RICHARD LOWENTHAL

World Communism

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

WORLD COMMUNISM

The Disintegration of a Secular Faith

RICHARD LOWENTHAL

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Chapter 5 of two brief sections referring to the American discussion on the "originality" of Mao Tse-tung, and by those liberties of phrasing that must be permitted to an author acting as his own translator. Inasmuch as our increased knowledge of the facts may give rise to new reflections on the interpretation of the conflicts described, the present preface seems the place to indicate them briefly.

The first such point concerns the importance of Khrushchev's destruction of the Stalin myth for the development of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The aggressive defense of Stalin's memory by the Chinese Communists, which began after the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU, has developed into a general attack on Khrushchev's domestic policies and his new "revisionist" party program with the 25-point proposal for the "general line" of the Communist world movement, which the Chinese published in June 1963, on the eve of their bilateral talks with the Soviet leaders; and in their subsequent commentaries on the "Open Letter" with which the Soviet Central Committee replied to that document, the Chinese have tried to prove that Khrushchev's "secret speech" at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February 1956 was the original cause of the conflict, because its "wholesale negation of Stalin" had "opened the floodgates" to a general revision of the Marxist-Leninist doctrines defended by the late leader.

In this form, the Chinese version of the origin of the conflict does not correspond to the known historical facts. While it is perfectly credible that the Chinese leaders were shocked and worried by the crude form of Khrushchev's action—by the brutality with which he disclosed Stalin's crimes without regard for the continuity of doctrinal authority, and also by the fact that he had not consulted them in advance—the record shows that they welcomed much of the substance of his criticism, including the strictures on Stalin's "Great Power chauvinism" as shown in his dealings with Yugoslavia; and the Soviets in turn appear to have taken Chinese advice into account in their much more cautious and "balanced" public statement on the "personality cult" of June 30, 1956. Subsequently, Chinese advice and criticism clearly influenced Soviet policy toward both Poland and Hungary during and after the October crisis of 1956; in backing Gomulka's desire for increased autonomy but urging the utmost severity against the Hungarian revolution, the Chinese worked for preserving the unity of a reformed Soviet bloc under Russian leadership, and they worked largely with and through Khrushchev. During the entire critical year of 1957, the Chinese seem to have strictly refrained from backing Khrushchev's "Stalinist" opponents at home (who were then still powerful), while working actively for the restoration of Soviet authority in the bloc; and this loyal co-operation culminated on one side in the secret October agreement on military-technological aid (of which the Chinese now claim that it entitled them to expect assistance in the development of nuclear weapons), and on the other in Mao Tse-tung's insistence on the "leading role" of the Soviet Union and the CPSU during the November conference of Communist Party leaders in Moscow. Thus if there were differences during that period, there was also steady consultation and adjustment on the basis of mutual confidence, surpassing anything that had existed in Stalin's time and far removed from the later atmosphere of conflict.

Yet if Khrushchev's dethronement of the Stalin idol was not the starting-point of the conflict, it certainly, by weakening Soviet authority, became a source of a new sense of self-confidence and world-wide ideological responsibility among the Chinese Communist leaders. Though Mao had won power only by emancipating himself from Stalin's instructions in Chinese affairs, he had always accepted him as a great teacher of Marxism-Leninism and as the unquestioned ideological guide of the Communist world movement; and both the crudity of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization and the subsequent waverings of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe must have convinced the Chinese leader that the heir to Stalin's power lacked the capacity for a

similar role. The idol had fallen, but its place remained empty and no Russian seemed able to fill it; while the very fact that Khrushchev had listened to Mao's advice in the hour of peril must have confirmed the latter in his growing conviction that it was up to him to supply the needed ideological leadership. If in Moscow he stressed the need for Soviet primacy because of the facts of power, he nevertheless took the initiative on a variety of international issues in the confident belief that his own ideological superiority would prevail.

In retrospect, it seems clear that this new confidence of the Chinese leaders has been one of the crucial factors in the development of the Sino-Soviet conflict. While I have stated my reasons for believing that the direct cause of the latter has been a clash of national interests—the growing Chinese disappointment at the lack of Soviet willingness to aid Chinese development and take risks on China's behalf to the extent desired—the repeated failure of all attempts at compromise was due only to the Chinese decision to transfer the conflict to the ideological plane; and Peking's persistence in this decision, in spite of the obvious risks of a split, is explicable only in terms of this conviction of Mao's ideological superiority. Since 1956–57, the Chinese had come to feel that their one-sided material dependence on their Soviet ally could henceforth be compensated by Soviet ideological dependence on Chinese authority, and it was this belief that made them think they were playing a trump card in opening the ideological attack. But Khrushchev, who had been willing enough to listen to confidential and friendly criticism while he was struggling to consolidate his rule over Eastern Europe, was bound to reply with a sharp counterattack to a public attempt to put pressure on him when he was in firm control; and the Chinese took this refusal to acknowledge their claim to ideological superiority not as proof that they had overplayed their hand, but as evidence that the new ruler of the Soviet Union had hardened in his determination to follow the road of revisionism and treason to the bitter end, and that it was now the duty of every good Communist to work for his overthrow.

It was at this point that Chinese attacks ceased to be comprehensible as a mere ideological expression of national interests and became imbued with an ideological zeal that seemed no longer to care how much it damaged those interests by jeopardizing all hope of further Soviet aid: from the time of the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU at the latest, the Chinese were embarked on a crusade against Stalin's unworthy successor, aiming no longer primarily at obtaining specific changes of Soviet foreign policy, but at winning world-wide recognition for themselves as the true guardians of the Marxist-Leninist tradition.

Here, then, is the deepest connection between the two most dramatic phases of the process of disintegration described in this book—the East European crisis of 1956 and the Sino-Soviet break: both start from the destruction of the Stalin myth because that action created a vacancy of authority in the Soviet bloc and the world Communist movement. The East European October was the direct effect of that action on countries where the Communist leadership was now divided between Stalin's henchmen and his surviving victims. The Chinese challenge was the delayed repercussion of the proven incapacity of the Soviet leaders to fill the void—to regain international authority beyond the confines of their imperial power. Of the three major blows that the Communist faith has suffered in the course of the Khrushchevian decade, the second and third—the Hungarian revolution and the Chinese schism—are in that sense inconceivable without the first—the destruction of the Stalin myth, which in its doom involved the myth of Soviet infallibility.

Yet the absence of international authority created by Khrushchev's de-Stalinization, and the opportunity it has opened for the Chinese claim to represent the orthodox tradition of Marxism-Leninism, are not the only reasons for the growing role that Chinese attacks on Khrushchev's "revisionist" domestic program and Soviet countercharges of "Stalinist dogmatism" against Mao have come to play since the Twenty-second Con-

gress of the CPSU. Beyond the rivalry for world-wide leadership, the debate on "Stalinism" versus "revisionism" reflects the different needs of Communist parties ruling societies in different stages of economic and social development.

The central domestic problem facing Stalin's Russian heirs, and the most important reason for Khrushchev's decision to destroy the Stalin myth, has been the need to adapt the rule of the CPSU to the conditions of a growing industrial society. Khrushchev understood at an early stage that Soviet society could not develop further without a drastic change in the methods of governing it, a major reduction in the role of police coercion, and a major increase in the role of material incentives; and he knew that the party bureaucrats trained by Stalin could not be induced to change their methods unless the legend of Stalin's infallibility was destroyed first. The very fact that Khrushchev wanted to accomplish the change while maintaining the primacy of an ideological party forced him to take the risk of an ideological break.

Again, the claim in Khrushchev's 1961 program that the Soviet Union was no longer a "dictatorship of the proletariat" but a "state of the whole people" was intended to emphasize the change of political climate brought about by the disappearance of mass terrorism: the important point was not that state and party were no longer proletarian—which everybody knew they had long ceased to be in Stalin's time—but that the regime no longer wished to describe itself as a dictatorship. The ideological revision reflects the belief of the Soviet leaders that, at the present stage of development, single-party rule can best be justified by disguising rather than emphasizing its dictatorial character: within certain limits, a climate of relaxation now seems to serve the stability of the regime better than the extreme of totalitarian tension.

By contrast, the entire development of China since June 1957 has been dominated by Mao's conviction that his regime could only be maintained if ideological militancy was kept up in a climate of permanent internal and external tension—a con-

viction forced on him by the flood of both popular and intellectual criticism that came to the surface during the temporary relaxation of the "Hundred Flowers Campaign." It was not only the shock of Hungary, but this internal shock that made Mao insist on branding "revisionism" as the main danger during the Moscow conference of the same year; and we know now that at this conference, where he sought not a quarrel but the closest possible collaboration with the Soviet leaders, the Chinese delegation expressed serious doctrinaire qualms about the concept of the "peaceful" or "parliamentary road to socialism" which Khrushchev had introduced in his report to the Twentieth Congress—even though the new formula intended nothing more reformist than a "legal" seizure of power of the type exemplified by the Prague coup of 1948. Underlying these qualms was the Chinese fear of any theory that, by seemingly blurring the picture of an irreconcilable world-wide struggle, might interfere with their determination to maintain the atmosphere of a besieged fortress at home; and during the following years, that determination has clearly been an important contributing factor both in shaping the domestic policies of the "Great Leap Forward" and in causing the Chinese leaders to engage in various international conflicts.

To men with this outlook, the Khrushchevian "abandonment" of the dictatorship of the proletariat must have appeared not only as a tactical opportunity for appealing to Communist traditionalists in the Soviet Union, the Soviet bloc, and the Communist world movement against such "revisionism," but as a really dangerous encouragement of opponents of their own harsh regime inside China; hence their insistence that the dictatorship must be maintained for the entire period until the building of communism has been completed, because new bourgeois elements may arise again and again and must be fought ruthlessly to prevent a capitalist restoration. In the Chinese "Ninth Commentary" on the Soviet "Open Letter," which reads like a political testament of Mao Tse-tung, this insistence comes close to Stalin's 1937 thesis that the class struggle must

become sharper with the progress of socialist construction—a thesis correctly denounced in Khrushchev's "secret speech" as the ideological justification for the blood purges: the Chinese now argue that this struggle against the hydra-headed danger of capitalist restoration may last "from five to ten generations" or "one or several centuries," and may enter particularly acute phases at any time during this period. The domestic motivation of this argument becomes evident in the document's concluding appeal to the Chinese party to train in time loyal successors to the first generation of revolutionaries, lest revisionist careerists of Khrushchev's ilk gain power and co-operate with the neo-capitalist elements in turning society away from the true socialist path.

If the different concepts that the Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders hold of the best methods for maintaining power in their respective conditions have thus greatly enlarged the field of the ideological dispute, it is equally true that the involvement of those concepts in the dispute has made them less liable to short-term change. On one side, Khrushchev's new party program has created additional obstacles to any return to "Stalinist" methods of rule; on the other, Mao's testament seeks to bind his successors to reject forever the policy of differential wages and privileges for foremen, technicians, and bureaucrats which has played a vital role in Soviet (and particularly in Stalinist) construction. The Sino-Soviet conflict thus tends to perpetuate the differences in the social climate of the two Communist powers.

To the conflicting needs of the Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes to emphasize respectively the growth of personal security and comfort or the preservation of a state of permanent tension at home, there corresponds an equally divergent emphasis on the socialist potential of the advanced industrial workers or the revolutionary potential of the underdeveloped nations abroad.

The Chinese Communists have long seen their own revolution as the natural model for the colonial and ex-colonial peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Since 1959–60, one of the basic Chinese charges against Khrushchev's diplomacy of "peaceful co-existence" has been that it seeks to put the brake on anti-imperialist, revolutionary movements in the interest of limiting Soviet risks; conversely, Chinese strategy has aimed at frustrating Soviet diplomacy by pushing such movements regardless of risks.

Yet underlying all such strategic considerations there has been an increasing Chinese realization that it is only the masses of these underdeveloped nations who can still be described as having "nothing to lose but their chains," and that they alone still constitute a reservoir for armed revolutionary struggle. Early in 1963, this view was first expressed by the Chinese in the formula that the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America now constitute "the main focus of imperialist contradictions," and that the struggle of their peoples would be "decisive" also for the ultimate victory of the proletariat of the advanced industrial countries; and this formula has been repeated in the 25-point proposal for a "general line" of June 1963. The Russians have not hesitated to reply to these statements by charges of "racialism," accompanied by dire warnings that any attempt to "isolate" the struggle of the colonial and ex-colonial peoples from the advanced "socialist" countries and from the advanced proletarian movements of the industrial West could only lead them into certain defeat.

Now it is certainly true that Lenin, in seeking to forge the alliance between the Western industrial proletariat and the colonial revolutionary movements, regarded the former as the vanguard and the latter as a kind of massive auxiliary force of the world revolution. But it is equally true that in the four decades since Lenin died, the Communist proletarians have failed to win power in any advanced industrial country, while Communist revolutions have been victorious in various parts of the underdeveloped world. In tending to transfer the revolutionary mission from the "internal proletariat" of the West

to its "external proletariat" (in the terms coined by A. J. Toynbee), the Chinese Communists are thus in conflict with Marx and even with Lenin, but in accord with historical reality.

Nor are their Russian opponents any closer to Leninist orthodoxy; for while clinging to the belief in the decisive role of the industrial proletariat which Lenin took over from Marx, they have been forced by experience to modify Lenin's vision of the revolutionary uprising of the workers in favor of the attempt to trick the workers into supporting a Communist seizure of power by means of the "parliamentary road." The truth is that, in the light of all recent history, it is no longer possible to maintain Lenin's belief in the urgency of revolution and in the leading role of the working class of the advanced countries at the same time, and that Peking and Moscow have plunged for the opposite horns of this dilemma. The schism in the Communist world movement thus forces the disintegration of the Leninist synthesis into the consciousness of the Communist leaders: while the Chinese are increasingly discarding the Marxist elements in Leninism, the Soviets are criticizing their neglect of objective economic conditions with Marxist arguments that often read like a paraphrase of those once used by the Russian Mensheviks against Lenin.

On the Soviet side, this development has gained increased momentum following the failure of Khrushchev's prolonged efforts to achieve the collapse of the Western alliance by nuclear blackmail while avoiding the risk of world war, and his subsequent turn toward a phase of relative *détente* in foreign policy coupled with a concentration on efforts to raise the domestic standard of living. In seeking to justify this turn in the face of the persistent ideological attacks from Peking, Khrushchev is now quoting Lenin to prove the primacy of economic construction after the seizure of power, and Suslov has even described the "building of communism" at home as the foremost *international* duty of the Soviet Communists. Moreover, while under Stalin the building of "socialism in one country" was pursued by means of a permanent revolution from above, Khrushchev is increasingly identifying the achievement of "communism in one empire" with straightforward progress in economic performance and the standard of living, hence with the decline of social tensions; and while this evidently corresponds better to the needs of present-day Soviet society than the Chinese recipe, the Chinese may be right in doubting whether it corresponds to the long-term needs of maintaining the party dictatorship. It is easy to see that such a dictatorship is necessary for maintaining a policy of permanent conflict abroad and permanent revolution at home; it is less plausible in the long run that a similar regime should be required to promote peaceful economic progress—even though it is now called the leadership of the party in a "state of all the people."

What all this amounts to is that it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the hold of the Communist ideology over both the Soviet elites and the Soviet masses at the present stage; and this means that it becomes correspondingly more difficult to ensure the continuation of the primacy of the party after each new crisis of succession. The basic cause of this difficulty is, of course, the growth of a modern industrial Soviet society, whose social climate is characterized both by new material needs and by a more widespread capacity for critical thought. But while this new climate has contributed to deepening the divergence between the policies and doctrines of the Soviet and Chinese Communists, it is also true that the logic of the conflict with Peking has forced the Soviet leaders to move farther and faster toward a revision of the Leninist tradition than they would otherwise have done. The disintegration of the Communist faith that first became visible in the emergence of different national versions has begun to affect developments within the original citadel itself.

Berlin R.L.
Summer 1964

The size of the Bolshevik achievement in power politics, coupled with a continuity of conscious goals unheard of in the history of revolutions and with the intensity of the threat represented by a world power that sees its own role in those messianic terms, has led not a few among the opponents of Bolshevism to accept an unhistorical concept of Soviet expansion proceeding "according to plan," and to overlook uncritically the inner contradictions of this whole development. Some look for the secret of Bolshevik success in the systematic unity of a doctrine that seems to foresee all possible situations and to provide a guide to action for each of them; others regard the doctrine as a mere cloak for the will to power of a "world-conspiracy," whose wirepullers are ready to set aside their proclaimed creed without any scruple whenever this seems expedient for achieving their political power objectives of the moment. Both these interpretations of Soviet policy—purely in terms of applied doctrine or purely in terms of power politics—see it as free from contradictions; hence the exponents of both are necessarily surprised by the actual about-turns and crises of that policy.

Yet the truth is that the history of the Soviet Union and the Communist world movement has in no way evolved according to plan; nor are the successes that rightly impress us in the least identical with those that the Bolshevik leaders were led to expect by their doctrine. Their belief in the Marxist-Leninist scheme of thought has been perfectly genuine, and they could not preserve the cohesion of their party and their regime without it; but it has repeatedly involved them in illusions which they subsequently had to correct in order to maintain their power. Thus the doctrine itself has had to be reformulated again and again, the continuity of the goals notwithstanding, and this process of adjustment has often led through painful crises. The transformation of a backward, primarily agrarian Russia into the present Soviet society with its bureaucratically planned industry and its—still backward—collective farms is a truly remarkable achievement, but something

utterly different from that creation of a classless society based on the free association of producers and active mass participation in the administration that was the vision of its founders; and the discrepancy between Lenin's concept of world revolution and the actual development of Soviet world politics is no less radical.

