HISTORY OF
Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages

BY ETIENNE GILSON

Director of Studies, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto

RANDOM HOUSE · NEW YORK

CONTENTS

NOTES

the place of philosophy in history. Before Christ, there was the Jewish Law, which had certainly been willed by God. The Old Testament has prepared the New Testament. Yet the latter has not abrogated the former; rather, it has completed it, so that there has been a continuity even in the progress of the divine revelation. Unlike the Jews, the Greeks had neither law nor faith, yet, they were not altogether without help, since they had natural reason to judge them, as Saint Paul says (Rom. 2, 14-15), and to prepare them to receive Christianity. Clement is here introducing the theme of the "preparation of the Gospel" by the Greek poets and philosophers, especially Plato. Eusebius of Caesarea will fully develop this idea. The philosophers, Clement says, have been the prophets with respect to Greek natural reason. True enough, God was not speaking directly to the philosophers; unlike the prophets, the philosophers received from God no special revelation; yet, since natural reason itself is a divine light, it can be said that, through it, God was guiding the philosophers toward truth. To deny this would be to deny that the divine providence takes care of historical events, including their very order. God has certainly created reason to some useful purpose. If he has willed the existence of philosophers, it was because, like a good shepherd, he wanted to put his best sheep at the head of his flock. This, at least, should be easily understood by those who reproach the Greek philosophers for having stolen their ideas from the Old Testament. It cannot be maintained, at one and the same time, that philosophy is evil in itself and that it has been borrowed from Revelation by the Greeks. In fact, Jewish law and Greek philosophy have been two rivers, at whose confluence Christianity sprung forth, like a new source, powerful enough to carry, along with its own waters, those of its two feeders.[8] This ambition to include the totality of truth accessible to man had already been affirmed by Justin Martyr; it will still inspire the scholasticism of the thirteenth century.

Necessary to the Greeks before the coming of the Lord, philosophy remains useful to the Christians, provided they keep it in its proper place. From the very beginning of the *Miscellanies* (1, 5), Clement establishes this point by means of Biblical comparisons borrowed from Philo and which were to become the common property of the thirteenth-century theologians. In warning to keep away "from the stranger who sweeteneth her words" (Prov. 7, 5), Scripture gives us to understand that we should make use of profane learning without mistaking philosophical widom for the Christian wisdom which it but prepares. Just as the liberal arts "contribute to philosophy, which is their mistress, so also philosophy itself co-operates for the acquisition of wisdom. For philosophy is the study of wisdom, and wisdom is the knowledge of things divine and human, and of their causes. Wisdom therefore sways philosophy, as philosophy sways preparatory intellectual culture." Philo has thus become, through Clement, the inspirer of the famous formula: "philosophy is the handmaid of theology"; he has also

2. MINUCIUS FELIX

Scholars have not yet been able to decide whether the *Octavius* of Minucius Felix[49] was written before or after the *Apology* of Tertullian. The question is not without interest, for indeed the one of these two works which was written first has certainly inspired the other, at least in part. The Ciceronian turn of mind of Minucius Felix does not invite consideration as a likely source of ideas. He had few of them, whereas they are plentiful in the works of Tertullian. At any rate, even if Minucius Felix had borrowed from Tertullian some of his arguments, the general tone of his apology would remain quite personal and entirely distinct from that of his predecessor. It has been remarked that while Tertullian had strongly claimed, for the Christians, the right to practice their religion freely in a pagan empire, he would have been perhaps less favorable to the liberty of pagan worship in a Christian empire. After his conversion, Tertullian seems to have completely forgotten what reasons he had once had to be a pagan. This is something which Minucius Felix has never forgotten. Among all the Apologists of the second and third centuries, Minucius Felix is the only one who has shown us the two sides of the question.

Minucius reports an imaginary conversation, or, at least, an artistically reconstructed one, held in his presence, at Ostia, by the pagan Cecilius Natalis and the Christian Octavius. The two main arguments directed by Cecilius against Christianity are those which Cicero himself might have used. First, there was in the blunt dogmatism of Christian faith something unpalatable to the cultured pagan mind. At the end of his dialogue *On the Nature of the Gods,* Cicero had concluded his ample theological inquiry by these modest words: "When we parted, it seemed to Velleius that the opinions of Cotta were more true, and, to me, that there was more likelihood in those of Balbus." Such being the attitude of men of parts and well trained in the doctrines of Plato, Aristotle, Zeno and Epicurus, we can easily imagine their impatience with the Christians. It was annoying, for aristocrats of Greco-Roman culture, to hear illiterates answer all questions concerning God, the origin of the world, the nature of man and his destiny. Moreover, there were national reasons, for a wise and pious Roman citizen, to keep faith with the gods of the Empire. Had not these gods led it to world leadership? No doctrine could be certain enough to justify national apostasy. The only wise thing to do was to adhere to the commonly received Roman religion and to keep up its traditions.

In answering these objections, Octavius observes that there is no reason why truth should remain the exclusive property of the happy few instead of belonging to all. It is not easy to imagine the feeling of liberation which pervaded the minds of many men when they were told, for the first time,

that the ultimate truth about man and the world had been revealed to all. What philosophy had not been able to give to the most learned intellects, that is, a complete explanation of the world, Christianity was offering to the millions. A single God, creator and providence of all was then revealing to man the secret of his origin and of his destiny. The end of the world, the immortality of the soul, the rewards or punishments that await all men in future life—these are so many truths which the pagans have worked hard to discover and which the Christians glory in having received from God. At the end of this conversation, Cecilius graciously consents to declare himself convinced and to embrace the religion of Octavius. Whereupon, Minucius Felix concludes: "We departed, glad and cheerful: Cecilius, to rejoice that he had believed; Octavius, that he had conquered; and I, that the one had believed, and the other had conquered."

3. ARNOBIUS

A great figure of the early Latin Christian church, Saint Cyprian[50] was more interested in practical and moral problems than in philosophical or theological speculation. Arnobius,[51] on the contrary, was a second-rate Christian writer, whose religious information was weak to the point of being questionable. Yet he remains an interesting witness to the remarkable progress achieved by the opponents of Christianity in their criticism of the new religion. Besides repeating the old accusations of immorality and atheism, the pagan apologists had learned to draw more serious objections from Christian doctrine itself. Be it only for this, the *Adversus Gentes* of Arnobius still deserves to be studied. For instance, in Bk. II, 63-65, Arnobius' opponent asks why, if Christ was sent by God that he might save men from destruction, he has not been sent earlier, to all without exception, and why God does not now compel us to believe in his salutary doctrine? These were no longer calumnies but real objections.

Against his adversaries, Arnobius defines the Christians as the worshippers of the supreme King of the world under the guidance and leadership of Christ.[52] To him, Christ is essentially the teacher by whom the truth about the supreme God has been revealed to us. There is only one God, Lord of all that is, whom we must obey and love. Of course, this fundamental truth implies many other ones;[53] yet, on the whole, this is the sum total of the new religion.

What impresses Arnobius most in the Christian revelation is that it is for all a pressing invitation to intellectual modesty. This conviction is the real source of his alleged "scepticism." The personal experience of his conversion was still vivid in his mind when he wrote his apology. While deriding the fables of pagan mythology and the ridicules of pagan worship, Arnobius could not possibly forget that, not so long ago, he himself had worshipped sacred stones anointed with olive oil and begged favors from

A. *Cosmology*

At the beginning of his *In Hexaemeron,* Gregory states his intention not to contradict Basil, but to follow a somewhat different order. In fact, the positive and literal method of interpretation of Holy Scripture prevails in this work. Speaking "in a summary way" (*en kephalaio,* rather than "in the beginning"), Moses says that God created heaven and earth, that is: 1) matter, which is the whole made up of all sensible qualities, each of which, taken apart, is an ideal notion, a pure object of thought; 2) all beings, animate or inanimate; 3) all their powers, causes and occasions. To "say" and to "create" are for God one and the same thing. His Word is "reason," wisdom; consequently, there is a "reason" (or intelligible essence) inherent in every created thing. The cause of all is an illuminating power which created light and fire; after spreading throughout matter, light and fire collected themselves on high and separated themselves from the rest, which became darkness. Thus the earth was "invisible" under the "firmament." Whether it be one of the four higher heavens, or a fifth heaven surrounding the other ones, as the "philosophers out of the pale" say it is, the "firmament" is not a solid body; it has a subtle and indestructible nature, akin to that of fire, and which can be said to be practically incorporeal. Beyond this external limit of the material world are the purely intelligible realities. All that is in motion, is moved in a circular way by a nature perceptible to the mind alone. From this point on, "following its own order, the nature of things added to the principles their necessary consequences." In short, the "order" or explanation which Gregory claims for his own, consists in showing that, when Moses said that God created heaven and earth, he described "in a summary way" the creation of all beings, whose natures necessarily follow from these two principles.[77] The commentary of Gregory on the work of the six days is a cosmogony, which, presupposing the creation of the four elements by God, deduces the nature of things from the elemental properties of fire, air, water and earth. The work of Gregory excels that of Basil by its more systematic elaboration.

B. *Anthropology*

Gregory's doctrine of man is chiefly found in his *De hominis opificio* (On the Formation of Man). Man has been created after all the rest because all the rest has been created for him. Unlike other creatures, he was created in the image of God. This can be gathered from the shape of his body, but still more from his soul (*psykhè*), to which man owes his truly royal dignity. Man is masterless (*adespotos*); he does everything of his own accord; he governs himself, so to speak, with supreme authority; in short, he is a king. Man is not a king unto himself only, but with

tian life itself. The result of this effort is a purification of the soul, that is, a reviving of the divine resemblance which had been blurred by sin. A Christian is well advised to follow the advice of Socrates: "Know thyself," for indeed, to know oneself as an image of God is to know God. When this resemblance nears its supreme degree, mystical life begins to yield its most precious fruits: God is in the soul, and the soul is in God. The essentials of this doctrine will provide the framework of the mystical theology of Saint Bernard of Clairvaux. On the contrary, the eschatology of Gregory was too deeply influenced by that of Origen not to become obsolete. In order to insure the complete and final triumph of the Good over evil, Gregory admits that the whole world, purified at last from all pollution, will recover its pristine perfection, without even excepting, after the sufferings required for their purification, the reprobates and the devils. In the ninth century, John Scot Erigena will follow him even on this point.[80]

C. *Theology*

There is in man a "spoken word" (i.e., *logos*) which is an expression of his thought (*nous*). Since we were made in the image of our creator, God too should be conceived as a supreme Thought, that begets a Word. This divine Word is the perfect expression of his Father; not, indeed, a fleeting word like those we utter, but an eternally subsisting and living Word. Since he lives, the Word has a will, and since his will is divine, it is an all powerful and perfect will. Just as our mental words imitate the eternal generation of the divine Word, so also the inseparability of words from thought imitates in us the inseparability of the divine Word from the Father. And just as our breath proceeds from the unity of body and soul, so also does the Holy Ghost indivisibly proceed from both the Father and the Son. Natural reason here bears witness to the truth of the highest among all the Christian mysteries, and it confirms the superiority of the Christian notion of God over those held by the Jews and the pagans. The Jews know the unity of the divine being, but they ignore the plurality of the divine persons; on the contrary, the pagans know the plurality of the divine persons, but they ignore the unity of the divine being; the Christians alone know both, and this is why they know the whole truth. This attempt to rediscover by a dialectical process the truth of the Christian dogma of the Trinity has been aptly compared to the similar efforts of Saint Anselm and of Richard of Saint Victor.[81] In fact, like Anselm and Richard, Gregory attributes a certain reality to essences: if we can understand that Peter, Paul and Barnabas are three distinct persons sharing in the same essence of man, we should also understand how three divine persons may share in the unity of a single divine nature. There is, however, a difference: we correctly say that Peter, Paul and Barnabas are three men, whereas we correctly say of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost that they are one single God.[82] The authority of the Council of

cause of that which has no cause. For the will of God has no cause; it *is* the Cause; and since this cause is the will of a perfect Good, all that God wills must needs be good.[21]

According to Scripture (Ecclus. 18, 1), God has created all things at once. The six days of creation are a metaphor intended to help our imagination. By a single instantaneous act, God has created out of nothing all the beings which then were, and, in them, all those that have come to be ever since the first instant of creation, as well as all those that still are to come up to the end of the world. The created world was big with their "seminal reasons," that is with the seeds, or germs, of future beings, and since to create mutable beings was tantamount to creating time, it can be said that the succession of all future times was created at once, together with the totality of all future beings, in the very instant of creation.[22]

By "heaven" and "earth," Scripture means to designate matter, both visible and invisible, that is, the very mutability of spiritual substances, or angels, and that of corporeal substances, or bodies. As in all created beings, there is in angels an element of mutability, which is matter, but the sweetness of beatific contemplation at once withdrew them from change, so that, changeable by nature, they became immutable in fact. Their mode of duration is neither eternity, which belongs properly to the immutable essence of God; nor is it time, which is the duration of beings whose nature is subject to change; it is *aevum*, that is, the mode of duration proper to mutable natures that do not change[23] because they have achieved their perfection.

