



BASIC WRITINGS OF
Saint
Thomas Aquinas

VOLUME TWO

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RANDOM HOUSE · NEW YORK

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XV. FAITH.

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mon unity, namely, *the true*, or *being*, or *essence*. Now under the good which is common there are contained many particular goods, to none of which is the will determined.

Second Article

WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED OF NECESSITY BY ITS OBJECT?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the will is moved of necessity by its object. For the object of the will is compared to the will as mover to the movable, as is stated in *De Anima* iii.⁶ But a mover, if it be sufficient, moves the movable of necessity. Therefore the will can be moved of necessity by its object.

Obj. 2. Further, just as the will is an immaterial power, so is the intellect; and both powers are ordained to a universal object, as was stated above. But the intellect is moved of necessity by its object. Therefore the will also is moved of necessity by its object.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever one wills is either the end, or something ordained to the end. But, it would seem, one wills an end necessarily, because it is like a principle in speculative matters, to which one assents of necessity. Now the end is the reason for willing the means; and so it seems that we likewise will the means necessarily. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by its object.

On the contrary, Rational powers, according to the Philosopher, are directed to opposites.⁷ But the will is a rational power, since it is in the reason, as is stated in *De Anima* iii.⁸ Therefore the will is directed to opposites. Therefore it is not moved, of necessity, to either of the opposites.

I answer that, The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the exercise of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act, derived from the object. As to the first way, no object moves the will necessarily, for no matter what the object be, it is in man's power not to think of it, and consequently not to will it actually. But as to the second manner of motion, the will is moved by one object necessarily, by another not. For in the movement of a power by its object, we must consider under what aspect the object moves the power. For the visible moves the sight under the aspect of color actually visible. Therefore, if color be offered to the sight, it moves the sight necessarily, unless one turns one's eyes away; which belongs to the exercise of the act. But if the sight were confronted with something not in all respects colored actually, but only so in some respects, and in other respects not, the sight would not of necessity see such an object: for it might look at that part of the object which is not actually colored, and thus would not see it.

⁶ Aristotle, *De An.*, III, 10 (433b 10; b 16). ⁷ *Metaph.*, VIII, 2 (1046b 8).

⁸ Aristotle, *De An.*, III, 9 (432b 5).

Now just as the actually colored is the object of sight, so good is the object of the will. Therefore if the will be offered an object which is good universally and from every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it cannot will the opposite. If, on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to it of necessity.—And since the lack of any good whatever is a non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect and lacking in nothing is such a good that the will cannot not-will it; and this is happiness. But any other particular goods, in so far as they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods; and, from this point of view, they can be set aside or approved by the will, which can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view.

Reply Obj. 1. The sufficient mover of a power is none other than that object that in every respect possesses the nature of the mover of that power. If, on the other hand, it is lacking in any respect, it will not move of necessity, as was stated above.

Reply Obj. 2. The intellect is moved, of necessity, by an object which is such as to be always and necessarily true; but not by that which may be either true or false, viz., by that which is contingent, as we have said of the good.

Reply Obj. 3. The last end moves the will necessarily, because it is the perfect good; so does whatever is ordained to that end, and without which the end cannot be attained, such as *to be and to live*, and the like. But other things, without which the end can be gained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills the end; just as he who assents to a principle does not necessarily assent to the conclusions without which the principles can still be true.

Third Article

WHETHER THE WILL IS MOVED OF NECESSITY BY THE LOWER APPETITE?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by a passion of the lower appetite. For the Apostle says (*Rom. vii. 19*): *The good which I will I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do*; and this is said by reason of concupiscence, which is a passion. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by a passion.

Obj. 2. Further, as is stated in *Ethics iii.*, *according as a man is, such does the end seem to him.*⁹ But it is not in man's power to cast aside a passion at once. Therefore it is not in man's power not to will that to which the passion inclines him.

⁹ Aristotle, *Eth.*, III, 5 (1114a 32).

with which we enjoy, as Augustine says.⁷ Therefore a man enjoys his enjoyment. But the last end of man is not enjoyment, but the uncreated good alone, which is God. Therefore enjoyment is not only of the last end.

On the contrary, Augustine says: *A man does not enjoy that which he desires for the sake of something else.*⁸ But the last end alone is that which man does not desire for the sake of something else. Therefore enjoyment is of the last end alone.