Marxism-Leninism, like any ideology promising a harmonious final solution of all human conflicts, aims at fulfilling incompatible aspirations; and this incompatibility, hidden in immanent ideological exegesis, is uncovered step by step once ideology is confronted with reality. World revolution meant to Lenin that the proletarians of industrial Europe would be able to follow on their own the Russian model and set up Communist dictatorships in their countries; but this did not happen. It meant to Stalin that the Soviet system would extend its sway only by the direct expansion of the power of the Russian empire; but Tito and Mao conquered power by their own efforts. It meant to Khrushchev, who had to face the effective independence of China and Yugoslavia, the harmonious parallel advance of independent Communist revolutions; but the differences of national interest among Communist states led to irreconcilable disagreements on the interpretation of the doctrine. By the course of events, the history of the Communist world movement has become a critique of its ideology.

During the past decade, in the reign of N. S. Khrushchev, this critique of the ideology by "life itself" has led to the progressive disintegration of the dogmatic unity of the Communist world movement. I have attempted to retrace the main lines of this process and to bring out its inherent, "dialectical" necessity—as an unfolding of the implicit contradictions of the ideology. Each individual chapter was originally written as an analysis of current events. In combining them into a consecutive account, I have eliminated repetitions whenever this could be done without damage to the argument, and have also filled a few gaps and changed all time references to make them fit into the perspective of 1963; but facts that were not known at

ing the notes for both the German and English editions. The work of following developments in the Soviet bloc and the Communist world movement, in sometimes recondite source material and for some years before I had the resources of a university institute at my disposal, was enormously facilitated by the generous assistance of the research department of Radio Free Europe in Munich, first under William E. Griffith and the late Herbert Ritvo, more recently under Richard V. Burks and his team of specialists.

The account of Yugoslav relations with Russia during the crucial phase of 1956–58 presented in Chapter 4 differs from the rest of the book in that much of its material was based not on generally available documents, but on individual communications received from well-informed Yugoslavs; I have therefore preserved its original character as a personal report. A final word of gratitude goes to my Yugoslav friends—not only for this information, but for the broader insights into the problems of East European communism that I owe to many earlier visits to their country.

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in a different framework. Whether the Soviet leaders regarded themselves as prophets of a revolution in control of a powerful empire, or as rulers of an empire armed with a revolutionary doctrine, they could as little abandon ideology as they could the state interest: their position was more similar to that of the Caliphate in its conquering period than to that of a secular Western state.

Stalin's solution of the dilemma – as brutally simple, and as unique as his solutions for all the contradictions of the state bequeathed by Lenin to his disciples – consisted in making the primacy of Soviet state interest an essential part of the ideology itself: that was the essence of the doctrine of "socialism in one country," later elaborated in the formulas of the "fatherland of all toilers" and of the "leading role of the Soviet Union" in the world-wide struggle of the proletariat. The advance of communism throughout the world was declared wholly dependent on the growth of the might of the Soviet Union. Aided by the fact that for twenty-five years the Communists spectacularly failed to repeat in any other country the Bolshevik victory of 1917, this was understood more and more clearly to mean that Communists could, and should, henceforth take power only under the protection of Soviet bayonets – that Communist revolution would no longer take place on the 1917 model, but only as a consequence of the expansion of Soviet power, as a *revolution from above.*

The victory of the Yugoslav Communist partisans under Tito, won in most of the country before the arrival of Soviet troops and with a revolutionary policy adopted and retained against Soviet advice, was the first serious blow to Stalin's "leading role" doctrine. Tito's strategy, moreover, had been influenced to a large extent by an

> it desirable to have mutual confidence established between our parties. The strongest ties are created among the peoples of those countries where the leading forces are parties which base their activities on the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. . . . We would not be doing our duty to our peoples and to the working people of the whole world if we did not do everything possible to establish mutual understanding between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav Communist League, on the basis of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism.[7]

The first public reply was given the next day (May 28) in an editorial in *Borba*, which expressed approval for everything Khrushchev had said about the need to reduce international tension and to improve Soviet-Yugoslav "inter-state relations," but pointedly omitted both the strange apology and the appeal for party contacts, and concluded with a condemnation of "the partition of the world into ideological blocs," which was "not the path that leads to peace." Throughout the stay of the Soviet visitors, the Yugoslav press continued to elaborate on the danger of ideological blocs, and to underline the distinction between "co-existence in the sense of some temporary truce between hostile blocs, created by an ideological division" – that is, the Soviet concept – and the Yugoslav idea of "active co-existence," – that is, "the active co-operation of all countries regardless of differences in their internal systems." [8] In the end, the Yugoslavs failed to get the Soviet delegation to subscribe to their view of ideological blocs, and had to content themselves with an equivocal condemnation of "military blocs" in the joint declaration – equivocal because, as the Yugoslavs well knew, the coherence of the Soviet bloc did not depend on

leaders in the satellite countries, and might even accelerate the process of change inside the Soviet Union. Under cover of the ideological non-aggression pact both sides thus started an ideological tug of war for highly ambitious stakes.

The Soviet argument in this tug of war (exemplified by editorials in *Pravda* of July 16, 1955, and *Kommunist*, No. 11, 1955) stressed Soviet willingness to recognize "separate paths to socialism," but held that Yugoslavia could only resist imperialist pressure for the restoration of capitalism if she adjusted her policies so as to strengthen ties with the Soviet Union and the "people's democracies"; further steps should now be taken toward "the establishment of contact . . . between the CPSU and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism." [11] The Russians thus admitted that the purpose of Khrushchev's Belgrade visit had not been fully achieved at the time, but claimed that the foundations had been laid.

The Yugoslav reply was put forward on the theoretical level in an article by Veljko Vlahovic, of the Yugoslav Communist Central Committee, on "The forms of Co-operation between Socialist Forces," [12] and on the level of practical politics in a speech by Tito at Karlovac on July 27.[13] The Vlahovic article marshaled Yugoslav objections to the Soviet idea of "a rapprochement on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles" – that is, to a one-sided ideological alignment with the Soviet bloc – and opposed to it the long-term perspective of an all-inclusive International, to which both Communists and democratic Socialists would one day belong.

To the idea of an alignment based on Marxist-Leninist principles, Vlahovic raised three objections: first, Marxist-

Leninist doctrine did not take adequate account of developments in recent decades, such as the liberation of former colonial countries, the emergence of progressive forms of state capitalism, and so forth, and thus any doctrinaire alignment would be an obstacle to an open-minded analysis of these developments; second, progress toward socialism was not confined to movements following a Leninist revolutionary strategy or to any one bloc of states; third, the interests of labor therefore required the co-operation of movements following different strategies in different countries on a basis of mutual tolerance, on the model of the First rather than the Third International, and such broad co-operation was incompatible with the attempts of the representatives of any one doctrine to exercise a "hegemony."

The Vlahovic article thus constituted an open attack on the doctrinal authority of Moscow and the organizational authority of the Cominform. In part, that attack served the defensive purpose of preserving the special position of the Yugoslav Communists in their friendly but independent contact with both Soviet Communists and Western Social Democrats. But in part, it also aimed offensively to loosen the Soviet hold over the East European satellites, inasmuch as that hold was exercised through party ties and based on doctrinal arguments. If one of the basic differences in the interpretation of the Belgrade declaration was that Moscow conceded the right to a "different road to socialism" only to independent Communists, while Belgrade admitted it also for "reformists," the other main difference was that Khrushchev would grant even such independence in the development of Communist power only to those who had already effectively taken it, like China and Yugoslavia, while Tito now began to urge it for the satellites.

This latter point was strongly underlined in Tito's Karlovac speech in which he attacked "certain leaders in neighboring countries." His attack clearly had a dual political objective: to discredit the leaders who had conducted the former anti-Titoist campaign by forcing an open revision of the show-trials of the period, and also to induce the satellite states to develop, through direct contact with Yugoslavia, a new relationship which would be more than merely a kind of appendix to the new relationship begun by the Soviet Union. Strategically, both demands were aimed at ending the satellite status of the Communist states of East and Southeast Europe; this was also the purpose of his demand for a dissolution of the Cominform.

There is evidence that the Yugoslav leaders at that time regarded such a "Titoist" development as feasible and even probable in some of the satellites; for example, they called attention not only to the release of a number of former "national Communists" but to such phenomena as the successful refusal of the Hungarian Communist ex-Premier Imre Nagy to recant after he had been deposed, and to the continued popularity of figures like Nagy, or Gomulka in Poland, inside their Communist parties. There is just as much evidence, however, that the Soviet leaders were not then ready to grant such independence to their satellites; for one thing, preparations for the co-ordination of the new five-year plans which were to start throughout the Soviet bloc with the beginning of 1956 showed clearly that the Soviet leaders now intended to introduce a detailed division of labor within their empire on a scale that seemed incompatible with effective national autonomy.[14]

Tito's trumpet calls, however, produced a great deal of inner-party discussion in Eastern Europe; and since the

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1956: THREE ROADS TO "SOCIALISM"

The Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party saw the first attempt since Lenin's time to systematize the experience of communism as an international movement.[1] Never before had the Soviet leaders cast a theoretical eye on the Communist victories in China and Yugoslavia as well as on their own successes in Eastern Europe, viewing them as historical events from which new lessons could be learned by Communists everywhere. Never before had they explicitly told the Communist parties all over the world that there were other models to be followed than the Soviet.

In Western discussion of the Congress, the importance of this new departure has tended to be overshadowed by the sensational reassessment of Stalin's role in Communist history and by the major changes in Soviet domestic politics connected with it. Yet the renewal of serious interest in the problems of "world revolution" was itself one of the major aspects of the breach with the Stalin tradition — an aspect that in the minds of Mr. Khrushchev and his team clearly formed a necessary complement to the di-

plomacy of "peaceful co-existence" and to the attempt to consolidate the CPSU's domestic position by a series of major reforms.

The one element in the reformulation of revolutionary theory that at once aroused some discussion among non-Communists was the Soviet leaders' recognition that a "peaceful" or "parliamentary" road to "socialism" is possible under certain conditions. This was widely interpreted as an attempt to trick Western democratic Socialists and Asian nationalists into alliances of the "Popular Front" type. But while this interpretation is correct as far as it goes, most commentators seem to have missed the really new element in the theory. For the "Popular Fronts" of the 1930's were explicitly confined to the purpose of "defending democracy within the capitalist framework," by creating governments friendly to the Soviet Union;[2] this limitation was still implicit in Stalin's attempt to revive the "Popular Front" strategy in his 1952 speech to the Nineteenth Party Congress.[3] Today, however, the "parliamentary road" is advocated as a means to achieve "socialism," that is, full Communist power.

It is true that Soviet spokesmen at the Twentieth Congress cited examples of past successful application of the strategy for this end. But they could find them only among countries where Soviet military pressure had played the decisive role in achieving this sort of "socialism" (as in Czechoslovakia and the Baltic states)[4] – the only condition in which Stalin had ever sanctioned the seizure of power. By contrast, at the Twentieth Congress the proximity and assistance of Soviet power were no longer mentioned as a condition for the future success of the "peaceful road"; in principle, therefore, attempts by the Communists to seize full control by this method were henceforth permissible anywhere on the globe.

working-class revolution against the bourgeois state, and they tended to regard its most striking political features — the taking of local power by Soviets and the uprising of armed workers in the capital — as the necessary forms for that social content. The Soviets were organs for direct mass activity, analogous to the Paris Commune admired by Karl Marx. In the Bolshevik view only these organs could paralyze the bourgeois state machine and destroy it at its roots, while only an armed uprising could overthrow the bourgeois-democratic central government and seize power. The example of the German revolution of 1918, though unsuccessful, confirmed this belief. For in Germany, too, workers' and soldiers' councils were formed (partly under the influence of Russian events), and in the following years a series of armed clashes took place between the Communist minority among the workers and counter-revolutionary military formations serving the "bourgeois republic." The Bolshevik leaders chose to view this development as proof of the typical character of their own experience.

Today it is clear that Lenin was totally mistaken both about the social and historical character of his own revolution and about the importance of its political forms. The revolution arose not from the oppression of the workers in a capitalist society, but from the retarded development of such a society; the historical role of the revolution was not to end exploitation but to modernize an underdeveloped country by dictatorial methods. The Soviets were not typical organs of working-class rule, but unique — and very temporary — forms of mass organization in a country where, owing to Tsarist oppression, the tradition of stable democratic organizations was lacking. This is why they never achieved comparable importance in Germany and

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never were formed in other advanced countries. (It is also why revolutionary workers' and soldiers' councils did spontaneously arise in the Hungarian people's revolt against a totalitarian Communist regime in October 1956.) The uprising in the Russian capital, finally, was victorious only because of the absence of a tradition of "bourgeois democracy"; in no country with established parliamentary institutions did the workers show the expected tendency to rise "against the state."

The really decisive political feature of the October Revolution was neither the role of the Soviets nor that of the workers' uprising in Petrograd, but the seizure of power by the centralized Bolshevik Party; it was this that made Lenin's victory the first of the totalitarian revolutions of the twentieth century. By contrast, the Soviets and the workers' uprising merely arose from the fact that this revolution was grafted onto the earlier, uncompleted democratic revolution against Tsarism, the last of the great democratic revolutions of European history. Yet, Lenin, who for all his insistence on the role of the party remained unaware of the true implications of the instrument of power he had forged, still saw himself as the heir of the democratic-revolutionary tradition of the West; hence his belief that the role of the Soviets, or of Soviet-like organs, and the workers' uprising would be repeated in the industrially advanced "bourgeois democracies."

In that belief, the Communist parties of the West marched for fifteen years from defeat to defeat. In countries with large organized labor movements, slogans like "Bildet Arbeiterraete!" or "Les Soviets partout!" proved absurd even in times of revolutionary crisis; and even where millions of workers voted Communist, as in Germany during the great depression of 1929–32 or in France

in the 1930's, they did not show the slightest inclination to rise against the "bourgeois-democratic state."

Toward the end of the postwar crisis, Karl Radek became the first Bolshevik leader to perceive the error; on the basis of the experience in Germany, he persuaded the Comintern in 1922 to adopt a demand for "workers' governments" (or "workers' and peasants' governments") as a "transitional slogan" [6] – in other words to call on the workers to press for parliamentary governments of the "united front," which were then to be urged on to extra-constitutional measures, until the resistance of the old ruling classes and their bureaucracies would convince the workers of the need to establish proletarian dictatorships. In a sense, Radek may thus be regarded as the originator of the present concept of the "parliamentary road to socialism"; but after the defeat of the German Communists in 1923, his ideas were condemned as "opportunist" and the old doctrine restored in its full rigidity.[7]

STALIN AND THE "PEACEFUL ROAD"

Yet under Stalin the restoration of the old doctrine did not imply a return to the old illusions about a working-class revolution in the West; on the contrary, it was a form of writing off the prospects of such a revolution, of turning the Comintern into a mere auxiliary of the Soviet state while proceeding with the "building of socialism in one country." But as Stalin, empirically following the logic of power, became gradually conscious of the true implications of the type of party that Lenin had led to victory, he was bound to see also the possibilities for foreign Communist parties in a new light. At home, he proceeded to resolve the contradiction between the democratic-

revolutionary heritage in Lenin's ideas and the realistic needs of a totalitarian state by liquidating the former and consistently developing the latter; abroad, he began to explore the possibilities of using dependent totalitarian parties as instruments not of popular revolution but of the infiltration of foreign governments, with the aim of influencing their international policy in the interest of the Soviet Union. The first large-scale experiment of this type was the policy imposed on the Chinese Communists from 1924 to 1927, which led to their affiliation with the Kuomintang, their filling of many key posts in its political machine during the northward offensive, and finally to an attempt by the CPC leadership to put the brake on the peasant revolution in a vain effort to avoid conflict with Chiang Kai-shek.[8] The fact that this policy ultimately failed must not be allowed to obscure its historical importance in pioneering a completely new type of Communist activity.

That experiment in China had been facilitated, however, by the accepted Leninist doctrine that in the national revolution of such a backward, "semi-colonial" country the immediate aim of the Communists could not be the "dictatorship of the proletariat" but only an alliance with all "progressive" classes; the strategy of infiltration was justified as the political form of that alliance.[9] It took the victory and consolidation of Nazism in Germany to make Stalin agree to a modified application of this strategy in democratic, industrial countries.

Mussolini had been the first to see that the technique of the centralized party and the one-party state could be applied for gaining and preserving power without accepting the Bolshevik ideology or program. He also recognized that such a party was by its very nature inde-

pendent of any particular "class basis" — that it could afford to rely on different social strata in turn. Applying these observations, he demonstrated how such a party could exploit the institutions of a parliamentary democracy in order to seize power "legally." This lesson was not understood in Russia at the time, but it was carefully applied by Hitler. By the summer of 1934, when Hitler had proved by the Roehm purge of June 30 that he was not the stooge of the Reichswehr which Stalin had believed him to be, the latter began to take him seriously [10] both as a danger to the USSR and as a model for new and significant political techniques. The time had come for Bolshevism to return to the Fascists the compliment of imitation.

In the meantime, the Communist parties in the West, while losing much of their early strength, had gone through many Kremlin-imposed changes of leadership. Admiration for the power and ruthlessness of Stalinist Russia, rather than belief in a repetition of Lenin's revolution, had become the decisive article of faith. Stalin now decided to use the parties to try and bring about "anti-Fascist" governmental coalitions; for the first time in their history, they were to attempt seriously to influence parliamentary politics within the bourgeois state by using all the unscrupulous maneuverability of a totalitarian party to this end. But as in China ten years earlier, the aim was not to seize power and carry out a social revolution, but to influence foreign policy in alliance with all "progressive" classes. This time, the reason given for limiting the objective was not the backwardness of the countries concerned but the need, with Hitler on the doorstep, to avoid civil war, and the danger to the Soviet Union if the Western countries without strong Communist parties — particularly Britain and the United States — should be scared into Hitler's camp by the specter of Communist revolution.