Besides this spiritual matter, which it calls "heaven," Scripture mentions the "earth." Whereas "heaven" designated a matter immediately stabilized under its forms, "earth" designates a formless matter, where forms will succeed one another up to the end of time. This matter of corporeal beings does not exist without some form; nor was it created by God prior to forms; rather, corporeal matter is to form in the same relation as inarticulate sound is to articulate voice. Matter is turned into a being by its form as a meaningless sound is turned into a meaningful word by human speech. Its anteriority to form is one of nature, not of time. Taken in itself, matter is neither a being nor a pure nothingness. Farther removed from God than any other creature, it is something that is nearly nothing.[24]

The forms of created beings are so many images of, or participations in, the divine Ideas. From this point of view, each and every thing has a twofold existence, the one in itself, the other in its divine Idea. In God, the thing is God, just as a work of art is but the artist himself inasmuch as it exists in his mind. In itself, the created thing is but an imitation of its model in God, just as a work of art is but an approximation of what

the artist had in mind when he made it. This remark applies not only to species, but also to each and every individual. For instance, each and every individual man has his own Idea in God.[25]

The work of the six days describes in a figurative way the many effects caused by the simple creative act of God. Taken as a whole, the universality of beings exhibits a hierarchical structure, determined by their respective degrees of perfection. Since all creatures are images of the divine Ideas, there is not one of them in which the perfection of their common cause does not find its expression. Every created being is determined by an intelligible formula (*ratio*) which defines what it has to be according to its nature; so it has shape, form, order, measure, beauty. Even change and becoming in time can be expressed in intelligible terms by means of numbers. Now, to relate certain beings to other beings by numerical relations is to reduce change to a rule that does not change; in a sense, it is to redeem becoming from time by revealing in it an element of constancy and of true being. Likewise, to grasp several different beings as included within a certain order is to know them as one; consequently, it is to reduce their multiplicity to unity, that is, once more, to true being.[26] This unity of order between the diverse parts of each being, as well as between the diverse beings which make up the universe, concurs with the laws of their succession in time to give the world its beauty. World history then appears as the progressive unfolding of an immense poem, where every single word contributes to the meaning of the whole while it itself derives from it the fullness of its own signification.

C. *Man and Knowledge*

We know from Scripture that God created man a compound of soul and body. Augustine has always maintained that man was neither his soul apart nor his body apart, but the whole which results from their union. Yet, following Plotinus (*Enn.*, I, 1, 3), who himself had followed Plato on this point (*Alcibiades*, 129 E), he has also defined man: "a soul that uses a body." Taken literally, this formula would mean that man is essentially his soul.[27] Augustine himself never took it quite literally, but, rather, as a forcible expression of the transcendent superiority of the soul over the body. Even taken in this limited sense, the Plotinian notion of man has deeply influenced the noetic of Saint Augustine.

All corporeal beings are extended in space and measurable according to the three dimensions. The soul has neither extension nor dimensions in space; hence it is incorporeal. Besides, the soul knows this by immediate self-knowledge. It knows that it exists, that it lives and that it knows. In short, the soul is aware of living the life of an intelligence. Even where, in some philosophies, the soul mistakes itself for a body, it is not truly certain to be a body, but it is certain that it thinks. Let the soul therefore conceive itself as being that which it is sure to be, namely a thinking

being. I know that I am because I know that I think and that I live. Even the most extreme scepticism cannot possibly deny this, and since I know myself directly as a knowing being, this is exactly what I am.[28]

Having described man as a soul that uses a body, Augustine finds it hard to understand their union. Since it is immaterial, the soul cannot spread throughout the body, but it exercises in it a permanent act of "vital attention." [29] Nothing of what happens to the body escapes the vigilance of the soul. This active watchfulness is what is pointed out in saying that the soul is the "life" of its body. But this is only possible because the soul is life in itself. Consequently, when the body dies and disintegrates, the soul continues to live. To survive its body is simply for the soul to continue to be what it is. A substance which, like the body, receives its life from without, ceases to be as soon as it becomes unable to receive it; a substance which, like the soul, is life in virtue of its own nature, cannot possibly lose it. The soul then is a spiritual and living substance which is immortal by the very fact that it is a soul.[30]

No superior substance can be acted upon by an inferior substance; so the body cannot act upon its soul. Sensations are not passions undergone by the soul; on the contrary, they are its actions. The human body undergoes actions exercised upon its sense organs by other bodies; since the human soul is constantly exerting a "vital attention" upon all the modifications undergone by its body, these corporeal modifications do not escape its watchfulness. As soon as it is aware of one of them, the soul instantaneously makes up, out of its own substance, one of the spiritual images which we call sensations.[31] This doctrine is in full agreement with the definition of man as a soul using its body; all that which is in the body comes to it from the soul, all that which is in the soul comes to it from within.

This appears still more clearly in the inner structure of the sensations. Each of them is a response of the soul to a corporeal motion that lasts a certain time and obeys a numerical law. In matter, each successive moment of these motions ceases to exist as soon as it is replaced by the succeeding one. On the contrary, every sensation has a certain duration. In order to hear a word of several syllables, I must still remember the first syllable while hearing the last one. In order to hear even a single syllable, I must remember its beginning while hearing its end. Its duration may be very short, yet it has one. If this be true, memory is at work in all our sensations. Now, what is memory, if not one of the clearest manifestations of the spirituality of the soul? Without it, what happens in matter would vanish into nothingness as soon as it happens. A certain redemption of matter from multiplicity and from time is achieved by memory even in the simplest of sensations.[32]

From the point of view of their cognitive value, it should be noted that, in the doctrine of Augustine, sense cognition is not perfectly safe. First,

its proper function is to warn the soul of some changes that take place in the body rather than to represent to it the nature of things. Secondly, this nature of material things is itself a changeable one. For these two reasons, no pure truth can be expected from sensations. During the time when he had adhered to the moderate scepticism of the New Academy, Augustine had become acquainted with the main arguments of the sceptics against the truth value of sensations. In his *Contra Academicos,* and later on in his *De Trinitate,* Augustine forcefully maintained the validity of sense knowledge against all these sceptical arguments (sensory illusions, dreams, mental diseases). Yet, wholly sufficient to all practical purposes, these certitudes do not measure up to the standards of pure and unshakable truth. Like Plato, Augustine himself considered intelligible truth the best safeguard there was against scepticism. His doctrine of the divine illumination, to which we now have to turn always remained for him the decisive moment in his own liberation from scepticism.

Since the soul is the cause of its sensations, it is still more obviously the cause of its intellectual cognitions. Yet, on this point, Augustine has often stressed the fact that there is more in intellectual knowledge than in either the thing or the mind. Fully rational knowledge is true knowledge. Now, true knowledge exhibits certain characters which are both distinct and intimately related. Truth is necessary: whether we say that seven plus three are ten, or that wisdom is a knowledge that confers beatitude upon those who possess it, we do not simply know that it is so; we say that it cannot be otherwise. Since truth is necessary, it is immutable, for indeed that which cannot be other than it is, cannot possibly change. Thirdly, since truth is immutable, it is eternal, because that which cannot change cannot cease to be. Now, where could our mind discover these characters of truth? Not in things, for all of them are contingent and, since they all begin and end in time, none of them is either immutable or eternal. Nor can our mind discover these characters in itself, since, like all created things, it is contingent, mutable and enduring in time. The only way to account for these characters of truth in the human mind is to admit that, every time it forms a true judgment, our mind is so to speak in contact with something that is immutable and eternal. But to say "immutable" and "eternal" is tantamount to saying God. The existence of immutable truths in mutable minds is the proof of the existence of God. In other words, the demonstration of God's existence can be considered as included in the epistemology of Saint Augustine.

This proof is confirmed by the common nature of truth. All minds can see the same truth in the same way. Now, since I cannot see it in the mind of any other man, nor make any other man see it in my own mind, there must be a cause which makes us all see it at the same time and in the same way. God is the inner master who teaches the same truth to all the minds that seek after it. He is, so to say, the Intelligible Sun which en-

lightens the minds of all men. Those who turn away from sensations and purify their souls from vices can raise their minds up to a contemplation of truth that is a sort of intellectual contact with God, but even in the simplest judgment, provided only it be a true one, there is a sufficient foundation for a proof of the existence of God.[33] However different in their details, all the Augustinian itineraries of the soul in quest of God are substantially the same: they go from the exterior to the interior, and from the inferior to the superior; *ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab inferioribus ad superiora.*

D. *Ethics*

Like his anthropology and his noetic, the ethics of Augustine is one with his metaphysics and his religion. Ethical knowledge is a particular case of the divine illumination which itself is an effect of the divine Ideas. The definitions of the circle or of the sphere are eternal and necessary truths, which judge our thought and by which, in its turn, our thought judges particular circles and spheres. But moral truths are just as immutable, necessary and eternal as speculative truths. In their case too, each man sees them in his own mind, and yet they are common to all. All men agree that wisdom is that knowledge by which happiness is obtained; whence they all infer that they should strive to acquire wisdom. Many rules of wisdom are clear: to respect justice; to subordinate the inferior to the superior; to deal with equal things in an equal way; to give everybody his due, etc. All these rules, and many others that could be quoted, are in us so many imprints of an Idea, or of an Intelligible Law, which is for our mind a light. There is therefore a moral illumination of the virtues as there is a speculative illumination of scientific cognitions. In other words, the same metaphysical explanation accounts for the physical illumination of bodies by numbers, for the speculative illumination of minds by science, and for their moral illumination by virtue.[34]

The moral rules whose light shines in us make up the "natural law," whose awareness in us is called "conscience." But moral conscience and the knowledge of virtues are not enough to achieve moral life. Man is not an intellect only, he is also a will, and so long as his will does not conform to the prescriptions of moral truth, there is no morality. The model of the order which should obtain in ourselves, lies before us in nature. The wisdom of God has put everything in its own place and established between things all the relations that befit their natures. This physical "justice" is the ideal pattern after which our own actions should be performed. The four cardinal virtues of prudence, fortitude, temperance and justice are particular expressions of the "eternal law," that is, rules of conduct applicable to the particular problems of moral life. Inversely, the common origin of moral vices is the unjust move of a will that refuses to conform to the prescriptions of the eternal order. More specifically, vices are the

disorderly motions of wills which prefer the enjoyment of material goods to enjoyment of intelligible truth. In short, just as God has made the mind a receiver of intellectual illumination, he has made the will the receiver of a moral illumination, through the intellectual illumination of the mind. To be an intellect is not to be wise; to be a will is not to be just, but man can become both wise and just by sharing, as a finite creature can do, in the blessed life of God.[35]

An obvious metaphysical optimism pervades the whole doctrine of Augustine. He never admitted that matter was evil, nor that the soul of man was united with the body in punishment for his sin. Having overcome the gnostic dualism of the Manicheans he never relapsed into it. On the other hand, Augustine never ceased to repeat that the present relations of soul and body were no longer what they used to be. The body of man was not created as a prison for his soul, but this is what it has come to be in consequence of Adam's sin, and the main problem of the moral life is for man to escape from this jail.

Sin, that is, the transgression of the divine law, resulted in a rebellion of the body against the soul. Hence arise both concupiscence and ignorance. Instead of controlling its body, the soul is controlled by it. Turned as it is toward matter, man feeds upon the sensible and since, as has been said, his soul draws sensations and images from its own substance, it exhausts itself in furnishing them. There comes a time when, drained by that loss of substance, the soul becomes unrecognizable, even to itself. It then takes itself to be a body. It is that error, not the body, which is the soul's tomb and the evil from which it has to be liberated.

In his fallen state, man cannot save himself by his own strength. Since it was a creature of God, free will was good; but since it was but a creature, it could not be perfectly good.[36] In other words, the fall of man was not necessary, but it was possible. Now, although he fell by his own free will, the free will of man is not sufficient to raise him again. This was, in Augustine, more than an abstract conviction. The decisive moment in his personal history had been the discovery of sin, of his inability to overcome it without God's grace, and the experience of his success in doing so with divine help. This is the reason why, from the very beginning of his career, and even before knowing Pelagius, he wrote against him as if he had known him.[37] The anti-Pelagian controversies which began about 412, only encouraged him to stress still more forcefully the necessity of grace. True enough, one cannot sustain disputes of this kind for more than twenty years without occasionally overstressing certain points. Having to answer endless objections against the necessity of grace, Augustine had no reason to stress the rights of nature and of free will. His central position has always remained the same: it takes both grace and free will to achieve moral righteousness because grace is an aid granted by God to man's free will. If grace destroyed free will, there would be nothing left

to receive its aid. The effect of grace, therefore, is not to suppress free will, but rather to help it to achieve its purpose. This power of using free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) to good purposes is precisely liberty (*libertas*). To be able to do evil is a proof of free choice; to be able not to do evil is also a proof of free choice; but to be confirmed in grace to the point of no longer being able to do evil is the supreme degree of liberty. The man most completely strengthened by grace is also the freest: true liberty is to serve Christ.[38]

This plenary liberty is not accessible to us in this life, but to draw near it during this life is the means of obtaining it after death. Man lost it by turning away from God to the body; man can regain it by turning away from bodies to God. The fall was a movement of cupidity; the return to God is a movement of charity, which is the love of that which alone deserves to be loved. Expressed in terms of knowledge, this conversion to God consists in the effort of human reason to turn from the sensible to the intelligible. As immersed in sensible objects, reason is called "inferior reason"; as striving to break away from sensible objects and to rise up to the contemplation of the divine Ideas, it is called "superior reason." Both Plato and Plotinus already knew that such was the end of man; they themselves seem to have sometimes attained it for a split second in some fits of ecstasy. They knew the goal, but they did not know the way. Because they know both the goal and the way to it, the Christians who philosophize eminently deserve the title of philosophers. For indeed since the goal of philosophy is happiness, to be happy through the enjoyment of wisdom is truly to be a philosopher. Only the Christians are happy, because they alone possess the true Good which is the source of all beatitude, and, with Christ's grace, they will possess it forever and ever.