I answer that, As we have stated above, the notion of fruit implies two things: first, that it should come last; second, that it should calm the appetite with a certain sweetness and delight. Now a thing is last either absolutely or relatively. It is last absolutely if it be referred to nothing else; relatively, if it is the last in a particular series. Therefore, that which is last absolutely, and in which one delights as in the last end, is properly called fruit; and this it is what one is properly said to enjoy.—But that which is delightful, not in itself, but is desired only as referred to something else, e.g., a bitter potion for the sake of health, can in no way be called fruit.—And that which has something delightful about it, to which a number of preceding things are referred, can indeed be called fruit in a certain sense; but we cannot be said to enjoy it properly or as though it answered perfectly to the notion of fruit. Hence Augustine says that *we enjoy what we know, when the delighted will is at rest therein.*⁹ But its rest is not absolute save in the last end; for as long as something is looked for, the movement of the will remains in suspense, even though it has reached some good. So, too, in local movement, although any point between the two terms is a beginning and an end, yet it is not considered as an actual end, except when the movement stops there.

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says, *if he had said, 'May I enjoy thee,' without adding 'in the Lord,' he would seem to have set the end of his love in him. But since he added 'in the Lord,' he signified that he set his end in the Lord, and also his enjoyment in Him.*¹⁰ In effect he said that he enjoyed his brother not as a term but as a means.

Reply Obj. 2. Fruit has one relation to the tree that bears it, and another to man that enjoys it. To the tree that bears it, it is compared as effect to cause; to the one enjoying it, as the final object of his longing and the consummation of his delight. Accordingly, these fruits mentioned by the Apostle are so called because they are certain effects of the Holy Ghost in us (and this is why they are called *fruits of the Spirit*); but not as though we are to enjoy them as our last end. Or we may say with Ambrose that they are called fruits because *we should desire them for their own sake;*¹¹

⁷ *De Trin.*, X, 10 (PL 42, 981). ⁸ *Op. cit.*, X, 11 (PL 42, 983). ⁹ *Op. cit.*, X, 10 (PL 42, 981). ¹⁰ *De Doct. Christ.*, I, 33 (PL 34, 33). ¹¹ Cf. *Glossa interl.*, super *Gal.*, V, 22 (VI, 87v); Peter Lombard, *In Gal.*, super V, 22 (PL 192, 160); *Sent.*, I, i, 3 (I, 19).—Cf. also St. Ambrose, *In Gal.*, super V, 22 (PL 17, 389).

ON COUNSEL, WHICH PRECEDES CHOICE
(In Six Articles)

WE must now consider counsel, concerning which there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether counsel is an inquiry? (2) Whether counsel is of the end or only of the means? (3) Whether counsel is only of things that we do? (4) Whether counsel is of all things that we do? (5) Whether counsel proceeds by way of resolution? (6) Whether the process of counsel is without end?

First Article

WHETHER COUNSEL IS AN INQUIRY?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that counsel is not an inquiry. For Damascene says that counsel is an *[inquiring] appetite*.¹ But inquiry is not an act of the appetite. Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.

Obj. 2. Further, inquiry is a discursive act of the intellect; for which reason it is not found in God, whose knowledge is not discursive, as was shown in the First Part.² But counsel is ascribed to God, for it is written (*Ephes. i. 11*) that *He worketh all things according to the counsel of His will*. Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.

Obj. 3. Further, inquiry is of doubtful matters. But counsel is given in matters that are with certainty good; and thus the Apostle says (*1 Cor. vii. 25*): *Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord; but I give counsel*. Therefore, counsel is not an inquiry.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa says: *Every counsel is an inquiry; but not every inquiry is a counsel*.³

I answer that, Choice, as we have stated above, follows the judgment of the reason in matters of action.⁴ Now there is much uncertainty in matters of action, because actions are concerned with contingent singulars which, by reason of their variability, are uncertain. Now in things doubtful and uncertain, the reason does not pronounce judgment without previous inquiry. Therefore the reason must of necessity institute an inquiry before deciding on what is to be chosen; and this inquiry is called counsel. Hence

¹ *De Fide Orth.*, II, 22 (PG 94, 945). ² *S.T.*, I, q. 14, a. 7. ³ Cf. Nemesius, *De Nat. Hom.*, XXXIV (PG 40, 736). ⁴ Q. 13, a. 1, ad 2; a. 3.

the Philosopher says that choice is the *desire of what has been already counselled*.⁵

Reply Obj. 1. When the acts of two powers are ordered to one another, in each of them there is something belonging to the other power; and consequently each act can be denominated from either power. Now it is evident that the act of the reason giving direction as to the means, and the act of the will tending to these means according to the reason's direction, are ordered to one another. Consequently, there is to be found something of the reason, viz., order, in the act of the will which is choice; and in counsel, which is an act of reason, something is found of the will, both as matter (since counsel is of what man wills to do), and as motive (because it is from willing the end that man is moved to take counsel in regard to the means). And, therefore, just as the Philosopher says that choice is *intellect influenced by appetite*,⁶ thus pointing out that both concur in the act of choosing, so Damascene says that counsel is *appetite based on inquiry*,⁷ so as to show that counsel belongs, in a way, both to the will, on whose behalf and by whose impulsion the inquiry is made, and to the reason that pursues the inquiry.