Here was the essence of the "Popular Front" strategy: it was the first great experiment in using totalitarian Communist parties to gain influence within the state machine of Western democracies by parliamentary means. Since the objectives were limited to foreign policy, Communist parties were ordered to modify their social and economic programs to keep them within the "capitalist framework." [11] The strategy was thus an attempt to combine the lessons of the Chinese experiment and of Hitler's victory in a spirit completely foreign to the Leninist tradition. Again, it failed in the end. But in France it resulted in large permanent gains by the Communist Party; and in Spain it led temporarily to almost complete Communist control of the remnant of the Republican state machine, after the civil war and "non-intervention" had made the government dependent on Soviet supplies and advisers. From this experience, Stalin learned how successful the new technique of "legal" seizure of the state machine might be, if combined with dependence on the Soviet Union.

FROM "POPULAR FRONT" TO "PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY"

The new strategy was abandoned between the time of the Munich agreement and the German attack on the USSR — that is, during the period of Soviet-German negotiations and of the Stalin-Hitler pact. But after Hitler's invasion of Russia, the same policy was readopted under the slogan of "National Liberation Fronts" in occupied Europe and of "National Unity" in other allied countries. The Soviet

Russian attitude seems to have been ambiguous for some time; the indications are that Stalin never wished any Communists to make a bid for total power, either by parliamentary or violent means, in countries where they could not be physically backed by Soviet forces and kept afterwards dependent on the "leading role of the Soviet Union," but that he was prevailed upon to tolerate a certain amount of experiment. It is a fact, at any rate, that a number of Western Communist leaders in 1946 made statements interpreting the coalition governments of this time as stages in a "people's democratic" development, which might peacefully lead to "socialism" by the "parliamentary road," and the Italian Communists, at least, showed considerable confidence that they might come to power as independently on this road as Tito had done on the road of civil war.[12] Those ideas could not have been put forward without at least the tentative approval of Stalin, but he never committed himself to them in public.[13] It was only after the end of the Communist participation in West European governments, the formation of the Cominform, and finally the conflict with Tito, that these hopes faded and the Western Communists returned — after some ill-prepared attempts at revolutionary mass action — to sterile and rigid opposition.

Since the Twentieth CPSU Congress and the dissolution of the Cominform, the West European Communists have been resurrecting these statements of 1946, and again it is the Italians who do so with the greatest self-confidence and apparent conviction.[14] Khrushchev's "Leninist revival" has resulted in the first explicit theoretical recognition of the strategy of the "parliamentary road" which had been developed, gropingly and gradually over more than twenty years, by Stalin; but it has also freed

that strategy from its Stalinist limitation to either foreign policy objectives or to states under Soviet military control. In contrast to Lenin, the present leaders know as clearly as did Stalin that they are dealing not with working-class risings against the bourgeois state, but with totalitarian techniques for legally seizing the state machine; in contrast to Stalin, they believe in the "world revolution" – that is, in the possibility and desirability of Communist victories outside the immediate Soviet sphere.

THE PATH OF THE PARTISANS

The possibility of such victories must have been impressed even on a reluctant Stalin by two Communist movements that followed an altogether different road from either Lenin's or his own – the Chinese and the Yugoslav. Mao Tse-tung apparently had from the beginning been opposed to one aspect of Stalin's Chinese policy of the 1920's – the attempt to brake the peasant revolution in the interest of preserving the Communist-Kuomintang alliance.[15] After the defeat of this policy, some of the military specialists of the Chinese Communist Party, including Chou-En-lai, undertook a number of unsuccessful attempts to imitate the Leninist tactics of the armed workers' uprising, even though conditions were plainly unfavorable. Meanwhile Mao, then still far from the leadership of the party, took to partisan warfare in a mountainous region.

It seems evident that Mao at first acted not from a conscious strategic concept of the Chinese road to power but from an instinct of political self-preservation, guided by the immemorial tradition of Chinese peasant risings. Only gradually, as this partisan warfare was moderately

successful while all else failed, did Mao's strategic concept develop. Some Western students of communism have seen his originality in the bold decision to rely on guerilla tactics in the countryside and to avoid decisive battles for the control of big towns even though this meant building up an army and even a party organization in which the peasants formed the great majority, contrary to Communist doctrine. Yet the difference between Mao's partisan warfare and the traditional peasant rising was no less vital; it consisted in his gradual creation of a mobile force, officered partly by intellectual and working-class cadres, but consisting mainly of uprooted peasants, who could be used outside their region of origin.[16] The famous "long march" to the Northwest, like the equally heroic marches of Tito's partisans during the war, was the visible symbol of the complete emancipation of the new army from its original social basis; despite the peasant origin of most of its members, it was no more a class force of peasants than a class force of workers, but a truly totalitarian creation.

The success of Mao's policy depended in part on the creation of new local government organs – which acted also as organs of agrarian revolution – in whatever area was held at any time by the partisan forces. The "Soviets" arose in China, as did later analogous organs in Yugoslavia, not as spontaneous forms of mass organization but as auxiliary institutions of the military rule imposed by the party. Another element of success was the transfer of experienced Communist cadres from the cities to the "Soviet areas." The party leadership long obstructed this, however, since it would have implied recognition that the uprising in the countryside had, contrary to traditional doctrine, become the party's main task; only after Mao

had struggled for years against the "working-class" prejudices of successive Moscow-imposed leaderships were the latter forced by persecution themselves to join the "Soviet areas."[17] After the Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow, Mao at last openly attributed such "sectarian" resistance to the errors of Stalin.[18]

In Yugoslavia, Tito based his partisan activity from the start on a study of the Chinese experience, transferring the Central Committee and the largest possible number of urban cadres to the mountains and using the latter as soon as possible to form "proletarian brigades" in order to achieve mobility.[19] Years later, Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, the Yugoslav leader who had been in charge of liaison with Communist partisans in neighboring countries, saw one of the principal causes of the defeat of the Greek Communists in their repeated hesitation to take similar steps.[20]

While Mao's partisan strategy succeeded in preserving the Communist force for years as a potential contender for power and an actual factor of anarchy, it would not have led to victory without the Japanese war and occupation; the latter acted as a decisive solvent of all state authority and at the same time gave the Communists an opportunity to add the appeal of nationalism to their program. The German occupation played an even more important role in Yugoslavia, for without it no partisan war would have started. Similarly, Japanese occupation and anti-colonial revolt offered the Vietnamese Communists their opportunity. By contrast, Communist attempts to apply "Chinese tactics" of guerilla uprisings in independent Asian countries after 1948 have been as uniformly unsuccessful as the attempts to apply "Russian tactics" in Europe after World War I.

During both the Sino-Japanese war and World War II the importance of "National Front" tactics was fully recognized by Stalin, and he urged on all Communist partisan forces a corresponding moderation of their program — in the Chinese case more or less successfully,[21] in the Yugoslav case with very limited and temporary success only. But the final struggle for power was initiated in both cases against his advice;[22] and it is doubtful whether the later guerilla actions elsewhere were ever intended by Moscow to be more than harassing operations. When in 1949 the victorious Chinese Communists proclaimed to the world movement that their revolution should become the model for all colonial and semi-colonial countries, their claim received from the Russians the same kind of guarded and tentative approval as the idea of the "peaceful road" for Western Europe had received in 1946; the speech by Liu Shao-ch'i that formulated the claim was reprinted in the Cominform weekly and in *Pravda*,[23] but no Soviet leader and no resolution of the CPSU endorsed it explicitly, and no discussion of the consequences of such approval took place in public; hence the Russians remained free to repudiate the claim whenever they pleased. It was only at the Twentieth Congress that partisan warfare of the Chinese and Yugoslav type was explicitly recognized by Moscow as one of the "roads to power" that parties might use as a model in similar circumstances.

ALL ROADS LEAD TO POWER

The Soviet leaders made no attempt at the Twentieth Congress to map out in detail the several "roads to power" they now profess to sanction for foreign Com-

crisis of Soviet authority — the refusal of many leading Communists and some entire parties further to recognize the Soviet Union as the sole model and its leaders as necessary guides for their own decisions; this is the phenomenon loosely known as "national communism." Second, there was the open expression of doubt by a number of hitherto leading Communists about some of the fundamental principles of Leninism, such as the need for a monolithic, centralized party and a single-party state controlled by it; such "revisionism" had not appeared on any serious scale for more than thirty years. Third, there was an outright loss of faith in the truthfulness of the Communist leaders and the value of Communist ideology as a whole by large numbers of ordinary party members and sympathizers, most striking among intellectuals but not confined to them; this loss of ideological attraction was marked both in satellite Europe and throughout the Western world, and occurred even in the Soviet Union, though hardly any signs of it had yet appeared among the underdeveloped states of Asia.

The principal political milestones of the crisis are well known. It began with the first major disavowal of Stalin's doctrines and policies at the end of May 1955, when N. S. Khrushchev as First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party and N. Bulganin as Minister President of the USSR went to Belgrade, publicly admitted that the Soviet government had been wrong to try to force its views on Communist Yugoslavia and to treat Marshal Tito as a "Fascist" and an "agent of imperialism" when he refused to comply, and proclaimed that the Yugoslav Communists had remained a "Marxist-Leninist" party with which fraternal relations should be resumed by all good Communists. It gathered momentum with the disclosure of

Stalin's methods of inner-party terrorism and the damage done by them to the Soviet state in Khrushchev's "secret speech" to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, followed in April by the dissolution of the Cominform. It reached its dramatic climax in the revolutionary events in Eastern Europe in October 1956: the defiant proclamation of independence in their internal affairs by the Polish Communist leaders, accomplished in the teeth of protests and threats by the Soviet rulers; and the initially successful rising of the people of Hungary against the Soviet-imposed Communist dictatorship, which led to the formation of a coalition government of democratic parties and to the proclamation of Hungarian neutrality before it was drowned in blood by armed Soviet intervention. Finally, the development of the crisis included the independent ideological initiatives undertaken by the Chinese Communists, the stubborn resistance of writers in Russia and other Communist states against the party's ideological control, as well as the outburst of open polemics between "orthodox" and "heretical" Communist parties in the winter of 1956–57.

Thus the immediate cause of the ideological crisis had clearly been the disavowal of Stalin's policies and the disclosure of his crimes by his successors and former accomplices; without the shattering effect on Soviet authority of the Belgrade journey and the "secret speech," the October revolutions in Poland and Hungary would have been inconceivable. But this in itself requires an interpretation of Stalin's significance for Communist ideology. If he had just been the indispensable symbol of authority needed to maintain the unity of a world-wide centralized movement, the iconoclasm of Khrushchev would appear to have been an act of wanton folly. In

fact, however, Stalin's name stood for a peculiar ideological synthesis – a brutal but consistent solution of some of the basic contradictions inherent in the Leninist myth. The idol *had* to be broken because the synthesis was no longer workable; the ideological crisis continues because those basic contradictions have re-emerged into full view.

STALIN'S IDEOLOGICAL ACHIEVEMENTS

The first of these contradictions concerns the character of the Bolshevik revolution and of the Communist Party. Lenin saw his own victory as the culmination of one of the great democratic revolutions of Europe, and his party as the "Jacobins" of the working class. Yet by his insistence on centralized control he had in fact created a totalitarian party which could change its "social basis" at will and become purely an instrument of power; his victory was thus the beginning of the first of the totalitarian revolutions of our century – the first stage in the creation of the first single-party dictatorship. Throughout Lenin's life, the fiction of the "basically" democratic working-class party and of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" – a fiction in which he himself somehow managed to retain his belief – kept coming into conflict with the reality of the totalitarian party dictatorship over all classes, the workers included. Stalin's solution consisted in eliminating step by step the remaining concessions to the democratic and proletarian fiction by turning the governing party into a party of bureaucrats, while maintaining that the rule of any Communist party was *by definition* the "dictatorship of the proletariat" – whether it actually enjoyed working-class support or not.

The second contradiction concerns the duration of the dictatorial regime. The "dictatorship of the proletariat" had originally been justified as necessary for the transitional period until the economic power of the former ruling classes had finally been broken; after that, state power, conceived as an instrument of oppression, would gradually "wither away." But the Bolshevik Party had no intention of renouncing its monopoly of power after the final destruction of the capitalist and landowning classes, nor even after the "liquidation of the kulaks as a class" by forced collectivization. Stalin's solution consisted in laying down the doctrine that the more the "construction of socialism" advanced, the more the class struggle was bound to sharpen; this absurdity (proclaimed in the spring of 1937, at the height of the great blood purge)[1] served as a justification for maintaining the dictatorship by turning its terroristic power periodically against ever new groups, thus keeping Soviet society in a state of permanent revolution from above.

The third contradiction arose between the state interests of the Soviet Union and the interests of "world revolution" as represented by the Communist parties outside it. How far should the Soviet state shape its foreign policies to aid the cause of world revolution, and how far was it entitled to sacrifice the latter to its own consolidation? Stalin's solution, formulated first in the slogan of "socialism in one country," later in that of "fatherland of all toilers," consisted in declaring as a matter of doctrine that the state interests of the Soviet Union constituted the supreme interest of international communism, to which every loyal Communist must willingly sacrifice every other consideration. It followed that the victory of communism in any other country was not only highly

improbable, but indeed undesirable unless it depended on Soviet aid and thus coincided with an extension of Soviet state power, and that any new Communist states that did come into existence had to be subordinated to the "leading" Soviet Union just as completely as all Communist parties.

It was this last doctrine that led to the conflict with Tito's Yugoslavia and threatened to lead to a far more vital conflict with Mao Tse-tung's China — the only other country where Communists had taken power primarily by their own efforts; it was this, then, that Stalin's heirs first recognized as untenable. A journey to Peking by Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan in the autumn of 1954 preceded their journey to Belgrade, and one of the central theses of the Twentieth Congress was the recognition of the growth of a "Socialist world system," that is, a plurality of sovereign Communist states.

But by the time of that Congress the second of the Stalinist doctrines mentioned — the justification of ever new purges by "the sharpening of the class struggle" — seemed equally impossible to maintain. Having greatly weakened the secret police in an effort to revive the party organization, Stalin's heirs found themselves under growing pressure to offer to the leading administrative, technico-economic, and military strata of the Soviet Union guarantees against any return to Stalin's blood purges; finally they were driven both to disavow the doctrine and to admit through the mouth of Khrushchev its horrible results.[2] With the discarding of the doctrinal covers, the terrorist actions ordered by Stalin against potential opponents at home and against potential "Titoists" in Eastern Europe stood revealed in their naked ugliness as the crimes of a tyrannic regime; and the sudden collapse of

before had to criticize their own "mistakes" under Soviet pressure in the early days of the post-Stalin "new look," and that the chief exponent of this popular alternative policy, Imre Nagy, though overthrown by them early in 1955, had remained alive and free. Moreover, the Yugoslav's efforts to influence developments in the satellites had been deliberately concentrated on Hungary, where they regarded Rakosi as a symbol of the Cominform past and Nagy as a potential ally in working for a neutral belt extending from Yugoslavia to Austria.[14] The result was a bitter inner-party struggle leading to increasing paralysis of the regime.

In July 1956 the Russians, alarmed by the growth of open opposition within and without the party in Hungary, forced Rakosi to resign in favor of Geroe, who had supported his policy all along; in late August or early September they sent out a circular to all Communist parties warning that the Yugoslavs, though now considered as friends, showed ideological weaknesses of a Social Democratic type and should not be taken as a model.[15] In September, Khrushchev obtained Tito's support for Geroe at the price of a public disavowal of Rakosi's policy, the solemn reburial of Rajk, and the readmission of Nagy to the party.[16] But when these terms were carried out early in October, and were followed immediately by the Polish events, the effect was to destroy what remained of the Hungarian leadership's authority, so that an unrepentant speech by Geroe on his return from Belgrade was enough to start the Budapest students' riots which became a revolution.

The course of events [17] quickly showed that the Hungarian Communist Party had ceased to exist as a coherent force. The Geroe leadership was conscious of having no

the roots of their faith, conscious criticism remained still largely confined to the demand for guarantees against being duped in the future, in the form of increased autonomy of the individual parties and more effective "party democracy" within them.