Only the Christians possess it, but all Christians possess it together. What is called a people, a society, or a city, is a group of men united in the pursuit and love of some common good. All men, pagans and Christians alike, live in temporal cities whose members are united by their common desire for the temporal goods that are necessary to temporal life. Peace, that is, tranquillity born of order,[39] is the most lofty of these desirable goods, because it includes all the others. But besides being members of these temporal cities, Christians make up another one, whose citizens are the men who, living by the same faith, are united by their common love of the same God and by their common pursuit of the same beatitude. Considered as organizing themselves in view of earthly goods and apart from God, all temporal cities can be considered as forming together a single "Earthly City," whose history begins with the earliest days of mankind; considered as organizing themselves into a Church, whose aim and scope it is to lead them to eternal beatitude, all Christians integrate a single "Heavenly City," which can justly be called the "City of God." The citizens of this City are recruited from among all the Chris-

quently, since we cannot know him directly, we cannot name him directly. The only way correctly to name him from the names of creatures involves a threefold operation. First, we affirm that God is what Scripture says he is: One, Lord, Powerful, Just, etc. This first moment, which is common to both the simple believers and the theologians, constitutes what is called the "affirmative theology." But the theologians know that such notions as oneness, lordship and power, cannot possibly apply to God in the same sense as to creatures; hence, for them, the necessity of denying that God is any one of those things in the only sense which we can give to their names. If to be "one" means to enjoy the sort of unity which belongs to sensible beings, then God is *not* one. We have no positive notions of his oneness, lordship, power, etc. This second moment constitutes what the theologians call the "negative theology." These first two moments are then reconciled in a third one, which consists in saying that God deserves these names in a sense which, because it is incomparably higher than that in which it applies to creatures, is inconceivable to human reason. This Denis calls "superlative theology." God is "Hyper-Being," "Hyper-Goodness," "Hyper-Life," and so on. Denis has given a striking example of negative theology in his short treatise on *Mystical Theology*. The conclusion of this work is a series of negations, followed by a series of negations of these negations, for God is above all negations and all affirmations. What is affirmed about God is beneath him. His not being light does not mean that he is darkness; his not being truth does not mean that he is error; rather, because God is the inaccessible Cause of all things, he transcends both what can be affirmed or denied of him from our knowledge of his effects.[47]

In the *Divine Names*, God appears as deserving, before any other name, that of "the Good." The reason for this is clear: we can approach him only through his creatures, and it is by right of supreme Good that God has created them. In this sense, the God of Denis closely resembles the Idea of the Good described by Plato in his *Republic* (VI, 509), which is "not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their very entity, and yet is not entity, but far exceeds entity in dignity and power." Like the visible sun which, without having either to reason or to will, but from the sole fact of its existence, begets all those beings which its energy makes to grow, so also the divine Good, of which the visible sun is but a pallid likeness, bursts forth into natures which, after springing forth from him, strive to return to God.[48]

The world of Denis can be best described as a circulation of the good, from the Good and toward the Good. Denis himself speaks of it as of an "illumination" which, developing by degrees and weakening as it proceeds farther and farther from its source, naturally begets a hierarchy. To be a member of a "hierarchy," as Denis understands it, is both to occupy a certain place on the universal scale of beings and to exercise a certain

function. A being has the very nature defined by its degree of elongation from God; pure Intelligences are at the top, matter is at the bottom. Moreover, each and every member of this universal hierarchy receives the divine illumination which makes it to be, and to be what it is, only in order to transmit it, in turn, to a lower rank.

The divine light and the being which it confers are the illuminative cascade whose steps are described by the treatises *On Celestial Hierarchy* and *On Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*. This "illumination" must not be conceived as a simple gift of light to already existing beings, but as the gift of a light which *is* their very being.[49] From the being and substance of that which has neither life nor soul, through the life of plants and the unreasoning souls of animals, up to rational beings and intellectual substances, all that merits to any degree the title of "being" is a definite moment of this illuminative effusion of the Good. What we call creation, then, is the very revelation or manifestation of God through his works. Denis calls this manifestation a "theophany." This doctrine justifies the use which Denis makes of the "divine names." Itself a "theophany," the world should enable us to know something about God. In fact, since each being is good inasmuch as it is, its cause must needs be "the Good"; but God cannot possibly be good in the same way as his creatures are good; consequently we must deny that God is good; on the other hand, the reason why God is not good is not that he is beneath goodness; rather, he is above it; our negation then must become an affirmation: God is not good, because he is the "Hyper-Good."

The same method applies to the other divine names: Light, Beauty, Life and so forth. Among these names, Love plays a particularly important part because it is through the divine love that all beings which radiate from God strive to return to him as to their source. Love is in each being as an active energy which, so to speak, draws it out of itself, in order to bring it back to God. This is what we mean in saying that of its very nature, Love is "esctatic" (*exstare*). Its natural effect is to place the lover outside of himself and to transform him into the object of his love. From this point of view, the universal circulation of being, from the Good and toward the Good, is a circulation of the divine love. Its effect in this life, and its term in future life, is a certain divinisation (*theosis*) of the loving creature which its love assimilates to, and unites with, God.

In such a universe, which is but the manifestation of the Good, all that which is, is good. Following the teaching of Proclus (411-485), Denis maintains that, as a consequence of what precedes, evil is, of itself, non-being; its appearance of reality is due only to the semblance of good it affords. This is precisely how evil deceives us, for although it be without substance or reality, it exhibits an appearance of good. God, therefore, is not the cause of evil, but he tolerates it because he governs natures and

freedoms without using compulsion. In a work now lost *On the Just Judgment of God,* Denis had shown that a perfectly good God can with justice punish the guilty, because they are guilty of their own free will.

To say that God is the "Hyper-Good" is to name him with regard to creation, of which his goodness is the cause; with regard to himself, the best name which we can borrow from creatures in order to designate him is "Being." God is HE WHO IS (Exod. 3, 14), and by that right he is the cause of all being. He even is being for all that is, in this sense that, existing eternally in himself, he is that by which all the rest exists by mode of participation. In the temporal images of God, being comes first of all and this first participation is the foundation of all the others. Because a thing has first to be in order to be something else,[50] this participation in being necessarily precedes all other participations.

Taken in God, all these participations are one in him, as the radii of a circle are one in their center, or as numbers are one in unity. As models or patterns of possible beings, their prototypes in God are called Ideas; as active and causal forces, these prototypes are also called "divine volitions" or "predestinations." [51] Let us note, however, that there is in Denis a marked tendency to subordinate the divine Ideas to God. The reason for it is that, according to him, even being is just a "divine name." Accordingly, it cannot be correctly applied to God without being first affirmed, secondly denied, and thirdly reaffirmed in a transcendent way. Strictly speaking, God is no more Being than he is the Good; he is "Hyper-Being." Now, inasmuch as the other participations presuppose a first participation in being, God, who is beyond being, is beyond all the other participations. This principle applies to the divine Ideas themselves. As Denis himself says in the *Divine Names,* Ch. V, 5: "It is through their participation in being that the various principles of being exist and become principles; but they exist first, and then they become principles." It is because the Ideas are the first manifestations of God that they come after God, and it is because they are participations in being that they come after "Hyper-Being." Ideas are so many divine rays scarcely removed from their center, and yet already distinct from it.[52]

For this reason, Denis often resorts to the terminology of Plotinus and of Proclus. Rather than call God Being, he prefers to call him the One. God contains all within himself in a pure unity innocent of all multiplicity, because he is not the sum total of multiplicity, but its source. The multiple cannot exist without the One, but the One can exist without the multiple. All that exists participates in the One; on the contrary, the One participates in nothing. Hence God is both perfect and self-sufficient. One in his incomprehensible Trinity, the One is the principle and the end of everything else, that from which everything flows and to which everything returns. Yet, like being, "one" cannot be properly affirmed of God unless it has first been denied of him. God is not a unity made up of three other

unities, which is the only kind of trinity we are able to imagine. He is no more One than he is Being. In short, God has no name. Because he is nothing of what does not exist and nothing of what does exist, no being can know him as he is. To know him as above all affirmation and all negation, that is, to know that he cannot be known, is the mystical ignorance in which the supreme degree of knowledge consists. Other ignorances can be dispelled by acquiring the lacking knowledge; this one, on the contrary, consists in an excess of knowledge to which one is raised by going beyond all possible cognition. So long as, in contemplating God, a man comprehends what he contemplates, what he is really contemplating is not God, but one of his creatures. Ignorance is necessarily the highest form of knowledge, in a case where knowledge strives to attain an object that lies beyond being.[53]

This view of a world emanating from God and flowing back to its source will become the common property of all the Christian theologians. The doctrine of Denis called for many precisions and corrections or, rather, for a reinterpretation in terms of a metaphysics of being; yet, such as it was, it has provided Christian thinkers with a general framework within which their interpretation of the world could easily take place. Moreover, the authority of Denis could not be lightly dismissed. Up to the time when Laurentius Valla and Erasmus will raise the first doubts on the subject, the author of the *Corpus Areopagiticum* will be unanimously accepted as a disciple of Saint Paul and perhaps a witness to some esoteric teaching of Christ belatedly revealed to the rank and file of the Christians. The works of Denis were several times translated into Latin during the middle ages and turned to account or commented by John Scotus Erigena, Hugh of Saint Victor, Thomas Gallus, Robert Grosseteste, Albert the Great, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, etc. Among his followers, some will embrace his Platonism with enthusiasm; others will strive to tone it down and to make it more acceptable to Latin minds; all will be indebted to him for some aspect of their own thought.

2. MAXIMUS OF CHRYSOPOLIS

Ever since the ninth century and throughout the whole late middle ages, the doctrine of Denis has remained inseparable from that of his commentator, Maximus of Chrysopolis,[55] commonly called Maximus the Confessor (580-662). In fact, the commentaries on Denis commonly attributed to Maximus partly belong to John of Scythopolis, whose annotations, written about 530/40, were blended with those of Maximus by Byzantine copyists. It has become practically impossible to distinguish between the respective contributions of John and of Maximus.[56] Let us then remember that, when we say Maximus Confessor, it would often be just as correct to say John of Scythopolis.

Full as he was of Denis's doctrine, his commentator has nevertheless presented it in his own way, and it is necessary to consider his interpretation in itself, because, on certain points, it has exercised its influence independently from that of Denis. God is not a being; rather he is beyond being and entity.[57] God is pure Monad, that is, not that numerical unity which engenders numbers by addition, but rather, the source from which the manifold springs forth without altering its absolute simplicity. Inasmuch as it begets multiplicity, the Monad initiates a movement. Owing to this movement of the Divinity (*kinesis théotètos*), its being and the nature of its being begin to appear to intellects capable of knowing such objects.

The first movement of the Monad gives rise to the Dyad by generation of the Word who is its total manifestation; then the Monad proceeds up to the Triad by the procession of the Holy Ghost. The first movement of the Monad stops there because its highest manifestation is now perfect: "For our cult does not appeal to a petty monarchy consisting of a single person" (like that of the Jews) "nor, on the other hand, to a monarchy confused and which loses itself in an infinity of gods" (like that of the pagans) "but indeed to the Trinity of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost who are naturally equal in dignity. Their riches is that very accord, that irradiation at once distinct and one, beyond which divinity does not diffuse. Thus, without introducing a nation of gods, we shall not conceive divinity as a poverty bordering on indigence." [58]

This first movement precedes a second one, by which God manifests himself outside himself, in beings that are not God. The Word, who is a perfect knowledge of the Monad, contains eternally within himself the very entity (*ousia*) of all that exists or is ever to exist. Each of these future beings is eternally known, willed, decreed in him, to receive existence in due time. God does not make a special decree each time a new being appears. All is eternally contained in the infinite foreknowledge, will and power of God. As objects of the prescience of God, these cognitions are called Ideas. Each Idea is a partial and limited expression of God's perfection. And not only its expression, but its manifestation. The eternal manifestation of God by the production of beings after the pattern of their Ideas is called creation. By an effusion of pure goodness, the divine Triad radiates those expressions of itself called creatures. The whole of creatures makes up a sort of hierarchy where each of them occupies a place determined by its proper degree of perfection. Some of them are as permanent as the world itself; others pass away and are replaced by those which come to take their places at the moment fixed for them by the wisdom of God.[59]

Among creatures, many have no other destiny than to imitate God according to their essences. These can be only what they are, but others are capable of determining to a certain extent what they will become, and, consequently, their own place in the hierarchy of beings. Such creatures

are capable, through the decision of their free will, of increasing or decreasing their likeness to God. According to the good or bad use which they make of their knowledge and of their will, they embark upon the road of virtue or of vice, of good or of evil, of reward or of punishment. In fact, any voluntary increase in divine resemblance is accompanied by an enjoyment of God which is its own reward; any voluntary non-participation entails, on the contrary, an exclusion from this enjoyment, and this is their punishment.