Reply Obj. 2. The things that we say of God must be understood without any of the defects which are to be found in us; and thus in us science is of conclusions derived by reasoning from causes to effects, but science, when said of God, means sure knowledge of all effects in the First Cause, without any reasoning process. In like manner we ascribe counsel to God, as to the certainty of His decision or judgment, which in us arises from the inquiry of counsel. But such inquiry has no place in God, and so in this respect it is not ascribed to God; in which sense Damascene says: *God takes not counsel, for those only take counsel who lack knowledge*.⁸

Reply Obj. 3. It may happen that things which are most certainly good in the opinion of wise and spiritual men are not certainly good in the opinion of the many, or at least of carnal men. Consequently, in such things counsel may be given.

Second Article

WHETHER COUNSEL IS OF THE END, OR ONLY OF THE MEANS TO THE END?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that counsel is not only of the means but also of the end. For whatever is doubtful can be the subject of inquiry. Now in things to be done by man there happens sometimes a doubt as to the end and not only as to the means. Since, therefore, inquiry as to what is to be done is counsel, it seems that counsel can be of the end.

⁵ *Eth.*, III, 3 (1113a 11); 2 (1112a 15). ⁶ *Op. cit.*, VI, 2 (1139b 4). ⁷ *De Fide Orth.*, II, 22 (PG 94, 945). ⁸ *Ibid.*

Obj. 2. Further, the matter of counsel is human actions. But some human actions are ends, as is stated in *Ethics* i.⁹ Therefore counsel can be of the end.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa says that *counsel is not of the end, but of the means.*¹⁰

I answer that, The end is the principle in practical matters, because the nature of the means is taken from the end. Now the principle cannot be called in question, but must be presupposed in every inquiry. Since, therefore, counsel is an inquiry, it is not of the end, but only of the means to the end. Nevertheless, it may happen that what is the end in regard to some things is ordained to something else; just as also what is the principle of one demonstration is the conclusion of another. Consequently, that which is looked upon as the end in one inquiry may be looked upon as the means in another; and thus it will become an object of counsel.

Reply Obj. 1. That which is looked upon as an end is already fixed. Consequently, as long as there is any doubt about it, it is not looked upon as an end. Therefore, if counsel is taken about it, it will be counsel, not about the end, but about the means to the end.

Reply Obj. 2. Counsel is about operations in so far as they are ordered to some end. Consequently, if any human act be an end, it will not, as such, be the matter of counsel.

Third Article

WHETHER COUNSEL IS ONLY OF THINGS THAT WE DO?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that counsel is not only of things that we do. For counsel signifies some kind of comparison. But it is possible for many to compare things that are not subject to movement, and are not the result of our actions, such as the natures of various things. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.

Obj. 2. Further, men sometimes seek counsel about things that are laid down by law; and so there are men called counsellors-at-law. And yet those who seek such counsel have nothing to do in making the laws. Therefore, counsel is not only of things that we do.

Obj. 3. Further, some are said to take consultation about future events; which, however, are not in our power. Therefore, counsel is not only of things that we do.

Obj. 4. Further, if counsel were only of things that we do, no one would take counsel about what another does. But this is clearly untrue. Therefore, counsel is not only of things that we do.

⁹ Aristotle, *Eth.*, I, 1 (1094a 4). ¹⁰ Cf. Nemesius, *De Nat. Hom.*, XXXIV (PG 40, 740).

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa says: *We take counsel of things that are within us and that we are able to do.*¹¹

I answer that, Counsel signifies a conference held among several. The term [*consilium*] denotes this, for it means a sitting together [*considium*], from the fact that many sit together in order to confer with one another. Now we must take note that, in contingent particulars, in order that anything be known with certainty, it is necessary to take several conditions or circumstances into consideration, which it is not easy for one to do; but these are considered by several with greater certainty, since what one takes note of escapes the notice of another. In necessary and universal matters, however, our consideration is more absolute and more simple, so that one man by himself can be sufficient to consider these matters. Therefore, the inquiry of counsel is concerned, properly speaking, with contingent singulars. Now the knowledge of the truth in such matters does not rank so high as to be desirable of itself, as is the knowledge of what is universal and necessary; but it is desired as being useful towards action, because actions bear on contingent singulars. Consequently, properly speaking, counsel is about things done by us.

Reply Obj. 1. Counsel signifies conference, not of any kind, but about what is to be done, for the reason given above.

Reply Obj. 2. Although that which is laid down by the law is not due to the action of him who seeks counsel, nevertheless it directs him in his action; for the mandate of the law is one reason for doing something.

Reply Obj. 3. Counsel is not only about actions but also about whatever is related to actions. And for this reason we speak of consulting about future events, in so far as man is induced to do or omit something through the knowledge of future events.