The demand for greater autonomy was classically expressed by the Italian Communist leader, Palmiro Togliatti, in his formula of a "polycentric" Communist movement.[18] Theoretically, this implied a rejection of Soviet world leadership, and therefore the heresy of "national communism." But the Soviet leaders, who were at first so sensitive when the same tendency was shown by Gomulka in Poland, did not react to Togliatti's heretical formula at the time. They did, however, at once attack another statement of Togliatti's: his thesis that it was necessary for Marxists to look for the weaknesses in Soviet society that had made Stalin's abuses possible [19] – clearly an echo of Yugoslav and earlier Trotskyite criticisms of the "bureaucratic degeneration" in Soviet society. The statement of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party of June 30, 1956 [20] – the first officially published statement of the revaluation of Stalin's role, and at the same time the first attempt to limit the damage and to react to such danger signs as the Poznan riots and the discussions in the Petoefi Club – strongly denied any such "degeneration" and claimed that, despite Stalin's "mistakes" and "departures from the Leninist norms of party life," the "general line" of the party had always been correct, and Soviet society as a whole had therefore party was compatible with steady progress toward "communism. But this implied the cynical belief that the complete destruction of democratic life within the ruling party was compatible with steady progress toward "com-

logical crisis. Outwardly, this was expressed in the defection of a large part of the intellectual periphery and a number of prominent individual members of the Western Communist parties, as well as in a general loss of membership of 20 per cent; in the appearance of opposition to Soviet policy with the "World Peace Council," which necessitated the public admission that no agreement could be reached on Hungary; and in open polemics between the Polish and Yugoslav Communist press, on the one side, and that of the "loyal" part of the Soviet bloc, on the other. The Yugoslavs refused explicitly and officially, and the Polish press implicitly and with some official backing, to accept the Soviet version of the Hungarian events; and when a conference of Soviet-bloc Communist parties under Soviet leadership met in Budapest early in the new year, neither Poles nor Yugoslavs attended.[24]

Even those Communist leaders who officially defended the final Soviet intervention in Hungary were at first divided in their version of the events leading up to it. The Italian Communists as well as those of the United States and of most of the smaller European parties admitted, like the Yugoslavs, that there had been a genuine popular revolt due to the "mistakes" of the former Hungarian leadership; but they claimed that counter-revolutionary elements had gained control of the movement so that Soviet troops had to intervene to "save the achievements of socialism." The French Communist leaders, on the other hand, and those of the "loyal" satellites, unconditionally echoed the Soviet version that the Hungarian rising had been counter-revolutionary from the start, and blamed the Yugoslavs for their support of the Nagy group, which had weakened the cohesion of the regime. Parallel with this dispute, the former group con-

tinued to emphasize the need for autonomous leadership of each Communist party and to reject the idea of a single center of authority and organization, while the latter called for the restoration of such a center under Soviet leadership as a condition for international unity based on common principles.[25]

Ideologically even more significant than these disputes was the reappearance of openly anti-Leninist views among the Polish and Yugoslav Communists. In Poland, this took the form not only of a general call for a "humane socialism" as opposed to Stalinism – the formula for the continuing moral revolt of the intellectuals – but also of a specific revival of the fundamental critique of the Bolshevik revolution written in 1918 in a German prison by Rosa Luxemburg, the Polish-born founder of the German Communist Party. Rosa Luxemburg had always been an uncompromising critic of Lenin's centralist party of the Jacobin type and of its tendency to substitute itself for the working class; when the Bolsheviks seized power in the name of the Soviets, she welcomed their victory, but warned at the same time against equating the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in the Marxian sense with a terrorist party dictatorship, which would inevitably end in personal rule. The critique, published only posthumously by her pupil, Paul Levi, after his expulsion from the Comintern,[26] had not been discussed by Communists for thirty-five years. Now Dr. Julian Hochfeld, a former left-wing Social Democrat and a leading member of the Communist Sejm group, applied the salient points to the disclosures about Stalin's regime;[27] he concluded that the only long-run guarantee for a Socialist development was real democracy, including the right of free criticism and organized opposition. These views were not, of course,

accepted by the Polish Communist Party, any more than were the philosophical criticisms of orthodox Marxist dogma published by the young Communist philosopher Leszek Kolakowski; but both authors were allowed to remain party members although neither recanted.

From another angle, the theoretical spokesman of the Yugoslav Communists, Vice President Edvard Kardelj, had long sought the cause of Stalin's excesses in the "bureaucratic degeneration" of Soviet society, and the remedy in the devolution of administrative and managerial functions to elected organs of self-government, such as workers' councils, communes, and so forth. But when during the winter of 1953–54 Milovan Djilas had drawn the conclusion that effective self-government was incompatible with the monopoly of a single party whose members in all self-governing organs act under centralized discipline, and had advocated the abolition of this Leninist discipline in the interest of true Socialist self-government,[28] he had been branded as a heretic and deprived of all his functions. Now, under the impact of the Hungarian revolution, Kardelj himself took a major step toward revising Leninism. In a speech to the Yugoslav Federal Assembly, he argued that the political "workers' councils" formed in Hungary would have been the natural organs of a truly Socialist power in contrast to the bureaucratic power of the discredited Communist Party, and that both Kadar and Nagy had been wrong in trying to revive that party – the one with Soviet help, the other with the help of a parliamentary coalition – instead of relying on the organs of the "direct rule of the workers."[29] He thus admitted that party dictatorship might have to give way to such "Soviets without Communists," in some cases, in the interests of socialism; and he even came

close to the "Djilasist" conclusion that a state party was in principle an obstacle to the growth of workers' self-government in saying that "any party monopoly at the center, whether exercised by one or several parties, is incompatible with a truly decisive role of the masses of producers in the workers' factory councils and the communes." While no practical conclusions have been drawn from this astonishing statement in Yugoslavia, it has never been withdrawn or disowned, though it was, of course, bitterly attacked in Soviet and other orthodox Communist publications as "anarcho-syndicalist."

As for Djilas himself, he reacted to the Polish and Hungarian events by publishing abroad his final conversion to Social Democratic views:[30] "national communism" of the Yugoslav type, he wrote, might mitigate some evils but could not overcome the fundamental defects of every totalitarian system; true socialism could not be achieved without the freedom of organized opposition, that is, a multi-party system. At this point, the Yugoslav rulers recognized a danger to their own regime, and Djilas was sent to prison for "hostile propaganda."

THE "SAFE" COMMUNIST STATES

In the Soviet Union and in the "loyal" member states of the Soviet bloc, it remained impossible publicly to advocate such "revisionist" political concepts as those of Hochfeld or Kardelj. But even there, the official polemics against these views, as well as contacts with Polish and Hungarian intellectuals and reading of Polish and Yugoslav newspapers (or in some cases of Western Communist newspapers which had to give space to dissident views), broke through the official monopoly of information and

In the light of the above remarks about the basic contradictions in Communist ideology which the crisis of 1956–57 brought to the surface, it is not difficult to understand this reaction. Communism in Asia has not, in the main, presented itself as the heir to the Western democratic ideals of liberty and equality; rather has its attraction been based on its proven value as an engine for the speedy industrialization and modernization of an underdeveloped country. Nor has it seriously pretended lately to be a workers' movement. Following Mao's example, the Asian Communists have increasingly claimed to embody an alliance of *all* "anti-imperialist" classes – workers, peasants, petty bourgeois, and "patriotic" bourgeois – and while making obeisance to the "leading role of the working class," they have hardly bothered to disguise the fact that the leading role is in practice exercised by the intelligentsia.

But this means that Communist attraction in Asia, with matic event, and far more on true facts. It is not true that the Communists are the heirs of the ideals of 1789, and the tragedy of Hungary has demonstrated this even to the willfully blind; but it is true that a combination of state-directed industrialization, financed by ruthless dictatorial exploitation, with the ideological monopoly of a revolutionary party opposed to traditional superstitions as well as to traditional values, is a powerful engine of speedy modernization.[32] It is not true that the victory of the Communists in an industrial country would improve the material position and rights of the working class, for the West on fictions that may be destroyed by some dra-the possible exception of Japan, is based far less than in Hungary has shown this dramatically; but it is true that their victory in an underdeveloped country would open vast opportunities to the modern-minded intelligentsia to

turn itself into a powerful political and economic bureaucracy – in fact, into the new ruling class. Where ideological attraction is not chiefly based on lies, there is no scope for an ideological crisis: in Asia, the lesson of the Sputniks proved more important than the lesson of Hungary.

The weak point of Communist ideology as preached in Asia is, of course, its claim to champion the equality and sovereign independence of all nations. Inasmuch as Hungary had a critical effect on the Asian Communist following at all, it was as a case of oppression of a small nation by a Great Power; but on the whole, the disillusionment of Asian Communists and fellow travelers with Soviet "anti-imperialism" had hardly yet begun at that time, except to some extent in Japan.

More important to the development of Asian communism during the same period was the attempt, and later the failure, of Mao Tse-tung to "liberalize" the Communist regime in China. Though given additional impetus by the spectacle of Soviet "de-Stalinization" and by the Hungarian and Polish events, this effort had its roots in the very features that have always distinguished Chinese Communist ideology from the Soviet variety, and must therefore be discussed in a different context.[33]

THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

What was, however, of the utmost importance for the over-all development of the crisis of 1956–57, and for the later evolution of the world Communist movement, was the gain in international authority that the crisis brought to the Chinese Communist leaders and the manner of their intervention in its course. Even before he took the decisive steps on the road to power. Mao Tse-tung

Communist leaders thus increasingly came to ask Mao's advice and to look upon him as the natural arbiter of their ideological problems: the year between the fall of 1956 and 1957 saw the first direct intervention of China in the history of Europe.

The direction of this intervention and the specific use Peking made of the authority that had thus accrued to it were determined in part by its interest in preserving the cohesion of the bloc on a new and more flexible basis, but in part they also represented the contemporary vicissitudes in the evolution of the Chinese regime itself. As has been mentioned,[35] the Chinese seem to have encouraged the Polish Communists' desire for greater autonomy when talking to their delegation at the Chinese party congress in September; after the October crisis, Chou En-lai took the opportunity during his European visit to urge Gomulka to recognize the "leading role" of the Soviet Union, but he also urged the Russians to recognize the independence of the new Polish leadership in domestic affairs.[36] A loosening of Soviet control over the satellites, combined with preservation of the Communist alliance and its common ideological principles, would indeed give the Chinese the best possible opportunities for strengthening their direct economic relations with the Communist states of Eastern Europe. By contrast, an overthrow of the party regime, followed by defection from the bloc, as occurred in Hungary during the climax of the revolution, could only be regarded by the Chinese – just as by the Russians – as a direct menace to their political and economic interests, and even as an ideological threat to their own regime. In condemning the Hungarian "counter-revolution," Peking therefore supported from the start the "hard" Soviet line; and it contributed to the subse-

ists in Poland. The basis of this consolidation was that Russia, in return for support of its foreign policy and for the definite rejection of "revisionist" views on fundamentals, would allow each Communist leader unquestioned authority in deciding for his own country such major questions as the scope and pace of agricultural collectivization, the forms of economic planning, and the role to be granted to workers' councils.

Yet this was clearly a diplomatic compromise rather than an ideological solution: it rested on the unwarranted assumption that these economic issues had no major ideological significance; it ignored such ideologically ominous facts as Gomulka's concessions to the Church and the continued existence in Poland of the very freedom for writers and scholars for which their Russian colleagues were still vainly striving – that is, freedom from party ideological control; it left the Yugoslav heresy about the possibility of successful "reformist" roads to socialism in advanced democratic countries unrenounced and unforgiven. Above all, it left the crucial question of the ultimate seat of doctrinal authority in abeyance – and because of that, it did not even effectively guarantee that the pledged solidarity in foreign affairs would last.

Khrushchev quickly showed himself aware of these weaknesses. He called the November conference of Communist parties in Moscow and used it not only to re-create the nucleus of an international organization, based on an inner ring of twelve ruling Communist parties, but to gain acceptance for the principles that international communism requires a single center of authority, which could only be the Soviet Union, and that ideological solidarity in a divided world requires allegiance to a military bloc. His success was marred by the renewed refusal of the

the dangerous drift toward "liberalization" at home, they were only too willing to believe that these better relations could be secured without danger to their independence, simply by talking less about ideological differences. This group was dominant in the Serbian Central Committee; it also included the leading Serb among Tito's Politburo colleagues — Aleksandar Rankovic, creator of the political police and controller of the party's organization and personnel. It was, in fact, from about this time that Rankovic came forward as Tito's effective deputy in all party matters, and began to be discreetly boosted as his designated successor.

Conversely, the leaders opposed to concessions to Khrushchev, and particularly to dealings with Geroe, were the same who had shown most zeal in promoting Yugoslavia's internal reforms, from the workers' councils to the dissolution of Soviet-style *kolkhozes*, and from the planned market economy to the growth of organs of decentralized self-government. These people did not belittle the importance of the process of social change that had started in post-Stalinist Russia, but they refused to regard it as dependent primarily on Khrushchev's influence, or to believe that Yugoslav efforts to support him could have a decisive effect on the broad trend of Russian development. In their view, Yugoslavia could contribute most to that trend by continuing her own experiment and seeking to win increased diplomatic elbow-room by support for like-minded elements in neighboring countries.

Not surprisingly, this group had its main strength among the Slovenian and Croatian leadership — that is, in the most advanced parts of the country. To them, the vision of closer co-operation with a neutral Hungary and Austria was both historically plausible and politically welcome as

a recipe for diluting the retrograde "Balkanic" influences within Yugoslavia, while preserving the unity of the Yugoslav nation. They also enjoyed the warm support of all those younger elements in the party who feared that closer relations with Russia would produce the very thing that the conservative disciplinarians hoped for – an end to reform and experiment, a tightening of control from above, an attempt to shut the windows and to restore the stuffy climate of an orthodoxy they had outgrown during the years when Yugoslavia first discovered the non-Communist world.

Between these groups, the aging leader was apparently swayed by motives all his own. There is no reason to assume that he then shared the preoccupations of the petty bureaucrats, their fear of further reforms and dangerous ideas; but neither was he much concerned to spread the ideology of "Titoism" within a limited regional framework. For years, he had become accustomed to bestride the world stage; now the evolution of post-Stalinist Russia seemed to present him with the chance of a new "historic role." Perhaps we in the West have come to take Marshal Tito too much for granted as a national leader, and to underestimate the emotional importance of his long years as a professional international revolutionary. However genuinely and successfully he filled his national role, the separation from the comrades of his youth must have been a severe psychological strain – and the chance to return into that brotherhood, not defeated and contrite but proudly triumphant, an immense temptation. During his Russian journey in the summer of 1956, when enthusiastic crowds hailed him at every station as the symbol of their own new hopes, that temptation assumed flesh and blood, became vivid, exciting experience. Russia, and with

ment of Geroe by Kadar with Soviet consent, and Nagy took over the government in fact as well as in name, they hoped – as did the Soviet representatives on the spot – that Kadar and Nagy would succeed in stabilizing the situation under a reformed Communist regime.[9] But it quickly became clear that the revolutionary movement had gone beyond that stage, that the people and the armed forces were calling for a revival of democratic political parties, a withdrawal of all Soviet troops, and immediate neutrality, and that Nagy was willing to meet these demands. At that point the Soviets lost confidence in Nagy – and so did Tito.

The motives of that decision have been obscured by a flood of lies about the alleged danger of "Fascists" and "counter-revolutionaries" getting control of the movement – a fiction that Tito still maintained in his Pula speech.[10] The more honest Yugoslav spokesmen have always said that the crucial argument for the second Soviet intervention was one of power politics rather than ideology. The Soviet leaders had, in fact, never intended to allow a Communist Hungary to leave the Warsaw pact; they could not possibly permit a non-Communist Hungary to do so in an atmosphere of violent rebellion against Soviet control, and at the moment of the international crisis produced by the Suez expedition. In Soviet language, which the Yugoslavs understood only too well, the term "counter-revolutionary" simply expressed the fact that the movement was no longer in Communist hands and the fear that a new democratic government would in fact assume a pro-Western orientation, whatever its formal neutrality. What was at stake, from the Soviet point of view, was the loss of an important territory to their potential enemies, without compensation and with incalculable repercussions on other members of their bloc,

betray their own dream of a neutral, progressive Hungary when it could no longer be reconciled with the preservation of Communist Party rule, and they sided with Kadar against Nagy, who clung to the dream. As a last service, they tried to save him by granting him temporary asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy, but they were not strong enough. If the Yugoslavs were ever deceived by the Kadar government's promise of safe-conduct for those who would leave the building, their envoy at least must have learned the truth at the last minute. For the Hungarian officer who headed the escort for Nagy – he is now a refugee abroad – reported to him with the words: "Mr. Prime Minister, it's not home we are going"; and that was still before Nagy boarded the fateful bus and took leave of his Yugoslav friends.

THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE ON HUNGARY

The critical reaction of the Yugoslav Communist rank and file to the Soviet intervention in Hungary proved unexpectedly strong. For the first time, Tito had publicly to admit a mistake. Within a week of the final crushing of the revolution by Soviet tanks, he conceded in his Pula speech that he had been unwise to receive Geroe, who had proved himself an unrepentant Stalinist and had brought about the Hungarian tragedy by his incompetent and provocative behavior.[13] In a further circular he sought to explain the nature of the pressure from Khrushchev to which he had yielded in September. Moreover, he publicly emphasized the issue on which he now disagreed with the official Soviet view – that the rising had started as a genuine working-class movement with the active participation of many good Communists, and had only come

8

1961: FROM DISPUTE TO SCHISM

In the history of the Russian revolution and of international communism, N. S. Khrushchev is emerging with increasing clarity as a figure of transition. He, more than anyone else, has helped to destroy the Stalinist forms of organization and thought that were no longer adequate to the changing character of Soviet society and the changing international situation. Applying a rare combination of realistic shrewdness and primitive faith, he has striven valiantly to replace outdated dogma with a new ideological synthesis – to combine, inside the Soviet Union, the development of a new incentive economy with the continued monopolistic rule of the party and, beyond her frontiers, the expansion of Russian power with the advance of independent revolutionary allies in a single bid for world hegemony. Yet he is now beginning to see this beatific vision disintegrate before his eyes and to discover that, while his work of destruction will last, his synthesis is proving much more fragile and short-lived than the dogma it was intended to replace.

The Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU marks the

moment of truth when this discovery forced itself on Stalin's successor. Already labeled the Congress of the "second de-Stalinization," it has been widely interpreted as a new stage in a development that began at the Twentieth Congress in 1956. Certainly the great themes of post-Stalinist renewal were common to both Congresses: the denunciation of the regime of mass terrorism and the pledge to avoid its return, the proclamation of the autonomy of national parties within the Communist world movement and of the equality of Communist governments within the "Socialist world system," and the vision of world-wide victory without world war. Yet while the Twentieth Congress saw the birth of the new synthesis, the Twenty-second saw the beginning of its breakup.

The foundation of Khrushchev's policy for international communism had been his belief that there could be no major contradiction between the interests of Russian power and the interests of revolutionary expansion by independent Communist states and movements. The collapse of this assumption became manifest at the Twenty-second Congress with the breakdown of the Soviet-Chinese compromise that had been negotiated after prolonged debate at the 1960 Communist world conference. In contrast to the Twentieth Congress – where the dramatic form Khrushchev chose for "de-Stalinization" (his notorious "secret speech") was mainly due to domestic resistance within the party and government leadership to his political innovations – the principal cause of the dramatic events at the Twenty-second Congress was international: it was the open Chinese challenge to the authority of Khrushchev and his team, expressed in persistent and even provocative backing for the defeated Stalinist remnants in the USSR and the Soviet bloc, that

forced the Soviet leaders publicly to destroy the last shreds of the Stalin legend and to remove the body of their teacher from Lenin's side – going far beyond the formal ideological résumé of the process of "de-Stalinization" for which the CPSU and the Russian people had been prepared.