Man is one of these beings. He is made of a body which, because it is material, is divisible and perishable; and of a soul which, because it is immaterial, is indivisible and immortal. Since the body cannot exist without the soul, it cannot have existed before it. Conversely, the soul cannot have existed before its body. Those who concede the pre-existence of souls to Origen are led to the error of believing that God only created the body as a prison where the souls of sinners suffer punishment for their crimes. The eternal will of God cannot have been determined by the future behavior of mere creatures. Through his pure goodness, and for the good of man, God has willed the body as well as the soul. It is therefore only reasonable to admit that soul and body come into being simultaneously in virtue of an eternal divine decree.

Originally created on the border line between pure spirits and pure bodies, man was intended to be their connecting link. He was in touch with both the multiplicity of matter by his body and with the unity of God by his mind. His own function was therefore to gather up the multiple into the unity of his intellectual knowledge, and thus to re-unite it with God. In point of fact, man did just the contrary; instead of re-uniting the multiple by bringing things back to God, he lessened unity by turning away from the knowledge of God toward the knowledge of things. Now, for any being, to be one and to be are one and the same thing. By thus turning away from unity, man nearly relapsed into non-being. In order to save man from impending destruction, That whose nature is entirely immobile, or, in other words, That which moves only immovably within itself, began to move, so to speak, toward fallen nature in order to create it anew. The Word was made flesh to rescue man from perdition. God restored human nature to unity by bringing together the natures of body and soul in the person of Christ. For indeed Christ took on the whole nature of man, except sin, in order to free him from sin. Moreover, by being born of a non-carnal act of generation, Christ revealed that another way of multiplying mankind was possible and that the division of the sexes had only been made necessary because man had lowered himself to the level of dumb beasts by misusing his liberty.

This union of human nature and of divine nature is the very redemption of man. The end of our restlessness is to rejoin the immutability of God. Now, for a mind, to move is to know. To move toward God then is to

strive to be assimilated to him by knowing him. But God is the good and one cannot know the good without loving it. In knowing God man begins to love him. Placed outside of himself in the object of his love man undergoes a sort of ecstasy; he rushes headlong with an increased velocity, nor will he stop until he is completely absorbed within his Beloved and, so to say, embraced by him on all sides. Free from fear as well as from desire man then wishes for nothing more than this very saving envelopment and the awareness of being thus embraced in God who embraces him. Man then is like unto iron liquefied by fire, or like air wholly illumined by the presence of light. Blessed ecstasy where human nature shares in the divine resemblance to the point of becoming that very resemblance so that, without ceasing to be itself, it passes into God. When this happens, man no longer lives; rather, Christ lives in man.

In thus moving toward God by knowledge and love, man is simply returning to his own Idea in God. Even while he himself is wandering away from God, his Idea remains there. Every man is a part of God (*moira théou*) to the extent that, by his Idea, his essence is eternally pre-existent in God. Ecstasy is an earnest of life to come when the divinization (*theosis*) of the universe will be achieved by the returning of all things to the eternal Ideas, essences, natures and causes from which they now are separated. Maximus foresees a time when the universe will be brought back to God by the returning of man to his Principle. For man is the center of creation, and since, by his defection, the other beings were exiled from their principle, his return to God will bring about the return of the whole world. The division of human beings into two distinct sexes will be the first to go; next, the inhabited earth will be metamorphosed by uniting with earthly paradise; the earth will then be like unto heaven because men will become like unto angels; finally, the difference between sensible and intelligible beings will be abolished. Having been the first ones to appear, intelligible beings will be the last ones to disappear, but they finally must vanish, in this sense at least that they will not eternally remain in their present state of separation. Ultimately, all things shall be reunited with their eternal essences, or Ideas. God will then be All in All, to everything, and forever.[60]

This synthesis of what Christian thought could retain of Origen's teaching will become the very framework of the doctrine of John Scotus Erigena. A world that is but the self-revelation of God; whose creation is but the act whereby God declares, as it were, the intelligible essences in which his Word is so rich; where these essences, or intelligible entities, fall away from their origin by an error of man's judgment and, owing to the incarnation of Christ, are brought back to their origin through man's knowledge and love—these were vast perspectives. In point of fact, after being purified of their excessive neoplatonism and translated into a metaphysics of being more suitable to the Christian notion of God, these views will dominate the Sums of theology and the Commentaries on the Sentences during the whole age of scholastic theology. The general plan of the scholastic theologies will always remain: God, the divine names, the creation of the world, the fall, the restoration of creation by the incarnation of the divine Word and the final return of creation to its creator. The long and slow maturation of Christian philosophical thought will take place, during centuries within the general framework set up by Denis, John of Scythopolis and Saint Maximus Confessor, while the development of speculative mysticism will draw its inspiration either from its doctrine of ecstatic love (Bernard of Clairvaux) or from its invitation to intellectual contemplation (Albert the Great). Both tendencies will unite in the mystical theology of Thomas Aquinas.

3. JOHANNES PHILOPONUS

The obvious influence of neoplatonism on Christian speculation should not make us forget the no less manifest resistance of Christian thinkers to the doctrines of the eternity of matter or of the transmigration of souls. Two Syrian teachers, Aeneas of Gaza[61] and Zacharius Rhetor,[62] bear witness to the survival of this controversy during the sixth century. Johannes Philoponus, who belongs to the same period,[63] is a more important representative of this permanent dialogue between Christianity and Platonism, but the very versatility of his mind makes it difficult to encompass his thought within anything like a definition.

As a theologian, Philoponus is known to have taught that there are in God three "partial essences," plus an essence common to the three divine persons. The treatise in which he maintained this "tritheistic" position, *The Arbiter,* is now lost. In another lost treatise *On the Resurrection,* Philoponus upheld the view that resurrected bodies will not be identical with our present bodies. We still have his commentary *On the Creation of the World,* in which he begins by forcefully stating that the biblical account of creation is neither a scientific nor a philosophical explanation of the origin of things, but an invitation to seek after God and to live in conformity with his laws. In his treatise *Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World,* which has also been preserved, Philoponus continues the classical controversy between Christians and neoplatonists on the precise meaning of the notion of creation.[64] His commentaries on Aristotle, especially that on the Third Book of *On the Soul,* are the only part of his work which has exercised a deep and lasting influence upon mediaeval thought.

Himself a Christian, Philoponus could not write commentaries on Aristotle without stumbling upon many difficulties. In point of fact, he sometimes found himself at grips with the very same problems which Saint Thomas was to solve later on in refuting Averroes. The controversy between Philoponus and Simplicius foreshadows that of Thomas with

Averroes in the thirteenth century and even that of Brentano with Zeller in the nineteenth century. Absolutely speaking, it has not yet come to an end.

According to Philoponus, all the interpreters of Aristotle agree in admitting that every man has a possible intellect of his own, but they differ on the agent intellect. Some say that the agent intellect is universal, since it is God. The reason they give is that since it is sometimes in potency the being of the human intellect cannot be that of an act; hence the only intellect that can be essentially act is God. This doctrine of God as universal agent intellect will be taken up and blended with the doctrine of Augustine on divine illumination by several theologians of the thirteenth century. Yet, Philoponus adds, others say that the agent intellect is not God, but a being both inferior to God and superior to man (*demiourgos*), which illumines our souls and confers upon them a light proportionate to their nature; still others, on the contrary, place within the soul itself the principle of intellectual knowledge. Consequently, the latter posit two intellects in every soul: the one, which is the "possible intellect," belongs to each soul in virtue of its own nature and is always present in it; while the other one, the "agent" intellect, acts intermittently every time it illumines the possible intellect. Philoponus notes that the supporters of this thesis quote Plato as an authority in its favor, but without valid reason. The fourth interpretation of Aristotle is the true one: every man possesses his own intellect, and it is the same intellect that is now in potency, then in act.[65] Was this interpretation of Aristotle correct? This is a debatable question. Aristotle's own text is obscure on this point and his interpreters have understood it in many different ways. At any rate, Philoponus has interpreted it in a way which permitted its reconciliation with the teaching of Christianity concerning man. Unless every human soul has its own intellect, personal immortality is impossible. In Philoponus' own words, this interpretation makes it possible to uphold the immortality of the rational soul at least, even though all the other parts of the soul were mortal. The Christian Philoponus was thus breaking away from the doctrine of Alexander of Aphrodisias on the oneness of the agent intellect common to all human souls, just as, in the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas was to break away from Averroes, and for practically the same reasons.

In kinetics, Philoponus gives proof of the same freedom of mind. In his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* (*ca.* 517), he turns against the doctrine according to which the shock communicated to air by someone throwing a missile, accompanies it and thus keeps it going. Against this explanation of the continuation of motion, which will be maintained by most mediaeval philosophers on the authority of Aristotle, Philoponus upholds that when we hurl a ball, we impart to it a certain moving force, or "kinetic energy," which continues to propel it after it has left the hand.

reaches completion in a third argument which proves, contrary to Epicurus, that the order and distribution of things cannot be the result of chance. This God whose existence is thus proven is unknowable to us: "It is evident that God exists; but what he is, as far as his being and his nature are concerned, we are entirely unable to grasp or to know (*akatalèpton touto pantélôs kai agnôston*)." We know that God is incorporeal. He is not even made of that incorporeal matter which Greek scientists call the "fifth essence" (quintessence). Similarly, God is non-begotten, immutable, incorruptible and so on; but with such words we tell what God is not, not what he is. All we can understand about him is that he is infinite and consequently incomprehensible. As to the positive names we give him, neither do they tell what he is nor describe his nature, but only what is predicable of his nature. We say that the Incomprehensible and Unknowable, which is God, is one, good, just, wise and so forth; but the enumeration of these attributes does not enable us to know the nature or the essence of the one to whom we attribute them. In fact, like the Good of Plato, the God of John Damascene is beyond knowledge because he is beyond entity. John Damascene interprets in this sense even the name God is given in the oft-quoted text of *Exodus* (3, 14): "I Am Who Am (*ho ôn*)." Properly understood, this name designates his very incomprehensibility, since it signifies that God "possesses and gathers within himself the totality of being, like some infinite and boundless ocean of entity (*ousias*)" (I, 9). This formula, borrowed by John Damascene from Gregory Nazianzenus, was frequently to be taken up and commented upon during the middle ages, in particular by Saint Thomas Aquinas.[70] In its comprehensive plan which includes the study of the angels, the visible heavens, the stars, the elements, the earth and man,[71] the *De fide orthodoxa* already presents itself as a work distinctly scholastic in aspect, whose very technicality was to interest the theologians of the thirteenth century and to serve as a model for their *Commentaries on the Sentences* or their *Sums of Theology*. Not only was its plan to be their inspiration, but it was to be exploited as a ready mine of notions and definitions, many of which could be immediately taken up by theologians familiar with Aristotle. Chapters XXII-XXVIII of Book II, on will, on the difference between the voluntary and the non-voluntary, on free will considered in its nature and its cause,[72] have handed down to the middle ages a great many notions, most of them Aristotelian in origin, but probably collected by John Damascene from the works of Gregory of Nyssa or Nemesius. Although he does not rank as an outstanding thinker, John Damascene has been a useful transmitter of ideas. One must certainly acknowledge him to be one of the most important intermediaries between the culture of the Greek Fathers and the Latin culture of Western theologians in the middle ages, including the greatest among them, such as Saint Bonaventure and Saint Thomas Aquinas.

5. THE PLATONISM OF THE FATHERS

The general impression left by Greek patristics is that its dominating philosophical inspiration was Plato's and the neoplatonists'. This was assuredly not the only one. On the contrary, we have seen some early Fathers accepting a materialistic conception of the soul, and hesitating to admit its survival between the death of the body and its resurrection. Elements of Aristotelian or Stoic origin have sometimes been welcomed by Christian writers of Greek culture. Yet, historians have often spoken of the "Platonism of the Fathers," as if their theologies were simple adaptations of neoplatonism. The problem goes beyond the bounds of Greek patristics, as it arises with regard to Saint Augustine as well, but all the data are contained in the work of the Greek Fathers and the answer is the same in both cases.[73]

It is important first of all to be forewarned against an almost inevitable error of perspective. The very attempt to discern the philosophical elements which theologians have used in their work throws these elements into an exaggerated relief with respect to the very theologies from which they are taken. For the Fathers of the Church, neither the truth of the faith, nor the dogma defining it, depended in any way on philosophy. In their mind, faith was the essential. The formula "The Platonism of the Fathers" would lead to an absurd interpretation if it were meant to say that the Fathers were Platonists. They were essentially Christians, that is to say, teachers of a doctrine of salvation by faith in Jesus Christ, and not at all the disciples of a philosopher who conceived salvation as a natural reward for the philosophical exercise of reason.