Reply Obj. 4. We seek counsel about the actions of others in so far as they are, in some way, one with us; and this either by union of affection (thus a man is solicitous about what concerns his friend, as though it concerned himself), or after the manner of an instrument, for the principal agent and the instrument are, in a way, one cause, since one acts through the other (thus the master takes counsel about what he would do through his servant).

Fourth Article

WHETHER COUNSEL IS ABOUT ALL THINGS THAT WE DO?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that counsel is about all things that we have to do. For choice is the *desire of what is counselled*, as was stated above. But choice is about all things that we do. Therefore counsel is too.

Obj. 2. Further, counsel signifies the reason's inquiry. But whenever we

¹¹ Cf. *ibid.* (PG 40, 737).

do not act through the impulse of passion, we act in virtue of the reason's inquiry. Therefore, there is counsel about everything that we do.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says that *if it appears that something can be done by more means than one, we take counsel by inquiring whereby it may be done most easily and best; but if it can be accomplished by one means, how it can be done by this.*¹² But whatever is done, is done by one means or by several. Therefore counsel takes place in all things that we do.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa says that *counsel has no place in things that are done according to science or art.*¹³

I answer that, Counsel is a kind of inquiry, as we have stated above. Now we are wont to inquire about things that admit of doubt, and so the process of inquiry, which is called an argument, *is a reason that attests something that admitted of doubt.*¹⁴ Now that something in relation to human acts admits of no doubt, arises from a twofold source. First, because certain determinate ends are gained by certain determinate means, as happens in the arts which are governed by certain fixed rules of action; and thus a person writing does not take counsel how to form his letters, for this is determined by art. Secondly, from the fact that it matters little whether it is done this or that way; and this occurs in small matters, which help or hinder but little with regard to the end aimed at. Now reason looks upon small things as mere nothings. Hence there are two things about which we do not take counsel, although they conduce to the end, as the Philosopher says,¹⁵ namely, small things, and those which have a fixed way of being done, as in works produced by art, with the exception of those arts that admit of conjecture, such as medicine, commerce and the like, as Gregory of Nyssa says.¹⁶

Reply Obj. 1. Choice presupposes counsel because of its judgment or decision. Consequently, when the judgment or decision is evident without inquiry, there is no need for the inquiry of counsel.

Reply Obj. 2. In matters that are evident, the reason makes no inquiry, but judges at once. Consequently, there is no need of counsel in all that is done by reason.

Reply Obj. 3. When a thing can be accomplished by one means, but in different ways, doubt may arise, just as when it can be accomplished by several means; and hence the need of counsel. But when not only the means, but also the way of using the means, is fixed, then there is no need of counsel.

¹² *Eth.*, III, 3 (1112b 16).

¹³ Cf. Nemesius, *De Nat. Hom.*, XXXIV (PG 40, 740).

¹⁴ Cf. Cicero, *De Invent.*, I, 34 (p. 45^b).

¹⁵ *Eth.*, III, 3 (1112b 9).

¹⁶ Cf. Nemesius, *ibid.*

Question XV

ON CONSENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN RELATION
TO THE MEANS
(In Four Articles)

WE must now consider consent, concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive power? (2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals? (3) Whether it is directed to the end or to the means? (4) Whether consent to an act belongs only to the higher part of the soul?

First Article

WHETHER CONSENT IS AN ACT OF THE APPETITIVE OR OF
THE APPREHENSIVE POWER?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that consent belongs only to the apprehensive part of the soul. For Augustine ascribes consent to the higher reason.¹ But the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent belongs to an apprehensive power.

Obj. 2. Further, consent is *co-sense*. But sense is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent is the act of an apprehensive power.

Obj. 3. Further, just as *assent* is an application of the intellect to something, so is *consent*. But *assent* belongs to the intellect, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent also belongs to an apprehensive power.

On the contrary, Damascene says that *if a man judge without affection for that of which he judges, there is no decision*,² *i.e.*, consent. But affection belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore consent does also.

I answer that, Consent expresses the application of sense to something. Now it is proper to sense to take cognizance of things present. For the imagination apprehends the likenesses of corporeal things, even in the absence of the things of which they bear the likeness; while the intellect apprehends universal notions, which it can apprehend indifferently, whether the singulars be present or absent. And since the act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination to the thing itself, the application of the appetitive power to the thing, in so far as it cleaves to it, acquires by a kind of likeness the name of sense, since, as it were, it acquires an experience of the thing to which it cleaves, in so far as it finds satisfaction in it. Hence it is written

¹ *De Trin.*, XII, 12 (PL 42, 1007).

² *De Fide Orth.*, II, 22 (PG 94, 945).

(*Wis. i. 1*): *Think of [Sentite] the Lord in goodness*. And on these grounds consent is an act of the appetitive power.

Reply Obj. 1. As is stated in *De Anima* iii., *the will is in the reason*.³ Hence, when Augustine ascribes consent to the reason, he takes reason as including the will.