The prospect of open and insoluble ideological quarrel between the two principal Communist powers leaves the international Communist movement bewildered and divided, without a recognized organizational center or ideological authority. In the Babel that has replaced the traditional *unisono*, some of the leaders can be overheard repeating lines familiar from the ideological crisis of 1956–57 – the crisis that followed the first "de-Stalinization." But that first crisis was overcome with the help of Chinese support for Soviet leadership. The new crisis is likely to prove more lasting – not only because the same solution is no longer open, but because the developments that have led to the crisis have also proven that the assumptions underlying Khrushchev's version of "proletarian internationalism" were hopelessly wrong.

KHRUSHCHEV'S STARTING-POINT

To grasp the depth of the new crisis in relations between the Soviet Union and the international Communist movement, we have to go back to the original contrast between Khrushchev's concept of these relations and Stalin's. Stalin won and consolidated his position of total control over the Soviet Union by proclaiming the principle that the power interests of the Soviet state – of the building of "socialism in one country" – must be given clear preference over the interests of "world revolution" whenever

clearly could not be run by remote control from Moscow in the same way that Soviet-created satellite states or powerless Communist parties could; the attempt to establish such control failed dismally in Yugoslavia and was not even undertaken in China. Yet Stalin remained unwilling to abandon in principle his Soviet-centered definition of "proletarian internationalism" and his claim to the primacy of Soviet state interests for the whole worldwide Communist movement. This inability to adjust his outlook to the new fact of a plurality of independent Communist states – expressed, for example, in the pathological hunt for "Titoist conspirators" throughout Eastern Europe – remained a major source of political rigidity and an element of Soviet political weakness right to his death.

Khrushchev, on the contrary, started from a recognition of the new situation and from the conviction that it could be turned into a decisive source of strength. China and even Yugoslavia proved that the age of Soviet isolation and of "capitalist encirclement" was over. The old imperialist order had been weakened beyond the possibility of another long-term stabilization; it could no longer resist the revolutionary movements of the colonial peoples; and in a world in revolutionary flux, new independent Communist victories were possible, if only the USSR would use its own increased strength to aid and encourage them instead of anxiously seeking to control and restrain them. By recognizing the actual independence and equality of China and Yugoslavia, and by giving the fictitious independence of the satellite governments and parties some element of substance in the form of increased domestic autonomy, he hoped to strengthen greatly both the cohesion of the "Socialist camp" and its attraction for out-

siders — while at the same time preserving the Soviet Union's leadership on the basis of its historic prestige and greater power. By proclaiming the right and duty of all Communist parties to find their own roads to victory according to national conditions, he wished to improve their chances to ride the crest of the new revolutionary wave. The "rebirth of Leninism" expressed above all Khrushchev's confident expectation that, after thirty years of a steady build-up of Soviet strength and a steady accumulation of "imperialist contradictions," the time had come at last when Soviet power and world revolution could advance in step — without a major conflict of interests and hence without subordination of the one to the other — to bring about a Communist-dominated world.

That had been the vision underlying Khrushchev's visit to Peking in the fall of 1954, when he negotiated a revision of Stalin's unequal treaty of alliance with Mao, as well as his journey to Belgrade in the spring of 1955, when he tried to win back Tito to the bloc by the disavowal of Stalin's policies and the recognition of "different roads to socialism." It was made explicit in Khrushchev's public report to the Twentieth Congress, when he advanced his concept of the "Socialist world system" as a commonwealth of equals, with scope for a diversity of institutional means in the pursuit of common aims on the basis of common principles. The position of the Soviet Union "at the head of the camp" was not even explicitly mentioned on this occasion, not because it had been abandoned but because it was taken as assured by the Soviet party's uncontested ideological authority and its unique role as the historically first and most powerful member of the system. The belief that the Soviet position no longer required enforcement through organizational means was further underlined two months later when the Cominform, once a key instrument

of Stalinist discipline in the international Communist movement, was dissolved.

OVERCOMING THE FIRST CRISIS

In its essentials, this Khrushchevian vision was maintained even after the October crisis of 1956 had shaken the East European satellite empire to the point where its cohesion could be restored only by force, and had led to renewed discussion of inter-party relations throughout the international Communist movement. The October events were not, in fact, a necessary consequence of Khrushchev's belief in a harmonious alliance of independent revolutionary powers, or even of his loosening of the Soviet grip on the satellite empire. They occurred rather because this loosening coincided with a triple crisis of authority caused by the disclosure and disavowal of Stalin's crimes, by the involvement of many East European Communist leaders in the "anti-Titoist" phase of those crimes, and by uncertainty about the ultimate outcome of the succession struggle in the Soviet Union. This crisis of authority led to bitter and prolonged struggles within the leadership of a number of East European Communist parties — struggles in which the Yugoslavs intervened to some extent — and created the uncertainty at the top, without which an atmosphere of public criticism and finally of mass opposition to the regime could not have developed in Poland and Hungary.

The manner in which the Soviet leaders coped with the crisis was still characteristically Khrushchevian and non-Stalinist in that it allowed a considerable diversity of solutions and did not seek to restore the former type of detailed administrative control from Moscow. In Poland, the Soviets reluctantly accepted a change in leadership

should also have had the right to take Hungary out of the Warsaw pact. If the new autonomy meant that there was no longer any "leading party," any single center for the Communist world movement, as Togliatti had claimed after the Twentieth Congress,[3] then no doctrinal judgment binding on all true Communists could be pronounced by any authority short of a unanimous world conference; if organized relations among autonomous Communist parties were to be confined to bilateral contacts, as the Poles suggested,[4] even that solution would be barred.

At the Moscow international conference of November 1957, the Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders, acting in concert,[5] succeeded in meeting these issues by defining the minimum requirements of international Communist unity without revoking the fundamental innovations of the Twentieth Congress. The admissibility of different roads to Communist power and of institutional diversity in its use was maintained; but the need for a common foreign policy of all "Socialist states" was sharply stressed, and ideological principles were formulated that would continue to distinguish all true Communists from "revisionist" traitors. To ensure unity in the interpretation of these principles as well as in the decision of foreign policy, the continued need for Soviet leadership both in the "Socialist camp" and in the world Communist movement was made explicit;[6] and while no new formal international organization was set up, an extended international liaison machinery of the CPSU and a Soviet-edited international journal were allowed to take its place, and the need to hold further international conferences from time to time was recognized.

This solution proved ultimately acceptable (despite strong Polish and Italian misgivings) to all but the Yugo-

matic significance that Khrushchev's policy had failed to win back the one independent Communist state in Europe – that Tito remained unwilling to join the Warsaw pact in return for his "rehabilitation" as a good Marxist-Leninist and for a guarantee that he could retain the peculiar institutions he had developed in the meantime. But that failure could be explained by the prolonged dependence on Western aid into which the Yugoslav regime had been driven by Stalin's intolerance, and by the consequent weakening of its international revolutionary zeal. At any rate, Khrushchev felt able to regard Tito's obdurate nonalignment as no more than a minor irritant which could not possibly make him revise his basic outlook: even after the Yugoslavs in the spring of 1958 adopted a "revisionist" party program justifying their refusal to identify the Soviet bloc with the cause of socialism, Khrushchev had them expelled from the fraternal community of Communist parties once again, but carefully refrained from repeating Stalin's attempt to bring them to heel by economic, military, and political pressure. On the contrary, after a short period of vigorous ideological denunciation, he settled down to treat Yugoslavia as a reasonably friendly neutral state, and was rewarded by finding that the Yugoslavs this time made no sustained attempt to propagate their heresies within his East European empire.

The Chinese attitude, clearly, was of infinitely greater importance for future relations between the Soviet empire and world communism; and here Khrushchev's new outlook at first seemed to yield ample dividends. In 1954–55, the Chinese had been brilliant partners and even pioneers in the effort to overcome the rigid attitude toward the ex-colonial, uncommitted countries that the "Socialist camp" had inherited from Stalin – at the Geneva confer-

ence on Indochina, at the signing of the "five principles of peaceful co-existence and non-interference" with India, and at Bandung. In 1956, though worried by the drastic form of Khrushchev's downgrading of Stalin, they had publicly welcomed the substance of the critique of Stalin's "Great Power chauvinism,"[7] including his policies toward Yugoslavia – and this at a time when Molotov was still defending those policies inside the Soviet leadership. During the crisis later on in the year, they had actively intervened in the Soviet-Polish dispute in favor of a compromise combining increased national autonomy for Poland with explicit recognition of Soviet leadership,[8] while vigorously defending Soviet intervention in Hungary against all critics. Finally, during the Moscow conference of November 1957, Mao had reacted to the double shock of Hungary and of discovering the strength of his own domestic opposition in the "Hundred Flowers Campaign" by placing strong emphasis on fighting "revisionism" as "the principal danger"; but he had also personally taken the initiative to have the Soviet Union's position "at the head of the Socialist camp" embodied in the Moscow declaration,[9] at a moment when Khrushchev had clearly eliminated the "Stalinist" opposition and established himself as the uncontested Soviet leader.

It may be readily assumed that not even at that time was this Chinese zeal for re-establishing the Soviet Union's position of international leadership based on unqualified admiration for Khrushchev's genius as a statesman or ideological innovator, nor on an absence of differences of doctrine and political style: the whole independent historical development of the Chinese party under Mao precluded that. But the Chinese Communists were then vitally interested in maintaining the cohesion of the bloc

while preserving their post-Stalin gains of independent and equal status as well as of direct influence on the bloc's European members, and universal recognition of the leading role of a CPSU headed by Khrushchev seemed the best way to achieve both objectives. Would not Stalin's benevolent but comparatively inexperienced successor, once restored with Chinese help to a position of international pre-eminence at a moment of crisis, have to lean heavily on the advice of the kingmaker in Peking? The expectation seemed plausible enough, so long as one assumed that no major conflict of interest could arise between the two main powers of the Communist world. The outcome of the 1957 Moscow conference – the "Maoist reconstruction of the center" under Soviet leadership – was possible only because at that moment both Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung still held that assumption.

IN PLACE OF HARMONY

By the spring of 1958, it must have been clear to the Chinese Communist leaders that their expectation of continued major influence on the formation of Soviet policy had been unfounded, and that Chinese interests had a fairly low place on Khrushchev's list of priorities. The sharp left turn in domestic economic policy taken by the second session of the Eighth Congress of the CPC – the "Great Leap Forward" and the first pilot schemes for the creation of the "people's communes" – is inexplicable without a sharp disappointment of Chinese hopes for massive new Soviet capital aid; and the same disappointment probably played its part in the Chinese pressure for treating the Yugoslavs once again as enemies: Why should people who took money from the American imperialists

continue to receive Soviet credits as well? The summer brought the tentative Soviet acceptance of a summit conference on the Middle Eastern crisis "within the framework of the Security Council," with scant regard for Peking's political prestige, and (after the withdrawal of that acceptance) Khrushchev's visit to Peking and the joint communiqué promising "all-round consultation"; yet, while full Soviet political support was given to Peking during the subsequent bombardment of Quemoy, the military support appears to have been unsatisfactory at the crucial point. Most important of all, this was the year during which the Soviets first agreed to expert discussions on the possibility of an inspected ban on nuclear tests, and then, pending political three-power negotiations on the subject, to a moratorium on such tests. As they also consistently refused to supply their Chinese allies with ready-made nuclear arms, a successful test ban agreement could even then be seen as an attempt to exclude China permanently from the circle of nuclear powers.

The ground for the later Chinese charges of an opportunistic neglect of international revolutionary solidarity by the Soviet leaders must have been laid by these successive disappointments. As in Tito's case in 1948, though there had been long-standing ideological differences due to diversities of historical development, the conflict was not "about ideology": it was a clear conflict of national interest which took ideological forms. Finding that the Soviets consistently failed to give Chinese economic, political, and military objectives the same high priority as did the Chinese themselves, Mao naturally came to doubt the fitness of Khrushchev and his team for the role of international leadership for which he had cast them. As has frequently been pointed out, the claim in the

Chinese Central Committee's resolution on the "people's communes" that these revolutionary innovations constituted a direct short cut to the "higher stage" of communism amounted to an ideological preparation for challenging the right of the Russians – still halting at the "lower stage" of socialism – to lead the world Communist movement.[10]

The Soviet response showed instant awareness of the danger and a determination to forestall it: Moscow promptly described the new Soviet seven-year plan as a program for laying the foundations of communism and called an extra-ordinary party congress to adopt it; on the other hand, Soviet theoretical journals vigorously attacked as "utopian" any attempt to reach the "higher stage" before a high level of technical productivity had been achieved and the conditions for material abundance created. By December 1958, under the dual impact of Soviet criticism and the severe practical difficulties of the communes, the Chinese withdrew this first ideological challenge.[11] As the Twenty-first Congress of the CPSU opened in February 1959, a truce had clearly been called; Chou En-lai explicitly recognized that Russia alone had entered the road to the "higher stage," and a new Soviet-Chinese economic agreement was signed.

The truce was broken in the fall of the same year, once again for a non-ideological reason: Khrushchev's visit to the United States and his preparations for a summit conference revived intense Chinese fears of a possible Soviet-American agreement at Peking's expense – above all, presumably, in the form of a serious attempt to close the "nuclear club." [12] The new disagreement was soon reflected in the failure to issue a communiqué on the Khrushchev-Mao talks held in Peking on the Soviet Premier's return

trip from the United States; in Khrushchev's subsequent public reference to the "Trotskyite adventurism" of a policy of "neither peace nor war"; in a series of warnings against illusions about the nature of American imperialism published in the Chinese press during the winter and repeated by the Chinese observer at a meeting of the Warsaw pact in February 1960: and in Khrushchev's ostentatious detachment from Chinese claims against India and Indonesia during his winter visit to both countries. This time, the Chinese did not stop at ideological preparations for challenging the "leading role" of the Soviets. They raised the charge of Soviet "opportunism" at a number of leadership meetings of international "front organizations," thus openly seeking to recruit allies in other Communist parties. Finally, on the occasion of the ninetieth anniversary of Lenin's birth in April, they published in a series of articles what amounted to the ideological platform for their attack.[13]

With that, the existence of a Russo-Chinese "ideological dispute" on the principal issues of international Communist strategy became public knowledge. Its course from April to the conference of the eighty-one Communist parties which met in Moscow in November, and to the compromise declaration published by it in December 1960, may be assumed here as generally known.[14] While that declaration on balance favored the Soviet viewpoint on the immediate matters in dispute, its most important aspect was that it *was* a compromise, and openly viewed as a starting-point for further compromises. Moscow's monopoly of ideological authority had been the implicit precondition for the unity of action of independent Communist powers and autonomous movements as conceived by Khrushchev at the time of the Twentieth Congress. It had been made explicit following the crisis in Eastern

Europe at the 1957 Moscow conference. Now it was explicitly renounced by Khrushchev himself; he reported that the Soviet delegation had asked that the formula referring to the CPSU as the "leading party" of the world movement be dropped from the 1960 declaration, because it had in fact become impossible to lead all Communist parties from a single center.[15] But without such a center, unity in both the world movement and the "Socialist camp" could henceforth be preserved only by a process of continuous adjustment leading to ever new compromises – as in any alliance of non-ideological governments or parties.

The harmony of interests between independent Communist powers and movements had supposedly been guaranteed by a common ideology, interpreted by a generally recognized authority. The actual conflicts of interest, leading to conflicting interpretations of the ideology, had destroyed that authority. There remained, of course, major common interests regarded by all sides as overriding the internecine conflicts, and it remained true that these common interests were rooted in the common ideological opposition of all Communist parties and governments to the non-Communist world. But it was the paradox of the new situation that this common "ideological" interest could now only be made to prevail over the differing national interests if the latter were adjusted in a non-ideological, pragmatic way, and not embittered by a continued struggle for ideological leadership.

ALBANIA AND THE FAILURE OF COMPROMISE

Yet when the 1960 Moscow compromise was concluded, the Chinese Communists were already determined to view

it as a mere stepping-stone in a long-term struggle to win for themselves the international "leading role" that the Russians had just given up. The proof of this, and the root cause of the breakdown of the compromise, was that they persisted in supporting Khrushchev's "Stalinist" opponents within the Russians' European empire, with whom they had concluded a tactical alliance during the previous phase of open conflict. In the Chinese leaders' eyes such "factionalism" may have found part of its justification in the fact that Khrushchev himself had tried to encourage a "right-wing opposition" in the Chinese party – and that at the time of the 1959 truce.[16]

We have seen that, far from being genuine "Stalinists" in their outlook, the Chinese Communists had in effect supported Khrushchev during the critical period of 1956–57. Even the new "leftist" ideas which they developed during the first phase of Sino-Soviet tension in 1958 – ideas of "uninterrupted revolution" at home and unlimited support for revolutionary movements abroad – were "Trotskyite" rather than "Stalinist" in inspiration. Nevertheless, the common antagonism to Khrushchev on the part of the Chinese Communists and the defeated Russian "Stalinists" may have suggested a *rapprochement* between them even then. Both distrusted Khrushchev's personal diplomacy in general and his eagerness for top-level contacts with the Americans in particular. Both reproached him for his "softness" toward the Yugoslav heretics and for his costly foreign aid policy benefiting "bourgeois nationalist" rulers of uncommitted, ex-colonial countries. Finally, both believed that the road to the "higher stage" of communism lay through increasing the importance of payments in kind – as envisaged, in different ways, in Stalin's last pamphlet *Economic Problems of Socialism in the*

to the meetings of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid.[30] Again, the Chinese countered by refusing to send an observer to the CMEA meeting, by continuing demonstratively friendly exchanges with Albania after the Soviet break, and by causing the North Korean and North Vietnamese Communists to send clearly friendly and fraternal – if less demonstrative – New Year messages to the Albanian leaders as well.[31]

The resulting situation was unprecedented. As no international Communist conference has spoken, the Albanians must still be regarded even by the Russians as members of the international Communist movement; indeed, Albanian delegates took part in the Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions in December 1961 and in the World Peace Congress of summer 1962 in Moscow itself, in spite of the rupture of Soviet-Albanian diplomatic relations! [32] Again, at the Stockholm session of the World Peace Council in December 1961, an Albanian delegation actively co-operated with the Chinese, and that session showed by its debates and even by an open vote that the 1960 compromise had broken down as completely on general policy as on the form of unity, with the issue of priority for "peaceful co-existence" or for "wars of liberation" once again the center of dispute.[33] Thus, the world Communist movement, while openly divided politically, is not yet formally split in the organizational sense. Yet, at the same time, state relations between the Russians and their East European followers on one side and Albania on the other are already broken!

