is an effort aimed towards apparent goods.[176] Where the will is conceived of as having this deep positive purpose, it is naturally based on knowledge; and to obtain this knowledge, if it is possible to do so, means human perfection.

Ever since Socrates framed the concept, we have been talking of men's *decisions*, and of the *aim* of human life and action.[177] The aim of life is what the will naturally wills—good. The

metaphor *aim* assumes the pre-existence of another, the *way*, which is much older in Greek thought and has a separate history.[178] But there were many different 'ways', before the way could be found which led to the Socratic end. The good was imaged, now as the End on which all the ways of human effort converged (the *telos* or *teleuté*),[179] now as the Aim (*skopos*) [180] on which the shooter directed his arrow, and which he might hit or miss. In these images, life took on another appearance. It became movement towards a consciously willed stopping-place or climax, or the act of aiming at an object. It became inner unity, it took on form, it set up a tension. Man now began to live in constant watchfulness, 'looking towards the target', as Plato often says. It was Plato who worked out in abstract theory and concrete image all these consequences of the Socratic conception of life, and embodied them in his portrait of Socrates, so that it is hard to draw an exact line of demarcation between him and Socrates. However, the thesis that nobody errs willingly presupposes that the will is directed to the Good as its *telos*, and since not only Plato but the other Socratics too have that idea, it is clearly Socrates' own. What Plato did was to objectify in philosophy and art the new attitude to life created by Socrates. He classified men, according to the telos each strove to attain, under various types of life, and extended this idea to take in all realms of existence. In Plato Socrates began a rich development which attained its climax in Aristotle's 'biological' philosophy of life.

However important these consequences may be for the history of philosophy, it is Socrates' idea of the *aim of life* which marks the decisive point in the history of paideia. It threw a new light on the purpose and duty of all education. Education is not the cultivation of certain abilities; it is not the communication of certain branches of knowledge—at least all that is significant only as a means and a stage in the process of education. The real essence of education is that it enables men to reach the true aim of their lives. It is thus identical with the Socratic effort to attain *phronésis*, knowledge of the good. This effort cannot be restricted to the few years of what is called higher education. Either it takes a whole lifetime to reach its aim, or its aim can never be reached. Therefore the concept of paideia is essentially altered; and education, in the Socratic sense, becomes the

effort to form one's life along lines which are philosophically understood, and to direct it so as to fulfil the intellectual and moral definition of man. In this sense, man was born for paideia. It is his only real possession. All the Socratics agree on this point. Therefore it must have come into the world through Socrates, though he himself said he did not know how to teach. Numerous judgments could be quoted to prove that through the changes initiated by Socrates the concept and the meaning of paideia took on a broader and deeper spiritual significance and that its value for man was raised to the highest point. It will be enough to cite a remark made by the philosopher Stilpo, a prominent member of the Socratic school founded in Megara by Euclid. After the sack of Megara, Demetrius Poliorcetes wished to show Stilpo special favour by compensating him for the loot of his house: so he commanded him to render an account of all the property he had lost.[181] Stilpo wittily replied, 'No one carried off my paideia.' This epigram was a new version, revised to fit the time, of a famous maxim by one of the seven wise men, Bias of Priene, which is still current in its Latin form: *omnia mea mecum porto,* 'all that is mine I carry with me'. For the follower of Socrates, paideia became the sum-total of 'all that was his'—his inner life, his spiritual being, his culture. In the struggle of man to retain his soul's liberty in a world full of threatening elemental forces, paideia became the unshakable nucleus of resistance.

But Socrates did not take his stand outside the wreckage of his homeland, as did the philosophers of the early Hellenistic age. He remained within an intelligent and (until shortly before his death) a powerful state. The harder it fought against a world of foes for its existence, during the last decades of Socrates' life, the more important his educational work became to it. He wished to guide his fellow-citizens to 'political virtue', and to show them a new way to recognize its true nature. Although, outwardly, he lived in a period when the state was breaking up, he lived spiritually in the traditional era of earlier Greece, when the polis was the springhead of all the highest goods and values in life—Plato's *Crito,* very movingly, makes that clear.[182] But while he still believed in the political purpose of human life, he could not, because the spiritual authority of the state's law

had been so gravely impaired, share the faith of any of the great old believers in Law, Solon, for instance, or Aeschylus. The sort of political education he wanted to give presupposed, as its first condition, the re-establishment of the inward moral authority of the polis. True, he does not seem, like Plato, to have believed in principle that the contemporary state was too ill to be cured. He was not, in spirit, a citizen of an ideal state made by himself, but through and through a citizen of Athens. And yet it was from him above all that Plato received the conviction that the recovery of the state could not be effected simply by the re-establishment of its outer authority, but must begin in the conscience of each man (as we should put it) or (the Greek phrase) in the soul itself. It is only from that inner source of truth that, purified by the examination of the logos, the real standard which is incontestably binding for all can be derived.

Therefore it was in Socrates' eyes entirely unimportant whether or not the man who helped others to know this standard was Socrates or not. Often and often he drives this point home. 'It is not I, Socrates, but the logos that says this. You can contradict me, but you cannot contradict it.' Still, philosophy was potentially at war with the state as soon as it turned away from the study of nature to look at 'human things', namely the problems of the state and of areté, and professed to set up standards for them. That was the moment when it gave up the heritage of Thales, and became the heir of Solon. Plato realized the necessity of this conflict between the state which has the authority and the philosopher without office who is searching for the norm of conduct; and he tried to abolish it by making the philosophers the rulers in his ideal state. But Socrates was not living in an ideal state. All his life he remained a plain citizen in a democracy, where everyone else had just as much right as he had to talk about the highest problems of public welfare. Therefore he explained that he himself was obeying a special command from God.[183] But the guardians of the state felt that this eccentric Athenian's self-chosen role merely disguised the rebellion of an intellectually superior person against the things that seemed right and good to the majority: therefore it was a threat to the state's security. The state wishes to be, alone and unchanged, the foundation of everything else. It seems to need no other basis to support it. It cannot bear

to have a moral standard set up with the claim to be absolute, and it sees in such a standard nothing but the attempt of a presumptuous individual to make himself judge of the community's actions. No less a one than Hegel denied that subjective reason had the right to criticize the morality of the state, which (he declared) is itself the fountainhead and the concrete reason for the existence of all morality on earth. That is a thoroughly classical idea, and teaches us how to understand the opposition of the Athenian state to Socrates. From that point of view Socrates was simply a revolutionary fanatic. But no less classical is the attitude of Socrates himself—who prefers the state as it should be (or rather, as it was) to the state as it is, and says so in order to bring it back to harmony with itself and its true nature. From this side, it is the decadent state which is the real renegade, and Socrates is not just the voice of 'subjective reason' but the servant of God,[184] the only man who stands on firm ground while all others totter and fall.

His pupils took various attitudes to his conflict with the state, which is best known to us from Plato's *Apology*. The least satisfactory to us is Xenophon, because he does not see the principles at stake. Himself banished from his country for aristocratic tendencies, he strove to show that Socrates was condemned and executed only because his views on preserving the state were quite misunderstood. In other words, the whole thing was just an unfortunate accident.[185] Among those who did recognize the profound historical necessity of Socrates' death, many took the view we have already seen represented by Aristippus in his discussion with Socrates of the nature of true paideia.[186] He held that it was the inevitable conflict between the spiritually free individual and the community with its inevitable tyranny. There is no escape from that conflict so long as one lives as the citizen of a political community, he said; and men of his type withdrew from life, because they did not feel the call to martyrdom, but wanted only to remain unobserved and ensure themselves some enjoyment of life or intellectual leisure. They lived in foreign countries as resident aliens, so as to be free of all civic duties, and built themselves an ivory tower on this unsteady foundation.[187] It is easier to understand that behaviour if one realizes that historical conditions were not the same for them as for

Socrates. In the *Apology* Socrates himself, exhorting his fellow-citizens to areté, begins his address with 'You, citizens of the city which is greatest and most famous for its wisdom'; and that is an important guide to his motives in making the exhortation.[188] By inserting it, Plato intends to characterize Socrates' own position indirectly. But could Aristippus have felt the same emotion when he thought of his own birthplace, the rich African colonial city of Cyrene?

Only Plato had enough Athenian feeling and enough 'political' feeling to understand Socrates fully. In *Gorgias* he shows the preliminary stages of the tragedy. There we see how it came about that it was not the conscienceless rhetors and sophists from abroad, training their pupils to exploit the state and to have profitable careers as cavaliers of fortune, but the Athenian burgher, filled with deep anxiety for his state and with the sense of responsibility for its future, who suffered the fate of being put away as intolerable to his own country.[189] His criticism of the degenerate state was bound to look like opposition to it, although his purpose was to reconstruct it. The representative leaders of the miserable Athens of his day felt themselves to be under indictment—although Socrates found excuses for the embarrassment in which he placed them, and declared that the desperate state of his city was only the crisis of a long wasting disease.[190] He preferred to look for the germ of the infection back in the era which the prevalent historical view presented as days of splendour and power. But that harsh judgment only strengthened the impact of his negative criticism.[191] We cannot hope to separate the fine gradations in which Socrates' part of this view passes into Plato's, and no subjective judgment can carry conviction. But, whether Socrates held it or not, this at least is undeniable—Plato's will to rebuild the state (which produced his greatest works) was formed by his experience of the tragic conflict with the contemporary state into which Socrates was drawn by his educational mission to reform the world. Plato never says that Socrates should have behaved in any other way. He never says that the jury could have been wiser or better. It was inevitable for both sides to be what they were, and fate took its unalterable course. The conclusion Plato drew was that the state must be reformed so that the real man could live in it. The historian can only judge that the time had come when the

state was no longer strong enough to incorporate the realms of morality and religion, as it had done in early Greece when the state was all in all. Plato shows what the state ought to have been if it were to fulfil its original purpose at the time when Socrates proclaimed the new aim of human life. But the state was not what it ought to have been, and it could not be altered. It was too much of this world. And so Plato was led, by his discovery of the inner world and its values, not to reform the existing state, but to create a new ideal republic in which man could have his eternal home.

That is the timeless significance of the tragedy of Socrates, as revealed most clearly in Plato's philosophical struggles to solve the problem. Socrates himself was far from thinking of the conclusions that Plato drew from his death. He was still further from judging and interpreting his conflict and death as part of the history of the human spirit. If historical understanding had existed in his time, it would have destroyed the tragic element in his destiny. The doom which he suffered with the passionate emotion of a unique unconditioned experience would have been reduced to a natural process of development. To see one's own time or even one's own life as history is a doubtful privilege. The conflict could only have been met and suffered with the simplicity with which Socrates stood up and died for his truth. Even Plato could not follow him along that way. Ideally, he asserted that man must be part of his state; but for that very reason he retreated from political reality, or attempted to realize his ideal somewhere else, where conditions were better. Socrates was heart and soul bound to Athens. Except as a soldier going to fight for her, he never left her once.[192] He did not travel far away, like Plato; he did not even go beyond the suburbs, because he could not talk to the trees.[193] He says that he exhorted both foreigners and citizens to take care of their souls, but he adds 'particularly citizens of Athens, who are nearer me in blood'.[194] His service of God was dedicated not to 'humanity' but to his polis. That is why he did not write books: he only talked to men who were actually present. That is why he did not lecture on abstract theories, but argued his way to an agreement with his fellow-citizens about a common idea, presupposed in every such conversation, and rooted in common origin and a common home, common history and tradition, common laws and constitution. This sharing in a common knowledge or belief gave concrete content to the universals he was always seeking. His comparative neglect of science and learning, his enjoyment of dialectic and argument about questions of value are Athenian; his feeling for the state, for morality, and for the fear of God is Athenian; and not least Athenian is the intellectual charm which plays round his whole life. He was not attracted by the idea of escaping from prison, through gates unlocked by his friends' gold, and crossing the frontier into Boeotia.[195] In the moment of temptation, he said, he saw the laws of his city, which his judges had misused, appear before him and remind him [196] of all he had received from them since childhood, of his ties to his parents, of his birth and education, and of the benefits he had shared with other citizens in his later life. He did not leave Athens before, although he could have done so if he objected to anything in her laws; he had felt well contented there for seventy years. Thereby he acknowledged the laws, and now he could not withdraw his acknowledgment. Plato probably was not in Athens when he wrote these words. He fled to Megara with the other disciples of Socrates after his master's execution,[197] and wrote his earliest Socratic works either there or while travelling. He may not have known whether he would ever return to Athens. That casts a strange sidelight on his description of Socrates' endurance, even to his fulfilment of his last civic duty, which was to drink the poison cup.

Socrates was one of the last citizens of the type which flourished in the earlier Greek polis. At the same time, he was the embodiment and the finest example of the new form of moral and intellectual individualism. Both these characters were united in him, without impairment of either. The former pointed back to a mighty past; the latter looked forward to the future. Thus, he was a unique event in the history of the Greek spirit.[198] By the attraction and repulsion of the two poles of his nature, his ethical and political ideal of education was created. That gave it its profound internal tension—the realism of its starting-point and the idealism of its aim. This is the first appearance in the West of the problem which was to live through many centuries, the problem of state and church. For, as Socrates shows, that is not a problem peculiar to Christianity. It is not necessarily con-

nected with either an established church or a faith in revealed religion; but appears at a similar stage in the development of the Greek 'natural man' and his culture. Here, it is not the conflict of two forms of society, each conscious of its power, but the tension between the individual's citizenship in an earthly community and his immediate spiritual subjection to God. The God in whose service Socrates performs his educational work is different from 'the gods in whom the polis believes'. The charge against Socrates was chiefly based on that point:[199] and it was well directed. It was of course wrong to think of the notorious daemon whose inner voice held Socrates back from many actions.[200] At most, his possession of a daemon can only mean that, as well as the power of knowledge for which he cared more than others, he possessed a very great deal of the quality of instinct which blind rationalism so often lacks. Instinct, not the voice of knowledge, was the meaning of the *daimonion*—as is shown by the occasions of its intervention which he refers to. But the knowledge of the nature and the power of good, which had with overwhelming power taken possession of his soul, became for him a new way to find God. Socrates' intellectual character made it impossible for him to give his allegiance to any dogma. But any man who lives and dies as he did is wholly the servant of God. His creed, that we must obey God more than men,[201] is as surely a new religion as his faith in the all-surpassing importance of the soul.[202] From this faith in God there grows up, in Socrates, a new form of the heroic spirit, stamped from the very beginning by the Greek ideal of areté. In the *Apology* Plato presents him as the incarnation of the highest courage and greatness of spirit, and in *Phaedo* he tells of his death as a heroic triumph over life.[203] This Greek areté, even in its highest incarnation, remains true to its origin. No less than the deeds of Homer's heroes, the struggles of Socrates made a new and splendid example to form the characters of those who looked on it—an example which was to find, in Plato, its poet and its prophet.

before Socrates) by the urge to solve the riddle of the world, but by the necessity of knowledge in maintaining and shaping human life. His aim was to bring the true society into being as the proper milieu for the achievement of the highest virtue possible to man. He was a reformer inspired by the educational spirit of Socrates, whose aim was not only to see the true nature of things, but to do good. His entire work as a writer culminated in two great educational systems—*The Republic* and *The Laws;* and similarly his thought always centred on the problem of the philosophical assumptions underlying all education, and was aware of its own lofty claim to be the highest power in moulding the human soul.

Thus Plato put on the mantle of Socrates. He inherited his master's leadership in the great debate in which philosophy criticized the educational forces of his age and the historical tradition of his nation: sophistic and rhetoric, legislation and the state, mathematics and astronomy, gymnastics and medicine, poetry and music. Socrates had said that knowledge of the good was man's goal and his standard. Plato now sought to find the way to this goal, by asking what was the nature of knowledge. Having passed through the purifying fire of Socratic 'ignorance', he felt capable of pressing on to that knowledge of absolute values to which Socrates had aspired, and thereby restoring the lost unity of knowledge and life. Plato's 'philosophy' sprang from Socrates' φιλοσοφεῖν. Its position in the history of Greek *thought* is defined by the fact that it is paideia, and that it is aimed at finding a large-scale solution to the problem of educating human beings. From another point of view, its position in the history of Greek *paideia* is defined by the fact that it points to philosophy and knowledge as the highest form of education and culture. It takes the traditional problem, how a better type of man is to be educated, and sets out to answer it by building up a new pattern of reality and value. This new code takes the place of the former foundation of all culture—religion. Or rather it is itself a new religion. That is its essential difference from a scientific system like that of Democritus, which is the complete antithesis, in the history of knowledge, to Plato's philosophy, and which historians of philosophy rightly compare with it as being one of the truly original creations of the Greek mind. And yet Greek natural philosophy—whose originators in

startling evolutions. No form of communicating thought can awake the interest and sympathy of the reader so surely as a well-planned conversation aimed at discovering the truth. The repeated attempts of the Socratic dialogues to reach the truth by pooling the intelligence of the speakers show Plato's full mastery in the pedagogic art of making his readers wish to co-operate. As we read, our thoughts outstrip the discussion and try to reach its end; so that when Plato brings us, not once only but every time, to what seems to be an impasse, he makes us wish to think beyond it and go on with the train of reasoning started in the discussion. If these were real conversations at which we happened to be present, it might be pure chance that they came to a negative conclusion. But a philosophical writer and teacher who brings us again and again to a confession of ignorance must mean to do more than give a lifelike picture of the proverbial 'ignorance' of Socrates. He is setting us a riddle, and he believes the solution lies within our grasp.

These conversations are all attempts to find out the nature of one virtue; and they all lead to the admission that this virtue, whichever it is, must be some kind of knowledge. If we ask 'knowledge of what?' we discover that it is knowledge of the good. We recognize this for Socrates' well-known paradox: Virtue is Knowledge. But at the same time we feel that a new force is at work in Plato's Socratic dialogues, not merely to re-create the master himself, but also to take up his problem and go further with it. The attentive reader will see the workings of this force in the fact that Plato's Socrates is exclusively concerned with the problem of virtue. From the *Apology* we know that the real Socrates tried above everything else to exhort his fellow-men to practise 'virtue' and 'the care of the soul'; and that the cross-examination which went along with his exhortation and convinced his interlocutor of his own ignorance was just as much a part of that protreptic mission. Its aim was to disquiet men and move them to do something for themselves. But in Plato's other books of this early period, the protreptic preaching is far less important than the elenctic cross-examination. Clearly Plato wants to push his readers forward to the knowledge of virtue, without letting them stop at the consciousness of their own ignorance. The helplessness (*aporia*) which was Socrates'

of the rest of *The Republic,* and that its form most closely resembles that of the early 'Socratic' dialogues. Some have even suggested that it was once an independent work which Plato incorporated in *The Republic,* in order to build the ideal state upon justice, with which it deals. Although many still believe this, it is really no more than a brilliant hypothesis. And yet, true or not, it does illustrate the close organic connexion between the early dialogues and the ideas underlying *The Republic,* in which the world of Plato's thought is revealed for the first time as a whole. Not only that first book, with its discussion of justice, but *Laches, Charmides,* and *Euthyphro* with their discussions of the nature of courage, self-control, and piety, even if they have no structural link with *The Republic,* still belong to the same realm of ideas. They are, as it were, the material of its foundations.