Reply Obj. 2. *To sense*, properly speaking, belongs to the apprehensive power; but by way of likeness, as being a certain experience, it belongs to the appetitive power, as was stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. *Assentire [to assent]* is, so to speak, *ad aliud sentire [to sense towards something else]*; and thus it implies a certain distance from that to which assent is given. But *consentire [to consent]* is *to sense with*, and this implies a certain union to the object of consent. Hence the will, to which it belongs to tend to the thing itself, is more properly said to consent; whereas the intellect, whose act does not consist in a movement towards the thing, but rather the reverse, as we have stated in the First Part,⁴ is more properly said to assent, although one term is wont to be used for the other. We may also say that the intellect assents in so far as it is moved by the will.

Second Article

WHETHER CONSENT IS TO BE FOUND IN IRRATIONAL ANIMALS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that consent is to be found in irrational animals. For consent expresses a determination of the appetite to one thing. But the appetite of irrational animals is determined to one course of action. Therefore consent is to be found in irrational animals.

Obj. 2. Further, if you remove what is first, you remove what follows. But consent precedes the accomplished act. If, therefore, there were no consent in irrational animals, there would be no act accomplished; which is clearly false.

Obj. 3. Further, men are sometimes said to consent to do something through some passion, *e.g.*, through desire or anger. But irrational animals act through passion. Therefore they have consent.

On the contrary, Damascene says that *after judging, man approves and embraces the judgment of his counselling, and this is called the decision*,⁵ *i.e.*, consent. But counsel is not in irrational animals. Therefore neither is consent.

I answer that, Consent, properly speaking, is not in irrational animals. The reason for this is that consent implies an application of the appetitive movement to something that is to be done. Now to apply the appetitive movement to the doing of something belongs to the subject in whose power it is

³ Aristotle, *De An.*, III, 9 (432b 5).

⁴ *S.T.*, I, q. 16, a. 1; q. 27, a. 4; q. 59, a. 2.

⁵ *De Fide Orth.*, II, 22 (PG 94, 945).

place *when man approves and embraces the judgment of his counsel*.⁸ But counsel is only about the means. Therefore the same applies to consent.

I answer that, Consent is the application of the appetitive movement to something that is already in the power of him who causes the application. Now the order of action is this. First, there is the apprehension of the end; then, the desire of the end; then, the counsel about the means; then, the desire of the means. Now the appetite tends to the last end naturally, and hence the application of the appetitive movement to the apprehended end has not the nature of consent, but of simple volition. But as to those things which come under consideration after the last end, in so far as they are directed to the end, they come under counsel; and so consent can be applied to them, in so far as the appetitive movement is applied to what has been judged through counsel. But the appetitive movement to the end is not applied to counsel; it is rather counsel that is applied to it, because counsel presupposes the appetite of the end. On the other hand, the appetite of the means presupposes the decision of counsel. Hence, the application of the appetitive movement to the resolution of counsel is consent, properly speaking. Consequently, since counsel is only about the means, consent, properly speaking, is of nothing else but the means.

Reply Obj. 1. Just as the knowledge of conclusions through the principles is science, whereas the knowledge of the principles is not science, but something higher, namely, understanding, so our consent to the means is because of the end, in respect of which our act is not consent but something greater, namely, volition.

Reply Obj. 2. Delight in his act, rather than the act itself, is the end of the intemperate man, and for sake of this delight he consents to that act.

Reply Obj. 3. Choice includes something that consent has not, namely, a certain relation to something to which something else is preferred; and therefore after consent there still remains a choice. For it may happen that by aid of counsel several means have been found conducive to the end, and since each of these meets with approval, consent has been given to each; but after approving of many, we have given our preference to one by choosing it. But if only one meets with approval, then consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only in our way of looking at them; so that we call it consent, according as we approve of doing that thing, but choice, according as we prefer it to those that do not meet with our approval.

Fourth Article

WHETHER CONSENT TO THE ACT BELONGS ONLY TO THE
HIGHER PART OF THE SOUL?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that consent to the act does not always belong to the higher reason. For *delight follows action, and perfects it, just as*

⁸ *Ibid.*

*beauty perfects youth.*⁹ But consent to delight belongs to the lower reason, as Augustine says.¹⁰ Therefore consent to the act does not belong only to the higher reason.

Obj. 2. Further, an act to which we consent is said to be voluntary. But it belongs to many powers to produce voluntary acts. Therefore the higher reason is not alone in consenting to the act.

Obj. 3. Further, *the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things eternal*, as Augustine says.¹¹ But man often consents to an act, not for eternal, but for temporal reasons, or even because of some passion of the soul. Therefore consent to an act does not belong to the higher reason alone.