If the formula is legitimate, it is in another sense. In point of fact, the Fathers of the Church openly adopted a definite position toward some Greek philosophies, and they judged them according as they could help them to achieve a rational interpretation of Christian faith. Now it seems difficult to deny that Plato offered himself as an ally of Christianity on several important points: the doctrine of a maker of the universe; of a provident God; of the existence of an intelligible and divine world of which the sensible world is only an image; of the spirituality of the soul and its superiority over the body; of the illumination of the soul by God; of its enslavement to the body and of the necessity for it to liberate itself; last, not the least, the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and of a life beyond the grave where it will receive the reward or punishment for its acts. The list of these Christian-Platonic affinities could be lengthened, especially in the domain of theology properly so-called. The Fathers have discovered in Plato and in some neoplatonists, a more or less vague presentiment of the Christian Trinity, the Demiurge announcing the Father, the *Nous* corresponding to the Word, and the World Soul to the

Holy Ghost. Besides, the whole doctrine of Plato was animated with such a love of truth and of those divine realities which every true philosopher strives to attain that one could hardly imagine a philosophy that would come nearer being a religion without actually being one. The Greek Fathers have felt this, and this alone would explain their predilection for a doctrine which, while it was not their own, appeared to them as the most easily assimilable by Christian thought. In the course of this task of assimilation errors were the more to be expected as Christian dogma itself was then in the process of being formulated; the fact remains, however, that most of these acquisitions have been immediately definitive, and that even where it was calling for rectifications, Platonism has been a wholesome challenge for Christian speculation to seek a philosophical formulation of its own truth.

Through Ammonius Saccas and Plotinus, this influence of Plato has reached the Latins as well as the Greeks. The striking difference which obtains between the respective styles of thought of Greek theology and of Latin theology must therefore have another cause, and, as we seem to see it, this cause is a theological rather than a philosophical one. What dominates the theology of Augustine, and that of almost all the Latins after him, is the relation of nature to grace. Hence, in the Latin world, the interminable controversies on the relation of grace and free will. It goes without saying that the same problems arise in the Christian theology of the Greeks, but their data are not identically the same. The central notion in Greek theology is rather that of "image" than of nature. As is said in Scripture (Genesis, i, 27), God has created man "in his own image"; the effect of sin has been the loss of this likeness or, at least, its blurring, and the main problem which Christians have to solve is how to recover this divine likeness by restoring it to its pristine purity. This is what the Greeks call "divinization." For this reason, the notion of image plays, in Greek theologies, a part analogous to that performed by the notion of grace in Latin theologies. In comparing them, the main difficulty arises from the fact that, when a Greek speaks of man as of a being created in the image and likeness of God, it is not easy to know if, for man, to be "image" is his nature or if it is a grace added to it. When Pelagius somewhat clumsily identified nature with grace, he fell the first victim to the risky undertaking of directly translating the language of Greek theology into that of Latin theology. Centuries were to elapse before the time when, owing to the efforts of Saint Bernard of Clairvaux and of William of Saint-Thierry, this difficult task would be successfully completed in the field of mystical theology. As to the field of metaphysics proper, the subtle and somewhat laborious commentaries of Thomas Aquinas on *The Divine Names,* as well as on the *Liber de Causis,* make it abundantly clear that it is not easy to speak, at one and the same time, the language of the One and the language of Being.

ing to the objects to be known, practical philosophy is divided according to the acts to be accomplished. It is made up of three parts: one which teaches how to conduct oneself by the acquisition of virtues; one which consists in having those same virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance hold sway in the state; and finally, one which presides over the administration of domestic society. Three other disciplines make up the *trivium:* grammar, rhetoric and logic. These are concerned less with the acquisition of knowledge than with its method of exposition.[83]

A difficulty arises, however, with regard to logic; is it an art, or is it a science? In other words, is it an instrument at the service of philosophy, or is it part of philosophy itself? Boethius is of the opinion that the two theses can be reconciled. As the art of distinguishing the true from what is false or only probable, logic has its own object and can therefore be considered as one of the parts of philosophy; but since logic is useful to all the other parts of philosophy, it can be said to be their instrument. Logic is like the hand, which is, at one and the same time, both a part of the body and an aid to the whole body.[84]

The logic of Boethius is a commentary on Aristotle's in which the desire to interpret it according to Plato's philosophy frequently shows through. This is explained by the fact that Boethius closely follows a commentary by Porphyry and, in turn, it explains the swarm of contrary opinions which were to arise in the twelfth century on the meaning of Aristotle's doctrine. For all professors will comment on the text of Boethius, but while some of them will retain what he had kept of Aristotle, others, on the contrary, will cling to anything of Plato's which Boethius had introduced into it. In this respect the crucial problem is that of the nature of general ideas, or "universals." Mediaeval philosophy has long been spoken of as though it had dealt almost entirely with the problem of universals. In fact, the problem of universals is a battlefield where the adversaries join battle only when provided with all their armament. Conflicting metaphysics have tested their strength in attempting to solve it, but they did not spring from the solutions they proposed for it.

A passage from Porphyry's *Isagoge* (Introduction to Aristotle's *Categories*) is rightly considered to be the point of departure of the controversy. After having announced that he will deal with genera and species, Porphyry adds that he is postponing until later his decision as to whether genera and species are subsistent realities in themselves or simple conceptions of the mind; furthermore, supposing they are realities, he declines for the moment to say whether they are corporeal or incorporeal; finally, supposing they are incorporeal, he declines to investigate whether they exist apart from sensible things or only as united with them. As a good professor, Porphyry simply avoids raising problems of advanced metaphysics at the beginning of a treatise in logic written for beginners. Nevertheless, the very questions which he declines to discuss will remain, for

the men of the middle ages, as a standing challenge to choose between Plato and Aristotle without having at their disposition either Plato or Aristotle, at least up to the middle of the thirteenth century. Boethius was the first one not to imitate Porphyry's discretion and, in his desire to conciliate Plato and Aristotle, he has proposed two solutions.

In his two commentaries on the Introduction to Aristotle's *Categories,* Aristotle's answer naturally prevails. Boethius first demonstrates that general concepts cannot be substances. As an example, suppose we take the concept of the genus "animal" and that of the species "man." Genera and species are, by definition, common to groups of individuals; now, that which is common to several individuals cannot itself be an individual. It is impossible because the genus belongs entirely to the species (a man possesses animality completely), whereas if it itself were a being, the genus should be divided between its various specific participations. But let us suppose, on the contrary, that the genera and species represented by our general ideas (universals) are only simple notions of the mind; in other words, let us suppose that absolutely nothing corresponds in reality to the concepts we have of them; in this second hypothesis our thought thinks nothing in thinking them. Now, if every thought worthy of the name has an object, universals must be thoughts of something, so that the problem of their nature arises once more, and in the same terms.

Faced with this dilemma Boethius rallies to a solution he borrows from Alexander of Aphrodisias. The senses turn things over to us in a state of confusion or, at least, of composition; our mind (*animus*), which is able to dissociate and recompose this data, distinguishes between elements given to it in a mixed state and considers them separately. Genera and species are of this number. Either the mind finds them in incorporeal beings, where they are separated from matter and already distinct; or it finds them in corporeal beings, in which case it extracts from the body whatever the body contains that is incorporeal in order to consider it separately as a naked and pure form. That is what we do when, in sense experience, we draw abstract notions of man and animal from given concrete individuals. Perhaps someone will object that this is another case of thinking what is not; but the objection would be superficial, for there is no error in separating in thought what is united in reality, provided one knows that what one thus separates in thought is united in reality. For instance, there is nothing wrong in conceiving line separate from surface. The mistake would be in thinking of things as joined which are not joined in reality; the chest of a man and the hindquarters of a horse, for example. Nothing forbids us to think of genera and species separately then, although they do not exist separately. And such is the solution of the problem of universals; *subsistunt ergo circa sensibilia, intelliguntur autem praeter corpora:* "they subsist in connection with sensible things, but we know them separate from bodies."

Boethius therefore did more for the middle ages than to posit the problem of universals. He solved it, and the solution he proposed was indeed that of Aristotle, but he did not propose it as its own: "Plato," he added, "thinks that genera, species and other universals are not only known separately from bodies, but also that they exist and subsist outside them; while Aristotle thinks that incorporeals and universals are really objects of knowledge, but that they exist only in sensible things. I had no intention of deciding which of these opinions is true, for that rests with a higher philosophy. I clung to Aristotle's opinion, therefore, not because I favored it particularly, but because this book (i.e. Porphyry's *Isagoge*) happened to be written in view of the *Categories*, whose author is Aristotle." [85]

Examining Boethius a little more closely one could easily see that the question was indeed not completely settled in his mind. The whole Aristotelian theory of the agent intellect, which gives its full meaning to the notion of abstraction because it explains why one can think separately of that which does not exist separately, is absent from the text of Boethius. He simply tells us that the mind abstracts the intelligible from the sensible without giving us any information on the nature and condition of that mysterious operation. Besides, even if they subsist only in individuals, these universals must needs be something! It is no wonder then, that in Book V of the *De consolatione philosophiae*, where he expresses his own views, Boethius propounds a rather different doctrine. Any being whatsoever, for example a man, is known in various ways according as he is known by the senses, by imagination, by reason, or by intellection. The senses see only a figure in a matter; the imagination pictures the figure alone, without the matter; the reason transcends the figure and grasps in one general view the form of the species present in all the individuals; but the eye of intelligence sees still higher, for, clearing the wall of the universe, it contemplates that form, simple in itself, with a pure glance of the mind.[86]

These formulas, which are to unite in the *De Anima* of Gundissalinus with Platonic notions coming from other sources, bear witness to the fact that, for Boethius, the reality which corresponds to universals is that of the Idea. For him, as for Augustine, sensation is not a passion suffered by the soul in consequence of some action on some part of the body, but it is indeed the very act by which the soul judges the passions suffered by its body. Sense impressions invite us simply to turn to Ideas. Acquainted as we are with history, we cannot fail to see the fundamental Platonism of Boethius, but some of his mediaeval readers have hesitated over the true meaning of his thought. They have imagined him hesitating between Plato and Aristotle, listening first to the one and then to the other, without ever reaching a decision.

B. *Problems in psychology and theology*

In fact, the real Boethius of history did not waver. For him the most lofty knowledge was the science, not even of the intelligible, object of reason, but of the "intellectible," object of pure intellectual intuition. Now, to him, the "intellectible" *par excellence* was God. We have an innate knowledge of God which represents him to us as the Sovereign Good, that is to say, according to the same definition that Saint Anselm was to exploit, a being than which no better can be conceived. In order to establish the existence of this being Boethius relies upon the principle that the imperfect can only be a diminution of the perfect; the existence of the imperfect in any order whatsoever therefore presupposes the existence of the perfect. Now the existence of imperfect beings is obvious; the existence of a perfect being, that is, of a Good, the source and principle of all other goods, cannot be doubted. We could, if need be, dispense with proving that this perfect being is God, since the perfect is better than anything we can conceive. But let us ponder this fact: to admit that God is not the perfect would be to admit a perfect being prior to God and, consequently, his principle. Now God is the principle of all things; he it is, therefore, who is the perfect. Short of admitting an absurd regression to infinity then, a perfect and supreme being, who is God, must exist. Saint Anselm was later on to follow a similar line of thought in his *Monologion*.

Being perfect, God is beatitude. In a formula which became classic, Boethius defined beatitude: "a condition made perfect by the union of all that is good." God is therefore blessed, or rather he is beatitude itself; hence the corollary that men can become blessed only by participating in God and by becoming themselves gods, so to speak. "So to speak," for the beatitude of man will never be in him more than a participation in the beatitude of God.

Being the primary cause of the universe, as the order of things suffices to show, this God escapes the determinations of our thought. Being perfect, God is absolutely One. The Father is God; the Son, God; the Holy Spirit, God. The reason for their unity, Boethius says, is their non-difference (*indifferentia*), a formula William of Champeaux was later to use to explain how a universal notion can be both one and yet common to several individuals at one and the same time. Since God is perfectly one, Boethius adds, he evades all the categories. What one can say of him applies much less to God himself than to the manner in which he administers the world. For instance, we describe him as the immobile mover of things, or as exercising his providence over everything, and so on for all the divine attributes. When man has said all he can about God, he has not yet attained what God is.[87]

All these theological doctrines are stated in the *De consolatione philoso-*

phiae without the support of the Scriptures, which is not surprising after all, since it is Philosophy speaking. Let us however note the case, apparently unique, in Book III, prose 12, where Boethius says of the Sovereign Good that it "reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly." This is undeniably the citation of a well-known text from Wisdom (8, 1) which Saint Augustine had indefatigably quoted. If one takes into account the fact that in the Preamble to the *De Trinitate*,[88] Boethius openly quotes Saint Augustine as his authority, one hardly risks being mistaken in saying that where the doctrine of the *De consolatione philosophiae* coincides with that of Augustine, the coincidence is not fortuitous. Even when he is speaking only as a philosopher Boethius thinks as a Christian.