In the *Apology* Socrates' influence and the way he taught his fellow-citizens to approach true areté are related to 'the polis itself'. That stamps his mission as a political one.[14] If we look carefully, we shall see that Plato maintains that tone in all the smaller dialogues. We need only point to Socrates' conversation in prison with his old friend Crito, which deals with the citizen's duty to obey the law at all costs.[15] *Laches* emphasizes the political significance of its problem—the best way to educate the sons of two well-off citizens, in which the famous Athenian generals Nicias and Laches take part.[16] *Charmides* has several links to *The Republic* and its fundamental doctrines. It is the first dialogue to mention (as a 'riddle') the almost untranslatable idea τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν: 'to mind one's own business', 'to do one's own job and leave other things alone'.[17] The division of functions and social classes in *The Republic* is based on that idea.[18] And Plato several times points out the immediate importance to the lawgiver and to the government of the question around which *Charmides* is constructed: what is temperance, or self-control?[19] The science of politics appears in it (as in *Gorgias*) as a counterpart of the science of medicine.[20] And piety too, which is discussed in *Euthyphro,* is connected with politics: for the discussion arises from a problem of religious law. But in any case piety was for the classical Greeks a political idea, because it meant paying the proper honour to the gods of the state, who preserved the laws and institutions of the state.

After all this it is scarcely necessary to add that these separate lines of enquiry all meet in *Protagoras,* which shows the direction in which they have been moving by calling them all together 'the political art', πολιτικὴ τέχνη.[21] It is this political art or science whose elements Plato was investigating in his early dialogues, when he tried to define the nature of the fundamental political virtues. Later he was to build the true state upon these same virtues, and this is the beginning of that great work. Thus the central problem of *The Republic,* which is later revealed as the high point of Plato's educational activity—how men can acquire knowledge of the Idea of good—is foreshadowed in the very earliest of his books.

It is only when we see these youthful dialogues in this light that we understand the place Plato gave them in the whole scheme of his philosophy. Now we can realize that, from the very outset, the whole which he envisaged was the state. In his principal work on politics, he maintained that philosophers should rule the state because they possess knowledge of the good, and therefore they have that which is vital to society, understanding of the highest standards on which all human life must be based. Since his very earliest works, starting from different points, all lead with mathematical certainty to the same centre, it is evident that a fundamental feature of his thought is this architectonic awareness of the general plan, and that it marks an essential difference between the books of the poetical philosopher Plato and those of every non-philosophical poet.[22] He well knew the end towards which he was moving. When he wrote the first words of his first Socratic dialogue, he knew the whole of which it was to be a part. The entelechy of *The Republic* can be quite clearly traced in the early dialogues. But this way of writing is a new and unique thing. It is one of the greatest revelations of the Greek power of organic creation. Under the guidance of a powerful intelligence which seems in matters of detail to create with all the freedom of untrammelled play, and yet works steadily towards a supreme and ever-present end, Plato's philosophy appears to *grow* with the liberty and the certainty of a magnificent tree. It would be a serious mistake to believe that, when he wrote these little intellectual dramas, Plato's spiritual range was no broader than their foreground. Many scholars who have upheld the theory that his dialogues represent different

we once more believe the Letter to be genuine, another difficulty has appeared. It is genuine, and Plato is quoting himself in it; he must have known *when* he wrote *The Republic*. Therefore he wrote *The Republic* in the 'nineties![37] Of course it is impossible to believe that this, his greatest book, along with all the others which it presupposes and which we have learnt to look upon as the work of thirty years of continuous thought and writing, could have been written in the decade before his first voyage to Sicily. Therefore other scholars reject the conclusion above, but suggest that there was an earlier and shorter edition of *The Republic,* from which Aristophanes got material for his jokes about the empire of women in his *Women in Parliament,* produced towards the end of the 'nineties.[38] But this suggestion is no more probable than the other. In his seventh Letter Plato does *not* say that he had written down the thesis. He says he had 'spoken of it': and indeed it is extremely probable that, while teaching and lecturing, he often expounded and discussed the views expressed in his dialogues—before he wrote them down to explain to the outer world the true essence of his philosophy and his educational doctrine.[39] It took many years for him to commit his essential ideas to writing. But in teaching by word of mouth he could not wait for three decades before revealing the aim of all his enquiries into the nature of areté. And (though it is often overlooked) there is no need of elaborate arguments to prove that he did not start teaching at the foundation of the Academy (388), but that all the works he wrote in the 'nineties, from the smallest dialogues down to *Protagoras* and *Gorgias,* were meant to help him in carrying out an educational programme which he was developing in true Socratic fashion by his own talks and conversations.

This gives us the background for the smaller Socratic works of the 'nineties. It cannot be reconstructed unless we give them their proper place in the realm of thought revealed by *The Republic* and by Plato's own account of his development during that period, given in his seventh Letter. But what his contemporaries chiefly saw in them was the continuation of Socrates' dialectical enquiries,[40] which Plato must have undertaken on his return from self-banishment after Socrates' death. The little dialogues show how he carried on these discussions, and the points on which his theoretical reasoning was mainly concentrated. Apparently he began by making perfectly clear the assumptions of the logical procedure employed in these dialectical enquiries, and the regular logical patterns which they followed. Our evidence is such that we shall probably never be able to determine how far Socrates himself had gone in that direction, and how much logic Plato had learnt from him.[41] Many scholars are inclined to underestimate Socrates' work in that field, and to ascribe all those first steps to Plato—Plato, from whose school the next two generations were to explore territory which it would take two thousand years to settle.[42] Socrates made an art of 'contradictory conversations' and gave them his whole life. Surely he must have found out a great deal about logic; he cannot have been merely a routine performer. And yet, when we read the writings of his other pupils, we find that they have very little, if any, interest in logical theory and its application. And Xenophon's brief remark that Socrates was tireless in defining concepts does not help us very much in understanding Socrates' ability as a logician.[43] Plato's description of his dialectic should certainly be the easiest to accept as true, provided we remember that the subject has been enriched and developed by a man with a genius for systematic abstract thought.

But when we weigh the evidence offered by these first dialogues about the state of Plato's dialectic at that time, we find ourselves faced by the same problem which hinders our efforts to estimate their ethical and political content. Those who believe that they represent an early stage of Plato's development, appreciably different from the later ones, think they prove he was already familiar with such fundamental elements of formal logic as definition, induction, and the concept. But, as we have said, they point out that there is no explicit evidence in them for the theory of Ideas, although it is characteristic of Plato's dialectic in his later works.[44] From this point of view it is difficult to think how, from such modest beginnings in abstract logic, Plato ever got so far as to teach that Ideas were independent entities. According to Aristotle, he held that the ethical concepts which Socrates had always studied belonged to a world of permanent reality different from the ever-changing sensible world; and anyone who understands Greek ways of thinking must agree that this account sounds the most natural one, although it is very

alien to modern thought with its nominalist presuppositions.[45] The whole tradition of earlier Greek philosophy would make Plato assume that, where there is knowledge, there must be an object to know. Aristotle says Plato's first teacher Cratylus had convinced him that we live in a world of constant flux, of perpetual coming-to-be and passing-away. Then, when he met Socrates, a new world opened to him. Socrates tried to discover the nature of justice, piety, courage, et cetera, assuming that they were permanent and unalterable things.[46] We should say that Socrates' questions about the nature of the just, the pious, and the brave were aimed at discovering the concepts or universals underlying them. But, though that is now a common way of thinking, it was not discovered in those days. In his later dialogues Plato struggles with it and gradually masters it; while Aristotle fully understands the logical process of abstraction. But when Socrates asked 'what is good?' or 'what is just?', that certainly did not mean that he and his pupils had full theoretical knowledge of the logical nature of universals. When Aristotle says that Socrates, unlike Plato, did not hold the universals he was studying to exist in a world apart from that perceived by sense, he does not mean that Socrates possessed Aristotle's own knowledge of the universals, that he fully understood they were abstractions, and that Plato made the mistake of duplicating them by affirming that an independent Idea of the just existed to correspond to the concept of justice. It is true that Aristotle thought the Ideas, in so far as Plato held them to be a world of independent realities outside the sensible world, were a needless duplicate of this sensible world. He knew they were needless, because he had recognized the abstract character of universals. But this only makes it more certain that Plato had *not* reached that point when he created the theory of Ideas or Forms —far less Socrates. Plato was the first whose logical genius enquired into the nature of that Something which Socrates had been trying to discover with his questions about the good, the just, and so on. For him the dialectic way to the good, the just, and the beautiful in themselves, on which Socrates had set out, was the way of true knowledge. When Socrates had got far enough on his way to pass beyond change to permanence, beyond the manifold to unity, Plato believed that in that unity and permanence he had grasped true reality.

advance towards something they think is frightful.[88] The difference between them really is *what* they fear: the brave man is afraid of disgrace, the coward (because he is ignorant) fears death.[89] Here at last the deep meaning of Socrates' conception of knowledge emerges, now that we can see these contradictions face to face. It is knowledge of the true standard which inevitably dictates our choice and determines our will. And so courage is identical with wisdom. Courage is knowing what to fear and what not to fear.[90]

In Plato's smaller dialogues we saw the dialectic movement of Socrates' thought start forward again and again, but never reach its goal. Here for the first time we see it finish its course. The words in which he here formulates his result explain the purpose of the earlier dialogues. He says, 'The only reason I ask all these questions is to find out about virtue, and learn what it really is. If that could be discovered, I know it would clear up the question you and I have been talking about for so long, you asserting, and I denying, that virtue could be taught.' [91] Actually, the question about the nature of virtue must be settled before anyone can discuss whether or not it can be taught. But the result Socrates has reached—that virtue is knowledge, and that even courage fits into that definition—is not only the logical preliminary to any discussion of the subsequent question; it alone seems to make the teaching of virtue possible. Thus at the end of the dialogue the two speakers have changed places. Socrates, who thought virtue could not be taught, is now endeavouring to prove that virtue in all its forms is knowledge. And Protagoras, who explained that it *could* be taught, is striving to prove that it is certainly not knowledge—which, if true, would make it difficult to teach.[92] The drama ends with Socrates' astonishment at this remarkable contradiction; but for Plato this astonishment is clearly the origin of all true philosophy,[92a] and the reader closes the book with the realization that Socrates' creed, that virtue goes back to the knowledge of true values,[93] is to become the foundation-stone of all education.

In *Protagoras* Plato remains faithful to his Socratic principle of giving no dogmatic instruction. Instead, he enlists our sympathy for his problem, and makes it our own, by gradually building up knowledge in our minds under Socrates' guidance.

paradoxes lies deeper. They are meant to induce philosophical reflection.[31] To compare rhetoric with cookery—to dethrone the queen of contemporary politics and make her a contemptible scullion—does not change the facts of the case. But it gives a shock to his readers' estimate of the facts, a shock which extends until it affects all their ideas. His comparison is not made from the wish to injure. It is really and truly *seen* with all the visionary power of those eyes for which the ordering of things was far different from their appearance to the multitude's eye of sense. It is as if a chasm opened between appearance and reality: all human things have suddenly taken on a new value. Just as make-up relates to the healthy beauty of a body developed by gymnastic training, so the political culture taught by the sophists relates to the teaching of the true lawgiver. Just as the sauces and confectionery of a blue-ribbon chef stand to the health-giving rules and prescriptions of the doctor, so stands rhetoric, which tries to make wrong into right, to the activity of the true judge and statesman.[32] This makes the art of politics something poles apart from what the world calls politics. And so, even here in *Gorgias,* the kind of state-building and law-giving which Plato undertakes in his two greatest books is proclaimed as his conception of the great positive aspect of Socrates' work of 'caring for the soul'.[33] We cannot yet see the shattering results of this new idea, but it is evident that the signs by which we recognize it point to a complete transformation of the current philosophy of life. And indeed, in a passage later in *Gorgias,* Callicles describes Socrates' transvaluation of values as 'a revolution in our whole life' and condemns it.[34] The ideas which Socrates develops in his conversation with Polus provoke Callicles' passionate outbreak at the beginning of the third part of the book.

The strongest and most obvious objection made by Polus to Socrates' low estimate of rhetoric is that rhetoric actually does exercise a huge influence in politics.[35] The urge to obtain power is an impulse rooted too deeply in human nature to be disregarded. If power is a great thing, the faculty by which we obtain it is extremely important. So the problem whether rhetoric does or does not entail an exact knowledge of values, which seems to be a purely esoteric question of method, involves far wider decisions. It compels us to take up a definite attitude to the ques-

force. It sees war and conquest everywhere in life, and believes that that sanctions the use of force. It can have no meaning except through the seizure of the greatest possible power.[44] The philosophy of culture or education asserts that man has a different aim: *kalokagathia*. Plato defines it as the opposite of injustice and wickedness—it is therefore essentially a matter of ethics.[45] But he does not hold that it goes against man's nature to be trained to kalokagathia. Only it implies a different conception of human nature, which Socrates develops in detail. And now the foundations of his criticism of rhetoric come to light. As he conceives it, the real meaning of human nature is not power, but culture: paideia.

If we were to describe the philosophy of power as 'naturalism' (an obvious enough thing to do, from the Christian standpoint[46]), Plato would say we were doing it too much honour. It was impossible for the Greek philosopher to think of opposing nature, which was the highest norm and standard. But even if we say that, according to the higher Greek conception of human nature, the task of education was not to subdue nature but to ennoble it, that interpretation does not cover Plato's meaning. He did not think of nature (as the sophistic teachers did) as raw material out of which education was to form a work of art;[47] he thought it was the highest areté, which is only incompletely manifested in individual man.[48] Again, his attitude to power is not simply to condemn it as bad in itself. Here too his dialectic takes the conception which is under scrutiny, and treats it as a positive value, and transforms it. By 'power' Polus understands the ability of the orator or tyrant to do what he wants in his state.[49] Socrates starts by granting that power must be a real good if we are to pursue it; but he says that doing what one wants, be one orator or tyrant, is not a good, because it is without reason.[50] That is, he distinguishes true will from arbitrary desire. The man who does what he wants is running after a sham good which he desires. But the only thing he can *will* is a true good. For in desire he can always be deceived about the value of the thing desired; but no one can knowingly will what is bad and injurious. Socrates goes on to distinguish the end from the means.[51] In acting, we do not will what we are doing, we will the thing for whose sake we are acting. And that thing is what is naturally good and healthy, not what is bad and injuri-

He actually brings in religious imagery and symbols—the first hint that, behind the infinitely subtle dialectic distinctions in which his moral principles are concealed, there is a metaphysical transformation of the whole of life. 'Who knows,' he asks with Euripides, 'if life here be not really death, and death in turn be life?' [85] And he reminds his hearers of the Orphic imagery which called the unintelligent 'the uninitiate', which made a sieve the symbol of the soul of the insatiable lover of pleasure, and taught that in the next world he was punished by pouring water for ever into a leaky cask. Callicles despises a life without pleasure, calling it 'living like a stone'.[86] But neither here nor later in Plato's *Philebus* does Socrates uphold the ideal of a life devoid of all emotion. Just as he does there, he demands that pleasures should be divided into good and bad. By a close analysis of the pleasures and sufferings involved in thirst and its satisfaction, he makes Callicles admit that good is not the same as pleasure and bad not the same as pain, and that he himself makes moral distinctions between good and bad pleasures.[87] As a pendant to this he works out the idea that will depends on choice, and that what we always choose in willing is the good.[88]

Modern students of Plato have often pointed out that this definition of the telos is very different from the hedonistic definition of it in *Protagoras;* and have based their whole conception of Plato's development on this difference, assuming that he did not reach those lofty moral heights on which he stands in *Phaedo,* at any time before he wrote *Gorgias.*[89] Both in *Phaedo* and in *Gorgias* we find an inclination to asceticism and a tendency to think of death as a positive moral good.[90] The implication is that *Protagoras* is one of Plato's earliest works because it agrees with 'most people' in treating the good as identical with pleasure.[91] It is hard to imagine a more complete misunderstanding of the meaning of Plato's reasoning in *Protagoras.* Socrates is trying to prove to the sophists that, *even if* he assumes that the vulgar are correct in thinking that what is pleasant is always good, his thesis (so difficult for common sense to accept) that knowledge is essential for right conduct can be proved with perfect ease.[92] The only essential thing is always to choose the greater pleasure instead of the less, and not to make mistakes in calculation by thinking the nearer pleasure bigger than it is. To do this, one must have 'an art of measurement', although

in *Protagoras* Socrates says he will not discuss it in any detail.[93] He has proved what he wanted; and besides that, while the sophists all agree, as if under a spell, to everything he says, he has exposed the full inadequacy of their moral beliefs. For it is surely obvious that in that scene Socrates tries to show the reader, not once but again and again, with suspicious pertinacity, that the identification of good with pleasure is *not* his own view but the view of the mob. He explains that, if they were asked, they could give no other motive for their conduct than pleasure and pain; and he cheerfully invites them to name any other telos they can think of. But, he adds in obvious triumph, they cannot think of any other.[94] The notion that when Plato in *Phaedo* [95] scornfully rejects this conception of human conduct, calling it a barter-business carried on with pleasures of various sizes, he is deriding himself, cannot be taken seriously. On the other hand, the 'art of measurement', which is the guise assumed in *Protagoras* by the desirable knowledge of true standards, is not merely a joke. We need only take good as the standard instead of pleasure—for Plato in *Philebus,* and Aristotle under Plato's influence in his youthful work *The Statesman,* describe good as the most exact of all standards. The measurement referred to is not quantitative but qualitative. And that is what distinguished Plato from the multitude with its lower scale of values. This telos is announced in *Gorgias,* and assumed in *Protagoras.* From the very earliest of Plato's works, the small Socratic dialogues, it lies behind his search for areté, in the form of the knowledge of good; and as *Gorgias* unmistakably teaches, the good is 'that through whose presence the good are good'; [96] that is, it is the Idea, the ultimate shape of every good thing.[97]