On the contrary, Augustine says: *It is impossible for man to make up his mind to commit a sin, unless that intention of the mind which has the sovereign power of urging his members to, or restraining them from, act, yield to the evil deed and become its slave.*¹²

I answer that, The final decision belongs to him who holds the highest place, and to whom it belongs to judge of the others; for as long as judgment about some matter remains to be pronounced, the final decision has not been given. Now it is evident that it belongs to the higher reason to judge of all; for it is by the reason that we judge of sensible things, and of things pertaining to human principles we judge according to divine principles, which is the function of the higher reason. Therefore, as long as a man is uncertain whether he should resist or not, according to divine principles, no judgment of the reason can be considered as a final decision. Now the final decision of what is to be done is the consent to the act. Therefore, consent to the act belongs to the higher reason, but in the sense in which the reason includes the will, as we have stated above.

Reply Obj. 1. Consent to delight in the work done belongs to the higher reason, as also does consent to the work; but consent to delight in thought belongs to the lower reason; just as to the lower reason it belongs to think. Nevertheless, the higher reason exercises judgment on the fact of thinking or not thinking, considered as an action; and in like manner on the consequent delight. But in so far as the act of thinking is considered as ordered to a further act, it belongs to the lower reason. For that which is ordered to something else belongs to a lower art or power than does the end to which it is ordered; and hence it is that the art which is concerned with the end is called the architectonic or principal art.

Reply Obj. 2. Since actions are called voluntary from the fact that we consent to them, it does not follow that consent is an act of every power, but of the will, which is in the reason, as was stated above, and from which the voluntary act is named.

Reply Obj. 3. The higher reason is said to consent not only because it always moves to act according to the eternal exemplars, but also because it does not dissent according to these same exemplars.

⁹ Aristotle, *Eth.*, X, 4 (1174b 31; 1175a 5). ¹⁰ *De Trin.*, XII, 12 (PL 42, 1007).
¹¹ *Op. cit.*, XII, 7 (PL 42, 1005). ¹² *Op. cit.*, XII, 12 (PL 42, 1008).

intellect, to understand, and the eye, to see), but also external things, as a stick, to strike. But it is evident that we do not apply external things to an operation save through the intrinsic principles which are either the powers of the soul, or the habits of those powers, or the organs which are parts of the body. Now it has been shown above that it is the will which moves the soul's powers to their acts; and this is to apply them to operation.⁵ Hence it is evident that, first and principally, use belongs to the will as first mover; to the reason, as directing; and to the other powers as executing the operation, which powers are compared to the will, which applies them to act, as the instruments are compared to the principal agent. Now action is properly ascribed, not to the instrument, but to the principal agent, as building is ascribed to the builder, but not to his tools. Hence it is evident that use is, properly speaking, an act of the will.

Reply Obj. 1. Reason does indeed refer one thing to another; but the will tends to that which is referred by the reason to something else. And in this sense to use is to refer one thing to another.

Reply Obj. 2. Damascene is speaking of use in so far as it belongs to the executive powers.

Reply Obj. 3. Even the speculative reason is applied by the will to the act of understanding or judging. Consequently, the speculative reason is said to use, in so far as it is moved by the will, in the same way as the other powers.

Second Article

WHETHER USE IS TO BE FOUND IN IRRATIONAL ANIMALS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that use is to be found in irrational animals. For it is better to enjoy than to use, because, as Augustine says, *we use things by referring them to something else which we are to enjoy.*⁶ But enjoyment is to be found in irrational animals, as was stated above.⁷ Much more, therefore, is it possible for them to have use.

Obj. 2. Further, to apply the members to action is to use them. But irrational animals apply their members to action: *e.g.*, their feet, to walk; their horns, to strike. Therefore, it is possible for irrational animals to use.

On the contrary, Augustine says: *None but a rational animal can make use of a thing.*⁸

I answer that, As we have stated above, to use is to apply an active principle to action; and thus to consent is to apply the appetitive movement to the desire of something, as was stated above.⁹ Now he alone who has the disposal of a thing can apply it to something else; and this belongs to him

⁵ Q. 9, a. 1. ⁶ *De Trin.*, X, 10 (PL 42, 981). ⁷ Q. 11, a. 2. ⁸ *Lib. 83 Quaest.* q. 30 (PL 40, 19). ⁹ Q. 15, a. 1, 2 and 3.