The date and conditions for another international Communist conference have been repeatedly discussed since that time, both in correspondence between the parties concerned and in public. In the spring of 1962, the Chi-

nese Communists officially proposed to the Russians, following suggestions by several other parties, to call such a conference and the Soviets agreed to call one after proper preparation; [34] these confidential exchanges then formed the background to a lull in public Sino-Soviet polemics. Yet the crucial fact remains that Khrushchev has taken open governmental action without awaiting an international judgment. When both Tirana and Peking defied the public attack to which the Soviet leader had committed the prestige of his party and his government, he evidently came to view a demonstrative reassertion of Soviet imperial discipline as a matter of the utmost urgency – too urgent to await action by an international conference. Such a conference might have to be deferred while Moscow was working on the waverers; it might drag on owing to Chinese obstruction or to the desire of other parties to avoid a clear-cut stand; and its outcome might depend on Russian determination to force a majority vote and Chinese willingness to submit to it. So Khrushchev preferred to take unilateral state action and thus confront an eventual international conference with a *fait accompli*.

This means that Khrushchev, like Stalin, has been forced to make a hard choice between Soviet imperial interests and the unity of the world Communist movement – and that he has made the same choice as Stalin did. But for Khrushchev the choice was more drastic. For while Stalin was able to have Yugoslavia excommunicated by the Cominform before he took public state action against her, Khrushchev no longer had any such ready machinery of excommunication at his disposal. He had renounced that machinery in pursuit of his belief in the co-operation of equal and independent Communist powers and movements, and in the harmony of interests or at least the

comparative ease of compromise between the Soviet empire and the forces of international revolution. He has been forced back to the "Stalinist" use of state power in inter-Communist relations because that belief, which was to distinguish his world role from Stalin's, has failed.

THE PROSPECT OF SCHISM

By the time of the 1960 Moscow compromise, it was already clear that there was no road back to the centralized World Party created by Lenin. There is none now. Independent Communist powers do exist; and experience has proved that independent Communist powers cannot be subordinated to the ideological authority and organizational discipline of a single center.

The alternative attempted by the 1960 conference was to preserve an alliance of autonomous parties held together by a common faith. It was implicitly admitted that differences about the interpretation of that faith in the light of different national interests might arise from time to time, but it was hoped that the common basis of ideology and interest would be strong enough for compromises to be reached again and again in a process of steady adjustment.

This "conciliar" model of world communism has broken down because of the inherent difficulties of compromise by pragmatic adjustment among totalitarian ideological parties and states. At least one of the two major state parties has refused to renounce the right to carry "ideological struggle" into the territory of the other. Yet without some mutual respect of parochial authority – or of the principle *"cuius regio, eius religio"* – ideologically independent state parties can hardly live together in a common ecumenic organization. The Italian Communist leaders have been quite right in arguing that open "comradely" debate of inter-party differences in a spirit of mutual understanding and respect is the only way to preserve some measure of Communist world unity in the present situation.[85] But they have only been able to suggest such an un-Leninist solution because they are constantly exposed to the anti-ideological influence of an atmosphere of "bourgeois liberalism."

The remaining alternative is schism, that is, permanent factional struggle, with each Communist party forced to take sides, whether formal mutual excommunication takes place or not. The Chinese Communists would probably like to preserve mutual recognition of some ultimate community of faith as a formal basis on which all-inclusive meetings could take place from time to time – just as common congresses of the Russian Social Democrats took place long after Bolsheviks and Mensheviks had established separate factional organizations.[86] Like their predecessors, these meetings would be forums for recurrent wrangles about the recognition of mandates (for, say, the Albanians or Yugoslavs) and recurrent contests for the votes of factionally uncommitted parties (such as Cuba). Such an arrangement would enable Mao to keep the Soviets ideologically bound to the alliance while he continued the struggle for leadership. Yet why the Russians should be willing to maintain such a fiction of unity without a minimum of submission to "majority rule" – a relation that would be as remote from democracy as from centralism – remains an unanswered question.

The effects of the schism on the chances of individual Communist parties are likely to differ widely. A few strongly entrenched and confident leaders may use the

opportunity to acquire real political independence, shake off the identification with any foreign state, and actually improve their chances of gaining power, while remaining "national Communist" totalitarians. Other parties, whose leadership has proved divided in the past, may be paralyzed or split by the new factional struggle and find their attraction altogether destroyed. Probably the majority will at first side with Russia from automatic habit, but will face a gradual decline in their following as it becomes more and more evident that their position represents merely submission to a foreign power and no longer solidarity with a world-wide movement.

But the most profound repercussions may well be those on the Soviet Communist Party itself. Twice within five years, it has had to revise its image of its own international role. In 1956, Khrushchev ordered the party to abandon the Stalinist concept that the progress of world revolution was wholly dependent on Soviet strength. Now it will have to unlearn the Khrushchevian belief that the progress of world revolution would invariably increase that strength. Khrushchev was right in facing the fact that independent revolutions may occur outside Soviet control; Stalin was right in thinking that such revolutions may not necessarily be to the advantage of the Soviet Union. But if the progress of revolution and the expansion of Soviet power are distinct and sometimes mutually contradictory processes, it follows that the Soviet Union has as little chance to win world hegemony as any other power. This is not going to be the Russian Century after all.

No doubt, it will take time for these ideological implications of the schism to be generally realized by the Soviet Communists. But as the ultimate irrelevance of world revolution to the greatness of Russia comes to be

understood, the disillusionment of the believers among them is bound to be profound. It is not easy to see how either the aggressive *élan* of Khrushchev's foreign policy or the zest of his campaign for a "Leninist" ideological revival at home can recover from this blow. Yet the self-confidence of the more pragmatic element among Russia's administrators, technicians, and scientists will not be impaired by the discomfiture of the ideologues. The Congress of the "second de-Stalinization" has also sown the seeds, then, of a future "de-Khrushchevization"; in the next crisis of succession, reassertion of the primacy of an ideological party may no longer be the safest road to victory.

EPILOGUE: ON THE STAGES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

The death of Stalin in 1953 foreshadowed the abandonment of a historically unique enterprise – the attempt to transfer the centralism of a ruling totalitarian party to an international movement. The rise of Khrushchev to leadership of the Soviet empire was linked with the endeavor to replace the outlived model of a totalitarian World Party by a more flexible, but still single-centered, form of international co-operation, under which organizationally autonomous Communist parties and governments would nevertheless voluntarily submit to the ideological authority of the "leading party." By the end of 1960, the CPSU reacted to Chinese attacks on its policy by renouncing this "leading role" in the hope that it would thus escape the need for defending itself in recurrent ideological argument, yet maintain international unity on the basis of pragmatic compromise. Since then, Chinese insistence on unremitting ideological struggle has foiled that hope, and produced factional schism instead of pragmatic unity.

Today we are entitled to look back on the four main stages of the Communist world movement as on a finished period of history. The creation of the centralistic World Party was preceded by a loose alliance of rather heterogeneous revolutionary groups, developing from the "Zimmerwald Left" during the First World War and formalized under Bolshevik leadership by the foundation of the Communist International in 1919. The centralistic stage was by far the longest: it started well before Stalin's reign with the Second World Congress of the Comintern in 1920 and long outlived the formal dissolution of that body in 1943. The third stage opened with Khrushchev's first moves to establish his new type of international leadership in 1954; it was fully developed by 1957, but had become untenable by 1960. The final stage – the attempt at maintaining unity by compromise – can hardly be said to have worked at all.

In retrospect, one is struck both by the strangeness, not to say absurdity, of the concept of international centralism underlying more than thirty years of the Comintern's activity under Lenin and Stalin, and by the quick disintegration of the more "sensible" alternatives developed after Stalin's demise. The centralist structure of a totalitarian party serves to make it a fit instrument for the revolutionary conquest and preservation of total power, and the centralism of the Communist World Party was originally intended to serve this very purpose. Yet revolutionary parties have to win power within existing states by exploiting conditions of national crisis with the utmost flexibility and ruthlessness; they are bound to be inhibited if subjected to the instructions of an outside body tied to a foreign government, and in fact not a single Communist party was victorious for twenty years after the World

Party had been formed. Conversely, once one or more non-Russian Communist parties succeeded — whatever the exceptional conditions — in conquering power by their own efforts without receiving it from Russian hands, the eclipse of international centralism became merely a matter of time.

It may be argued, of course, that Stalin soon ceased to believe in the possibility, and even the desirability, of independent Communist revolutions, and that he increasingly used the centralist discipline of the World Party to turn its sections into mere tools of Soviet imperial interests. But while it is true that the centralism of the Comintern was more suitable for such employment than for its original purpose, such a view leaves us with two basic questions. One is why non-Russian revolutionaries should ever have accepted the concept of the centralist World Party under Soviet leadership with such blind faith as to allow their groups to be transformed into derivative totalitarian parties that could be used at will as tools of Russian foreign policy. The other is why a few of these derivative totalitarian parties nevertheless succeeded at a late stage in emancipating themselves from total dependence on Soviet instructions, so that they were able to work out a revolutionary strategy of their own and pursue it to the victorious conquest of power. The first question raises the problem of how the Communist World Party could ever arise; the second amounts to asking how, once its rigid discipline had been established, it could ever decay — how the fatal pluralism of independent Communist states could ever develop within such a system.

Finally, the ideological disintegration of world communism also raises the question of why it has proved impossible to maintain a single doctrinal authority for a

movement ruling a plurality of independent states — why the unity of doctrine could not survive the diffusion of power. The answer must be sought in the "Caesaro-papist" nature of modern totalitarianism, with its inseparable unity between ideology and state power: here lies the fundamental difference between the structure of international communism and that of the Catholic Church. A spiritual movement may preserve its world-wide doctrinaire unity so long as — for all its determination to influence the conduct of peoples and governments in this world — it refrains from seeking to exert political power directly. But in a movement constructed on the Byzantine model, where loyalty to the faith and obedience to the state coincide, ideological fragmentation is bound to follow the growth of political pluralism.

LENIN AND THE CREATION OF THE "WORLD PARTY"

Totalitarian parties are not born full-grown. Lenin created his Bolshevik Party only by a long and difficult struggle to transform the ideas and organization of the Russian revolutionary Social Democrats so as to forge an effective instrument for the conquest of power. Loose, dispersed, democratic circles expressing the political needs and forms of action of the awakening Russian working class had to be turned into a disciplined party ready to tap all sources of discontent, to combine the use of legal propaganda and illegal preparations for armed insurrection, and to follow the leader in meeting each new situation by sudden tactical changes. A Marxist belief in the necessary victory of the working class, which would find in each country its appropriate road to emancipation by trial and error, had to be replaced by the conviction that the revolutionary overthrow of Tsarist despotism depended en-

tirely on the "correct" strategy for rallying all revolutionary classes under the leadership of "the party," and that this strategy could only be worked out by the "right" leader combining profound scientific insight with tireless revolutionary zeal. Lenin did not set out to create a democratic party expressing the development of the working class, but rather a "Jacobin" party "linked" to the working class and using it to overthrow Tsarism; and what he in fact created was an instrument of power that did not depend on any one class but could use and abuse all classes at need.

No corresponding party existed outside Russia when the Bolsheviks seized power. None of the minority groups of revolutionary Marxists or syndicalists who became Lenin's allies during and immediately after World War I had similar ideas. On the contrary, German Spartacists and Dutch Tribunists, British shop stewards, French syndicalists, and American "Wobblies" (members of the IWW) all agreed that strict democracy in working-class organizations was the only road to revolutionary action: for they all believed that the workers would inevitably be revolutionized by their experience, and that reformism could be imposed on them only by the bureaucratic tricks of parliamentarians and trade union officials. The outlook of all these groups was thus much closer to that of Trotsky and of the revolutionary wing of the Mensheviks than to Lenin's concept; and Rosa Luxemburg, who was not only the foremost theoretician of the German Spartacists but had for many years participated in the factional struggles of the Russian underground as a leading member of one of the Polish Socialist groups, was fully aware of these affinities.[1] Hence these revolutionary minority groups rallied to the support of the Bolshevik Party

after the latter's seizure of power in November 1917 mainly because of the Bolsheviks' claim to represent the rule of the Soviets and above all because of their determination to end the war, rather than from any sympathy for Bolshevik ideas of party centralism and party dictatorship.[2]

Nor had Lenin tried to convert them to those ideas even when he had most opportunity to do so — during the wartime co-operation of the revolutionary internationalists in the "Zimmerwald Left"; for at the time, Lenin himself did not believe that those ideas were applicable to the broad working-class movements of Western and Central Europe. Until the very eve of World War I, he had accepted the revolutionary declamations of the European Social Democrats at face value; then, shocked by the support most of the parties gave to national defense and by the resultant collapse of the International, he had tried to explain it as the "betrayal" of a few leaders, backed by a thin upper stratum of "working-class aristocrats" who had been bribed with a share of the spoils of imperialism. He thus agreed with the European revolutionary minorities that the bulk of the working class in their countries was "really" revolutionary and that it was only the machinations of reformist bureaucrats that prevented them temporarily from expressing their true attitude in action. His logical conclusion was that a clean break with the reformist leaders was needed both nationally and internationally — that the revolutionaries must organize in separate parties and set up a new Communist International in order to unfold the true banner of revolutionary Marxism and rally the majority of the workers to their side.

But it did not then occur to Lenin that the new Com-

munist parties of Europe, working in quite different conditions, should be organized on the Bolshevik model; nor did he or any of his associates advance that demand when the Communist International was actually founded in the capital of the new Soviet state in March 1919. All that was then asked from its future members was that they support the new Russia, adopt a program of "proletarian dictatorship" exercised through Soviets, and make a clean break with the "reformists"; the expectation of an immediate, rapid advance of proletarian revolutions over most of industrial Europe precluded by itself any claim to lasting Russian leadership, or any thought of the need for laborious, preliminary transformation of existing revolutionary parties and groups.

Yet only a year later, the international outlook of Lenin and his team had changed completely. By then, the Bolshevik regime had emerged victorious from the most critical phase of the Civil War, and its prestige among the war-weary European workers stood high. But instead of the expected rapid spread of proletarian revolutions, the Bolsheviks' allies had suffered a number of bloody defeats, notably in Germany and Hungary, and the old order showed signs of consolidating itself.

In the spring of 1920, Lenin for the first time called on foreign Communists to study the tactics of the Bolshevik struggle for power as a model for their own action;[8] in the summer, at the Second World Congress of the Comintern, he took the decisive step of trying to impose the Bolshevik organizational model as well. The Red Army was then pursuing its offensive in Poland in the hope of giving a new impetus to Communist revolutions in Europe; and left-wing admiration for Soviet Russia caused a number of European Socialist leaders to ap-

ply for the admission of their parties to the Comintern, on condition of retaining full autonomy in their own affairs, as a means of avoiding a split. The Bolsheviks saw this as an attempt on the part of the reformist leaders to use the prestige of communism as a fig leaf while carrying on their policies of "betrayal" – and that at the very moment when true revolutionary action was more needed, and apparently more promising, than ever before. They reacted by making the Congress adopt twenty-one doctrinal and organizational conditions as the *sine qua non* for any party's admission to the Comintern.

The immediate, tactical purpose of the conditions was to deter the "reformist leaders" and to force the "waverers" to break with them; but this in itself implied that the revolutionary purity of each party and of the Comintern as a whole could be assured by organizational devices – a thoroughly Bolshevik idea. In detail, the conditions followed the Bolshevik model of "democratic centralism," with its strict subordination of the actions of party members in parliament, trade unions, and all other organizations to the Central Committee, and with the explicit obligation also for legally operating parties to maintain an underground apparatus for the preparation of armed risings. But the idea of organizational discipline as a guarantee against opportunism presupposes that the leadership – and ultimately one leader – possesses the "correct" scientific understanding of the road to victory; and that understanding, in the Bolshevik view, was fully developed only in the Bolshevik leaders themselves who had proved it by winning and holding power. Faced with the unforeseen problem of making sure that the international alliance of true revolutionaries would retain its ideological purity yet gain in effectiveness, the Bolsheviks automat-

ically fell back on the familiar organizational devices of their own party structure.

In form, Lenin and his associates did not demand the subordination of all Communist parties to Russian leadership — only to the democratic decisions of a World Congress and to the executive committee elected by it; by statute, the ruling Russian party was just as much subject to this international discipline as its weaker brethren, and despite its overwhelming strength it held no majority in the Congress and the ECCI. But in practice, the placing of the Comintern's headquarters on the territory of the only Communist-ruled country, the staffing of the secretariat with Russians and exiles living in Russia, the dependence on Soviet financial and technical support for underground contacts with countries where the parties were banned, did combine with the explicit ideological recognition of the Bolshevik model to make Soviet influence irresistible in this framework. The statute created the structure of a centralized World Party; the ideology combined with the facts of power to ensure that it would be Russian-directed.