This conversation with Callicles has led to a result diametrically opposite to the point from which it started—the doctrine of the right of the stronger. If pleasure and pain are not the standard for our conduct, then rhetoric must relinquish the supremacy over the most important branches of life which the rhetoricians had said it enjoyed,[98] and along with it all other types of flattery, which have as their goal only the pleasure, not the good, of man.[99] The most important duty in life is evidently to determine which pleasures are good and which are bad—and that, as even Callicles laconically admits when Socrates asks him, is not 'in everybody's line'.[100] This is a succinct statement

of a principle fundamental to Plato's ethical and educational doctrine. He does not advise men to trust their own moral sentiment as the supreme judge. He declares there must be a science, a techné, whose findings the individual must follow.[101] The conversation has turned back to its beginnings. Socrates' initial question whether rhetoric was a science or not now reveals its full meaning. There are two contrasting types of life, two *bioi*.[102] One of them is built upon the flattering quasi-arts—really not arts at all but copies of arts. We may call it, after one of its main species of flattery, the rhetorical ideal of life. Its purpose is to create pleasure and win approval. The other, its opponent, is the philosophical life. It is based on knowledge of human nature and of what is best for it: so it is a real techné, and it really cares for man, for the body as well as the soul.[103] Its therapy benefits not only the individual but the community too. Correspondingly, there is a flattery for the individual and another for the multitude. As examples of the latter, Plato mentions different types of poetry and music: flute-playing, choral and dithyrambic poetry, tragedy. All of these aim at pleasure alone; if rhythm, metre, and melody are subtracted from them, the remainder is nothing but *demegoria,* mob-oratory.[104] Later in Greek history this idea, that poetry was a part of eloquence, was universally accepted. This is its earliest appearance, but here it is meant disparagingly. Plato's radical criticism of poetry as an educational force, which is so essential to his philosophy, is announced here for the first time. It finds its real place in *The Republic* and *The Laws;* for it belongs to the general system of Plato's paideia, which is laid out in detail in those works. It is of the same type as his attack on sophistry and rhetoric in *Protagoras* and *Gorgias*. The public which the poet addresses oratorically is not the male citizen-body; it is a mixture of children, women, and men, slaves and free alike. But even the higher type of rhetoric, addressed to free men, is no better than the type we call poetry: for it too is aimed, not at good, but at pleasing the multitude, without asking whether it makes them better or worse.[105]

Callicles takes this opportunity, and makes his last attempt to defend the spiritual values of rhetoric. He admits that Socrates' destructive criticisms are true of contemporary political speakers, in order to elevate the oratory of great Athenian statesmen of

the past into a model of truly educational art. (Thereby he tacitly accepts Socrates' standard for their valuation.) [106] Surely their very names—Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, Pericles—ought to silence all opposition. But Plato condemns them all without the flicker of an eyelash. If a statesman is great because he understands how to satisfy his own desires and those of the multitude, then they deserve the praise lavished on them by history. But if the statesman's real task is to give his work a definite form, an eidos, in the greatest possible perfection, to orient himself with reference to it—as the painter, the architect, and shipbuilder, and other craftsmen must do—and to reduce the parts composing the whole to an intelligible order so that every one fits every other, then those men were mere bunglers. As every work of art has its proper form and order, on whose realization its perfection depends, and as the human body has its own cosmos, called health, so there is a cosmos and an order in the soul too. We call it law. It depends on justice and self-control, and what we describe as virtues. The true statesman and orator will have his eyes on it when he is choosing his words and doing his actions and giving his gifts.[107] He will always be watching to see that justice comes into the souls of his fellow-citizens while injustice leaves them, that prudence and moderation grow in them while incontinence leaves them, and that every virtue grows in them while wickedness departs. The doctor does not glut a sick body with lots of sweet food and drink that do it no good; and the true statesman strongly disciplines the sick soul and does not indulge its fancies.

By this time Callicles is in an apathy. He scarcely seems to hear what Socrates says, although he is powerless to contradict him.[108] He cannot escape from Socrates' logical reasoning, but in his heart he is not convinced—indeed he says so later, and Plato adds 'as happens with most people'.[109] After silencing him, Socrates goes on with his reasoning, and follows it out to the very end by answering his own questions. In a short survey of the results already reached, he points out that all thinking about right conduct must be founded on the idea that the pleasant is not the same as the good and healthy. Therefore one should do what is pleasant only for the sake of the good, and not the other way about. A man, like anything else, is good because there

is an areté, an excellence or virtue, in him.[110] Areté or excellence in a utensil, a body, a soul, or a living being, does not come about by chance, but only by right order and deliberate art. Everything becomes good when its own peculiar type of order, its cosmos, becomes supreme and is realized in it.[111] Before Plato the word *cosmos* had not been used to mean an orderly system within the soul; but the kindred adjective *kosmios* had signified modest, disciplined, orderly behaviour. Solon's law dealt with *eukosmia* in the citizen's behaviour, especially in that of the young. In harmony with all that, Plato now declares that the self-controlled and disciplined soul is a 'good' soul.[112] (Remember that the Greek for 'good' [ἀγαθός] does not have merely the narrow ethical sense we give it, but is the adjective corresponding to the noun areté, and so means 'excellent' in any way. From that point of view ethics is only a special case of the effort made by all things to achieve perfection.) Socrates shows that every other type of virtue (piety, courage, and justice) naturally coexists with true sophrosyné.[113] In fact, he is bringing in here the theme discussed in the little dialogues and *Protagoras*—the unity of virtue.[114] What the Greeks called *eudaimonia,* perfect happiness, depends (he says) on excellence in this way; and when they called being happy 'doing well' (εὖ πράττειν) he declares they spoke more wisely than they knew, for *being happy* depends entirely upon *doing well.*[115]

To reach this areté and escape its opposite must be the fixed aim of our lives. All the energies of the individual and the state should be devoted to reaching that aim, and not to the satisfaction of desires.[116] The latter can lead only to the life of a robber; and the man who lives like that is hateful to men and gods, because no community is possible on such a basis, and where there is no community there can be no friendship. But wise men tell us that heaven and earth and gods and men are held together by community and friendship and orderliness and moderation and justice, and that is why the universe is called the Order, the Cosmos.[117] It is not *pleonexia,* the greed for more, that is powerful among gods and men; it is geometric proportion. But Callicles does not care about geometry![118] Thus, what seemed to be a paradox, that it is less bad to be wronged than to do wrong, is perfectly true. The real orator and statesman must be just and possess knowledge of justice. The greatest disgrace is

problem: how to behave to the 'tyrant' of their country who demands unconditional respect for his wishes—namely, the Athenian demos. Socrates has shown that he knows the consequences of his courage, and is ready to accept them for the sake of benefiting his fatherland. He, the representative of 'virtue', is the true hero. The other, Callicles, who upholds the mastery of the stronger, is really the coward, making himself a glib and supple imitation so as to become a ruler.

At this point Socrates very opportunely reminds his hearers of the fundamental distinction he made at the outset, between two methods of treating the body and soul: one directed to producing pleasure, the other to doing good; one flattering the lower side of man's nature, the other fighting against it.[129] Callicles and Socrates, it is now apparent, are the complete embodiments of those two methods. One is the flatterer, the other the fighter. We must choose. We cannot wish the state to have the deceitful sham arts, but rather the severe therapy of truth, that makes the citizens as good as possible. Neither the possession of riches nor the increase of power is worth anything to the man whose mind is not trained to real kalokagathia.[130] The philosophical educator who leads the state towards it is the state's only real benefactor, as Socrates observes, with a side-glance towards the statesmen whose services are publicly recognized in laudatory resolutions and immortalized in inscriptions.[130a] The attempt to raise the citizens to that stage must begin with the choice of political leaders. Since Socrates' political science is a techné, this choice is to be made by a regular examination.[131] If, he says, we were being examined for the post of state-architect, we should be tested to reveal whether we understood our profession, and who had been our teacher, and whether we had designed any buildings that would recommend us. It would be the same if we were candidates for a post as medical officer.[132] So, if politics is a true art, the future statesman must be tested to reveal what he has done in that department. Since it is the art of making men better, Socrates asks Callicles (as the only politician present) whom he has made better in private life, before he entered politics.[133] And then, after this half-joking question, he turns to examine the most famous statesmen of Athenian history, Pericles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Themistocles. Pericles, he says, made the Athenians lazy, cowardly, talkative, and avaricious by introducing the dole-system. When he took them over from his predecessors, they were relatively tame, but (as his own impeachment proved) he made them savage. They sent Cimon and Themistocles into exile; they voted to throw Miltiades into the *barathron,* the traitor's gulf. All those men were like drivers who handle obedient teams so badly that they are thrown out of the chariot.[134]

A statesman, in Socrates' sense of the word, has never yet existed.[135] The famous Athenian statesmen were only servants, not teachers, of their country.[136] They made themselves subservient to the weaknesses in human nature, and tried to use them, instead of changing them by persuasion and compulsion. They were not trainers and doctors, but confectioners, who filled the body of the nation with fat and relaxed its once strong muscles. Of course the consequences of that gluttony cannot be seen till much later. Meanwhile we praise the men who served us the sweet dishes, and say they made the state great, without seeing that it is bloated and shaky because of what they did to it.[137] For without self-control and justice, they filled it with harbours and dockyards and fortifications and tributes and such rubbish. But when the attack of the disease comes, people will not turn upon the really guilty men, but on those who are ruling the country at the moment, although they are only accessories.[138] Still, it will be useless to call the people ungrateful when it overthrows and persecutes its leaders. The sophists foolishly do the same: they profess to educate men in virtue and then complain because their pupils wrong them by refusing to pay the fees.[139] There is no real difference between the sophist and the orator; in fact, the orator, who despises the sophist, is really as far beneath him as the judge is beneath the lawgiver, and the doctor beneath the trainer. A rhetor or a sophist who blames the people he has 'educated' is really accusing himself and his method of education.[140]

Therefore if Socrates is to choose between the two methods of treating men—serving the Athenian people by flattery, or fighting them to make them better—he can choose only the second, and that although he knows the mortal danger he is running.[141] Anyone who accuses him will be a bad man. And it would not be strange if he were put to death. He expects that that will be the result of his teaching, for, as he says, 'I believe

were, one foot in the unseen world, he would lose his equilibrium —at least so it would seem to the dim eyes of sense. The truth of his conception of life cannot be understood unless it is referred to such a Beyond as that imaged in the vividly realistic language of Orphic eschatology: a place where the value or worthlessness, the blessedness or damnation of man are finally determined, where 'the soul itself' is judged by 'the soul itself' without the defensive and deceptive clothing of beauty, rank, wealth, and power.[148] This 'judgment', placed by religious imagination in the second life which begins after death, becomes a higher truth for Plato when he thinks through all that is meant by Socrates' idea of human personality as a purely inward value, based in itself alone. If the soul's purity from injustice is its health, and its infection with guilt is its deformity and sickness, then the judgment in the next world is a sort of medical examination of the soul. Naked, it appears before the judge (himself a naked soul); he examines every scar, every wound, every blemish left in it by the sickness of its own injustice during life.[149] Plato did not borrow *that* trait from Orphic myths; it is an expression of Socrates' basic belief that the evil that men do lives on in them and forms the nature of their souls. It means a permanent weakening of the value of the personality. This is the ground of the doctrine expressed in *Gorgias,* that happiness is identical with moral perfection. The healthy souls, mostly those which have striven for wisdom (φιλόσοφοι ψυχαί), are sent to the Isles of the Blest. The souls which are found to be unhealthy, and are consequently despatched to Tartarus, are divided into curable and incurable: this leaves a way open for the curable to recover after long suffering and painful treatment.[150] The incurables—mostly despots and tyrants, beyond the power of any therapy—are used as eternal examples, *paradeigmata,* for the benefit of others.[151]

Gorgias closes with a warning against *apaideusia,*[152] ignorance of 'the greatest goods in life'; and postpones practical concern with politics to the time when we have freed ourselves of this ignorance. Thus Plato reminds us once again of the educational tendency of the whole dialogue, and of the whole Socratic philosophy; and thus he stamps his unique conception of the nature of paideia deeply and indelibly in our memory. Paideia for Plato

truth seen by the intellect, Plato interprets the potential existence of mathematical knowledge in the soul as a sight seen by it in a previous life.[35] The myth of the immortality of the soul and its migration through various bodies gives that supposition the form and colour needed by our mortal and finite imagination.[36] In *Meno* Plato cares less about assuming immortality as the necessary foundation for his concept of the moral personality [37] than about providing a background for his new theory that we are all born with knowledge in our souls. Without such a background, the innate knowledge would have to remain a vague and colourless supposition. Combined with the doctrine of pre-existence and transmigration, it opens up a number of unexpected avenues for thought and fancy; and the knowledge of good in itself, for which we must always strive, is shown to be perfectly independent of all external experience, and to have an almost religious value. It is mathematically clear; and yet it impinges on our human life like a ray from a higher universe. All through Plato's work mathematics takes this position: it is ancillary to the theory of Ideas. It is always the bridge which we must cross to understand them; [37a] and it must have been so, even for Plato himself, when he set out to find a logical definition of the knowledge sought by Socrates and of its object.

With this, Plato felt he had fulfilled the purpose of Socrates' life; and at the same time he had taken a long step beyond him. Socrates had always finished by confessing his ignorance. Plato pushed impetuously on towards knowledge. And yet he took Socrates' ignorance to be a sign of his true greatness, for he thought it was the birth-pangs of a new kind of knowledge struggling to be born of Socrates' travailing mind. That knowledge was the vision within the soul, which *Meno* is the first attempt to define and describe, the vision of the Ideas. So it is not mere chance that in *Meno* Plato casts a new, positive light on his master's 'ignorance'. It was not that Plato himself had suddenly seen it in that light for the first time. But it had been impossible for him to show it to others thus until he could expound to them the strange character of that knowledge which drew all its certainty from within. When young Meno, at Socrates' invitation, attempts to define virtue, and ends with a false definition which (as Socrates explains to him) offends against a basic rule of dialectic, he says in his disappointment that others

that virtue must be knowledge and making his way towards that knowledge, he took the place of those false prophets of wisdom, as the only real educator. In the concluding section of *Meno* he is deliberately put in contrast with this background of sophistic paideia, because a new figure, Anytus, enters the conversation, and the talk turns to the right method of education. The problem with which the dialogue begins, and through which it develops Socrates' conception of knowledge, is, 'How does man acquire areté?' From the very beginning the discussion of it has been moving towards education. Like *Protagoras, Meno* ends with a dilemma. Since the sophists' teaching cannot make men virtuous, and since the areté of the statesmen who possess virtue naturally (φύσει) is incapable of being transmitted to others, areté seems to exist only by divine dispensation—unless a statesman (πολιτικός) can be found who can make someone else a statesman too. But that 'unless', so easily overlooked, really holds the solution of the dilemma: for we know from *Gorgias* that Plato paradoxically thought Socrates was the only true statesman, the statesman who made his fellow-citizens better. *Meno* has shown how his type of knowledge is evoked in the human soul. And so, at the end, it is evident that Socrates believes areté is *both* natural *and* teachable. But if these words are taken in the usual pedagogical sense, then it is *neither* teachable *nor* naturally implanted—unless it is innate like a talent or a disposition which cannot account for itself.

But Socrates' educational mission does not depend only on the methodical character of knowledge as he conceives it and as Plato explains it in *Meno,* with the assistance of dialectics and mathematics. The philosophical knowledge of the Ideas, born from the mind's reflection on its own inner cosmos, is shown in Plato's dialogues to be always the same thing in different lights: it is the true fulfilment of man's natural disposition. In *Euthydemus* Socrates' phronésis is described as the way to perfect happiness and to true success.[61] There his gospel has an almost universal import, and it is certainly unthinkable without his consciousness that he is giving men a firm foothold in life by knowledge of the highest goods. In *Phaedo* its strength, rising above and looking beyond the world, appears in the serene, mystical, last hours of the master. There it is shown to be the philosopher's daily and nightly preparation for death.[62] But this con-

8

THE SYMPOSIUM
EROS

In *Lysis,* one of the most charming of his smaller dialogues, Plato enquired what was the nature of friendship. This was his first handling of a theme fundamental to his whole philosophy, which was fully and absorbingly discussed in the great books on Eros written in his maturity, *The Symposium* and *Phaedrus.* No less than the examination of the special virtues in his early dialogues, this discussion forms part of the great structure of Plato's political philosophy. His teaching about friendship is the nucleus of a theory of politics which treats the state primarily as an educational force. In *The Republic* and his seventh Letter, he explains that he gave up all political activity because he had no trustworthy friends and comrades to help him in rebuilding the polis.[1] When society is suffering from a great organic disorder or disease, its recovery can be initiated only by a small but basically healthy association of people who share the same ideas, and who can form the heart of a new organism. That is exactly what Plato means by friendship (φιλία). It is the fundamental form of all society, in so far as society is not only a natural but a moral and spiritual association of human beings.

Therefore the problem covers a far wider field than any conception of friendship existing in our own highly individualized society. We can understand the meaning of the Greek *philia* more clearly if we trace the working-out of the concept as far as the subtle distinctions and systematizations which Aristotle introduces into his theory of friendship in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: for his teaching on the subject is directly derived from Plato's. He elaborates a complete scheme of all possible types of human association (φιλία), from the simplest basic forms of family life to the various types of states and constitutions. The root from which this social philosophy sprang was the theorizing of Socrates and his pupils, especially Plato, about the nature of friendship, and the unique importance it had in Socrates' life and

that he could infuse that spirit into all the contemporary world; he felt that all those natural instinctive energies which his paideia would vainly strive to combat ought instead to contribute to it. His teaching about Eros was a bold attempt to bridge the chasm between Apollo and Dionysus. It was, he held, impossible, to neglect the inexhaustibly renewed energy and enthusiasm of man's irrational powers, if one hoped to reach the height of illumination which was possible for the spirit looking upon the Idea of Good. The thought on which *The Symposium* is based is the union of Eros and paideia. As we have shown, this was not a new thought. It was traditional, and the advance made by Plato lies in this: at a time of sober moral enlightenment and rationalism, when it seemed certain that the male Eros of old Greece, with all its undoubted evils and with all its lofty ideals, would be relegated to oblivion, he revived it, and purified it, and ennobled it. He gave it immortality in this last form, as the highest spiritual flight of two closely united souls towards the realm of eternal beauty. We know nothing of the personal experiences which may have been responsible for that refining process. But they inspired one of the greatest works of poetic imagination in the literature of the world. Its beauty lies not only in the perfection of its form, but in its blending of genuine passion with the winged flight of pure thought, and with the power of moral self-emancipation which is expressed with triumphant courage in the final scene.