will, can be found in God if they befit His nature (I, 19, 3, obj. 3).—That the life of God is most perfect and eternal because His intellect is most perfect and always in act (I, 18, 3).—That God has one simple operation (I, 20, 1, ad 1).—That God is one (II-II, 1, 8, obj. 1).—That from the unity of order in things we may conclude the unity of God as governor of things (I, 47, 3, ad 1).—That beings resist an unsuitable disposition, and that a plurality of rules is not good: hence the governor of the world is one (I, 103, 3).—On the best disposition of a multitude: I, 108, obj. 1 and ad 1.—That the good of a multitude is twofold, immanent and transcendent (I-II, 111, 5, ad 1).—That things are not said relatively because they are referred to other things but because other things are referred to them (I, 13, 7).—That God is named relatively to the creature because the creature is referred to Him (I, 13, 7, ad 4).—That God is the end of creatures as the general is the end of the army (I, 108, 6). Cf. I, 103, 2, ad 3.—That what is best in things is the good of the order of the universe (I, 15, 2; C.G., III, 64).—That when many are directed to one end, one is found to head and rule them (I, 96, 4).—On desire in the cause of the motion of the heavens: I, 70, 3, obj. 4.—On magnifying God: I, 32, 1, obj. 1 and ad 1.

IV. Psychology:

1. The Soul (soul and body; powers; organs).
2. Living Operations.
- 3-4. The Intellect (immateriality; man as a microcosm).
5. The Agent Intellect.
6. The Possible Intellect and Knowledge.
- 7-II. The Nature and Order of Knowledge.
12. Appetite.
13. Biology.
1. The Soul (soul and body; powers; organs).

On the definition of the soul: I, 76, 4, obj. 1 and ad 1; 76, 5, *O.t.c.*; 77, 1.—That the soul is the cause and the principle of the living body (I, 18, 3, obj. 2).—That the first principle by which we understand is the form of the body (I, 76, 1).—That that by which we first sense and understand is the soul (I, 77, 1, obj. 4; 77, 5, obj. 2).—On the soul as first act: I, 77, 1.—That the intellectual principle is the form of man (I, 76, 1).—On whether the soul is in the body: I, 76, 8,

obj. 1.—On soul and body as one: I, 76, 7, *O.t.c.*—That when the soul has departed, the parts of the body are said to be human equivocally (I, 76, 8).—That the soul can move, not any body, but only its own (I, 117, 4, *O.t.c.*).—That as a part of the soul is related to a part of the body, so the whole soul is related to the whole body (I, 76, 8, obj. 3).—That the soul rules the body with a despotic rule, and the intellect the appetite with a political and royal rule (I, 81, 3, ad 2; I-II, 58, 2).—That the body is compared to the soul as the slave to the master (I-II, 17, 2, obj. 2).—That those who are of keen minds are of soft flesh (I, 76, 5; 85, 7; C.G., III, 84; I-II, 50, 4, obj. 3).—That souls are like different figures one of which contains the other (I, 76, 3). Cf. I, 77, 4, *O.t.c.*—On the manifold meaning of *to live*: I, 78, 1, obj. 2.—That to live is for living things to be (I, 18, 2, *O.t.c.*; 54, 1, obj. 2; 54, 2, obj. 1; C.G., III, 104).—That the first principle of life in the sublunary world is the vegetative soul (I, 97, 3).—On the parts of the vegetative soul: I, 78, 2 with obj. 4 and *O.t.c.*—That an animal cannot be without the sense of touch (C.G., III, 109).—That the sense of touch is one genus, but is divided into many senses according to species (I, 78, 3, ad 3).—That the sense of taste is a species of the sense of touch, residing only in the tongue (I, 78, 3, ad 4).—That the soul has many powers (I, 77, 2, *O.t.c.*).—That acts and operations are prior to powers and are themselves preceded by objects (I, 77, 3, *O.t.c.*; 79, 10, obj. 3; 87, 2, *O.t.c.*; 87, 3).—On the five powers of the soul: I, 78, 1, *O.t.c.*—That apprehensive and motor powers belong to different genera (I, 79, 11, obj. 1).—That the appetitive and the intellective are different genera of powers in the soul (I, 79, 1, obj. 2).—That the appetitive is distinguished from the other powers (I, 80, 1, *O.t.c.*).—That memory is a power of the sensitive soul (I, 77, 8, obj. 4).—That imagination and memory are passions of the *first sensitive* (I, 78, 4, obj. 3).—On the passive intellect as the particular reason: I-II, 51, 3.—That there are only five external senses (I, 78, 3, *O.t.c.*).—That the same power of the soul is concerned with one contrariety, as sight with white and black (I, 81, 2, obj. 1).—That if an old man receives the eye of a youth he will see as a youth (I, 77, 8, obj. 3).—That among the senses sight is more spiritual and nearer to the reason because it points out more differences in things

(I-II, 83, 4, obj. 3).—That the sense of sight is more excellent than the other sense and extends to more things (I-II, 77, 5, ad 3).—On the tongue as ordered to taste and speech: I-II, 12, 3, *O.t.c.*—That those who lack one sense are missing in one science (I, 78, 4, obj. 4).—That in sleep the sense is fettered (I, 84, 8, obj. 2).—On why this is so: I, 84, 8, ad 2.—On the cause of dreams: I, 111, 3.—On dreams in animals: I-II, 80, 2.—On prophetic dreams: C.G., III, 86.—That the sense is corrupted or weakened by strong sensibles (C.G., III, 59).