After the intellectible, which is God, comes the intelligible, which is the soul. Only two texts of Boethius deal with the origin of the soul, but these two confirm one another and what they say is rather curious. The first is found in Boethius' commentary on Porphyry, where he speaks of the state and condition of human souls who, after having all been with the first intellectible substances (*i.e.* the angels), have, however, degenerated at contact with the body, from intellectibles into intelligibles. As a consequence, souls are no longer fitting objects for intellectual intuition, nor are they capable of exercising it. All they can do is to recapture happiness, for a fleeting moment, each time they apply themselves to the intelligibles. If souls have all been with the angels, they must have been preexistent to the body. The second text outlines the same position and links it with the same doctrine of the pre-existence of souls.[89]

We have described the hierarchy of cognitive activities with regard to universals. Boethius did not deal with this point to any extent, but he developed his own views on the will at some length. The very subject of the *De consolatione philosophiae* invited him to do so. Threatened with death, he could only find consolation in the thought of a divine providence, whose will one had to submit to if one wished to be happy whatever the adversities of fortune might be. Natural beings tend naturally toward their natural places, where their integrity will be preserved; man can and should do likewise, but he does so by means of his will. Will is the synonym for liberty. Will is free only because man is endowed with a reason capable of knowing and choosing. The better a man uses his reason, the freer he is. God and the superior intellectible substances enjoy a knowledge so perfect that their judgment is infallible; their liberty is therefore perfect. As to man, his soul is all the freer as it patterns itself on divine thought; it is less free when it turns away from God to the knowledge of sensible things, and still less so when it allows itself to be governed by the passions of the body it animates. To will what the body desires is the extreme degree of servitude; to will what God wills, love what he loves, is the highest form of liberty; it is therefore happiness.

The objection will perhaps be raised that the problem is still untouched; if God's foreknowledge is infallible, either our will cannot decide other than he has foreseen, and it will not be free, or else it can, and the infallibility of providence will prove at fault. This is the classic problem of "future contingents." A simple question of logic in Aristotle, who did not ascribe to God the foreknowledge of human acts, it raised for the Christians this most difficult metaphysical and theological problem: how is one to reconcile human liberty with the prevision of our acts by God? Boethius' answer consists in dissociating the two problems of prevision and liberty. God infallibly foresees free acts, but he foresees them as free; the fact that these acts are foreseen does not make them become necessary. Furthermore, God is eternal and eternity is the complete possession, perfect and simultaneous, of a life without end (*aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio*); God lives, then, in a perpetual present. It is not so with the world, for it endures in time, and even if one were to admit, with Aristotle, that it had always existed, one would have to call it *perpetual* (perpetually changing), but not *eternal* (immobility of a complete presence). There is, then, before-ness and after-ness in events, but not in the totally-present knowledge that God has of them. He does not *foresee,* he *provides;* his name is not "foresight" but "providence." He therefore eternally sees the necessary as necessary and the free as free. When I see that the sun is rising, the fact that I see it is not the cause of its rising. When I see that a man walks, that does not force him to walk. In like manner the immobile and permanent view that God has of our voluntary acts does not in the least detract from their liberty.

Sparing as he is of precise details concerning the origin of the soul, Boethius is even less prodigal with those concerning its end. He emphasizes the sanctions immanent in moral life itself; the good become godlike from the fact that they are good, it is their reward; the wicked grow beastlike from the fact of their wickedness, it is their punishment. Interpreting in the moral sense the mythology of Plato's *Phaedrus,* Boethius teaches that, through living as he does, the miser becomes a wolf because of his rapacity, the crafty person becomes a fox, the lazy one is changed into a donkey and the libertine into a pig. Boethius has not the slightest doubt that there is a purgatory after death for guilty souls and torture for criminals, but it is not his intention to hold forth on the subject.[90]

C. *Problems in the philosophy of nature*

After psychology comes physiology, or the philosophy of nature. The one Boethius proposed in the beautiful poem of the *De consolatione philosophiae,* Book III, metr. 9, is nothing but a résumé in twenty-eight verses of the *Timaeus* annotated by Chalcidius. Prompted by the generosity inherent in the good, God adorns chaotic matter with forms after the pat-

tern of Ideas; the doctrines of numbers, elements, of the world-soul and the liberation of the soul by contemplation are briefly but clearly sketched. This cosmological scenario has nothing original about it, but Boethius has gone more deeply into two of its points: the relation of providence to destiny and the metaphysical structure of beings.

Following the example of Chalcidius, Boethius subordinates what he calls destiny to providence. Considered in the directing thought of God, the order of things is providence; considered as the inner law, which regulates the course of things from within, it is destiny. These are two distinct realities, for providence is God and subsists eternally in his perfect immobility, while destiny, which is the law of the succession of actual things, unrolls with them in time. Destiny, the realization in time of the eternal decrees of providence, does not oppose providence, it only serves it. But neither does it detract from human liberty. In a series of concentric circles in movement, the center remains immobile; the more man turns from God and away from his center, the more he is swept along by destiny; but the closer he draws to God, the more immobile and free he is. Whoever remained firmly fixed in the contemplation of the supreme Intellectible would therefore be both perfectly immobile and perfectly free. There is, in all this, a curious escape from Stoicism by means of a sort of Christian Platonism.

The second problem closely studied by Boethius is perhaps the one in which his thought was to become most influential. He identifies, as do Plato and Augustine, being with good, and non-being with evil. For everything that is, then, to be and to be good are one and the same thing. But if things are good *substantially,* in what do they differ from good in itself, which is God?

Boethius' answer is contained in a formula so dense that it was to provoke numerous commentaries: *diversum est esse et id quod est.* What does that mean? Every individual being is a collection of accidents unique and irreducible to any other. Such a collection of determinations linked together (dimension, sensible qualities, figure, etc.) is that very thing which is (*id quod est*). "That which is" is therefore the result of the collection of the parts which make it up: it is all these parts collectively, but it is none of them taken separately. For instance, since man is made up of a soul and a body, he is body and soul at the same time, but he is neither a body nor a soul. And so, no single part of man is what man is (*in parte igitur non est id quod est*). That is the case with every compound being, since it is the collection of its parts, but is no one of them alone. In a simple substance such as God, the case is quite different; we might say that, by reason of his perfect simplicity, his being and what he is are one and the same thing.

It remains to be seen what that being (*esse*) of compound substance is, which is different from "that which is" in it. Since being in this case de-

but he left *Elements of Music* (*De institutione musica*), *Elements of Arithmetic* (*De institutione arithmetica*) and a *Geometry* (*De geometrica*) which is a summary of Euclid. These school text-books were to represent for a long time about all that the middle ages knew on those subjects. The influence of Boethius was manifold and profound. His scientific treatises nourished the teaching of the *quadrivium;* his works on logic took the place of Aristotle's during several centuries; his theological tractates set the example, which was to obsess certain fine minds in the middle ages, of a scientific theology, systematically deduced from previously-defined terms.[92] His *De Trinitate* will dominate the theology of the twelfth-century schools of Chartres. As to the *De consolatione philosophiae,* we find it present and active in all epochs. Annotated for the first time by the Anonymous of Saint Gall, then by Remi of Auxerre and Bovo of Corvey, it was later to be commented on by William of Conches, Nicholas Trivet, Peter d'Ailly (about 1372), to mention only a few names, and Badius Ascensius was to do it again toward the end of the fifteenth century. Its literary composition, alternating between prose and verse, made no slight contribution to the success of the "chantefable." King Alfred translated it into English, Notker Labeo into German, and John of Meun into French; it was to enter into the composition of the *Roman de la Rose,* and was put to good use by Chaucer. Finally, as supreme homage to the Sacred Science, the last days of the middle ages were to give as a counterpart to the *Philosophical Consolation,* which presided over its origin, the *Theological Consolation* of John Gerson. To be sure, the importance of the philosophical element is overwhelming in the writings of Boethius, even in his theological tractates, but this is precisely the reason why he is rightly considered as one of the founders of scholasticism. His whole doctrine is an example of putting to work a precept which he himself has formulated; "Conjoin faith and reason, if you can." There again Boethius could have quoted Saint Augustine.

4. FROM CASSIODORUS TO GREGORY THE GREAT

The treatise of Cassiodorus[93] *On the Soul* belongs to a sort of literary genre. Theologians will write treatises *De anima* just as, later on, they will write treatises *De intellectu.* The work of Cassiodorus betrays the influence of both Augustine (*De quantitate animae, De origine animae*) and of his more immediate predecessor Claudianus Mamertus (*De statu animae*). Like Augustine and Claudianus, Cassiodorus affirms the spirituality of the soul. A finite substance, since it is mutable and created, the soul is wholly present in the entire body, yet it is non-material since it is capable of knowing, and it is immortal, since it is spiritual and simple.[94] This treatise was to be quoted frequently and still more frequently plagiarised in the process of time. As to the *Institutiones,* their Book II was

PART FOUR

FROM SCOTUS ERIGENA TO SAINT BERNARD

The origin of the ninth-century philosophical movement is the effort of Charlemagne to improve the intellectual and moral state of the nations he governed. Hence the name of "Carolingian Renaissance" which it has sometimes been given. In point of fact, this intellectual movement was the continuation, in France, of the missionary work initiated in Great Britain by Augustine of Canterbury (?-604) and which had found its most perfect expression in the writings of the Venerable Bede (673-735). This Anglo-Saxon culture of Latin origin has been the starting point of the restoration of Humanities in continental Europe. Among the many scholars whom Charlemagne invited to share in this important work, one of the British masters of the cathedral school of York played an outstanding part. His name was Alcuin (730-804). About 580, Gregory of Tours had written in the preface to his *History of the Franks:* "The cities of Gaul have allowed the study of humanities to decline, or rather to die out . . . One could not find anyone who, as a grammarian versed in dialectics, could recount events, either in prose or in verse. Most of them lamented this and said: Woe to our times, for the study of Letters has perished in us!" After the death of Alcuin, the situation was entirely different. His personal ambition had been, in his own words, "to build up in France a new Athens," or, more exactly, a Christian one. It is worth noting that, at the very beginning of the *Chronicle of Saint Gall,* the monk Notker could write (about 885): "Alcuin's teaching was so fruitful that the modern Gauls, or Frenchmen, became the equals of the Ancients of Rome and Athens." [1]

This statement, which was to reverberate through centuries, was a manifest exaggeration, but it was not a complete illusion. At any rate already during Alcuin's lifetime, a modest revival of philosophical interest can be observed. Fredegisus (d. 834), compatriot, disciple and successor of Alcuin as abbot of Saint Martin of Tours (804-834) has left us an *Epistola de nihilo et tenebris,* in which he maintains that nothingness and darkness are something, and not simply the absence of something. His argument rests upon the assumption that any word with a definite meaning signifies something; a man, a stone, a tree, for example; therefore, nothingness refers to something, that is, to some actually existing thing.[2] This gram-

CHAPTER I

JOHANNES SCOTUS ERIGENA

THE personality of John the Scot (Johannes Scotus Erigena) dominates his era, and his doctrine occupies so unique a place in the history of Western thought that it deserves our close attention.[5] It offered to the Latins the possibility, one might almost say the temptation, of entering once and for all the way initiated by the Greek theologians, Denis and Maximus the Confessor. Had this invitation been accepted, a neoplatonist philosophy would no doubt have prevailed in Western Europe up to the end of the middle ages. The fact that Erigena's example was not followed is, on the contrary, a sure sign that what we today call Europe was already groping its way toward a different type of metaphysical speculation.

I. FAITH AND REASON

Erigena's doctrine has received divergent interpretations. Görres, for instance, accuses him of having confused philosophy with religion, an error, which, however, he considers as suitable for a pantheist. On the contrary, B. Hauréau calls him "a very free thinker," thus awarding him the highest eulogy at his disposal.[6] The true meaning of Erigena's doctrine results from his conception of the relations which obtain between faith and reason.

Man has been in three successive states with regard to truth. Between original sin and the coming of Christ, reason was clouded by the consequences of error and, pending the complete revelation of truth by the Gospel, it could only construct a physics in order to understand nature and to prove the existence of God who is its cause. As early as that epoch, however, the Jewish revelation began its work, until it reached its height with Christ. From that moment forth, reason entered a second stage, in which it still is. Since it now receives truth from an infallible source, the wise thing for reason to do is to accept this truth as God reveals it in Holy Writ. Faith must now precede the exercise of reason. Yet, far from suppressing it, faith engenders in us a twofold effort, first, to make it pass into our acts so as to purify our moral life, next, to explore it rationally through the exercise of contemplative life. A third and last state will later on replace the present one. In the beatific vision, faith will disappear and be replaced by the direct sight of Truth. Just now, however, human reason is a reason taught by a divine revelation and this remains equally true whether the reason at stake be that of a philosopher or that of a theologian. From this point of view, philosophy is exactly in the same situation as religion.