We have seen that Plato's method of thinking and writing is always the same: it is a combination of two elements, an effort to attain ideals of universal validity, and a lively awareness of all the concrete facts of the life in which he is living. This is shown by the form of his dialogues, which always centre upon definite situations and real men, and ultimately upon one spiritual situation which is viewed as a whole. Within that immediate frame, Socrates tries, with the assistance of his dialectic, to reach some understanding with his fellow-men about all sorts of goods common to them all. This leads to a discussion of the speakers' common problems, and they work together towards a common solution which will embrace all the divergent points of view. More than any other dialogue, *The Symposium* is the product of just such a definite intellectual and moral situation. It must

intercourse with nationals of other states, and that the state's inability to establish this kind of authority by its own legal powers must lead to tyranny. His chief concern, therefore, was in reaching practical solutions of the value of which he was already convinced, and which must essentially have corresponded to the views current in the Greek democracies after the conclusion of the ruinous war. But still, his book is highly significant: it shows the kind of atmosphere in which Plato's theory of the ideal state was constructed.

Plato is not content with assuming one type of constitution and giving advice for its betterment, or with discussing the relative value of different kinds of constitution, like the sophists.[18] He is more radical in his approach. He starts with the general problem of justice. The symphony of *The Republic* opens with the familiar Socratic theme of areté, in the same key as Plato's earlier dialogues. At first (as in the early dialogues) the state is not mentioned at all. Socrates seems to begin by discussing one single virtue. But the discussion has an important historical background, which, though invisible, is present to the eye of the historian. In order to understand the opening of the book, we must think back to the disputes about the ideal of justice which had taken place in the century before Plato. Justice was political virtue in the highest sense. As the old poet said, it contained all other virtues in itself.[19] Long before, when the constitutional state was coming into being, that line had pregnantly expressed the new significance of the concept of virtue; and now it was once more actual and up to date for Plato. But now its sense had changed and become deeper. For the pupil of Socrates, it could not signify mere adherence to the laws, that legality which had once been the rampart of the constitutional state against a world of autocratic feudal or revolutionary forces.[20] Plato's conception of justice transcended all human institutions: it went back to the origin of justice within the soul. What the philosopher calls justice must be based on the most inward nature of the human spirit.

Two hundred years earlier, the solution to centuries of party struggle had seemed to be that all citizens should be bound to obey the rule of universal law.[21] But subsequent developments had shown that this solution involved serious difficulties. Laws had been meant to last for a long time—perhaps for ever. But

health, whose existence it is impossible to doubt—unless, like the written laws of the state, it is simply a reflex of the changing influences of power and party.[37] It is beautiful to see that Socrates does not announce this dogma pontifically to an incredulous audience, as in *Gorgias*,[38] but instead, two young men, struggling to find some moral certainty for themselves, draw that conclusion from their own spiritual doubt, and only turn to Socrates so that his superior intellect can solve their enigma. This casts a distant light on Plato's definition of the state, which is destined to grow out of *this* ideal of justice: it is rooted in the inner depths of the personality. The soul of man is the prototype of Plato's state.

The close relation of the state and the soul is hinted at in the remarkable way in which Plato comes to discuss the state. The title of the book makes us think that now at last the state will be announced as the true ultimate aim of the long discussion of justice. And yet Plato treats the state simply as a means to explain the aim, nature, and function of justice in the soul. Since there is justice both in the soul and in the state as a whole, we must be able to spell out its character in the state, that larger although more distant picture, in bigger and clearer letters than in the individual soul.[39] At first glance this looks as if the state were the prototype of the soul. But for Plato they are exactly similar: their structure either in health or in degeneration is the same. Actually the description he gives of justice and its function in the ideal state is not derived from the realities of political life but is a reflection of his theory of the parts of the soul, projected in larger proportions onto his picture of the state and its classes. He makes the state grow up before our eyes out of its simplest elements, in order to discover the point at which justice becomes necessary in it.[40] That does not come to light for some time; but the principle underlying it is invisibly active in the first beginnings of the state, in the division between various trades and vocations that is necessary as soon as some craftsmen and farmers join to form even the simplest community.[41] This principle—that everyone should do his own job (τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν)—is for Plato connected with the nature of areté, which is the perfect functioning of everything and of every one of its parts.[42] It is easy to understand this of men working together in society, and less easy of the co-operation of 'the parts of the

poetry, which dominates his argument about education, and becomes acute at this point.

He was not the first Greek philosopher to attack poetry. There was a long tradition of criticism behind him; and although it is naturally impossible to be precise about his predecessors in this particular critical attitude, it would be a historical error to underestimate the strength of the tradition and its influence on him. He begins by attacking Homer and Hesiod for portraying the gods as too like human beings. That was the first point made by Xenophanes in his satiric attack on epic poetry.[60] Heraclitus had repeated the attack, and up-to-date poetry (personified in Euripides) had sided with the philosophical critics.[61] But did not Aeschylus and Pindar thoroughly sympathize with this criticism of the Homeric Olympus? did they not—although abstaining from negative criticism—put the whole weight of their moral earnestness, the whole energy of their personal conviction, into substituting their own purer conception of godhead for the old bad one? There is one unbroken line of thought from those early critics of Homer's heaven to the Christian fathers, who took their moral and religious arguments against the anthropomorphic Greek gods directly, and often word for word, from the pagan philosophers. The first such critic is really the poet who wrote the *Odyssey*—for he is obviously taking pains to make his gods (particularly Zeus) behave more nobly than they do in the *Iliad*.[62] Plato took over certain detailed arguments directly from Xenophanes, such as the criticism of the battle between the gods and the giants, and of the feuds of one immortal against another.[63] The ultimate source of his complaint is the same as that of his predecessors. Like them, he tests the stories which the old poets tell by the standard of his own morality, he finds them unworthy of what he believes divinity ought to mean, and he judges them false. Xenophanes had already attacked Homer 'because he was always the teacher of all men',[64] and because he knew that he himself possessed a higher truth.

Plato's attack moves along the same lines, but it goes far further. He is not casually criticizing the bad influence of poetry on popular thought; in *The Republic* he is revising the entire system of Greek paideia. Poetry and music had always been the foundations of the education of the mind, and had involved re-

meaning of the reform of poetry by philosophy in *The Republic* is spiritual; and it is political only in so far as a state-building force is contained in the expression of every spiritual ideal. That is what gave Plato the right to lay down that, in his newly constructed society, poetry ought to be written in conformity with the Ideas, or else be weighed and found wanting. He did *not* want to burn all the poetry that did not correspond with his standard; he did not question its aesthetic merits. But it was unfitting for the lean energetic state he was constructing, and suitable only for the rich overfed state.

And so poetry was doomed by the unique value with which the Greeks had invested it. In the same way the state was impugned by its own claim to moral authority, when Plato measured it by Socrates' moral standard—a standard which its mundane character for ever prevented it from attaining. Of course neither poetry nor the state could be abolished as factors in education, but in Plato's Republic they had to surrender their former leadership to philosophy, the knowledge of truth: because philosophy was able to tell them how they must change in order to justify their educational claims. In reality, they refused to change: so that the only visible effect of Plato's criticism was the unbridgeable gulf which thenceforward was to divide the Greek soul. But there was one positive result of Plato's apparently vain yearning to reconcile the aspiration of art towards beauty with its high educational mission. That was the philosophical poetry of his own dialogues. By the criteria set up in *The Republic,* his writing was entirely up to date, and quite supplanted the older type of poetry—even if, in spite of all attempts at imitating it, it remained unique. But why did he not say right out that his own books were the real poetry that should be given to teachers and pupils? Simply because he was pretending to record not his own thoughts, but a dialogue between others. In his old age he abandoned the pretence, and told the degenerate world that his own *Laws* was the type of poetry it needed.[69] Thus, dying poetry once more manifested its supremacy in the work of its greatest accuser.

Most of what Plato says about the education of the guards is concerned with the 'types' of poetry which are to be excluded from it. He has two reasons for doing this. By declaring that

tial characteristics of early Greek poetry, from Homer to Attic tragedy, to treat the destiny of man as dependent on the power of the gods. Our lives cannot be explained by themselves alone, on purely psychological grounds. They are joined by invisible threads to the power which controls the universe. Our effort to achieve our ideal culminates in heroic areté; but above us stands divine moira, inflexible and inevitable, to which all the will and the success of mortals are ultimately subjected. The spirit of Greek poetry is *tragic* because it sees in our mortal destiny the indissoluble link between every event, even the noblest of human endeavours, and the rule of heaven. Life became more and more rationalized in the sixth century, and the Greeks began to feel that men were responsible for their own actions and sufferings. But even that change of feeling did not invade the moral sentiment of thinkers like Solon or Theognis, Simonides or Aeschylus, so far as to destroy the last strong core of belief in moira—the belief which is still active in fifth-century tragedy, the belief that 'whom the gods wish to destroy, they first make mad'. Misery deserved and misery undeserved, each is 'moira of the gods': for God is the cause of everything that happens, be it good or bad.

The conflict between this religious conception and the ethical idea that man is fully responsible for the results of his actions runs through all Greek poetry, although sometimes beneath the surface. It was bound to come to a head when Socrates preached his radical doctrine that all human life should be judged by ethical standards. The world of areté in which Plato constructed his new order is based on the assumption that each individual shapes his own moral course through life towards what he has seen of the Good. This absolutely excludes the rule of moira. What is called moira by those who think like the old poets is not the will of heaven. If God were capable of leading men into evil, despite their efforts to avoid it, we should be living in a world in which paideia had lost all its meaning. And so, through Socrates' belief that men 'naturally' will the good and are capable of apprehending it, Plato is led to make a great transformation in the pre-Socratic conception of the world. In early days, the Greeks thought of God chiefly as the power which is the cause of everything: their poets and their philosophers were in harmony on that point. Plato does not shrink from the consequences of abandoning this belief. He admits that the realm of good and of freedom is counterbalanced by the realm of necessity (ananké) which his predecessors had described as 'Nature'. But (as *Timaeus* shows) he holds that the world of nature is merely *matter,* in which the *form,* which is the divine Idea of Good, realizes itself as the higher Nature. Everything which does not harmonize with the Good is an exception, an imperfect manifestation of pure being, and therefore an abnormality. Plato's paideia could not exist in the world as Democritus conceived it. Democritus' world was the world of the old poets, dominated by moira; but it was that world pushed to the scientific extreme. Plato held that the great enterprise of educating men was impossible unless teachers and pupils had a new conception of the universe, as a true cosmos, a world-order in the Platonic sense—unless they were both guided by a single good principle—and unless the whole work of education was in harmony with the law of the universe. In a universe of that kind paideia is truly the work of God, as Socrates calls it in the *Apology,* where he proudly acknowledges he is devoted to it as 'the service of God' and dedicates his life to it.

After laying down the rules for describing the gods, Plato proceeds to an argument, also supported by copious quotations, that poetry tends to prevent courage and self-control from developing. All his criticism of traditional paideia is based on the doctrine that there are four main virtues—piety, courage, self-control, and justice. He does not include justice here, but at the end he explains carefully that we do not yet know what justice really is, and what importance it has for our life and happiness.[74] In this section, too, he treats the old poets rather harshly. By his grisly descriptions of the underworld (he says) Homer would teach the guards to fear death. Of course he does not suggest banning Homer entirely, but he does make excisions in him (ἐξαλείφειν, διαγράφειν), he cuts out entire passages of the epic, and he does not shrink from rewriting the poets on the plan he demonstrates later in *The Laws*.[75] A scholar devoted to the true tradition must think this is the most violent depravation of despotism and arbitrary will: for of course he holds the poet's written words to be inviolable. But that view, although we all hold it almost instinctively, is the product of a culture which has

on the soul of a man who felt it was only through rewriting him that he could fulfil his twofold debt to the poet and to the truth.

But Plato does not attack the thing so naïvely as the older thinkers had done when they refashioned some old coin of wisdom. His stern censor's frown is lightened by a gentle irony. He has no quarrel with those who try to keep a place for aesthetic pleasure, and say that Homer's descriptions of Hades make the epic more poetic and more enjoyable for us. Only the more poetic these descriptions are, the less suitable they must be for the ears of boys and men who are to be free: for *they* ought to fear slavery more than death.[80] So also he relentlessly cuts out of Homer all dirges for famous men, and also the inextinguishable laughter of the Olympian gods, which will make readers too free in giving way to their own laughter. Insubordination, voluptuousness, avarice, and bribery also are excised, as tending to corrupt the soul. The same kind of criticism is exercised upon the epic characters.[81] Achilles, who takes ransom for Hector's corpse from Priam and expiatory money from Agamemnon, offends the moral feeling of a later century just as much as his tutor Phoenix, who advises him to take a gift and be reconciled with Agamemnon. Achilles' defiance of the river-god Spercheius, his abuse of Apollo, his insults to the corpse of the noble Hector, and his murder of the prisoners at the pyre of Patroclus deserve no credence. The morality of the Homeric heroes makes it impossible for them to be divine—or else they are wrongly described.[82] From all these points Plato does not conclude that the Homeric epics are rather old-fashioned and crude because they reflect the thought of a primitive age. He sticks to his thesis that poets ought to give examples of the highest areté, whereas Homer's men are often far from exemplary. To explain that fact away by historical arguments would miss the whole point of the thesis, because it would be to deprive poetry of the normative force on which its claim to guide mankind must rest. Poetry should be measured only by an absolute standard. Therefore it must either be expelled or be subjected to the rule of truth, which Plato holds up to it.[83] That 'truth' is the extreme opposite of what we understand by artistic realism, although such realism had indeed existed in the generation before Plato. He thought that to describe the ugliness and weakness of men or apparent faults in God's government of the world was to put

poetry will be permitted to exist in the perfect state. To answer this question, only one datum is needed: which of them is required in the education of the guards? Still driving home the principle that everyone should thoroughly understand his own job and do nothing else, he explains that the qualities of a good guard will not admit the wish and the ability to imitate many other things. Usually even a tragic actor cannot act a comedy properly, and a reciter of poetry is seldom fit to take a part in drama.[87] The guards are to be a professional class, understanding only one kind of work: the defence of the state.[88] The old paideia tried to educate not specialists, but universally capable citizens. Plato does indeed claim its ideal of kalokagathia for his own guards too,[89] but by his unfavourable comparison of the amateur's efforts to act in drama with the highly specialized professional acting of his own day, he transfers the question of allowing dramatic poetry in the guards' education into a test-case between two rival abilities, which it would be wise not to bring into conflict. It is a strange but comprehensible thing that Plato, himself a universal genius, should be so emphatically in favour of such businesslike specialization. It is obviously a sign of the internal conflict which, here as in many other points, forced him to take a rather unnatural solution. From the fact that human nature 'is split up into minute subdivisions' he draws the conclusion that it is better for a soldier to be deliberately one-sided.[90]

Well: that is a harsh and exaggerated way of arguing. And yet, beneath it lies Plato's profound understanding of the truth that imitation (especially continuous imitation) influences the character of the imitator. All imitation means changing one's soul—that is, abandoning its own form for the moment, and assimilating it to the character of the model, whether the model be good or bad.[91] Therefore, Plato lays down that the guards shall have nothing to do with acting, except in representing figures possessed of true areté. He entirely forbids imitating women, slaves, men of low character or conduct, and *banausic* persons (those who have no share in kalokagathia). And a well-behaved young man will not (except in fun) imitate the voices of animals, the rush of rivers, the roar of the sea, the crash of thunder, the howl of the wind, the creaking of wheels.[92] There is one way of talking for gentlemen and another for their opposites. If a candidate for the guards imitates anyone, he should

been forbidden in the discussion of poetry. Likewise the soft Lydian and Ionian modes, suitable for drinking-parties, were to be censored, because drunkenness and voluptuousness were improper for the guards.[103] Socrates' interlocutor, Plato's young brother Glaucon (who personifies the interests of the educated young men of his time), proudly shows off his expert knowledge of musical theory by observing that this would leave only the Dorian and Phrygian modes; but Socrates will not attend to these details. Plato is calling our attention to the fact that Socrates is a really cultured man, who has a flair for the essentials, but does not care to compete with specialists. A professional must make a point of exactitude, but for an ordinary man of culture it would look pedantic and unworthy of a free-born citizen.[104] Therefore Socrates says broadly that he merely wants to preserve the kind of music whose tones and accents imitate those of a brave man facing danger, wounds, and death, or of a man of sober character and decent behaviour in peace-time.[105] He condemns both variety in musical modes and multiplicity in musical instruments. Instruments, he says, are not to be valued by the number of the modes they produce or the range of their strings. Flutes, harps, and cymbals are absolutely banned. Only the lyre and the cithara are kept—because they are suitable for nothing but simple music; and in the country only the shepherd's pipe is to be heard.[106] This reminds us of the story that the Spartan officials prohibited the brilliant Timotheus, the greatest innovator in modern music, from appearing in Sparta, because he had abandoned the seven-stringed cithara of Terpander, hallowed by tradition, and played an instrument of more strings and richer harmonies. The tale need not be true, but it shows very clearly how the Greeks felt a fundamental alteration in the structure of music to be a political revolution, because it changed the spirit of education, on which the state depended.[107] That feeling was not peculiar to conservative Sparta. It was just as strong, or stronger, though differently expressed, in democratic Athens—as we can see from the violent attacks on modern music throughout contemporary Athenian comedies.

Rhythm, the orderly pattern of movement, is inseparable from harmony.[108] We have explained elsewhere that the Greek word originally did not imply movement, but in many passages meant a fixed position or relation between a number of things.[109]

other. A purely gymnastic training would make a man too hard and violent, and too much music would make him soft and tame.[155] If he were to let his soul be constantly lapped in soft Lydian airs, he would first of all be tempered, as steel is tempered and made usable. And then he would dissolve away altogether till his soul had no sinews left.[156] On the other hand, if he spent all his time training hard and eating heavily without cultivating any musical and intellectual interests, he would first of all be filled with pride and energy, thanks to his physical strength, and grow more and more courageous. But even if he were naturally apt for learning, his mind would become deaf and blind if it were never fed on learning and study. He would become a misologist—a brain-distruster, hating the Muses. He would not be able to persuade by argument, but settle everything by force and brutality, like a beast.[157] That is why God gave us gymnastics and music together, the inseparable unity of paideia. They are not separable as physical training and intellectual education. They are forces which mould the spirited and the rational sides of human nature. Anyone who can blend them in the proper harmony will be a greater darling of the Muses than the legendary hero who first put together all the strings of the lyre.[158] Plato could not have put the essence of his doctrine better than in that simile, with which he closes his description of the guards' education.[159] It is indeed a highly refined instrument, with numerous strings: dumb for those who cannot play it, and intolerably monotonous for those who play only one string. But to sound several strings at once, and produce not shrieking dissonance but a sweet concord, is the difficult art of true paideia.