The transformation of the non-Russian revolutionary parties into "parties of the new type" thus proceeded under an impulse from outside; they were turned into *derivative totalitarian parties*. Moreover, this was done not by a leader of the stature of Lenin, who had other work to do, but by the people whom the ruling Bolsheviks could spare for this work and by their exile associates. At first, many leaders of the old revolutionary groups tried to resist this process by defending the tradition of inner-party democracy and arguing that only an autonomous national leadership could win the confidence of the working class and develop a strategy in accordance with national con-

ditions. But in country after country, the *apparatchiki* of the Comintern and their local stooges, though often inferior in knowledge of the national situation and the traditions of the movement concerned, as well as in character and general ability, defeated the home-grown revolutionary leaders with comparative ease.[4] The reason seems to have been that almost all these leaders, impressed by the success of the Bolshevik revolution and by the failure of their own movement to equal it, had at least temporarily revised their own beliefs and adopted Leninist ideas as embodied in the twenty-one conditions. They had abdicated their own authority in favor of the Soviet myth, and now had no means to resist the authorized manipulators of that myth.

Moreover, the fact that the split in the working-class movement had now become permanent and that professed revolutionary parties continued to exist separately in what was often clearly a non-revolutionary situation meant that some of these parties had to rely increasingly on attracting a new type of follower, with few roots in the pre-1914 movement and little respect for the old revolutionary leaders, but with strong emotional ties to "Moscow" — a type far less self-reliant than the old revolutionary cadres and far more dependent on external sources of hope. In short, the political survival of the Communist parties in non-revolutionary conditions had become dependent on Moscow's moral even more than on its material support; hence leaders who defied the voice of Moscow found themselves in conflict both with the vested interest of their own party machine and with the emotional loyalties of their rank and file, and could easily be isolated and forced to submit, or expelled.

As the efficacy of the Comintern machine in imposing

the new type of control on its member parties was closely linked to the recession of the revolutionary wave, it came to bear little relation to Lenin's original purpose of making these parties fit for revolutionary action; and Lenin did indeed express doubts whether the process was not going too far for the future of the international revolution. At the Fourth World Congress of the Comintern in 1922, the last one he attended, he raised the "un-Leninist" query whether the resolution on organizational questions was not "too Russian," in the sense of being based on conditions alien to the foreign Communists and therefore unlikely to be fruitful for their practice.[5] Lenin was also worried at this time by the unintended consequences of the regime he had created in Russia itself – such as the growing power of the bureaucracy and the declining chances of its popular control. Yet, as with the Soviet regime, his doubts were also powerless to reverse the trend in the Comintern – the momentum of the new machine had already become too strong.

STALIN AND THE PRIMACY OF SOVIET INTERESTS

Stalin, in turn, was as little plagued by such doubts in the international as in the national field: the logic of totalitarianism, which had confronted Lenin with the unwelcome results of his actions, presented Stalin only with the welcome means of his ascent to power. By the time of Lenin's death, after the final flare-up in Germany in 1923, the European postwar crisis with its potential for revolutionary change had definitely ended, and Stalin recognized this fact in announcing the "relative stabilization of capitalism" and proclaiming the possibility of "building socialism in one country." He could therefore have

neglected the Comintern for the time being – but for two circumstances. One was the fiction that made the Russian Bolsheviks formally subordinate to the World Party (which they in fact controlled); the other was the knowledge of the foreign governments with whom the USSR was now trying to establish normal relations that the Soviet leaders had the power to issue instructions to the Communist parties of their countries.

The formal subordination of the CPSU to the Comintern gave each of the contenders in the struggle for Lenin's succession a powerful interest in securing control of the Comintern and its affiliated parties for his own faction. As Zinoviev had headed the new International from its foundation and Trotsky enjoyed great authority in the international Communist movement, Stalin started with a serious handicap; to insure himself against the use of this potential instrument of moral pressure by his domestic rivals, he had to purge both the top personnel of the Comintern and the leadership of many affiliated parties of their supporters. As he had done before at home, Stalin first removed the followers of Trotsky with the help of Zinoviev; then, to get rid of Zinoviev and his associates, he inaugurated an international "right turn" with the help of Bukharin; and a few years later he instigated an international "left turn" to disembarrass himself of Bukharin and his international friends. The means used for this international extension of the inner-Russian power struggle were the same old Bolshevik methods that the *apparatchiki* of the Comintern had begun using against independent-minded foreign Communists in Lenin's lifetime; these methods were now justified as necessary to assure the "Bolshevization" of the non-Russian Communist parties. By the end of the 1920's this "Bolshevization

by purge" had succeeded throughout the world in installing as party leaders "obedient blockheads" who would follow Stalin's every command without a murmur; to guard against any unexpected insubordination, Stalin's men moreover prevented the formation of homogeneous leading teams and kept alternate leaders in reserve within each party.

When Stalin first carried his domestic struggle for power into the Comintern, he may not have been as firmly convinced as in later times that no independent revolutionary victories by foreign Communist parties were to be expected or even to be desired. But he clearly did not regard the chance of such victories as topical,[6] and he had no compunction about using these obedient tools "in the meantime" for the benefit of such Soviet foreign policy objectives as the normalization of relations with the "capitalist" powers and the promotion of conflicts among them. He soon found that to make Soviet friendship for any particular non-Communist government credible, the policy of the local Communists had to be adjusted accordingly, and he proceeded to do so without hesitation.

It is sufficient to recall in this connection Soviet instructions to the Chinese Communists in the middle 1920's, when the latter were made to join the Kuomintang as a logical counterpart to Stalin's support for Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, and when during the northward offensive of the Chinese Nationalist armies they were instructed to avoid measures of land distribution that might endanger the unity of the national revolutionary forces, because Stalin regarded a united, nationalist China as the best chance of containing Japanese and British power on the Asian mainland. Despite the spectacular

failure of this policy in the spring of 1927, when Chiang suppressed the Communists and ruined Stalin's plan for the Chinese revolution, many of its features were repeated in the middle 1930's, when Stalin not only urged an anti-Japanese "United Front" of Chinese Communists and Nationalists, but inaugurated the "Popular Front" policy in Western Europe in order to buttress his diplomacy of collective security against Nazi aggression: then, too, the Communists in France and above all in Spain were instructed to put the alliance with the democratic section of the bourgeoisie against the "Fascist powers" ahead of all thought of social revolution. Finally, after Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union, the Communists of all the Allied Nations were bidden to give unconditional support to their governments, while seeking to occupy key positions in the state machines of the free countries and in the resistance movements of the occupied countries — a policy that reached its logical culmination in the 1943 decision to "dissolve" the Comintern officially while maintaining its machinery in secret.[7]

Far from expressing a renunciation of Soviet control over the Communist parties of the world, the "dissolution" of 1943 may thus be said to have marked one of the high points of their subordination to Soviet interests.[8] By then experience had long proved the congenital inability of these foreign-directed, derivative totalitarian parties to win power by their own efforts. It was not only that at some critical moments in their history some of the more important parties had been directly prevented from making a bid for power by specific Soviet orders issued for reasons of foreign policy, but that by virtue of their dependence on an outside center they were permanently deprived of the main advantage enjoyed by an

independent, home-grown totalitarian party over its democratic competitors — the single-minded concentration on the conquest of power.

In a grave social crisis, democratic parties are frequently handicapped by the fact that they are tied to specific interests, traditions, and methods — they cannot suddenly leap over their own shadow. A totalitarian party, which does not represent a particular section of society but a vision of its total transformation, is enabled by its centralist organization and by its belief in the overriding importance of the conquest of state power to exploit the crisis with ruthless opportunism, provided its leader is adequate to the task. In a home-grown totalitarian party, the leader is also the creator of the party: by forging his instrument he has already proved his ability as a technician of power and has established his authority in the process, and he will let nothing stand in the way of his ambition. But in the derivative totalitarian parties created by the Comintern, the leaders are as much creatures of a foreign will as are their organizations; they have been trained to act like subordinates who look for instructions before every decision; they have not established their authority in a struggle to get to the top but have received it ready-made from outside as a reward for faithful service, and they feel that it may be taken from them at any moment. Such a party is hampered in exploiting a crisis by the common knowledge of its dependence on outside orders and also by the fact that its drive to power is liable at any moment to be diverted by such orders — that its leaders have to look over their shoulder all the time instead of looking only to their goal. In the end, subordination to the interests of a foreign state must prove an even greater handicap than any tie to domestic sectional interests.

Because their will to power is conditional on foreign permission, such parties have never won power by their own efforts — they can only receive it from the conquering armies of their sponsoring country, as did the Communist parties of the Baltic states and of Eastern Europe during and after World War II. But this limitation, which might have worried Lenin, had long been consciously accepted by Stalin in his doctrine that the interests of world revolution were wholly comprised within the interests of the Soviet Union, and that any good Communist must willingly put the Soviet Union first. If the centralist World Party was a poor instrument for promoting independent revolutions, it was a useful weapon in the armory of Soviet power politics.

MAO AND TITO: THE TURN TO EMANCIPATION

Yet even while Stalin's centralized control of the World Party and its subordination to Soviet interests seemed perfect, the germs of independence and pluralism were at work within the supposedly monolithic structure. When the Yugoslav Communists got power during the Second World War and the Chinese Communists soon afterward, they did not receive it from the hands of the Soviet army. But these two seeming exceptions to the rule that derivative totalitarian parties are unable to win power by themselves did in fact confirm the rule — for both Tito and Mao Tse-tung gained victory by defying Stalin's "advice" at the most critical moment.

In the Yugoslav case that moment occurred in November 1943, when Tito's partisans formally "deposed" the Yugoslav exile government in London with which Stalin had urged them to co-operate and set up a "National Committee" as a virtual counter-government in the Bos-

nian mountains – a decision described at the time by the Comintern veteran Manuilski, on Stalin's authority, as "a stab in the back of the Soviet Union."[9] In the Chinese case, Mao appears to have defied Soviet pressure to negotiate an all-Chinese coalition government with Chiang and the integration of his armed forces into a single all-Chinese army after the end of the Japanese war in August 1945;[10] Mao's final decision to pass from partisan warfare to an all-out, southward offensive in the summer of 1948 may also have been taken against Soviet advice.[11]

None of the later crises leading to the present pluralistic decay of the former World Party could have occurred without the independent conquest of power by these two Communist parties. Yet neither victory would have been possible without acts of defiance against the Soviet leadership – acts that stand in stark contradiction to the customary posture of derivative parties led by obedient agents and dependent on an outside center. In other words, the germs of independence must have been present, at least in those two parties, *before* the final acts of defiance. In both cases, independent-minded leaders with a will to power must somehow have succeeded during the preceding years in building their own teams and emancipating themselves and their parties from total ideological and organizational dependence on the Comintern. If so, they must have worked by methods entirely different from those that had been attempted, with uniformly disastrous results, by the early Communist opposition groups: open appeals for party democracy and national autonomy were out of the question; in fact, they must have applied the utmost conspiratorial caution in order to avoid any open conflict with Moscow until their position was strong enough. Though such "emancipation by conspiracy" cannot, in its nature, be directly documented,

I believe that some of its main stages may be indirectly traced in both cases.

The Chinese Communists, whose final victory occurred after that of the Yugoslavs, were in fact ahead of them in this internal emancipation. Here we may start from a well-established fact – that Mao Tse-tung was the first, and for many years the only, Communist party leader who achieved his position without investiture by Moscow. He was elected party chairman during the Tsun-yi conference in January 1935 at a stage on the "long march" when even radio contact with Moscow was interrupted;[12] and he defeated his opponents at that time because his strategy of partisan warfare based on rural "Soviet areas" – tolerated at first by the preceding party leaders and by Moscow as a mere sideline to underground activity in the urban centers – had proved incomparably more successful than the latter, so much so that the areas under his control had eventually become the only remaining refuge for the Central Committee as well. Mao had thus become party leader with an independent strategic concept of his own. As to the crucial question of why Stalin subsequently confirmed the independent choice – apparently only after prolonged hesitation[13] – the most plausible answer seems to be that Moscow was then interested in using the limited but real strength of the Chinese Communist partisans to urge on the Nationalist government a truce in the civil war and a common front against Japan; that Mao proved both willing to accept this policy and able to carry it out successfully; and that Stalin's favorite, Wang Ming, could not have ousted him without destroying the effectiveness of his force. In the end, Stalin must have felt that Mao's value as an ally outweighed his failings as a subordinate.

Once confirmed in office and successful in pursuing

the immediate tactical task, Mao proceeded with further steps of emancipation — still avoiding any open conflict with Moscow. In 1939, he developed his original strategic concept of the "New Democracy," arguing that the four-class alliance envisaged by Lenin and Stalin for the first stage of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries was indeed necessary, but that it must be formed from the start under the leadership of the Communist Party.[14] In 1941–42, he began to subject his entire party organization to a thorough ideological re-education — the "rectification of thought," intended to make them proudly conscious that the CPC had its own peculiar style of inner-party life (with special emphasis on the constant remolding of the consciousness, that is, "brain washing"), which was clearly superior to the crude methods of Stalin's blood purges.[15] It was the moral and political unity thus forged by years of common danger and hardship, by improbable successes, and by deliberate training in a new spirit, that enabled Mao to defy Stalin's advice after 1945; and once the plan for a Chiang-Mao coalition had been foiled — by Chiang's intransigence no less than by Mao's — the solid unity of Mao's team and the need for a counterweight to the "American party" in China forced Stalin to go on supporting him, even though with marked reserve.

In contrast to Mao, Tito was invested with the leadership of the Yugoslav party by Stalin, but in most peculiar circumstances. The decision was taken in Moscow in late 1937, at the height of the blood purge, and after some wavering whether it would not be wiser to dissolve the Yugoslav party altogether as too hopelessly disrupted by "enemy agents" — a fate that was soon to befall the Polish party. Of the top Yugoslav leaders then available in Moscow, Tito alone seems to have got out alive — and with full powers to reorganize the Yugoslav underground party from top to bottom. Not surprisingly, Tito has never revealed how he succeeded in obtaining that decision.[16] What seems clear, however, is that he used his powers to build up an unusually homogeneous leadership loyal to him personally (the Croat leader Andrija Hebrang seems to have been the only watchdog kept in reserve by Moscow from the start) and to make the organization as far as possible financially self-supporting.[17] It also appears that he envisaged at an early stage the possibility of Nazi occupation and partisan warfare as his chance: there is evidence, both in his wartime conduct and in his final report on the partisan campaign given to the Fifth Yugoslav Party Congress immediately after his excommunication in 1948, that he had carefully studied Mao's partisan tactics even before the war, though these were not then generally accepted as a model in the Comintern.[18]

With Tito, too, defiance of Moscow, when it finally came in 1943 over the issue of relations with the exile government, occurred at a time when he had become too important as an ally for open attack; and when the British and U.S. governments continued to supply Tito despite his open proclamation of his aims, the Soviets had to swallow their resentment at his insubordination and to take a meager share in aiding him as well.[19] Under cover of the wartime alliance, the transition from secret to open emancipation had been accomplished.

We can now see in what special conditions the emancipation of derivative totalitarian parties from Soviet control has been possible. First, unlike the luckless Communist opposition leaders of the 1920's, who were democratic revolutionaries unused to totalitarian methods, the

new rebels against Moscow are authentic totalitarians, skilled in the arts of dissembling their thoughts and picking their cadres, and ruthless in the pursuit of national power. Second, both Mao and Tito have had the chance to build up homogeneous leading staffs in underground movements, where detailed observation was almost impossible for Moscow, and to strengthen the loyalty and cohesion of their teams in a prolonged struggle amidst great danger and hardship. Third, both impressed their followers by their strategic originality and by the successes due to it. Fourth, both took the risk of openly defying Moscow's orders only when their armies already represented a force of military value to Russia, so that an open attempt to use Soviet authority to disrupt them would have damaged the Russians themselves. Even given all these conditions, the successful emancipation of these two parties must have been immensely difficult – hardly less difficult, in fact, than the original creation of the first totalitarian party by Lenin. Yet once these two had succeeded, the monolithic shell of the World Party was cracked, and further rifts were bound to appear.

FROM STALIN TO KHRUSHCHEV: THE ROAD OF DECAY

The turning-point toward the pluralistic decay of the World Party was thus reached in Stalin's lifetime with the victories of the Yugoslav and Chinese Communists, achieved against his expectations and in defiance of his advice. With the emergence of the first independent Communist states outside Russia, further enforcement of centralistic discipline on a world scale became impossible, regardless of the intentions of the Communist leaders, Mao and Tito, who had emancipated their parties from

quest of power in colonial and semi-colonial countries was at first supported in the Soviet and Cominform press,[22] and a regional bureau for the Communist-directed trade union movements of Asia and Australia was established in Peking. Yet there is no evidence that Stalin ever delegated to the Chinese Communists organizational authority over the Communist parties in that region, and even in state relations he could not bring himself fully to accept their independence and equality: at his insistence, they not only had to recognize formally the "leading role" of the Soviet Union and the CPSU but also, after prolonged negotiations, had to grant the Russians military and economic privileges on Chinese territory under the 1950 treaty of alliance. Soviet persistence in the obsolete claim to leadership of a single-centered World Party, a persistence that in the Yugoslav case had destroyed the very façade of unity, thus led in the Chinese case to preservation of the mere façade – at the price of hidden tensions.