This position is a simple application of the principle, admitted by all mediaeval theologians, that God alone is infallible. Let us not, therefore, imagine John the Scot as a rationalist in the modern sense of the word. True enough, since he considered philosophy as a meditation on the substance of faith, it can be said either that he never had any philosophy, since all that he says presupposes faith, or that he never had any theology since, according to him, to theologize and to philosophize in the proper way are one and the same thing. The very least that can be said on this point is that Erigena consistently refused to distinguish between these two orders of speculation. Yet we should also remember that most of the Fathers would have approved his saying that, after Christ, the righteous use of reason, in all matters pertaining to God and to man, presupposes the acceptance of divine revelation. When we read Erigena's famous statement: "It is therefore certain that true religion is true philosophy, and, conversely, that true philosophy is true religion," let us not forget that he is merely repeating Augustine.[11] On the whole, his own position is simple; it even is a traditional one, and the bluntness of some of his formulas is mainly responsible for the misrepresentation of his thought by several of his historians.[12]

2. NATURE AND ITS DIVISION

The method reason uses to achieve the understanding of what man believes is dialectics, whose two fundamental operations are *division* and *analysis*. Division starts from the unity of the highest genera and progressively distinguishes their less and less general species, until it arrives at individuals, which are the terms of division. Analysis follows the opposite course. Starting from individuals, and going back up the steps division came down, it gathers them up on its way and reinstates them into the unity of the supreme genera. These two operations are complementary moments of one and the same method. In fact, they may be considered as a single movement which, after descending from the unity of the highest genus to the multiplicity of individuals, reascends to the original unity from which they came.[13]

It is a typical feature of this doctrine that division and analysis are not simply abstract methods of decomposing or recomposing ideas, but the very laws of nature are those which have just been defined. The explanation of the universe has to follow the ways of division and analysis because these are constitutive of its structure. Erigena's doctrine is not a logic. It is a physics, or rather, as he himself says, a "physiology" (IV, 1; 741 C). To understand the book of Genesis is to know "nature" (III, 29; 705 B); science is found in a proper understanding of revelation.

What is nature? The Greeks often used its name (*phusis*) as synonymous with being (*ousia*). Yet, their exact meanings are not identical. Being

(*ousia*) designates the essence of that which, in any being, can neither become, nor be increased or decreased. Nature (*phusis*) properly signifies being inasmuch as it can be begotten in place and time (*Div. nat.*, V, 3; 867 A). Thus understood, nature extends to all that which is able either to be or even not to be. It divides itself into four main distinctions: first, nature which creates and is not created; secondly, nature which is created and creates; thirdly, nature which is created and does not create; fourthly, nature which does not create and is not created (I, 1; 441-442. II, 1; 526 A C. III, 23; 688 C-689 A). In reality, the four parts of this division are reducible to two. Since the second and third are created, while the first and fourth are uncreated, we are faced with only two main divisions: the Creator and the creature. And indeed, nature which creates and is not created is God considered as the principle of things, whereas nature which is not created and does not create is God considered as having ceased to create and entered in his rest. On the other hand, the second division corresponds to archetypal Ideas, which create things but themselves are created by God, and the third includes those very things which are created by Ideas but themselves create nothing. In short, God is posited as creator or origin in the first division, and as end in the fourth, creatures all being included between this principle and end (II, 2; 527 B. III, 1; 621 A. V, 39; 1019-1020).

Let us now consider the division of nature insofar as it includes what is not. In a doctrine which, directly or not, derives its inspiration from Plato's *Sophist,* the concepts of being and of non-being have only a relative value. All being is the non-being of what it is not; moreover, there are cases when what is said not to be is more real than what we usually call being. For indeed being can be reasonably defined: that which can be perceived by the senses or understood by the intellect. Consequently, whatever escapes the grasp of these two cognitive powers can rightly be called non-being. Applying this definition, Erigena distinguishes five types of non-being. First, that which escapes our senses and our understanding on account of its very perfection; for instance, God, or even the essences of things, which we know only through their accidents. Second, within the hierarchical order of beings, the affirmation of the inferior is the negation of the superior, and conversely, so that what a being is implies the non-being of what it is not. Third, potential being is the non-being of what it will be once it is actualized. Fourth, beings subject to generation and corruption are not, at least in comparison with the immutable Ideas, which are their models. Fifth, in the case of man one can say that he is insofar as he carries the image of God and that he is not insofar as he loses this image through his fault (I, 3-7; 443-447).

It is important to understand correctly the nature of this division. To a large extent, the pantheistic interpretations of Erigena's doctrine rest upon what is perhaps a misinterpretation of the word "division." We

should not imagine "nature" as a whole of which God and creatures would be parts; or as a genus of which God and creatures would be species. God is not all things, nor are all things God. To say so would be to say a monstrosity (III, 10; 650 D). In point of fact, it would be to say that the One is multiple, which is absurd. The division of nature signifies the act by which God expresses himself and makes himself known in a hierarchy of beings which are other than, and inferior to, him.

When we want to determine the nature of a being, we must resort to the categories. The categories of Aristotle apply to creatures, that is, to those beings which *are,* because they can be perceived by sense or conceived by the intellect. All such beings are included in some genus and in some species. Now, as has just been said, God is neither a genus nor a species. He is so far above all particular beings that no category applies to him (I, 15; 463 C). This is but another way of saying that, strictly speaking, God is ineffable. In order to talk about him, we must use the method advocated by Denis. It follows three successive stages. First, that of "affirmative theology," which speaks as though the categories validly applied to God: God is substance; God is good (quality); God is great (quantity), etc. Next, the method of "negative theology," which corrects the affirmations of the preceding one: God is neither substance, nor quality, nor quantity, nor anything that enters any category. Let us note that affirmation and negation are equally justified, for it is true that God is everything that is, since he is its cause, and it is likewise true that God is nothing of what is, since he is above being. Hence the third moment of the method, which is that of the so-called "superlative theology." It says that God is not included in any particular category, because he transcends them all. For instance, the whole truth about God is neither that he is substance, nor that he is not substance; the whole truth is that God is "supersubstantial." Yet, we must admit that even the whole truth about God, at least as we can express it, remains a predominantly negative one. In saying that God is beyond substance, we say what he is not much more than what he is. So also, in saying that God is beyond being (*est qui plus quam esse est*), we are not saying what he is. What is he? We do not know. Since God is beyond all categories, he is superior to any affirmation and to any negation.[14]

3. THE DIVINE IDEAS

The second division of nature includes those created beings which are themselves creators. Philosophers have known both their existence and their nature, but they have given them many different names, such as "Ideas," "prototypes," "predestinations," "divine volitions," etc.[15] Whatever their name, these beings are the archetypes, or original patterns, of created things. Erigena himself uses different terms to express the way in

which these beings are produced by God. He says, for example, that Ideas are "preformed," "established," "formed," or "made," but the meaning of these various expressions is always that of "created." Precisely because they are "beings," the Ideas are not God;[16] hence they must needs be creatures of God.

Created by the Father in the Word, Ideas subsist in him from all eternity. Since they have had no beginning in time, they can be said to be co-eternal with God. Yet, the title of "eternal" properly belongs to that only which has no beginning nor principle in any sense of the word; in short, God alone is eternal, and since Ideas are creatures of God, they cannot be said to have true eternity. This is why Erigena teaches that Ideas are, in a sense, eternal, and even co-eternal with God, but not quite, because they depend upon God for their eternal existence.[17]

This doctrine of the eternal creation of Ideas in God will be often criticized, and even condemned, by later theologians. And indeed, how can it be admitted that creatures are subsisting in God from all eternity? Yet, we should remember that, in Erigena's doctrine, God is above being. Like the God of Denis and of Plotinus, he is the One. Now, just as all numbers are eminently included in the perfect simplicity of the One, so also all Ideas are in God without altering his absolute unity. This is so true that the divine Word himself may be considered as the supreme Idea (*idea*), the reason (*ratio*) and the form (*forma*) of all things visible and invisible. He is moreover their cause, since all that is to develop in time is eternally in him as in its principle. In short, the Word of God is the reason and the creative cause, both perfectly simple and infinitely multiple, of the created universe (III, 1; 624 A C). The Word of Erigena seems to have inherited the main attributes and functions of the *nous* of Plotinus. He is a unity which, itself simple, contains the seeds of future multiplicity.

Let us admit, however, that this doctrine of Ideas involves a considerable difficulty. If the archetypes of things are creatures, they are necessarily finite, but, if they are finite, how can they be identified with the Word? Erigena himself has been obscurely aware of the problem, so much so that he has made several attempts to eliminate it.[18] Yet, when all is said and done, the main data from which it arises cannot be eliminated. Whether we call them "creatures" or not does not alter the fact that, in Erigena's doctrine, the Ideas are "made" by God; that, for this very reason, whereas the Word is strictly co-eternal with the Father, the Ideas are not: "I believe absolutely that the Son is wholly co-eternal with the Father; as to the things the Father makes (*facit*) in the Son, I say they are co-eternal with the Son, but not quite co-eternal" (II, 21; 561 C). In short, the reason why they should not be called creatures is not that they are not made, but that they are being made from all eternity. How else could Erigena posit Ideas as the second division of nature, that which both creates and is created? Obviously, his own thought is moving on another plane than that of the metaphysics of being. The true reason why what appears to us as self-contradictory did not raise insuperable difficulties in his own mind can only be made clear by an analysis of his notion of creation.

4. CREATION AND REVELATION

In a metaphysics of being, the word "creation" signifies the giving of being, to what we call creatures, by a supreme Being, whom we call their creator. In a metaphysics of the One, the word "creation" signifies the manifestation of unity through plurality. In the doctrine of Erigena, several different metaphors are used to convey this meaning. Creatures can be said to be, with respect to God, in the same relation as numbers are to absolute Unity; or they can be compared to light beams radiated from some intelligible Sun; or else they can be said to be in the same relation to God as the radii of a circumference are to its center. Whatever the image, the meaning is the same. The God of Erigena is like unto a principle which, incomprehensible in its simplicity, reveals itself at a stroke in the multiplicity of its consequences. This self-manifestation of God is the true meaning of creation in Erigena's doctrine. This is why he often calls it a "theophany," that is to say, an "apparition of God." For God to create is to reveal himself, and since to create is to reveal, to say that God reveals himself is tantamount to saying that he creates himself.[19] In other words, just as revelation is creation, creation is revelation.

This remark first applies to the so-called creation of Ideas. Their creation is the first of all theophanies. In Ideas God begins to emerge from the most hidden secret of his nature and he reveals himself to himself. And indeed, since God is beyond being, he is non-being; as such, God is unknowable not only to us, but to himself, unless he begins to reveal himself to himself under the form of the only objects accessible to intellectual knowledge, namely beings. This is why we had to say that, in producing Ideas, God creates himself, because, instead of remaining in his own inaccessible transcendency, God then "begins to be in something" which is his self-manifestation.

From this moment on, the multiplication of beings continues without interruption until it reaches individuals. Creation properly so-called is the work of the Father, and it consists in producing Ideas in the Word. Strictly speaking, creation is from then on complete: "the cognition of that which is, is that which is." In other words, for Ideas, to be known and to be are one and the same thing. Nor should we imagine that this creation of Ideas has to be followed by another one, which will be the creation of things. All beings are already implicitly contained in the Ideas as in their universal causes. All that still remains to be done in order to produce the world as we see it is to let the Ideas externalize their content, from the universal to

the particular. By a continuous process of division which follows a downward hierarchical order, genera follow from Ideas; then, from genera follow the sub-genera, then the species, and, lastly, the individual substances. This emanation of the multiple from the One is the work of the third person of the Holy Trinity, the Holy Ghost. He is the fecundator and distributor of divine largesse. And so every creature, reproducing in its own way the image of God, is defined by a constitutive trinity: essence, which corresponds to the Father; active virtue, corresponding to the Son; operation, corresponding to the Holy Ghost.[20]

5. CREATION AND ILLUMINATION

The notion of creation conceived as a revelation introduces into the Erigenian universe another theme, that of "illumination." There were scriptural reasons to stress this notion. In a text of paramount importance to mediaeval thinkers, and which Erigena himself has often quoted and commented, it is said that: "Every best gift (*datum*), and every perfect present (*donum*), is from above, coming down from the Father of lights" (James, i, 17). Moreover, Saint Paul had said: "All that is made manifest is light" (Ephes., 5, 13). Thence comes, in many mediaeval doctrines, the two-fold illumination of grace (*donum*) and nature (*datum*). Thus conceived, nature is a light given by the Father of lights. In other words, all created beings are lights: *omnia quae sunt, lumina sunt,* and their very essence consists in being so many reflections of the divine light. Made up of that multitude of tiny lamps that things are, creation is only an illumination intended to show God.[21]

This conception of the creative act entails a correlative notion of the nature of created things. A manifestation of the divine light, the world would cease to be if God ceased to radiate. Each thing is therefore essentially a sign, a symbol, wherein God makes himself known to us. In Erigena's own words: "There is nothing, in visible and corporeal things, that does not signify something incorporeal and invisible" (V, 3; 865-866). This statement could be said to be the charter of mediaeval symbolism, not only in theology and philosophy, but even in the decorative art of the cathedrals. The universe is a revelation comparable to Holy Scripture. Let us look at things: each and every one of them is a word spoken to us by the Word.

The hierarchical illumination, or theophany, which constitutes the universe, divides itself into three worlds: that of purely immaterial substances, namely angels, that of corporeal and visible substances, and between the two, sharing in the natures of both and linking them together, this universe in reduction, man. God is present in all these beings as in his participations. Let us remember, however, that the word "participate" is here a misleading one. No creature is, in any sense, a "part" of God. In the

doctrine of Erigena, "participation" signifies "distribution." Exactly, it signifies the hierarchical distribution of the graces and of the natures which enter the structure of the universe (III, 3; 631 A). Here, as in many other cases, Erigena speaks Latin, but he thinks in Greek. The notion which, in his mind, answers the word *participatio,* is the Greek notion of *metousia,* which does not mean "to share being in common with," but, rather, "to have being after," and as a consequence of, another being (III, 3; 632 B).