THE POSITION OF EDUCATION IN THE PERFECTLY JUST STATE

If the Republic is to be preserved, there must always be someone in it who has the art of guiding it by maintaining this balanced paideia[160]—or, as Plato says when he takes up this thought later and elaborates it, there must always be an element in the state in which the founder's spirit lives actively on.[161] This requirement involves a new and greater problem: the education of the educator. It is solved by the development of the philosophical ruler. Plato did not begin this subject immediately

unparalleled, almost unlimited power which he puts in the hands of its rulers. The only real guarantee to ensure that they will be the guardians, not the masters, of the Republic—that they will not degenerate from watchdogs into wolves tearing their own sheep—is their good education.[166] It is clear, from the interpretation we have given, that it would be wrong to criticize the 'lack of guarantees' in the Republic exclusively from the standpoint of constitutional law and political experience, and to blame Plato for naïvely imagining that a state could be ruled without the complicated apparatus of a modern constitution. It seems perfectly clear that Plato had no intention of treating the problem seriously—because he was not interested in the state as a technical or psychological problem, but was regarding it merely as a frame and a background for education. We may reproach him for this, accusing him of deifying education; but the fact remains that his real problem was paideia. Paideia was for him the solution of all insoluble questions. It is not for any political reason that he crowds the greatest possible power into the hands of those who dislike it most. His rulers are the noblest products of education, and their duty is to be the noblest educators.

Plato leaves it an open question whether the education of the guards, which is primarily aimed at creating as fine an average type as possible, is sufficient to achieve that aim.[167] But even if this leaves the specific content of the ruler's education indefinite, he goes on to describe the ruler's life in such a way as to show that the new state is dominated by the educational ideal. Meanwhile, political problems are dismissed with notable curtness. The external life of the ruler is to be one of the greatest frugality, poverty, and severity. He has no private existence at all—not even a home of his own or meals at home. He is an entirely public man. His bare necessities in food and clothing are supplied by the community, but he can have no money and no private property.[168] It is not the duty of a real state to make its ruling class as happy as possible, although it may be happiest in its divine independence of earthly goods. The ruling class is meant to serve the happiness of the whole community, and the happiness of the community can be ensured only if everyone does his own work and nothing else. For, according to Plato, the life of every individual takes its meaning,

its justification, and its limitations from the function he performs as a member of the social whole, which closely resembles a living organism. The supreme good which it must realize is the unity of the whole.[169] But note this: although the rights of the individual are curtailed, they are not supplanted by those of the state. The state is not expected to become as rich and powerful as possible. The things to which it aspires are not power and economic prosperity and the limitless accumulation of wealth. Its endeavours to acquire power and riches are limited. These are external goods, and the state wants to obtain no more of them than will help to maintain the desired social unity.[170]

Plato does not think this is an impossible ideal. He believes it would be simple to carry his plan through, if the citizens would only maintain one thing: that one thing being good education, on which the state depends.[171] If it is faithfully maintained, it will stimulate superior characters in the community, and they will eagerly grasp at it, and so excel their predecessors.[172] Plato's conception of the social organism does not depend, according to his ideal, on individual preference or arbitrary will. He thinks it is the absolute norm, derived from *human nature,* from the nature of man as a social and moral being. Therefore the system must be *static.* There is no progress in it, no development. Any departure from its standards is degeneration and decay. The essence of an ideal state is that anything different from it is bound to be worse. If anything is perfect, we cannot wish to improve it—only to preserve it. But it can only be preserved by the methods through which it was created. Therefore the one essential thing is that education should not be changed.[173] A state like this can suffer nothing much from external changes, but a change in the spirit of its 'music' would alter the character of its laws.[174] Therefore the guards are to build the citadel of the state on the highest spot—that is, on 'musical' education.[175] If it degenerates, it will automatically and almost negligently spread unlawful customs and conduct throughout society. On the other hand, it is through it that right customs can be set up again—respect for age, piety towards parents, proper hairdressing, clothing, footwear, and posture.[176] Plato makes fun of elaborately detailed legal codes. He thinks they are a simple-minded exaggeration of the power

of language, written or spoken. The only way to reach the legislator's ideal is by education; and if education is really effective, laws are not needed. Of course, Plato often describes the rules he gives for setting up his Republic as 'laws', but all his laws are concerned solely with the establishment of education. It is education which is to do away with the state of constant law-making and law-changing (as was the rule in Athens in Plato's day) and render superfluous all special ordinances concerning the police, markets, harbours, insult and injury, as well as civil lawsuits and the constitution of juries.[177] Politicians carry on a hopeless battle with the hydra. They keep trying to cure symptoms, instead of striking at the root of the trouble with the natural cure, which is right education.

Greek and Roman admirers of the Spartan *eunomia* describe it too as a state educational system which made specialized legislation unnecessary, because of the citizens' rigid observance of the unwritten law dominating their whole lives. We have pointed out elsewhere that this conception of Sparta was really created in the fourth century under the influence of revolutionary political ideas like Plato's paideia[178]; but that does not necessarily mean that Plato himself, in planning his educational state, borrowed nothing from Sparta's example. Contempt for the mechanism of modern administration and legislation, abolition of incessant lawmaking in favour of the power of morality and an official educational system to dominate the whole of life, introduction of a public mess-table instead of private meals for all the guards, state supervision of music, and the respect for music as the citadel of the state—all these are Spartan traits. But it was only a philosopher who had grown up in opposition during the decay of Athenian democracy, who could describe Sparta as a political system in which extreme individualism was happily avoided. The pride of Athens was its constitutional state, with its respect for the written law and its principle of legal regulation of every detail, its maintenance of equal rights for every citizen, high or low, and its intricate administrative machinery. Of course Plato's depreciation of these principles is an exaggeration which can be understood only if we recall the spiritual danger of Athens in his day. He had come to the tragic conclusion that laws and constitutions are mere forms, which have no value unless there is a strong moral core in the nation

so that they can be protected and respected. Conservatives even believed that what actually held democracy together was something entirely different from what democratic ideology praised as its support. They said it was not really the citizens' new-won and jealously guarded freedom of criticism, but the supra-personal power of custom and tradition—which is often exceptionally strong in a democracy, which even the citizens themselves do not realize, and which the nationals of different types of states seldom appreciate. The continuous life of this unwritten law had been the strength of Athenian democracy in its heroic age; its collapse transformed liberty into lawlessness, despite all the laws which could be written. Plato believed that a severe education on the pattern set by Lycurgus was the only way to restore—not what so many of his fellow-nobles yearned for, the old aristocracy of birth, but the old code of custom which should bind the state together once more. We should be misunderstanding the background of emotion and of contemporary politics which lies behind Plato's educational proposals, if we expected him to create an evenly balanced blend of all the elements in the life of the state. It is with passionate moral conviction that he puts, in the centre and focus of his discussion of the state, the one great truth which he had learnt through the agonies of his time and the sufferings of its greatest man. The outward aspect of Plato's education may be very un-Athenian, but the deliberate 'Spartan ethic' which animates it was impossible anywhere else than in Athens. Its inmost spiritual essence is absolutely un-Spartan. It is the last effort of the Athenian democracy's educational will, which now, in the last stage of its development, turns to make head against its own collapse.

Now, finally, let us ask what the education of the guards has to do with justice. After all, we did set out to discover what justice is. Plato has already stated that a thorough investigation of the problem of education would be useful in discovering the nature of justice.[179] This promise is fulfilled. To begin with, we were doubtful whether the long enquiry into the education of the guards was really a way of discovering justice, or perhaps Plato thought it worth making for its own sake[180]; and now we have found that the whole structure of the state is

based on right education—or, more precisely, is identical with right education.[181] Now, if this is correct, we have not only found the aim of true education, but have realized true justice: all we have left to do is to understand more fully what justice means.

For this purpose, Plato goes back to the earlier motive he gave for constructing the state: he said he described it in order that, when it was finished, we could recognize justice in it.[182] There was never any real doubt that he conceived justice as a quality dwelling within the human soul; but still he thought it was easier to use the analogy of the state to make its nature and effects in the soul quite clear. And now we see that it was his *organic conception* of the state which induced him to make that comparison. He believes that justice in the state is the principle by which every member in the social body fulfils its proper function as perfectly as possible.[183] The rulers, the guards, and the working class—all have their fixed and definite duties, and if every one of the three classes does its job as well as it can, the state which is made by the collaboration of the three will be the best conceivable state. Each of them is characterized by a special virtue: the ruler is to be wise,[184] the soldier brave.[185] The third virtue, prudent self-control, is not a virtue in the same sense—it is not a quality peculiar to the third class, but it is specially important for it to have. It is concord between the three classes, based on the voluntary subordination of that which is by nature worse to that which is by nature or training better. It is to penetrate all three classes, but its principal demands are made on the class which is expected to be loyally obedient.[186] Thus each of the four cardinal virtues of the old city-state code has found its right place in the state, and its appropriate social class—all except justice, which has no special position, no class left to attach itself to. And so the intuitive solution of the problem lies before our eyes. Justice is the completeness with which every class in the state expresses its peculiar virtue in it and fulfils its specific function.[187]

But we must recall that this does not really interpret justice in the exact sense. It is only its enlarged image, projected on the social structure: so we must look for its nature and origin in the soul of man.[188] There are the same parts in the soul as in the state. The wisdom of the rulers corresponds to reason in

the soul, the bravery of the guards to the spirited element in the soul, and the self-control of the third class (which always seeks out profit and pleasure) corresponds to the libidinous part of the soul when it subordinates itself to the highest insight of reason.[189] Plato does hint that this way of proving the theory of the parts of the soul is rather sketchy, but he says he does not want to use too subtle a method to solve the problem, one which would lead too far away from the main theme.[190] How could the psychological distinctions between the various classes in the state have arisen, if they had not already existed as distinct or distinguishable elements in the soul?[191] Just as one part of the body can move while another remains still, so in our souls the lustful element desires, the rational element sets limits to the desire, and the spirited element beats down the desire and allies itself to reason.[192] The soul contains forces which restrain as well as forces which urge and strive: it is their interplay that creates the harmonious completeness of the personality. It is impossible, however, to create this unity, unless each part of the soul 'does its work'. Reason should rule, and the spirited element should obey and support it.[193] Their concord is the product of the right mixture of 'music' and gymnastics.[194] This kind of culture braces the intellect and feeds it with noble thoughts and knowledge, while it leaves the spirit free, under constant control, and tames it by harmony and rhythm. If they are both educated in this way, if each learns its part correctly, they should both together control the desires. Desires form the greater part of the soul, and they are naturally insatiable. They can never be induced to do their work by being satisfied. If satisfied, they will become big and strong, take over power, and upset their owner's entire life.[195]

So justice is not the organic political system which ordains that the cobbler shall make shoes and the tailor sew clothes.[196] It is the quality of the soul through which every one of its parts does its work, and through which the individual is able to control himself and unite the conflicting forces which make up his soul.[197] We might use the analogy of the organic state, and speak of the organic cosmos of the soul. If we do, we have reached the very centre of Plato's thinking about state and education. The parallel between doctor and statesman which was so strongly emphasized in *Gorgias* now recurs, at this decisive

point.[198] Justice is the health of the soul, if we take health to mean moral perfection.[199] It does not lie in separate actions, but in the ἕξις, the permanent state of having a *good will*.[200] Just as health is the greatest physical good, justice is the greatest good of the soul. So the question whether it is healthy and advantageous for the soul is exposed in its full absurdity[201]: for justice is the health of the soul, and departure from its standard is illness and degeneration.[202] Life without it is not worth living—for even a life without physical health is intolerable.[203] The comparison between the medical and the political problem shows that justice is an inner quality, independent of all changes in external power. It is a realm of true freedom. But this does not exhaust its significance. Plato goes on to the further conclusion that there is only one form of justice, but many forms of its degeneration; and so once more he reminds us of medicine. There is one 'natural' state based on justice, and one just soul corresponding to it; but there is a multitude of degenerate forms of state and soul.[204] Thus immediately the task of education is widened, to take in a huge new territory. Until now it seemed to be confined to moulding the normal and 'natural' type of state and soul. Now we see that it must include the unnatural types of state and the degenerate forms of individual culture corresponding to them.[205] These two parts are the physiology and pathology of virtue. One essential purpose of Plato's *Republic* is to connect them, and his method can be fully understood and justified only by bringing in medical science. But for the time being Socrates does not go further into this fascinating pathological eidology.[206] He turns to the question of the education of women and their position in his state. And so begins a new act in the great philosophical drama of paideia.

THE EDUCATION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN

This excursus on the community of wives and children has excited more sensational interest, both in Plato's own day and afterwards, than any other episode in *The Republic*. Socrates himself is reluctant to expound his paradoxical proposals, for he is afraid of the storm of anger it will call forth.[207] But he believes it is the logical sequel of what he has said about the guards' paideia.[208] After being brought up in utter devotion to

the service of the community, with no home, no property, and no private life, how could a guard be the head of a family of his own? If every accumulation of private wealth is to be condemned because it fosters economic selfishness in individual families, and thereby prevents the realization of complete unity among the citizens, Plato can scarcely avoid condemning the family too as a legal and ethical institution. So he abolishes it.

This extreme logical deduction shows more clearly than anything else how utopian *The Republic* is. But Plato's political idealism, with an almost mystical adoration for social unity, rejects every compromise. Of course he is still bound to explain, as he promised, how this moral and social revolution can be possible.[209] The only proof that it is desirable is that it is necessary, in order to establish the absolute unity of the social group by restricting the individual's rights. Actually the endeavour to make the individual wholly and permanently a servant of the state[210] is bound to produce conflicts with the life of the family. In Sparta, where men of the ruling class spent almost their whole lives in fulfilling their military and civic duties, the family played a very subordinate role, and the morals of the women (in what was otherwise a very puritanical state) were ill reputed throughout Greece. It is mainly through Aristotle that we know about these criticisms of Spartan wives.[211] But they go back beyond his day: for all Greece had been shocked by the panic of the heroic women of Sparta during the Theban invasion, after the disaster of Leuctra.[212] The resemblance of Plato's Republic to Sparta, because of the absence of family life in the ruling class, is even more pointed by Plato's borrowing of the Spartan custom of communal meals for the men.[213] Probably that was why he felt he ought to find a nonSpartan solution for the problem of the position of women and their relation to husbands and children. He very significantly restricts the community of women and children to the guards, who are immediately in the service of the state, and does not extend it to the mass of the working population. The Church later solved this same problem by directing priests, its own ruling class, to remain unmarried and childless throughout their lives. Plato, who was not married himself, did not adopt that solution—both because he did not, like the Church, believe that marriage was morally worse than celibacy, and because the ruling minority in his state

guards' school, we shall see that nothing deserves the name of God better than the Idea of Good: it is fully covered by his definition of the divinity, as that which never does evil and always does good.[42] That is the dogma underlying his criticism of epic and tragedy for misrepresenting the gods. As we have seen, it is based on the belief that the supreme principle is the Idea of Good. Perhaps that is another reason why he does not call it God—because he would not add anything essential to it by doing so. On the other hand, the statement that God can do nothing but good makes the nature and activity of God himself answerable to that standard which is the Idea of Good.[43] Actually, the leading proof of the 'divine' character of the Good is that it has made Plato's God into a 'measure' like itself. For, as Plato says in *The Laws,* God is the measure of all things;[44] and he is the measure of all things because he is the Good. The Idea of Good here is the supreme standard which is the basis for a conception that appears early and survives late in the development of Plato's thought: the conception that philosophy is the supreme 'art of measurement'. Such an art could not, as the sophists and the mass of ordinary men believed in *Protagoras,* use the subjective scale of pleasure and pain. It must employ an entirely objective standard.[45] But here we can adduce another piece of evidence. Aristotle, in one of his early dialogues, *The Statesman,* where he is evidently still thinking along Platonic lines, calls the Good 'the most exact measure'.[46] There are two points of interest about that remark: it shows the close connexion between the Good and the exact political art of measurement desiderated by Plato, and it provides a welcome link between the Idea of Good in *The Republic* and the God defined in *The Laws* as 'the measure of all things'.

For Plato's ontological realism, the Idea of Good is not an idea in our sense of the word, but is itself good. In fact, it is the Good in its most perfect form, just as the Idea of beauty is itself beautiful, and indeed the most beautiful being that there is. Moreover, to be good means, for Plato, to be happy.[46a] The Greeks held that one of the most essential aspects of God's nature was happiness. The Homeric gods are simply called 'the blessed'. If we are right in explaining that Plato held the Idea of Good, as the pattern of everything in the world that deserves

this process; and by describing the metamorphosis of the soul he explains the *liberating* work of knowledge, which he calls paideia in the very highest sense.

PAIDEIA AS CONVERSION

After reading his earlier dialogues, we are bound to expect that, somewhere in *The Republic,* he will draw the necessary deductions from the revolution in the conception of knowledge that is first foreshadowed in *Meno.*[74] Even in his earliest books he had taken care to show that Socrates' 'ignorance' was the *aporia* or doubt of a man who was endeavouring to conquer and to make more profound the existing concept of knowledge. What *The Republic* says about this subject is bound to be far less precise than the dialogues which are written as special studies of the problem of knowledge. In it he is merely setting in order the results they reached. His own interpretation of the images of the sun and the cave absolutely excludes the usual conception of paideia—that knowledge is poured into an ignorant soul as if the power of sight were given to blind eyes.[75] True education means the awakening of abilities asleep in the soul. It starts the functioning of the organ by which we learn and understand; or, to continue the visual metaphor, it turns the soul round to the source from which light (= knowledge) flows. As if the only way our eye could face towards the light were by turning the whole body round, so we must turn 'with our whole soul' away from the realm of becoming, until it can bear to look at the brightest pinnacle of reality.[76]

Therefore the essence of philosophical education is 'conversion', which literally means 'turning round'. 'Conversion' is a specific term of Platonic paideia, and indeed an epoch-making one. It means more specifically the wheeling round of the 'whole soul' towards the light of the Idea of Good, the divine origin of the universe.[77] There is an important difference between this experience and conversion to the Christian faith, which was later named after the philosophical concept, conversion. That is the fact that the philosopher's knowledge is rooted in objective reality. On the other hand, as conceived by Plato, it is absolutely free from the intellectualism of which it is often wrongly accused. The seventh Letter shows that the spirit of

this knowledge can kindle only in a soul which through long years of endeavour has reached the closest possible kinship with the object—i.e. Good itself.[78] The living manifestation and activity of this phronésis is a virtue, which Plato distinguishes from the ordinary virtues by calling it the philosophical virtue—because it is grounded on conscious knowledge of the eternal principle of all good.[78a] By comparison, the 'so-called virtues' (temperance, courage, et cetera) which were the aim of the guards' education, seem more closely connected with physical virtues such as strength and health. They were not pre-existent in the soul, but were created in it by custom and practice.[79] The philosophical virtue, phronésis, is the one comprehensive virtue which Socrates sought for throughout his life. It belongs to 'a more divine part of us', a part which is always present, but which cannot be opened up unless the soul is made to face in the proper direction and turn round to the Good.[80] Philosophical culture and the philosophical virtue corresponding to it are higher degrees of ordinary culture and ordinary virtue, because they are a higher degree of reality. If, as the soul strives to mould itself by striving towards wisdom, there is any progress towards a higher level of being and therewith to higher perfection, then that progress is, as Plato says in *Theaetetus,* 'becoming like God'.[81]

The incessant secret excitement that marks the efforts of Socrates and his friends in Plato's dialogues, as they endeavour to acquire knowledge of virtue in itself and of good in itself, here at last comes to rest. This is the end it has been striving to reach—even although it can never really enter a state of permanent possession and unmoved satisfaction. From the individual's point of view, the inmost nature of philosophy is constant struggle to imitate the paradeigma, 'the pattern that stands in the realm of Being'.[82] But in an idealized state that is considered to be entirely grounded on this philosophy (or phronésis) which appears throughout it as its architectural principle, philosophy must necessarily seem final, complete, and irresistible. Knowledge of the 'starting-point of everything',[83] the cause of all good, is the principle of government in that state. Apart from the variation in phrasing, there is no difference between this principle and the fundamental statement in *The Laws* that 'God is the measure of all things'.[84] The state described in *The Laws* is 'theonomic', ruled by God, but it is not the opposite of the Republic—it is modelled on it. Although it gives philosophical knowledge only as much scope as befits the lower plane of ontological reality on which it is built, it maintains that supreme principle. Plato says in *Phaedo* that the discovery of the good and of the final cause is the historical turning-point in the philosophy of nature, where the pre-Socratic and post-Socratic worlds divide.[85] Aristotle constructed his history of philosophy in the first book of the *Metaphysics* around this notion.[86] The statement is no less true of political philosophy than of natural philosophy. In natural philosophy Socrates' discovery led Plato to distinguish between physics and the highest philosophy which is the theory of Ideas, and is ultimately theology. In politics Plato's conviction that the Idea of Good is the end of all action leads to the rule of the philosopher-king (who represents the new religion of the spirit) over the Republic inspired by the pure Idea.