2. Living Operations.

That life is manifest in animals (I, 18, 1).—That life is divided into four operations (I, 18, 2, obj. 1).—That the operations of life are carried on through the act of natural heat (I-II, 85, 6, obj. 3).—On heat as the instrument of the power of the soul and also of the nutritive power: I, 118, 1, ad 3.—That processive motion is one of the operations of life (I, 51, 3, obj. 3).—That to live is principally to sense and to understand (I, 18, 2 and ad 1).—That to say that the soul senses or understands is as if one were to say that it weaves or builds (I, 75, 2, obj. 2).—That to sense is not proper either to the soul or to the body (I, 77, 5, *O.t.c.*).—That to sense is not an act of the soul alone (I, 84, 6).—That the operations of man are common to soul and body (I-II, 50, 4, obj. 1; 50, 4, ad 1).—That understanding is said to be common to soul and body because of the phantasms, which are related to the possible intellect as its object (I-II, 50, 4, ad 1).—That the act of the external sense is perceived by the common sense (I, 87, 3, obj. 3).—That the sensible in act is the sense in act (I, 14, 2; 55, 1, ad 2).—That common sensibles are not accidental sensibles (I, 78, 3, obj. 2 and ad 2).—That custom helps good memory (I-II, 50, 3, ad 3).—That meditation strengthens memory (I-II, 51, 3).—That the action of the imaginative power belongs to the composite (I, 84, 6, ad 2).—That a phantasm cannot be without the body (I, 75, 6, obj. 3).—That a phantasm is a motion produced by the sense in act (I, 12, 3, obj. 3; 84, 6, ad 2; 111, 3, obj. 1).—On understanding and sensing as motions: I, 105, 3, obj. 2.—That to understand, to sense and to will are acts of that which is perfect, *i.e.*, of that which exists in act (I, 18, 3, ad 1).—That in the large sense of the word, understanding and willing are *motions* (I-II, 109, 1).—That in the

motions of the soul the absolutely first motion is towards the principle of speculation or towards the principle of action (I-II, 113, 8, ad 3).—That intellect and will are the two moving principles in man (I-II, 58, 4).—That the soul is not moved (I, 77, 6, obj. 3).

3-4. The Intellect (immateriality; man as a microcosm).

That the highest form to which the consideration of the natural philosopher extends, namely the soul, is separate but yet in matter (I, 76, 1, ad 1).—That if the soul does not have a proper operation, it cannot exist separately (I, 89, 1, *O.t.c.*).—On when a form is separable: I-II, 53, 2, obj. 2.—That in the soul, as in nature, there is something by which it becomes all things and something by which it makes all things (I, 54, 4, obj. 1 and ad 1; 79, 3, *O.t.c.*; C.G., III, 43, 45). Cf. I, 79, 4, *O.t.c.*; 85, 1, obj. 4; 88, 1.—That the intellect is a part or a power of the soul which is the form of man (I, 76, 2; 79, 1, *O.t.c.*).—That the intellect is the highest part of the soul (I-II, 82, 3, obj. 3).—That among the activities of the soul, only understanding takes place without a bodily organ (I, 75, 3).—That the intellect is not the act of a body (I-II, 50, 4, obj. 1).—On the comparison of intellect and sense: I, 85, 6.—That reason is of universals, sense of particulars (I, 14, 11, obj. 1; 57, 2, obj. 1). Cf. I, 86, 1, *O.t.c.*—That the intellect is a substance that is not corrupted (I-II, 53, 1, obj. 2).—That the intellect is a certain substance (I, 79, 1, ad 1).—That the intellect is separate and unmixed (I, 14, 1; 76, 1, obj. 1 and ad 1).—That the intellect comes from the outside (I, 118, 2, ad 2).—That the intellect is simple (I, 85, 8, obj. 3).—That the action of the intellect is not transitive (I, 105, 3, obj. 1).

4. That the soul is in a manner all things (I, 14, 1; 16, 3; 84, 2, obj. 2).—That if the intellect had a determinate sensible nature this would prevent the knowability of other natures to it (I, 56, 2, obj. 1).—That man is a miniature world (I, 91, 1; I-II, 17, 8, obj. 2).—That rational powers are related to opposites (I, 62, 8, obj. 2; 79, 12, *O.t.c.*; 82, 1, obj. 2; C.G., III, 31; I-II, 10, 2; 13, 6, *O.t.c.*).—That things are related to the intellect according as they are separable from matter (I, 85, 1, *O.t.c.*).—That the excellence of intelligibles does not corrupt the intellect (I, 88, 1, obj. 3).—That because of their materiality plants do not have knowledge (I, 14, 1).—That beings such