Stalin's heirs seem to have realized from the start that this claim had become untenable in its old form, and Khrushchev in particular soon developed the concept that Soviet political leadership of the forces of international communism could no longer be based on their subjection to the organizational discipline of a World Party, but only on the ideological authority of the CPSU over parties that were in principle recognized as independent equals. This new concept was to apply both to parties that had in fact won power on their own (in the meantime, the Vietnamese Communists of Ho Chi-minh had joined the Yugoslav and Chinese in this category) and to others aspiring to do so. The concept was embodied in the 1954 revision of the Sino-Russian treaty, formulated on a basis of equality; in the 1955 attempt to persuade the Yugoslavs to rejoin the Soviet bloc as independent partners; in the

relations because it is comparatively well defined. In essence, it has not changed since the 1957 Moscow conference. In the Chinese view, the Communist parties cannot be run from a single center as a World Party, and should be fully autonomous in their organization; but they must be run on common ideological principles, and this requires recognition of the doctrinal authority of a leading party. Similarly, the Communist governments are sovereign and equal, but they need a common foreign policy, which must be laid down, after due consultation, by the government of the leading power. Yet while the Chinese Communists insisted in 1957 that this leading role could only be played by the CPSU and the Soviet government, they now consider that Khrushchev and his associates have proved unworthy of such leadership. In organizing the struggle against Soviet "revisionism," the Chinese have in fact, without so far formally announcing it, assumed the "leading role" themselves – at least for all those willing to adopt their factional platform.

We are thus observing the formation of a new Chinese-led international grouping comprising at least two other Communist governments (those of North Korea and Albania) and probably three (North Vietnam), a number of Asian Communist parties, important party minorities elsewhere in Asia and in Latin America, and preparatory contacts in a large number of other Communist parties and national revolutionary organizations. On the basis of their ideological statements, the Indonesian and Japanese Communist parties (the latter after expelling a dissident minority) must definitely be counted as part of this grouping, while the Malayan, Thai, and one of the rival Burmese parties (the illegal BCP) are known to be traditionally dependent on China, and the Indian Communist Party

before the schism, it clearly carries within itself the germ of further pluralistic decay; there is no guarantee that Hoxha or Kim Il-sung, let alone Castro, Ho Chi-minh, or a victorious Aidit, will agree in the future with the Chinese version of Communist doctrine just because they do so now.

In the relations of the CPSU with its supporting parties and governments, the effect of the schism appears to be that the latter are with increasing clarity grouped in two layers: an inner ring of parties that rule states under Moscow's imperial control, that is, the member parties of Comecon; and an outer ring comprising the non-ruling pro-Soviet parties, but now also the Yugoslavs and potentially – if they should stay within the fold – the Cubans. Within the inner ring, where recognition of Soviet leadership in foreign policy has always been assured by the imperial power, there has lately been strong pressure to reduce the autonomy of the member states in the economic field as well, in favor of joint planning under Soviet direction. Far from relying on turning the termination of Moscow's doctrinal monopoly to their advantage, the satellites are afraid that the removal of the potential Chinese counterweight from inner-bloc affairs may increase Russia's effective power over them. The Rumanian leaders' delay in rallying to the Soviet position was directly linked to their determination to win their economic dispute with the Comecon *before* the completion of the Sino-Soviet break. Similarly, parties as firmly opposed to the Chinese outlook as the Polish and Hungarian Communists have been seeking to prevent a formal break of party ties in the interest of their own autonomy. But in the outer ring, where the facts of imperial power are not directly operative, the weakening of Soviet doctrinal authority and

revolutionary party there; correspondingly the pressures for changing the character of the PCI and opening it widely to democratic currents will increase.

If I may venture a more general forecast at this early stage, I should say that those Communist parties that can only exist as derivative totalitarian parties will gradually wither away with the decline of Soviet authority; that parties rooted in the revolutionary tensions of their own country, but of a past or passing period, may suffer a democratic transformation, possibly culminating in a fusion with neighboring parties; and that only Communist parties in countries with a genuine potential for totalitarian revolution, or in the regions bordering the Communist empires, will survive as effective anti-democratic forces – the former in an increasingly independent, the latter in a continuing dependent position. The potentially independent totalitarian parties of the future are, of course, concentrated in the underdeveloped regions where today Chinese ideological influence is greatest. But the founder members of the Comintern, the Communist parties of industrial Europe that came into being through the transformation, under Bolshevik influence, of small democratic revolutionary groups, may yet end by reverting either to sectarian insignificance or to democratic independence.

relations with the Yugoslavs, on the grounds that toleration of their ideological deviations might encourage similar heresies in the satellite countries and in Poland particularly. See Bialer, "I Chose Truth," in *News from Behind the Iron Curtain*, New York, October 1956.

5. As I learned later from participants in the relevant discussions of the Yugoslav Central Committee, Khrushchev proposed in the preparatory correspondence that each side should assume part of the responsibility for the 1948 break but put the blame on a scapegoat: the Yugoslavs should blame their onetime ideological deviations on Djilas (who had been stripped of all party offices in early 1954 because of his attack on the one-party system); while the Soviets would declare Beria responsible for all their slanders of the Yugoslav regime and their persecution of "Titoists" throughout Eastern Europe. The Yugoslav Central Committee unanimously rejected this proposal on a motion of Tito's. This information shows that Isaac Deutscher's report that Djilas had been purged *in order* to pave the way for a reconciliation with the Soviets, published in 1955 without a source, reflected contemporary Soviet wishes rather than Yugoslav reality.
6. Edvard Kardelj, *La Democratie socialiste dans la pratique Yugoslave*, Brussels, 1955.
7. *Pravda*, May 27, 1955.
8. *Borba*, Belgrade, May 28, 1955.
9. Ibid. June 2, 1955.
10. Ibid. and *Izvestia*, June 3, 1955.
11. *Pravda*, July 16, 1955.
12. *Kommunist*, Belgrade, No. 6–7, July 1955.
13. *Borba*, July 28, 1955.
14. See, for example, the article "On the Road to Building Socialism" by the Rumanian chief planner M. Constantinescu in *For a Lasting Peace . . .* , September 9, 1955. For later information on the beginning of the Soviet turn toward a planned division of labor within the bloc, see Fritz Schenk and Richard Lowenthal, "Khrushchev's Changing Empire," *Observer*, London, November 9, 16, and 23, 1958; and "Politics and Planning in the Soviet Empire," *New Leader*, February 5, 12, and 19, 1959.

CHAPTER 2

1. In the official report rendered in the name of the Central Committee by N. S. Khrushchev on February 14, 1956, and in the contribu-

18. See the Chinese Politburo statement "On the Historic Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," *People's Daily*, Peking, April 5, 1956, with its critique of the application to China of Stalin's formula about "isolating the center." Even the Chinese Communists' 1963 defense of Stalin against Khrushchev admits that "of the erroneous 'left' and 'right' opportunist lines which emerged in the Chinese CP at one time or another, some arose under the influence of certain mistakes of Stalin. . . ." *People's Daily*, September 13, 1963.
19. See Josip Broz-Tito, *Political Report of the Central Committee of the CPY to the Fifth Congress*, Belgrade, 1948. This account of Tito's partisan strategy is substantially confirmed by the reports of Allied liaison officers, for example, Fitzroy Maclean, *Disputed Barricade*, London, 1957.
20. Svetozar Vukmanovic, *Ueber die Volksrevolution in Griechenland*, Belgrade, 1950.
21. With the proclamation of Mao's slogan of "New Democracy" at the close of 1939, his program and practice in the areas he controlled became more radical, and the pretense of confining action to the "national" and "democratic" stage of the revolution and seeking continued co-operation with the Chungking government largely nominal; see Mao's "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" and his "On New Democracy" in *Selected Works*, Vol. III, London, 1954; and the works by North and McLane cited in note 17 above.
22. For a fuller discussion see the final chapter of this book.
23. The reference is to Liu's report at the Peking regional conference of Asian and Australian trade unions affiliated to the WFTU, delivered on November 16, 1949, and reprinted in *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, December 30, 1949, and in *Pravda*, January 4, 1950.

CHAPTER 3

1. In Stalin's speech to the Central Committee of the CPSU in March 1937, published in English as *Mastering Bolshevism*, New York, 1937.
2. See Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, as published in English in the selection of documents issued by the Russian Institute of Columbia University, *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*, New York, 1956.
3. See Togliatti's interview with *Nuovi Argumenti* and his report to the Central Committee of the CPI in the same collection, as quoted in note 5 in the preceding chapter of this book; see also the article of the Polish party secretary, Jerzy Morawski, *Trybuna Ludu*, February 27, 1956, in English in the parallel collection, *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe*, published by Columbia University's Program on East Central Europe, New York, 1956.
4. For the stages of this development see the English publication of the memoranda of Imre Nagy, *On Communism: In Defence of the New Course*, London, 1957.
5. These ideas were first systematically developed by Edvard Kardelj in his Oslo lecture in late 1954; first printed in *Borba*, January 1, 1955; and reissued as a pamphlet, *La Democratie socialiste dans la pratique Yougoslave*, Brussels, 1955.
6. See the memoranda quoted in note 4 above.
7. From the wealth of literature on Hungary, for the intellectual prehistory particularly, see the "White Book," *The Hungarian Revolution*, edited by Melvin J. Lasky for the Congress for Cultural Freedom, London, 1957; and T. Aczel and T. Meray, *The Revolt of the Mind*, New York, 1959. For the corresponding phase in Poland see *National Communism and Popular Revolt* . . . , pp. 40 ff., 49 ff.
8. See the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU of June 30, 1956, *Pravda*, July 2, 1956; in English in *The Anti-Stalin Campaign* . . . (see note 2 above).
9. For the decision rehabilitating the Polish party, see *Pravda*, February 21, 1956; in English in *National Communism and Popular Revolt* . . . , p. 37 ff.
10. See the proclamation of Polish Minister President J. Cyrankiewicz of June 29, and the *Pravda* commentary of July 1, 1956, in *National Communism and Popular Revolt* . . . , pp. 131 ff., 136 ff.
11. The Chinese backing for Polish automony, rumored in Poland at once, is now confirmed by the Chinese article "The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves" (by the editorial departments of the *People's Daily* and *Red Flag*), NCNA, September 6, 1963.
12. For the basic documents of the Polish October, see *National Communism and Popular Revolt* . . . , pp. 196–261.
13. See the communiqué of November 18, 1956, ibid. p. 306 ff.
14. For Tito's attempt to influence Hungarian internal developments via the Soviets see his speech at Pula after the crushing of the revolution, *Borba*, November 16, 1956; for the "neutral belt" concept see Imre Nagy, *On Communism* . . . , and Chapter 4.

12. The Chinese have since charged that the Soviet government definitely refused to provide them with a sample atom bomb and designs for its manufacture in June 1959, that is, while Khrushchev's visit to the United States was being prepared. (*People's Daily* and *Red Flag*, September 6, 1963.)
13. See, above all, the *Red Flag* editorial "Long Live Leninism"; in English in *Peking Review*, No. 17, 1960, and also as a pamphlet.
14. See Chapter 7 and *The Sino-Soviet Dispute*, cited in note 5 above.
15. See Khrushchev's report on the conference in *World Marxist Review*, January 1961.
16. See David A. Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai," *China Quarterly*, October–December 1961.
17. See Ilychev's speech of October 24, 1961, in the Congress minutes, *XXII. Syzed Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovyetskogo Soyuza*, Moscow, 1962.
18. See the speech by Satyukov, the editor-in-chief of *Pravda*, of October 25, 1961, ibid.
19. Communiqué of the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, *Pravda*, May 5, 1960.
20. *Pravda*, April 30, 1960.
21. For the whole development of relations between Hoxha and Khrushchev, see Hoxha's speech of November 8, 1961, as cited in note 1 above.
22. See, besides Hoxha's speech, the communiqué of the Albanian Central Committee in *Zeri i Popullit*, September 9, 1960, quoted in Griffith, *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift*, Cambridge, Mass., 1963, and the remarks by Mikoyan at the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU, *Pravda*, October 22, 1961.
23. The term is Zbigniew Brzezinski's.
24. For this whole period compare Griffith, op. cit. Chapters 2 and 3, with the Albanian "act of accusation" against Khrushchev, as drawn up in *Zeri i Popullit*, March 25, 1962, and fully translated in Griffith's book. From this it appears that Soviet pressure on Albania, and Chinese aid to her, began soon after the Bucharest clash of June 1960, and not only after the Moscow compromise of December.
25. See note 18 above.
26. *Pravda*, October 18, 1961.
27. October 19, 1961; text in *Peking Review*, October 27, 1961.
28. On October 21.
29. *Peking Review*, December 1, 1961.
30. The break in Soviet-Albanian diplomatic relations was brought about by the Soviet "verbal notes" of November 25 and December 3,

36. For the consciousness of this comparison, see, for example, Pien Chung-yin, "The Revolutionary Tradition of Political Parties of the Proletariat," *Red Flag,* May 16, 1962; for an indication that the Soviets might prefer a clean break to a permanent factional struggle, see P. Pospelov, "Lenin and the Prague Conference," *Pravda,* January 18, 1962. English texts of both in A. Dallin, op. cit.

EPILOGUE

1. See Rosa Luxemburg, "Organisatsionnye Veprosy Russkoi Sotsial-domokratii" (Organizational Problems of Russian Social Democracy), *Iskra,* No. 69, July 1904, now in English as "Leninism or Marxism" in *The Russian Revolution and Leninism or Marxism,* edited by Betram D. Wolfe, Ann Arbor, 1961. See now also G. Haupt, "Correspondance entre Lenine et Camille Huysmans, 1905–14," Part II, in *Cahiers du monde Russe et Sovietique,* Paris, January–February 1963, where further sources on the conflict between Lenin and Luxemburg are cited, and, in particular, the circular of October 1912 published as Annex IV to this paper.
2. See Rosa Luxemburg's posthumously published critique *The Russian Revolution,* in Bertram D. Wolfe's edition quoted above.
3. In his pamphlet "Left-wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder": *Selected Works,* Vol. X, London, 1938.
4. For a study of the model case of this process, see R. Lowenthal, "The Bolshevisation of the Spartacus League," in *St. Antony's Papers,"* No. 9, *International Communism,* London, 1960.
5. Lenin, *Selected Works,* Vol. X, London, 1938, p. 332.
6. See Stalin's speech of June 9, 1925, at the Sverdlov University, in which he discussed the problems of Soviet domestic policy on the assumption that no proletarian revolution in the West would occur "in the next ten to fifteen years," *Sochineniya,* VII, p. 156 ff.
7. For first-hand evidence, see Wolfgang Leonhard, *Child of the Revolution,* Chicago, 1957.
8. See, however, Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin,* London, 1962, p. 34, for the contrary impression that the Comintern officials' only job after 1943 was "to gather information about Communist parties and to give advice to the Soviet Government and Party." As will be suggested below, this impression was largely due to Stalin's reluctant acceptance of the effective emancipation of the Yugoslav party from his control. But the extent to which other Communist parties, too, were temporarily granted a higher measure of autonomy between 1943 and 1947 seems to require further investigation.

9. Quoted in Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito Speaks,* London, 1953, p. 207. See also the earlier radio exchanges between Tito and Moscow on relations with the exile government as reproduced in Dedijer's authorized biography and in M. Pijade, *La Fable de l'aide Sovietique a l'insurrection nationale Yougoslave,* Belgrade, 1950, and the statement in Djilas, op. cit. p. 14, that the Yugoslav leaders kept their preparations for the crucial proclamation secret from Moscow.
10. This was disclosed by Stalin in conversation with Yugoslav and Bulgarian Communist leaders in February 1958: see the accounts in Dedijer, op. cit. p. 331, and Djilas, op. cit. pp. 164–5.
11. Reports to that effect which reached the West at the time are quoted in C. P. Fitzgerald, *Revolution in China,* London, 1952, pp. 103–4, and mentioned as "probably well founded" by M. Beloff, *Soviet Policy in the Far East,* London, 1953, pp. 60–61.
12. This account, first given in Robert C. North, *Moscow and the Chinese Communists,* Stanford, 1953, pp. 165–67, and based both on official Chinese Communist versions and on an interview with the leading ex-Communist Chang Kuo-t'ao, seems now to be generally accepted.
13. No Soviet publication specifically mentioned Mao as party leader before 1938, though he was freely praised as head of the Chinese "Soviets." As late as December 1937, the previous leader, Wang Ming, returned from Moscow to China with special instructions from Stalin. For an account of this whole obscure transition period, see Charles B. McLane, *Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931–1946,* New York, 1958.
14. See "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese CP," December 1939; and "On New Democracy," January 1940; both in Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works,* Vol. III, London, 1954.
15. See Mao's 1942 essays on the rectification of the party's style, in *Selected Works,* Vol. IV, London, 1956, and particularly Liu Shao-ch'i's 1941 essay "On the Inner-Party Struggle," with its warning that the "administrative methods" proper for police action against enemies should not be used in fighting erroneous views inside the party, in Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbanks, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism,* London, 1952, p. 353 ff.
16. Tito's first account of these events – in Dedijer, op. cit. p. 109 ff. – shows him profiting from the official charges of "anti-party-activity" against Gorkic, his factional enemy and predecessor as party leader – charges which have been retained in Yugoslav party publications even after the break with Moscow. A later interview, granted by Tito to *Kommunist, Belgrade,* April 16, 1959, confirms the statement first made by the Bulgarian Communist exile Karaivanov in *International Affairs,* Belgrade, May 16, 1952,

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enthal is the first to put Communist foreign policy since the Yugoslav defection in a historical context and to trace the development of schism and diversity within the Communist camp. The inner logic of events is made clear; the Communist technicians of totalitarian power are shown to be not the scientific manipulators of history they would like to be, but prisoners of their own illusions.

Richard Lowenthal is Professor of International Relations at the Free University, West Berlin, and a board member of its Eastern Europe Institute. One of the West's leading commentators on Communist policy, he was a Research Associate at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University (1959-60), and is the author of a number of other books.

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