Plato's pupils believed that when he proclaimed the Good to be the ultimate cause of everything in the universe, he was founding a new religion. This is made quite certain by Aristotle's laudatory poem on the altar of Philia. They thought also that Plato's belief that being good was the same as being happy was made manifestly true at least once in this world, in the person of their master.[87] Following the tradition of the Academy and the orientation given to philosophy by Plato, Aristotle called his 'first philosophy' *theology*.[88] Another of Plato's pupils, Philip of Opus, edited *The Laws,* adding an appendix of Plato's wisest thoughts, which he conceived as *theology* too.[89] He cannot have compiled it and published it along with *The Laws* without the consent of the Academy.[90] Now, he takes as the basic principle of the state described in *The Laws,* not the doctrine of the Idea of Good (although he is obviously thinking of it as a model), but the astronomical theology of the 'visible gods' mentioned in *Timaeus*.[91] That corresponds to the distinction between the empirical reality described in *The Laws* and the reality apprehended by pure phronésis described in *The Republic.* As a matter of fact, it was Plato who founded theology. That revolutionary concept never appears in history before Plato's *Republic,* where 'outlines of theology' are sketched out to help in employing the

knowledge of God (= the Good) in education.[92] Theology—study of the highest problems in the universe by means of philosophical reason—is a specifically Greek creation. It is the loftiest and most daring venture of the intellect; and Plato's pupils had to combat the widespread Greek feeling (really a vulgar prejudice) that the jealousy of the gods forbade men to understand such high matters. They could not appeal to the authority of a divine revelation which they possessed, but to the knowledge of good which Plato had taught them, good whose nature cannot admit jealousy.[93]

This makes theology a higher and purer work of the intellect than any mere religion—any worship which is based on mythical ideas accepted through faith. At an earlier stage of culture, the state had founded its system of discipline upon religion. Although piety had been undermined by the spirit of rational doubt, Plato's contemporaries still held it to be one of the four cardinal virtues of the citizen of the polis. Along with the other three, Plato takes it over from that religious and political tradition. It interests him from the beginning of his career as a philosopher. He gives it a dialogue to itself, soon after Socrates' death—the *Euthyphro*. Even there the traditional conception of piety is critically compared with the new Socratic concept, which measures all things not only on earth but in heaven against one standard, the Good.[94] It is not merely coincidence that makes *Euthyphro* the first Platonic dialogue in which the Ideas are mentioned.[95] Then in *The Republic* piety, *eusebeia,* is included as one of the 'so-called virtues' in the first stage of paideia, the education of the guards.[96] On the higher plane of reality represented by the philosophical culture of the rulers, it has disappeared. Together with the other three civic virtues of the average man, it has merged into the higher unity of 'wisdom'—which is itself a divine part of the soul and can know the divine in its purest aspect, as the Idea of Good.[97] Piety in the ordinary sense has been replaced by the philosophical form of it created by the Greeks, theology, which now becomes the basic principle of the state. We might well adapt Spinoza's title, and call *The Republic,* Plato's chief work, in which he lays this ideal foundation of paideia, a *Tractatus Theologico-politicus*. Despite the close connexion between religion and the state, the Greeks never had a priesthood supported by dogma. But in Plato's *Republic* Hellas produced a bold ideal worthy to be matched with the priestly theocracy of the Orient: a ruling class of trained philosophers, their claim to rule founded on the ability of the human mind to seek out and find the good which is God. We have pointed out above that, although Plato thought of his state as a Greek polis, its Greekness was only the material of which it was built.[98] The divine Idea of Good expresses itself as the formative principle in that material; and thereby the rational element which has been active in Greek political life ever since the ideal of the constitutional state was born, the element that strives to create universally valid laws and standards, now rises to the highest possible universality. Its visible symbol is the comparison of the good with the sun, which lights up the whole world.

But before we study the actual process of acquiring philosophical knowledge which corresponds to that conception of education, a new doubt arises—about the possibility of the philosopher's rule. Earlier we had discussed whether he was *capable* of ruling. Now we must ask whether he will be *willing* to rule, which means descending from the heights which he has so laboriously climbed to see true reality and being.[99] As far as his qualifications go, the image of the cave shows that what we call practical statesmen have a very poor insight into truth. Some of the folk chained in the cave acquired a certain dubious distinction among their fellow-prisoners because they managed to learn the commonest sequences of shadows recurring in the endless procession against the back wall of their cave. These (says Plato) are the men who handle power by experience alone without principle; and it is in their hands that government now lies.[100] According to the cave-parable, the uneducated man (ἀπαίδευτος) is one who has no fixed aim in his life;[101] and modern statesmen are the most notable embodiment of the type, for their subjective 'aim', suggested to them by ambition or power-hunger, does not deserve the name of 'end' in Plato's sense. If we follow him in saying that the supreme criterion for judging one's vocation to be a ruler is the possession of an absolute aim, then the philosopher, because of his paideia, is the only man who is truly entitled to rule. But how can he be induced to leave his 'isles of the blest' and take on a burden which

will pretty certainly keep him from continuing his studies?[102] The 'isles of the blest', as an image for the paradisal *vita contemplativa,* are such an apt invention that they have been used by many authors since, to describe what we might call 'the ivory tower'. They appear again in the work of Aristotle's youth, *Protrepticus,* where, as Plato's pupil, he expounds his own ideal of philosophical life; and through him they spread to the literature of later antiquity and beyond.[102a] Despite the attraction which Plato and Aristotle give to the life of pure contemplation, it was always meant ideally to culminate in action; and action is what justifies it. The original political meaning of all Greek paideia now emerges triumphant at the moment of its greatest conflict and danger, through the intellectual and ethical significance which Plato once more imparts to it. How and when the philosopher is to do his duty must be defined more closely later, but Plato lays down the principle to begin with: the philosopher *must* go back down into the cave.[103] He must be persuaded and compelled to help those who were his fellow-prisoners. This strong sense of social duty distinguishes Plato's ideal of spiritual culture from the philosophy of the pre-Socratics. It is one of the paradoxes of history that those thinkers who were interested in the study of nature more than man should have played a far more active part in practical politics than Plato, whose whole thought was centred on the *problem* of practice.[104] He believed it was only in the ideal Republic that a philosopher could get the right education and become a practical statesman, and it was only in the ideal Republic that he would be fully responsible to the community. Plato felt no active gratitude to the degenerate state of his own day: for if a philosopher could grow to maturity in any such state, it was very sure that the public and the state's institutions had done nothing whatever to help him.[105] That would all be different in the Republic. There the philosopher would have society to thank for his paideia, and therefore for his whole intellectual existence: so he would be ready to 'pay the cost of his upbringing'. Despite his reluctance, he would be impelled by his feeling of gratitude to take the office assigned to him, and fulfil it to the best of his ability. Therefore the best state will be that which is governed not by those who love power, but by those who positively dislike it.[106]

saving the positive exposition of his own theories for a special book, lead to the logical conclusion which we meet again in *Timaeus* and *The Laws:* that the mathematical regularity of celestial phenomena presupposes the existence of intelligent and conscious beings to conduct them in heaven.[128] But because he is concentrating on paideia, he refrains from going into these scientific details here—he always keeps to the broad outlines even in discussing his own philosophy.[129]

Plato finds no difficulty in crediting Socrates with knowledge of all these special sciences which he adumbrates rather than explains. Socrates always appears as the man who knows every subject that comes up; and, although he seems to be concentrating on the central subject, he reveals from time to time an astonishing familiarity with subjects about which we should expect him to know very little. There must be some historical foundation for this omniscience; and yet one fact is very well established. The real Socrates did not think so highly of the various mathematical disciplines which Plato here makes out to be *the* way to knowledge of the Good. This is a fine test-case to prove the complete freedom with which Plato, in writing his dialogues, puts his own thoughts in Socrates' mouth. Xenophon is obviously pointing to Plato's unhistorical treatment of facts when he says that Socrates knew something about mathematics, but thought its educational value was strictly limited by its practical usefulness.[130] This of course is the exact opposite of what Plato makes him say. The fact that Xenophon deliberately contradicts Plato may be taken to prove that he, and not Plato, is sticking to facts. The historical Socrates would never have reproached his interlocutors, as the Platonic one does, for justifying astronomy by declaring its usefulness in agriculture, navigation, and strategy.[131] Here Plato's paideia shows the immense importance he attaches to mathematics, even in the theoretical elaboration of Socrates' ideas. He is suspicious of any purely utilitarian foundation for the science, even though he himself points out that mathematics is indispensable for a strategist. 'To look upwards' with the soul, as we are taught to do by astronomy treated mathematically, is very different from turning one's gaze towards heaven as professional astronomers do.[132] That part of the soul which is kindled to pure flame by mathematics studied

liant scientists, vying with one another to advance their subject, created an atmosphere of victorious confidence which was bound to produce reactions on philosophical thought, in the general excitement of the intellectual life of fourth-century Athens. To the philosopher, mathematics looked like an ideal science: a solid and exact structure of logical inference and proof, something undreamed-of in the days of the pre-Socratic natural philosophers. The attention which mathematicians had lately paid to the development of scientific method enhanced the value of mathematics as a model for the new science of dialectic developed by Plato out of Socrates' conversations on virtue. Like all other great philosophers, Plato could not have brought his philosophy into being without the fertilizing influence exercised by contemporary science through its new questions and new solutions. Next to medicine (whose influence on him we have so often pointed out) it was mathematics which stimulated and encouraged him. From medicine he took the analogy between physical and spiritual conditions (condition = *hexis*) and the idea that philosophy ought to be a techné, a skill comparable to medicine, a science of the soul's health. Mathematics showed him how reason could operate with purely intelligible objects, such as the Ideas. On the other hand, Plato himself, with his new logical discoveries, strongly encouraged the mathematicians to build up their science into a systematic structure—so that the benefit was mutual, as indeed ancient tradition tells us.[140]

It was relatively late in Plato's life that Theaetetus became important for him. The latter was still in his prime when he died in 369 B.C.: therefore his discoveries must have been quite new some years earlier, when Plato brought them into *The Republic*.[141] Plato's first contacts with mathematics must have been made even before he met the Pythagoreans, because dialogues like *Protagoras* and *Gorgias,* which betray a marked interest in the subject, were written before his first visit to Sicily. There must have been plenty of opportunity to study mathematics in Athens at that period.[142] Unfortunately we cannot follow up Plato's connexions with Cyrene, which city he is said (though the tradition is not firmly established) to have visited after Socrates' death.[143] Later, when he wrote *Theaetetus,* he contrasted Theaetetus himself, representing the younger generation of mathematicians, who were receptive to philosophical prob-

mathematics show exactly what was the position of mathematics in the philosophical course given by the Academy. Evidently Plato made no distinction between research and teaching. The field was still clear and within view, so that he simply directed his future rulers to study the entire subject,[150] without making any selection, and he even welcomed newly developed branches like stereometry (the science of solid geometry) to extend the programme. It is easy to imagine that other schools had a different idea of the right paideia for a statesman. Wherever it was held to have a practical end in view, namely rhetoric, as in Isocrates' school, Plato's estimate of the value of exact mathematical knowledge in political education must have seemed exaggerated and greater emphasis must have been put on experience.[151] But the fact that Plato was criticized for developing mathematics too strongly shows that it was held to be the keystone of his educational system.

Neither in the simpler education of the guards, nor in this higher form of education, is Plato's paideia based on pure theory. In the former, he took over as its chief material all the traditional culture (by which he means Greek culture) in existence, all the poetry and music of his nation; only he compelled it to purify itself and prepare to fulfil its highest duty. In the latter, he guided the living stream of contemporary science into the channel of his own philosophical paideia; only he sought out everything which could serve his philosophical purpose directly, and subordinated it to that purpose. This suggests another question: what was his attitude to those other sciences which he does not mention in his programme? Nowadays we believe that science has no frontiers narrower than those of human experience. This might make us think that the great prestige given to mathematics in Plato's paideia was (however noble) a serious distortion of emphasis, or perhaps that it was due to the temporary predominance of mathematics in his time. But although it must have owed its pride of place in the Academy to the great specialists who were working in it and the feeling of confidence and progress they inspired, its importance was ultimately based on the character of Plato's philosophy and his conception of knowledge. He excluded all empirical knowledge from education. The attempts made by the sophists to cultivate encyclopaedic 'scholarship' were carried no further in Plato's school.

edge imposed on the soul by force does not cling to it.[180] Therefore Plato asserts that in this stage of education children should be introduced to knowledge as if it were a game.[181] This assertion is no doubt based on the bad results which must have been produced by the increase in 'cramming' during his lifetime, as soon as the new subjects were not kept for the keenest and most gifted pupils but were tried on the average boys too. Even Plato himself does not set the standard too high at this stage: he says that the games which compose elementary education are to show which are likely to be the most gifted pupils. He compares this system of learning by play with the other device which is put into action at the same period—taking the children out to watch the spectacle of battle: they are to 'taste blood' like puppies, and conquer their fear of the terrors of learning.[182] Even at this stage, they must not learn anything mechanically. Their teachers are to 'propose' (προβάλλειν) mathematical problems to them which are suitable for their age. This is the first hint of the concentration on 'problems' which is to become more and more pronounced in later and higher stages of Plato's mathematical curriculum.[183]

The first selection is to be made after the compulsory training in gymnastics is over. Plato says that will last two or three years. During that period, the mind is not trained at all, for exhaustion and sleep are enemies to study. Anyhow, perseverance in athletic exercises is itself an important element in the examinations and the selection based on them.[184] The fact that intellectual training recommences at the age of twenty shows that the compulsory athletic training, which is to be distinguished from voluntary athletics at earlier and later stages, falls in the period between the seventeenth and twentieth years. That was the age at which eligible young men in Athens were trained as military cadets, *ephéboi:* their service began at eighteen and lasted two years. Plato copied its duration, but felt that a third year might be added.[185]

Thereafter begins another course of education connected with the mathematical studies which were completed earlier, and designed to reveal and illuminate the connexion between the disciplines previously studied in isolation, and their objects. They are now to be compared with one another, until the student arrives at a 'synopsis', a comprehensive view, 'of their mutual

This idea often recurs in Plato, but is nowhere so fully developed as here, where the educational value of dialectic is being discussed. His warning against its dangers is made an actual part of his description of it, by revealing a negative aspect and throwing up the positive side concealed by it. For if dialectic seduces young men to practise it as an intellectual sport, that is not only because they are too young to know better, but partly because of the very nature of dialectic and its formal character. In the criticisms levelled at Plato by his contemporaries, especially rival educators, the close resemblance between his dialectic and eristic (or pure disputation) comes out very clearly. Dialectic and eristic are actually put on the same level.[200] For its bad reputation, its own students are responsible. Plato is very anxious to make his readers aware of the distinction between paideia and *paidia,* education and play. In Greek the two words have the same root, because they both originally refer to the activity of the child (*pais*) ; but Plato is the first to deal with the problem of the relation between the two concepts.[201] That was almost inevitable in an epoch when one of the two, paideia, acquired such a comprehensive meaning as to become equivalent to 'culture'. Down to the end of his life, Plato was interested in the subject of play. Nowhere is his interest clearer than in *The Laws,* the work of his old age, where we shall meet the problem in a new guise.[202] It was taken up by Aristotle, and serves to illustrate his ideal of culture—scientific leisure as opposed to pure play.[203] Plato is anxious to include the play-element in his paideia: the guards' children are to learn their lessons through play, which means that paidia helps paideia. Dialectic, however, is a higher stage. It is not play, but earnest, σπουδή.[204] Since many modern languages have taken over this classical contrast of the two concepts, it is difficult for us to realize what an effort of abstract philosophical thinking created it. The idea of 'earnest', or rather 'earnest activity', *spoudé,* does not occur as a philosophical problem until *The Laws;* but Plato obviously has it in mind when he compares beginners in dialectic who misuse their skill in contradicting others for their own amusement, to young puppies who love chasing other dogs and biting them.[205]

But the danger that dialectic will annoy others is not so great as that it may lead the student himself to lose his respect for

in such a way that they spend most of their lives in study, but are always ready when their time comes to take on the task of ruling—not as an honour, but as a duty.[212] And after training others in the same way to succeed them as guards of the state, they depart to the isles of the blest, this time not metaphorically, but literally. But during their lives, they have inhabited the blessed isles of peaceful study, and their journey to them now means only a passage into the bliss of an eternal *vita contemplativa*. The honours they are to receive after their death are like those paid by Greek states to the heroes of old. The final decision about their canonization as heroes is left to the Delphic oracle.[213]

That is Plato's description of the philosophical ruler, the philosopher-king. The supreme purpose of Plato's paideia is to produce such men. It is only through them that the perfect state can be realized—if it is possible at all, which Plato believes it is, despite difficulties.[214] He conceives that the Republic will be governed by one man or several men of that type, invested with all power—a king, therefore, or an aristocracy. It does not matter whether there is one ruler or several, since the nature of the constitution will not be altered by a variation in their numbers. They can be called an aristocracy in the true sense of the word. Greek culture had started in the aristocracy of blood. Now, at the end of its development, it became in Plato's vision the selective principle of a new aristocracy of intellect—whether it actually ruled or not. Two elements co-operated in the culture of those knights of the spirit. The perfect state contains them, as two complementary stages of education: 'philosophical logos mixed with music'.[215] Together, they are the two supreme forces of the Greek genius.

Plato claimed a great deal for his new paideia. His high conception of its position and function in the world is revealed by his proud assertion that it ought to produce the nation's true leaders. They will despise the honours given out by the contemporary state, for they know only one honour, that of ruling in the true sense, on the basis of justice.[216] If we ask how the rulers who have been formed in this way, through supreme paideia, are to construct and establish the state, the answer is once more 'through paideia'. Their purpose is to give ethical education to the entire population—the process which Plato had described,

which is natural and right to that which is wrong and deviates from the standard. If we disagree with Plato's outlook, we might say we were passing from the ideal to the real world of politics. There is only one perfect state; but there are many types of imperfect state.[222] There are as many as the types known to us by actual experience. The only difference between them is the degree of their imperfection. In order to establish their relative rank, Plato picks out the best-known types of constitution, and arranges them in a scale of value according to their distance from the perfect state.[223]

Aristotle too, in his *Politics,* combined a theory of the perfect state with a morphology of bad constitutions. He discusses in great detail why one science should perform these two apparently disparate functions.[224] Both the conjunction of the two subjects and the question why it is justified are taken by him from Plato's writings on political theory. In the final form of his *Politics* (which is the one we have) he begins by examining all existing forms of constitution one by one, pointing out that several of them are right,[225] and then works out the perfect type of state.[226] Plato does exactly the opposite. He begins with the problem of absolute justice and the ideal state which embodies absolute justice,[227] and then describes all other forms of state as departures from the norm, and therefore degenerate types.[228] If we accept his conception of politics as being an accurate science of standards, it is only logical to begin with the standard and then use it to appraise the inadequate reality. The only thing that needs discussion is the question whether the empirical types of constitution ought to be described at all, and whether they really form an organic part of the political science of standards.

Plato's answer to this question is determined by his idea of the meaning and purpose of political science. His science of dialectic in its *logical* aspect is based on mathematics, but in its *political* or *ethical* aspect (as we have observed) it is inspired by medical science.[229] His new techné of politics is first constructively outlined in *Gorgias,* and there Plato explains its method and purpose by parallels with medicine.[230] It makes the philosopher appear not merely a man who discusses abstract values, but an educator, the parallel to a doctor. His interest is the health of the soul, as the physician's is the health of the body. In *The Republic* we see clearly how profoundly important

Plato thought the parallel between medicine and politics was. It is based on the assumption, which is carried all through *The Republic,* that the purpose of every society is to develop the soul of the individual—to educate him until his character is as perfect as possible. Like medicine, politics has human nature (*physis*) for its object. What Plato means by human nature is explained at the end of book 4, where he defines justice as the real physis of the soul. That means that he is giving a normative sense to the concept of nature—just as the doctor does when he takes 'health' to be the normal state. Justice is health. And we must endeavour to attain it, because it is the only state which is natural (κατὰ φύσιν) to the soul. From this point of view it is impossible to ask whether one would be happier if one acted wrongly, any more than one could ask if it would be better to be sick than sound. Evil is unnatural (παρὰ φύσιν).[231] In treating the body, medicine distinguishes between individual and general human nature. As far as the individual is concerned, for example, many things seem all right for a weak constitution which would be not normal but unhealthy for the general average nature.[232] In the same way, if the physician of the soul is studying the individual, he will use the concept of nature to describe variations from the general norm; but Plato will not admit that 'everything is normal' if it corresponds to the nature of *some* individual or other; nor will he agree that the form which is most frequent by statistics is therefore normal. Few men, plants, or animals are perfectly healthy; but that does not make illness into health, it does not make the inadequate average into the standard.

If then the state is normal only when it educates men and women who have normal souls—i.e. who are just—then the types of state which actually exist are departures from the standard. At the end of the fourth book, Plato called them that briefly; having broken off the discussion there just after beginning it, he now takes it up again.[233] All actually existing states are phenomena of disease and degeneration. This is not merely a striking inference which is forced on Plato by his conception of the true meaning of 'standard'. The remarks he makes about his own life in the seventh Letter show that it is his own belief, the fundamental and unshakable principle of his political thought.[234] Still, his conception of politics necessarily includes the degenerate forms of state as well as the healthy one—just as medicine is the knowledge not only of health but also of illness: it is therapy and pathology too.[235] We knew this from *Gorgias.* The novelty in *The Republic* is Plato's working out of this scientific idea, by which the understanding of anything is linked with the understanding of its opposite.

The opposite to the one right kind of state is the multiplicity of wrong states. To study them he has to use another method, partly constructive, partly based on experience, which later assisted Aristotle to develop still further the empirical element in Platonism. The fact that it was Aristotle who elaborated this part of Plato's political science shows how fertile and suggestive was Plato's blend of ideal and reality. His theory of the forms of state is not primarily a theory of constitutional types. It is primarily, like his theory of the ideal state, a theory of the human soul. Using as a basis the parallel of state and man which runs all through his book, he describes and distinguishes the timocratic, oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical man, corresponding to timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny; and he sets up a scale of value for these types, sinking to the tyrant, who is the most extreme contrast to the just man.[236] But in *The Republic,* man and state are not merely outward parallels to one another; the state is the empty frame for the portrait of the just man. Similarly in the other types of constitution, the state is nothing without men. We speak of the 'spirit of the constitution' in this state and that; but the spirit has been created and given its special character by the type of men who have made the state that suits them.[237] This does not exclude the fact that the type of the community, once it takes form, usually stamps the individuals living under it with its own mark. But when the circle is broken and one form of state changes into a different one, as happens in reality, the cause is not some external circumstance, but the spirit of man, whose 'soul-structure' (κατασκευὴ ψυχῆς) is changing.[238] From this point of view Plato's theory of constitutional types is a pathology of human character. If we believe that the disposition (*hexis*) corresponding to the norm is created by the right education,[239] we must hold that degenerates are created by wrong education. If all the citizens of a state fall short of the standard in one particular way, the fault must lie with educa-

tion, not with nature, which strives towards the Good. Therefore the theory of constitutional types is also a pathology of education.[240]

According to Plato, every change in the state begins with the rulers, not with the subjects: a dissension (στάσις) appears in the governing class.[241] The entire teaching of Plato and Aristotle about political change is simply a theory of stasis—a word which has a wider connotation than our 'revolution'. The cause of deterioration in human nature, and therefore in the nature of the state, is the same as in plants or animals. It is the incalculable factor of *phora* and *aphoria,* good and bad harvests.[242] The origin of this idea (which we first met in Pindar's observations about areté)[243] is obviously in the old Greek aristocratic tradition of paideia. The old nobles were good farmers and good teachers; they must soon have found out that the maintenance of perfection anywhere in nature depends on the same laws. Plato gave scientific formulation and systematic development to this doctrine, using his favourite analogy of ethics and medicine. This passage is the first appearance in his work of the parallel between the pathology of plants and animals and the degeneration of areté in men. This way of regarding nature does not come from earlier natural philosophy, although it did study the problem of coming-to-be and passing-away, and therefore the causes of the pathé; it is closely connected with the problem of areté. Farmers and stock-breeders must have known something of these questions for centuries. To build their knowledge into the sciences of animal and botanical pathology was the work of the two generations from Plato to Theophrastus. Plato's biology of human areté could not have been worked out unless on the basis of empirical observation as practised by Aristotle's school. Yet its teleological concept of nature and its insistence on standards[244] evidently stimulated empirical observation in their turn. In Theophrastus' botanical pathology, whose classical expression is his book *On the Causes of Plants,* we may still trace the struggle between the severe Platonic idea that the norm is the best and most efficient form of the plant, its areté, and the purely statistical conception of the norm, which calls even an aberration 'normal' if it occurs frequently.[245] We have already pointed out that Plato calls for the community of women in the ideal state in order to control chance selection—the ordinary kind of marriage, in which so many other factors intervene—by a deliberate policy of eugenics.[246] Nevertheless, the birth of every living thing is subject to mysterious and inviolable arithmetical laws, which are almost beyond human comprehension;[247] and when marital copulation does not fall in with this hidden harmony, and misses the right kairos, to which divine chance and its success are bound, then the breed will not have the best physis, and will lack *eutychia,*[248] good luck and prosperity. Then gold will not marry gold, but silver or even iron; metals which have no kinship will be mated, and the results of this anomaly will be civil strife, discord, feuds. And that is the beginning of *metabasis,* the change from the ideal state to another less good.[249]

Plato's description of the constitutions is a masterpiece of psychological insight. It is the first general description of types of political life as seen from within in world-literature. Plato's analysis of the democratic type is differentiated from Thucydides' eulogy of Athens in Pericles' funeral speech by its realistic perception of the weaknesses of democracy, and from the critical pamphlet called *The Constitution of Athens* by its freedom from oligarchic rancour. Plato is not a partisan. He is equally critical of all constitutions. The nearest to the ideal Republic, he thinks, is Sparta, which like Crete was often eulogized by the sophists as the model of *eunomia,* political order.[250] To describe it Plato coins a new concept, timocracy, 'the rule of honour', because it is entirely founded on the standard of honour;[251] and his account of it has the charm of historical individuality, whereas the other constitutions are described in broader outline. Many points of *The Republic* are evidently borrowed from Sparta, so much so that he has been crudely called a philolaconian, like the Old Oligarch; but if we compare his description of Sparta with his own ideal state, we shall see what Spartan traits he made a point of avoiding.[252] The Spartan type, full of contradictions, is created by the mixture of inappropriate 'metals'. The iron and brass element in it inclines it towards making money and gathering landed property; for that poor element in the soul tries to complete itself by external riches. The gold and silver elements push it towards areté,

if he wished, by recalling and emphasizing the image of the three parts of the soul in the last sentence,[269] to draw his readers' particular attention to the logical way in which he reasons from the phenomenon of Spartan timocracy, apparently purely political, back to the pathological process within the Spartan soul. Health as defined by Greek doctors depends on keeping any one of the physical factors which constitute it from becoming dominant.[270] Plato did not take over this idea, because it would not lead to his own 'best constitution'. He thought the essence of health, physical as well as spiritual, was not a negative thing—the absence of domination by one part—but a positive thing, the symmetry of the parts, a condition he thought could easily exist if the better part dominated the worse. He believed the natural condition of the soul was that the best part, i.e. reason, should dominate the others.[271] Therefore disease originates when the part or parts of the soul which are not designed by nature to rule nevertheless come to dominate the soul.

So then Plato, in contrast to the general admiration of his contemporaries for all-powerful Sparta, feels that its weakness is the deficiencies in the famous Spartan education, on which the whole community depended.[272] According to the prevailing theory of chronology, which is probably right, *The Republic* was written between 375 and 370 B.C. His description of Sparta does not look as if it had been written after the striking Spartan defeat at Leuctra in 371. That event revolutionized contemporary thinking about Sparta, as we can see from Aristotle's *Politics,* and from the criticisms of other writers of the time, who are for once unanimous.[273] But both these criticisms and the previous adulation of Sparta spring directly from the inevitable admiration for the success of the state which had conquered powerful Athens. Plato seems to be the one great exception. Probably his analysis of the Spartan type was written before the unexpected collapse of Spartan power. Leuctra was not only a turning-point in the history of Greek power-politics, but also, because Sparta ceased to be a model to be copied and respected, a violent revolution in Greek paideia. The idealization of Sparta which had been so rife in the previous twenty or thirty years was essentially, as we have shown, a reflex of the general admiration of the Spartan system of education.[274] In spite of all Plato's respect for Sparta, and all he borrows from

Externally, of course, tyranny seems to bear the closest resemblance to Plato's own ideal Republic. Like the kingship of the wise and just man, it is based on the absolute rule of one person. But the resemblance is deceitful. Plato does not think that the existence of absolute monarchy defines the character of the state: it is only the form of the highest unity and concentration of *will,* which can be just, or can be unjust. The principle of tyranny is injustice. Because of its outward resemblance and inward contrast, it is the caricature of the ideal state, and the more any other state resembles it, the worse that state is. A complete lack of freedom is characteristic of it. That is what makes its origin from democracy understandable. Democracy contains the maximum of freedom. When any condition is exaggerated, it tends to swing back into the opposite. Excessive liberty is the shortest way to absolute unfreedom.[335] This medical explanation of a political phenomenon is of course based on the experience of the twenty or thirty years following the Peloponnesian war. The tyranny of an earlier age had been part of the change from aristocracy to democracy. The new tyranny of Plato's own day was the characteristic form of collapse in democracy, after it had become as radical as it possibly could. Therefore Plato's theory is one-sided, since it considers only the existing type of tyranny; but subsequent history seems to justify him. It shows that democracy is usually succeeded by tyranny. The Roman republic attempted to stop this process by the interesting device of making the absolute rule of one man a democratic institution, called into play for a short time at emergencies. This was the office of dictator. But Plato is not simply interpreting history when he connects tyranny with democracy. The connexion is made logically necessary by the psychopathological arguments which come from his theory of paideia. Interesting as his description of tyranny is, it is not what he says about the political pattern that interests us so much as his study of the psychological origin of tyranny as an ethical phenomenon in the widest sense of the word. In his whole gallery of tyrannical types, the political tyrant is only the most extreme, the one which affects society most deeply. This gradation in importance is evident in Plato's methodical transition from describing the political pattern of tyranny to analysing the tyrannical type of man in general.

As we have said, the origin of tyranny is liberty in excess. Plato is not content with the epigram alone. He illustrates it vividly by describing the symptoms of anarchy [336]—a description of the close interrelation of state and soul that is unequalled in world literature. Every line of it tells us that the gloomily realistic and sometimes sarcastically exaggerated colours in which it is drawn come from Plato's own experience in Athens. Sparta and oligarchy really mean much less to him than the situation he depicts here. He was able to describe anarchy so well because it was the phenomenon that had always determined the whole trend of his philosophy. Here we can see how his Republic and his paideia grew out of the anarchy which he saw around him. Therefore everything he says is a warning against what he knew to be the logically inevitable sequel of the present. It is a repetition on a higher plane of Solon's prophecy. For all politics is ultimately prophecy, whether it is based on the observation of recurrent phenomena (the method so despised by Plato),[337] or on knowledge of the profoundest logic of spiritual change. His theory of the passage of one type of constitution into another does not describe a historical sequence; but just as he describes the death-agony of freedom, he had seen the future to which Athens was doomed, during the last years of her apparent recovery. At some time, possibly, history might have taken that course, if the Athenian state could have developed wholly by inner laws. Tyranny, however, was not to grow up within it, but to be imposed on it by a foreign power. Yet the Macedonian invasion of Greece, while it struck across the fever-curve drawn by Plato in its last phase, was to give democracy one more great national duty to fulfil; and only in the weakness with which it faced that task was Plato's diagnosis, in conditions he had not foreseen, to be confirmed.

The symptoms of anarchy are first visible in education, for according to Plato's aetiology, it is in educational disorganization that it originates. The paideia of false equality results in strange unnatural situations. Fathers try to behave like children, and become afraid of their sons; while sons behave as if they were grown up, and stop respecting their parents and behaving properly, so as to feel quite free. Foreigners and resident aliens behave as if they were citizens, and citizens as if they were foreigners. Teachers are afraid of their pupils, and

flatter them, while the pupils despise their teachers. In general, young men copy their elders, and older men try to look young, smart, and amusing: anything to avoid being thought unpleasant and tyrannous.[338] There are no more distinctions between master and slave—to say nothing of the emancipation of women. These words read like a running commentary on the lively pictures given in the new Attic comedy, especially the description of the sons and the free behaviour of slaves. Plato's subtle perception of psychical facts enabled him to observe animals as well as men. In a democracy, dogs, horses, and donkeys are perfectly free and unrestrained, walking about full of dignity; when anyone meets them in the street, they seem to say, 'If you don't make way for me, I certainly won't for you'.[339]

Every extreme swings to the opposite pole, by an inevitable law of nature which holds in climate, in the vegetable and animal world, and which must surely hold in the world of politics too.[340] Plato emphasizes the fact that his principles are drawn from experience, by his careful choice of words. For instance, 'it is usual' (φιλεῖ) and 'it is customary' (εἴωθεν) are obvious allusions to the method of medical and biological pathology, in which these words are used to show the relative degree of certainty in our knowledge of any phenomenon.[341] Then follows the description of the disease. Just as phlegm and bile disturb physical health, so these elements in the social organism which do nothing and only spend money are the origin of unhealthy inflammation.[342] The 'drones' whose evil effects we have already seen in the oligarchic state are the cause of dangerous disease in democracy too.[343] A wise bee-keeper cuts them out, combs and all, to preserve the whole hive. The drones are the demagogues who talk and act on the platform, while their supporters sit round humming applause and preventing anyone from contradicting them. The honey is the property of the rich—that is what the drones feed on. The mass of the population, the working class, which is not interested in politics, is not very well off; but when it is collected, it is most powerful of all. The demagogues always give it a little honey as a reward, when they confiscate the rich men's money; but they keep most of it for themselves. Now, the rich enter politics too, to defend themselves with the only weapons which have any effect in such a state.

uses the worst elements in the nation to rule the best. He cannot maintain this numerous following except by committing further crimes, and confiscating the property of the church. Finally, the people realize what a monster they have produced. In trying to escape from the shadow of slavery, which they feared from free men, they have fallen into a despotism exercised by slaves.[349]

The tyrannical man seems to be the converse of the democratic man; but he originates in the hypertrophied desires to which Plato traces the origin of the democratic man too. The latter comes from the luxuriant growth of *superfluous* desires, and the tyrannical man from *unlawful* desires, a new type not mentioned hitherto.[350] In order to understand their character we must descend into the subconscious. In dreams, says Plato, the soul casts off the restraining bonds put upon it by reason, and the wild and bestial part of man awakens, revealing a part of his nature which he himself did not know. Plato was the father of psychoanalysis. He was the first to disclose that the horrible Oedipus-complex, the lewd desire to have sexual intercourse with one's own mother, was part of the unconscious personality. He disclosed it by analysing the experience of dreaming, and added a number of analogous wish-complexes, similarly suppressed, ranging from sexual intercourse with gods to sodomy and murder.[351] As an excuse for the detail with which he expounds the subject, he pleads its importance in educating the desires—for the tyrannical type does not even try to train and discipline his lusts. The unconscious, he says, thrusts upwards in dreams even with perfectly normal and self-controlled men: which proves that everyone has such wild and horrible desires in his heart.[352]

Plato draws the inference that he must extend paideia to the subliminal life of the soul, in order to bar these subterranean elements from breaking loose into the orderly world of conscious purpose and impulse. He describes a method of taming the abnormal desires which is based on the psychology of the three parts of the soul. The foundation is a healthy and temperate relation of every man to his own self. It has been remarked, correctly enough, that the modern individual concept of the personality, the Ego, does not exist in Plato. That is due to his idea of the structure of the personality. Personality for Plato consists in the right relation of the desirous part of man

He is full of mistrust, and his essential nature is injustice. He and his rule are the extreme opposite to the just man and the just state.[372] The just man is happy because justice is simply the health of the soul.[373] The tyrant is miserable, because the natural order within him is disturbed. No one can really judge that fact except the man who is able to penetrate another man's character, and who is not blinded by any great display like a child who sees only externals.[374] Here, at the end of his pathological analysis of political and individual types, Plato depicts Socrates as both a psychologist and a philosophical student of values—in fact, as the ideal educator whom he has been describing throughout the book. He makes him say, in a charming ironical way, 'Come, let us pretend to be students of the soul.[375] Is not the tyrant's soul like the country ruled by a tyrant? does it not suffer from the same diseases? Of all kinds of soul, it is the most slavish. There is no freedom anywhere in it: it is dominated by mad lust. Not the best, but the worst, rules it. It is constantly oppressed by anxiety and remorse. It is poor, insatiable, full of fear, mourning, depression, and grief.[376] But the greatest misery of all is that of the tyrannical man who is kept from spending his life as a private person and is raised to the absolute power which 'corrupts absolutely'.[377] In *Gorgias,* Socrates said that despite all the tyrant's authority he had no real power. It is not possible for him to do good, which is the natural aim of the human will.[378] In Plato's account of the tyrannical state we notice that he does not describe the tyrant as a man who acts freely; but he constantly emphasizes the fact that he 'must' drive out the best men, and 'must' do away with even his own comrades.[379] Everything he does is done on compulsion. He is the greatest slave of all.[380] His universal distrust makes him lonely, makes him far more confined in his movements than the ordinary man who can travel about and see the world.[381] So he is, to the eye of the philosophical doctor, the embodiment of utter unhappiness and misery.

THE STATE WITHIN US

As his motive for describing the various forms of state and the types of character corresponding to them Plato stated that the real aim of the discussion was to find out whether justice in

is doing the opposite. He is founding politics upon ethics, not only because he must begin political reform with teaching people how to behave, but because, in his belief, the principle of action which guides society and the state is the same as that which guides the moral conduct of the individual. For Plato the perfect state is only the ideal frame for a good life, constituted so that human character can develop unrestrained within it according to its own innate moral laws, in the certainty that it is thereby fulfilling the purpose of the state within itself.[48] In his view, that is impossible in any existing state. In every one of them there are inevitable conflicts between the spirit of the state and the ethos of the man who has the 'best state' in his own soul and tries to live up to it—the perfectly just man.[49] Looked at from this point of view, Plato's *Republic* is not so much a plan for the practical reform of the state as an artificial society in which all interests are subordinated to the education of the moral and intellectual personality, which is paideia. Everything in it is aimed at making men happy, not by satisfying the individual's will or judgment, but by assisting him to maintain the health of the soul, which is justice. At the end of the ninth book, where Plato draws distinctions between the various types of soul and ways of life, he says the only truly happy man is the just man. This was the answer to Glaucon's question, which started the main discussion: whether justice could make a man happy in itself without any social recognition.[50] But that was not his last word about the value of justice, and about the paideia leading to it. The prize of justice is greater, and the value at stake is higher than anything that can be realized in the brief span of human life.[51] The frame in which we must study the soul's existence is not time but eternity. What we are trying to do is to ensure its lasting safety in both this world and the next. The just man's life on earth is a constant education for the true state which, like the Ideas, is in heaven;[52] and so all education is preparation for a higher life in which the soul will not exist as a composite of the many-headed beast, the lion, and the man, but in its pure form.

It is not necessary here to go into the proofs of immortality which Plato advances.[53] Their general trend is that if the soul cannot be destroyed by its own illness, which is vice, then it cannot be destroyed at all. He does not even consider that the life of

145. See p. 66.

146. *Gorg.* 523a f.

147. This mistake is made by most of those scholars who emphasize the Orphic elements in Plato, from the point of view of the history of religion. The most extreme is Macchioro, who simply says that most of Plato's philosophy is derived from Orphism.

148. *Gorg.* 523e: αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα. The deceitful coverings are in 523b-d.

149. *Gorg.* 524b-d.

150. The Isles of the Blest, 523b, 524a, 526c; curable and incurable sinners, 525b-c, 526b7.

151. *Gorg.* 525c-d. Among the incurables are Archelaus, king of Macedonia, and the other absolute rulers, of whom Socrates in 470d-e had said that he did not know whether they were happy or not, for it depended on their paideia and their justice. During the medical examination in the other world it becomes apparent that the souls of those who have been 'brought up without truth' (525a) have nothing straight about them, but are deformed and crippled.

152. *Gorg.* 527e.

153. *Gorg.* 527d7.

154. *Prot.* 358c.

155. *Prot.* 357b5.

156. See pp. 67, 103.

157. *Gorg.* 521d.

158. This criticism of current paideia is elaborated in *The Republic* 492b f., especially in 493a-c. See p. 269 f.

159. Callicles confuses Socrates' criticisms of the Athenian state with the propaganda of the pro-Spartan oligarchic opposition: *Gorg.* 515e. He thinks Socrates gets his ideas from them; but Socrates emphasizes the fact that he is merely stating what everyone can see and hear for himself. Plato is obviously rejecting all party affiliations, and raising his criticisms to a higher level.

160. See p. 72 f.

161. *Ep.* 7.324e; and the end of *Phaedo.*

162. *Ep.* 7.324e, 325b, 325b-326b.

163. *Ep.* 7.325c f.

164. *Ep.* 7.331d.

Chapter 7

MENO

1. *Prot.* 357b.

2. *Meno* 70a.

3. *Meno* 71a. From the scientific point of view, this way of attacking the problem is the only logical and sensible one. But the old poets were very far from posing the problem about the nature of areté in that general form, even when they (e.g. Tyrtaeus, Theognis, Xenophanes) believed one areté was superior to all the others. When Socrates makes the acquisition of areté dependent on the answer to the question about its nature—i.e. on a difficult and complex intellectual process —it shows that areté itself had become a problem for him and the men of his time.

4. *Meno* 71d-e.

5. *Meno* 72a.

6. *Meno* 72b says the aim of such an enquiry is to discover the essence (οὐσία) of a thing; but before that see *Prot.* 349b.

over light and sight. That is not merely a poetic phrase. In others of his books (e.g. *Timaeus* and *The Laws*), and in the *Epinomis* published by his pupil, Philip of Opus, the sun and stars are called 'visible gods' (ὁρατοὶ θεοί), which makes them a parallel and contrast to an invisible divinity. It is important also to notice that in *The Republic* Plato calls the supreme god of the sky, Helios, the son, and Good, the father.

42. The 'outlines of theology' are in *Rep.* 379a: τύποι περὶ θεολογίας. The chief axiom about theology is (379b) that God is good in reality (ἀγαθὸς τῷ ὄντι). The phrase τῷ ὄντι is Plato's way of describing the being of the Idea.

43. Of course, in Greek religion, *God* was a description which could be applied to the supreme, all-controlling Good, with more justice than to any of the many other powers in the world whom the Greeks revered as gods. But the essential point from a philosophical point of view for Plato is the contribution he is making to the knowledge of the divine, by defining the supreme principle of the universe as that which is in itself Good.

44. In *Laws* 716c Plato's remark that God is the measure of all things is of course meant to be a contrast to Protagoras' famous epigram that the measure of all things is man.

45. *Prot.* 356d-357b. The true standard is Good in itself. The idea that there is a supreme art of measurement and that the philosopher's knowledge of values (φρόνησις) is the ability to measure, runs through all Plato's work right down to the end. In *The Statesman, Philebus,* and *The Laws* it appears with a new application to the problem of right action in ethics, politics, and legislation. The climax of its development comes in *The Laws,* where Plato calls God the measure of all things (see note 44). But as early as *Gorgias* (499e) Plato said quite clearly that good was the only true telos, the only aim of action.

46. Arist. *dial.* frg. ed. Walzer 99 (79 Rose).

46a. Aristotle thought that formula was the essence of Platonism: see his altar-poem, and the explanation of it in my *Aristotle* p. 107 f.

47. *Rep.* 526e. Plato says that the soul of the philosopher finally turns towards the region where the 'happiest thing in the realm of being' (τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος) is. He means the Idea of Good. Paul Shorey, in his footnote ad loc., minimizes this description as 'rhetoric'; but it strictly corresponds to calling the Good τὸ ἄριστον ἐν τοῖς οὖσι, *Rep.* 532c6; cf. n. 37.

48. *Rep.* 484c. So far Plato has said only that those who lack knowledge of Being, who have no clear paradeigma in their souls, are little better than blind men: because they have no clear point of reference to which they can orient their thoughts and by which they can always steer themselves. The opposite of such people, as we shall soon see, is the philosophical ruler of the Republic, who 'orders' (κοσμεῖ) himself and his polis by turning the bright part of his soul towards that which gives light to everything else, and who looks at Good itself in all its purity in order to use it as a paradeigma (*Rep.* 540a). This supreme paradeigma is the 'measure of everything' which Plato mentions in *The Laws* (716c) and identifies with God.

49. *Theaet.* 176b: ὁμοίωσις θεῷ. Cf. *Rep.* 613b: εἰς ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ. If God is Good itself, then ὁμοίωσις θεῷ becomes the formula for attaining virtue.

49a. *Rep.* 511b; see also 508e.

50. *Rep.* 501b: τὸ ἀνδρείκελον; see p. 277.

51. *Rep.* 501b: τὸ θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοείκελον and 501c: εἰς ὅσον ἐνδέχεται θεοφιλῆ ποιεῖν (scil. ἀνθρώπεια ἤθη).

52. See note 44.

53. *Rep.* 509d.

54. In *Rep.* 511c6 the sciences at this stage are called τέχναι.

55. *Rep.* 510b.

56. *Rep.* 510d; cf. 510b.

57. *Rep.* 511c-d.

58. *Rep.* 510b (see note 59).

59. *Rep.* 511b.

60. *Rep.* 510b10 and 511c3.

61. *Rep.* 511d. The basis of the comparison between the four stages described by Plato is the difference in *clearness* (σαφήνεια, sometimes ἀσάφεια) which they represent. Σαφήνεια means not only intelligibility but reality: cf. 510a9: ἀληθείᾳ.

62. Εἰκών means 'copy', not only as a likeness, but as something weaker than the original, as the examples show. Thus in 509e-510a Plato calls shadows and reflections εἰκόνες of sensible things.

63. *Rep.* 510e and 511a.

64. *Rep.* 511b5.

65. *Rep.* 514a. The word 'compare', ἀπείκασον (see also εἰκών at the end of the cave-image, 517a8), puts the whole parable on the same footing as the other 'images', εἰκόνες, used by Plato in this connexion: the image of the sun, and that of the mathematical ratios. Even the latter, the divided line, is a regular εἰκών.

66. *Rep.* 515c.

67. *Rep.* 516c9. Plato is obviously contrasting politics as the apprehension of Ideas culminating in the vision of the divine Idea, with politics as mere experience. It is significant that he uses the word 'accustomed', εἰώθει (516d), to characterize the traditional un-Socratic type of politician. For all judgments based on experience alone could be nothing better than perception of what *usually* happens. The formulæ γίγνεσθαι and συμβαίνειν εἰωθεν are characteristic of the empirical method in medicine: see my *Diokles von Karystos* p. 31; and in politics: see my essay, 'The Date of Isocrates' Areopagiticus and the Athenian Opposition', in *Athenian Studies presented to W. S. Ferguson* (Cambridge 1940) 432.

68. *Rep.* 517b.

69. *Rep.* 517b6.

69a. See the word ἐλπίς *Rep.* 331a in the reflections of old Cephalus about life after death, and Plato's words about the 'good hope' of the man who has lived the life of the philosopher *Rep.* 496c.

70. *Rep.* 517c.

71. *Rep.* 517d.

72. *Rep.* 504e, 505a.

73. *Rep.* 514a: ἀπείκασον τοιούτῳ πάθει τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας.

74. See p. 165.

75. *Rep.* 518b6 f.

76. *Rep.* 518c.

77. *Rep.* 518c-d. Plato's word in this passage is περιαγωγή, but his terms are not invariable. Μεταστροφή is also used, and so are the verbs περιστρέφεσθαι and μεταστρέφεσθαι. They are all attempts to convey the same visual image, that of the turning of the head and the eyes to the divine Good. See A. D. Nock, *Conversion* (Oxford 1933). He traces the prototypes of the Christian religious phenomenon of conversion in classical Greece, and mentions this passage in Plato among others. If we approach the problem, not from the point of view of the religious *phenomenon* of conversion, but of the origin of the Christian *conception* of conversion, we must acknowledge that Plato was its originator. The word was transferred to Christian experience in the circles of early Christian Platonism.

197. *Rep.* 539e-540a.
198. See p. 234.
199. *Rep.* 537e-539d.
200. See pp. 56, 147.
201. J. Huizinga, *Homo ludens: Versuch einer Bestimmung des Spielelements der Kultur* (German tr. 1939), has gone into these problems with the subtlety of a philosopher. He treats the Greeks and Plato too; in fact, the questions he asks are really the repetition of a problem which only Plato could have stated, but with the addition of modern material. He goes far further than Plato in tracing all culture to the human instinct of play. It is remarkable that the Greeks were confronted by the problem of play just at the point when they reached the profoundest philosophical understanding of paideia, which they took so seriously. But since the beginning of time it has been natural for play to pass into the deepest earnest.
202. See p. 253.
203. Ar. *Eth. Nic.* 10.6.1176b28 f.
204. Plato, *Rep.* 539b, says that playful use of dialectic skill for the sake of sheer argument (ἀντιλογία) is misuse (καταχρῆσθαι). The logical opposite to play is earnest, σπουδή. See also 539c8.
205. *Rep.* 539b6.
206. *Rep.* 537e.
207. *Rep.* 538c f.
208. Xenocrates, frg. 3 Heinze.
209. *Rep.* 538d.
210. *Gorg.* 460e f.
211. *Rep.* 540a.
212. *Rep.* 540b.
213. *Rep.* 540c.
214. *Rep.* 540d.
215. *Rep.* 549b.
216. *Rep.* 540d.
217. *Rep.* 443e5.
218. *Rep.* 540e5 f.
219. *Rep.* 541a. On the idea that Plato's perfect state is a 'myth', see *Rep.* 376d9, 501e4.
220. *Rep.* 449a: Plato alludes to that passage in *Rep.* 543c9.
221. *Rep.* 544a.
222. *Rep.* 445c5.
223. *Rep.* 544c.
224. Ar. *Pol.* 4.1.
225. Cf. Ar. *Pol.* 3.7.
226. Books 7-8.
227. *Rep.* books 2-7.
228. *Rep.* books 8-9.
229. See p. 242.
230. See pp. 131, 145.
231. Cf. *Rep.* 444c-e.
232. See *Paideia* III, 18, 29.
233. *Rep.* 445c9-d6; cf. 544c f.
234. See especially *Ep.* 7.326a.
235. Aristotle carried the comparison between the methods of philosophy and those of gymnastics and medicine further, at the beginning of the fourth book of his *Politics,* where he turns from the right to the faulty constitutions. The fundamental idea, however, is Platonic. Faulty constitutions, ἡμαρτημέναι πολιτεῖαι, are described as forms of sickness in *Rep.* 544c, and, before that, in 444d-445c.

236. *Rep.* 544d-545a.
237. *Rep.* 544d.
238. *Rep.* 544e5.
239. *Rep.* 443e6, 444e1.
240. This is the point of view which dominates the following analysis and interpretation; I may observe that commentators usually do it inadequate justice.
241. *Rep.* 545d.
242. *Rep.* 546a.
243. See *Paideia* I, 216.
244. Cf. *Rep.* 444d8-11.
245. Cf. Theophr. *De causis plant.* 5.8 f., especially the double meaning of the concept 'unnatural' (παρὰ φύσιν).
246. See p. 248 f.
247. *Rep.* 546b.
248. *Rep.* 546c.
249. *Rep.* 547c5.
250. Ar. *Pol.* 2.1.1260b names Sparta and Crete as countries whose constitutions are thought admirable (πόλεις εὐνομεῖσθαι λεγόμεναι): for the words at the beginning of the book refer to the description of these two states and of Carthage in chapters 9-11. See also the closing words of chapter 11. On the same problem in the *Protrepticus,* see the argument in my *Aristotle,* p. 77. Plato in *Rep.* 544c calls the Spartan and Cretan constitution 'praised by most people'. So does Isocrates, with regard to Sparta: *Panath.* 41, but see 109, 200, 216.
251. *Rep.* 545b6.
252. Cf. 547d. Even more important in this connexion is the direct criticism of the Spartan state in *The Laws,* books 1-2: see *Paideia* III, 218 f.
253. *Rep.* 547b.
254. *Rep.* 547c.
255. *Rep.* 547b-c.
256. *Rep.* 547d.
257. *Rep.* 547e-548a.
258. *Rep.* 548a-b.
259. *Rep.* 548b-c.
260. *Rep.* 548c9-d.
261. *Rep.* 548e4-549a.
262. *Rep.* 549a2. Between these two opposing ideas, Plato inserts a parenthesis: 'instead of being indifferent to slaves, as the truly cultured man is'. The ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένος does not lose his temper at the bad behaviour of slaves, as the Spartan does when he scolds them.
262a. It is easy to recognize this Spartan trait in Xenophon's ideal of culture.
263. *Rep.* 549a9-b7. It is in this context, when he is criticizing the Spartan type, that Plato coins the wonderful phrase λόγος μουσικῇ κεκραμένος ('rational and musical forces rightly harmonized') to illustrate what is lacking in an otherwise admirable character.
264. *Rep.* 549c-550b.
265. This new psychological method of describing types of state is one of Plato's greatest contributions to ethical and political science. It was naturally and logically produced by the shift of his interest from the state as a structure of positive law to its educational function and nature. The point of it is concentration on the

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297-8
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Gorgias 523 ff: originally physician as judge -- not justice = external measurement