The so-called "pantheistic" formulas of Erigena should always be read in the light of this precision. When he says, for instance, that God is, in all things, whatever they are, or that God is the entity of all things (*est enim omnium essentia*), we should never forget that, to him, God is in each and every thing as the sun is in each and every light. But even this is not quite true, for indeed, whereas both the sun and its radiations are light, God himself is in beings as what is beyond being. Erigena has always understood in this sense the famous formula of Denis: "the being of all things is the Deity which is above being" (*esse omnium est superesse deitas*). The most extreme formulas of Erigena should be read in this sense, not in order to palliate them, but because this is the meaning they had in his own mind. We are used to considering creation as a relation between beings and Being; consequently, when we read in Erigena that "God and creature are one and the same thing," we naturally label him as a pantheist. No error could be more excusable, yet, in point of fact, Erigena only means that each and every creature is essentially a manifestation, under the form of being, of what is above being. The *esse* of a being is but a light radiated by the *superesse,* which is God.[22]

If correctly understood, the very notion of "hierarchy" implies both the relation of beings to the Divinity and the distance they are from their source. The word itself does not simply mean a system of ranks and orders, but, exactly, a system of "sacred" ranks and orders. Just as the nature of a being is to be a light which shows God, its degree of perfection corresponds to the very amount of *superesse* which it reveals. The most perfect creatures, which we call angels, owe their dignity to the fact that they are the most perfect manifestations of God under the form of beings. Angels, then, occupy the summit of the universal hierarchy of beings. Incorporeal beings, they have, nevertheless, spiritual bodies, simple and not perceptible to sense. Unlike man, they enjoy an immediate cognition of the Divinity. This does not mean that the angels see God face to face. No one has ever seen God; no creature will ever see him directly and in himself, that is, in his unmanifested transcendency. What angels see by immediate and direct sight are the first "theophanies," or manifestations of, God. Of course, since, in a sense, the theophanies of God are God, to see them is to see God. It even is to see his whole being, since, beyond these theophanies he is the supreme non-being. The fact remains, however, that

the angels do not even see the archetypal Ideas, which would be for them to see the divine Word; they contemplate the first theophanies of the Word manifesting himself out of himself. Nothing could help us more to realize how, despite its misleading language, this doctrine is anxious to keep God above all finite being. Even the blessed, in the beatific vision, will not be able to see the innermost secret of the divinity. Strangely enough, while some theologians will accuse Erigena of confusing God and creatures, others will accuse him of completely separating creatures from God.[23]

6. THE HIERARCHY OF BEINGS

The divine theophanies do not communicate themselves to the angels equally; on the contrary, they are distributed according to a hierarchical scale, the most perfect angels receiving the first theophanies and transmitting them gradually downward. Here again, let us mind our expressions: this hierarchical transmission is not something added to the nature of angels and of their ordered hierarchy; it is their very nature and hierarchy. Every angel is part of the universal theophany; it is a particular theophany, and its place in the world order is determined by its relations to all the higher angels which illuminate it from above, and all the angels below which it itself illuminates. Its very being and essence can thus be defined by the amount of intelligible light which it both receives (or *is*) and transmits to others. Its individual nature is that of a unique moment in the universal manifestation of God.[24]

Thus distinguished and hierarchized, the angels make up an "order" whose intrinsic beauty is that of the universe. For, indeed, what is true of angels is equally true of all other creatures. All of them participate in the divine illumination through the intermediary of the angels, and the amount of perfection which constitutes its own being is, for each and every creature, exactly proportional to the degree of illumination which it represents. Such is precisely the case of man. Still less than the angels from whom he receives his illumination is man capable of illuminating himself by his own means. Just like air, which is only shadows as long as the light of the sun does not penetrate it, man is capable of wisdom only insofar as the light of the divine theophanies reaches him through the hierarchy of angelic substances. Because he is made up of mind and body, man is the lowest of all beings whose nature is capable of intellectual illumination.

To conceive correctly the nature of man, however, we must consider him in two different conditions; first, such as he was created by God; next, such as he now is in consequence of original sin (IV, 9; 780 B).

In his primitive condition, man was much more like an angel than he now is. True enough, man had a body, but mankind was not then

divided into sexes. The division of human beings into males and females, together with the animal mode of reproduction which attends it, is, in Erigena's own words, an additional device contrived by God as one of the remedies to original sin.[25] The same remark applies, within each one of the two sexes, to the multiplication of individuals differing in figure, kind of life, customs and thought (II, 7; 533). Basically speaking, the true man is the Idea of man in God. In this Idea, all possible individual human beings were eternally contained and it is through their own fault that they have now become separated from it. Strictly speaking, these two divisions are more the results of original sin than they are this sin itself. The tragic side of the picture is that, once it got started, nothing has been able to stop this process of separation through multiplication. There is no stopping point for creatures in their wandering away from unity.

Nor is this all. In separating himself from God, man so to speak carried with him, in his fall, all the beings of inferior nature whose Ideas were contained in his own, and which, since they were there as intelligible realities, enjoyed a much more perfect type of being than the one they now have in their present state of separation. If the nature of this change seems difficult to conceive, let us remember that, according to Erigena, the Ideas occupy a sort of intermediate position between God and creatures (III, 20; 683 B), so that, having real being, they can be considered as the very same realities migrating, so to say, from their condition of unity in God to their condition of multiplicity in the present universe. Far from being more real now than they used to be in the unity of their Ideas, creatures have in fact degenerated. The physical triangle which we imagine is only a drawn representation of the intelligible triangle which geometry defines in the purity of its universal essence. Of these two, which is the truer triangle? Obviously, the intelligible pattern which includes in its unity an infinite number of material ones. The true triangle then exists in the thought of the geometer only, and the same is the case with all geometrical figures (IV, 8; 774 C-775 A). In the same sense, all bodies are less truly real in themselves than they are in their own Ideas in God.[26]

To this conclusion the ready objection is that the very materiality of corporeal beings cannot possibly exist in a mind; consequently, material beings can exist in a mind inasmuch as they are known, but not in themselves and with their material nature. But this is an illusion. If we consider material bodies, their specific forms appear to us as intelligible; their quantity is also submitted to intelligible laws; even their sensible qualities are made up of intelligible elements whose confusion begets what we call corporeal matter, but which we can analyse again into purely intelligible components. The genesis of sensible matter, then, can be explained completely by principles that do not fall under the perception of the senses. In point of fact, matter itself is neither sensible nor imaginable, it is con-

point of the return trip, the death of man is the initial stage of his return to God.[33]

The second stage will be the resurrection of bodies which will be the joint effect of both nature and grace. The sexes will then be abolished and man will be as he would have been if God had not foreseen his fall at the time of creation. In the course of a third stage, the body of each individual will return to the soul from which it was separated by way of division. This reunion itself will require several return stages: the body will become life again; life will become sense; sense will become reason and reason will become pure thought. A fourth stage will return the human soul to its primary cause or Idea and, together with the soul, the body it has reabsorbed. By this movement, all those beings whose intelligible forms subsist in the intellect of man will be brought back to God. The fifth and last moment of this universal "analysis" will bring the terrestrial sphere back to Paradise. As this movement will propagate itself from sphere to sphere, nature and all its causes will let themselves be progressively permeated by God as air is by light. From that time and on, there will be nought else but God, and this will be the end of the great return, "when nothing else will be left but God." [34]

This first process of return already implies the work of grace, since, without the resurrection of Christ which is the pledge of our own resurrection, the universal movement toward God would be impossible; but it is completed by a second which is the work of grace alone. Good or bad, all men will once more inevitably recover the perfections with which they had been endowed by their creator. If then a new grace is added to the preceding one, it will no longer be for the purpose of restoring all natures, but to raise some of them to a truly "supernatural" state. Such will be the effect of beatifying grace, which will lift the chosen souls according to three stages. Having become pure thought again, that is, a pure Intellect, man will first attain plenary knowledge of all the intelligible beings in which God makes himself manifest; then he will be raised from this knowledge of Ideas to Wisdom itself, which is the self-subsisting plenary manifestation of God; the third and last degree will be the loss of even pure thought in the transcendent darkness of that inaccessible Light wherein are hidden the causes of all that is. What we call "beatific vision" will therefore take place beyond vision. It will not be the seeing of a light, but, rather, being engulfed in Light.[35]

Let us not believe, however, that this return of human nature and all other natures to God, that is, in Erigena's own words, their "deification," will result in their annihilation. Quite the contrary; since, as has been said, things are more real in their Ideas than in themselves, all nature will then recover the plenary reality which is its intelligible reality in God. Air does not cease to be air because the sun's light illumines it; red-hot iron is still iron, even though it seems to be transformed into fire; so, the body will still be a body when it is spiritualized, and the human soul will still be what it is in becoming transfigured to the light of God. In short, there will be no blending or confusion of substances, but a reunion, without mixture or composition, where all properties will immutably subsist.[36]

All this eschatology accounts for the chosen without difficulty, but what is to be done with the damned? In a universe where matter shall be dissolved into its intelligible elements, there is no place for a material hell. Like Origen, Erigena considers the notion of a material Gehenna to be a remnant of pagan superstition that the real Christians should get rid of. At least in the *De divisione naturae,* for the *De praedestinatione* seems to speak otherwise, Erigena considers the Valley of Josaphat (Joel, 3, 2), the cankerworms and the pools of sulphur, so dear to preachers, as childish imaginings, and he defends himself with great verve against those who attack him on this point. Where there is no corporeal matter left, how could there be valleys, worms or pools? Moreover, corporeal or not, should these punishments be considered eternal? To answer "yes," is to concede the final victory of sin, evil and the devil, in a creation which Jesus Christ has redeemed by his sacrifice. Unless we consent to the defeat of God by the devil, we must, on the contrary, affirm the final victory of good over evil. And the two problems are solved at the same time. With the reabsorption of matter into the intelligible, all trace of evil will one day disappear from nature. This done, the supernatural distinction between the chosen and the condemned will remain whole and will persist eternally, but each one will be beatified or punished in his own conscience.[37] Beatitude is eternal life, and since eternal life is to know truth, knowledge of truth is eternal beatitude. Conversely, if there is no other misery than eternal death, and if eternal death is ignorance of truth, there is no other eternal punishment than ignorance of truth, and who is truth, if not Christ? "Nothing then is to be desired but joy of the truth, which is Christ, and nothing is to be shunned but his absence, which is the one and only cause of all eternal sadness. Take Christ from me and nothing good will be left me, no torment can terrify me; for the deprivation and absence of Christ is the torment of any rational creature. That, and nothing else, at least in my opinion." [38]

It is easy to imagine the stupefaction of Scotus Erigena's contemporaries before that immense metaphysical and theological epic, hardly believable, and yet guaranteed at practically every point by the authority of Denis, Maximus Confessor, the two Gregories, or any one of the many ecclesiastical writers whom the astonishing erudition of its author enabled him to invoke. This "barbarian, placed on the outskirts of the world," of whom Anastasius the Librarian spoke with surprise to King Charles the Bald, aroused many misgivings. To us, he appears as the Latin discoverer of the immense world of Greek theology, that is to say, of a hitherto unknown mental universe whose wealth he had no time to sort out nor to assimi-

late.[39] Condemned and recondemned to destruction, his writings have nevertheless survived and they even seem to have exercised a kind of underground activity. No one, after him, has ever dared to take up as a whole a doctrine so little suited to the sober teachings of the Latin tradition, but it was to remain as a sort of permanent temptation against which, from century to century, doctrinal authorities were never to cease struggling, without ever succeeding in killing it.

CHAPTER II

SAINT ANSELM OF CANTERBURY

The movement initiated by Scotus Erigena did not survive its author. Even apart from the aberrant character of some of its features, the doctrine did not find a political and social environment favorable to the development of a philosophical school. Soon after the death of Charlemagne (814), the Normans had begun to invade and to plunder the Loire valley, in France, up to the monastery of Tours (838). In 845, they sailed the river Seine up to Paris and plundered the famous abbey of Saint Germain des Prés. Paris was attacked a second time, in 885, by Rollo, their chieftain, who finally settled with his warriors in what we now call the province of Normandy (911). Moreover, the decadence of the Carolingian dynasty in France after the death of Charles the Bald (877) was attended by a political disorder no less harmful to cultural life than the Scandinavian invasions. The revival of philosophical production in France was not to take place before the restoration of the royal power by Hugh Capet (987). This is not to say that intellectual life died completely during the tenth century. It survived in some Benedictine monasteries, owing to the personal endeavors of obscure men whose good services should not be forgotten.[40] Yet, when all is said and done, there is for historians of philosophy little to reap on the desolate ground which extends from the death of Erigena up to the early eleventh-century theological controversies between "dialecticians" and "anti-dialecticians." In point of fact, they all were dialecticians, but they disagreed on some applications of dialectics to Christian faith.[41] The conflict which then arose between the defenders of a strictly monastic ideal of Christian life and those of a wise use of secular culture found its first satisfactory solution, between the walls of a monastery, in the writings of Saint Anselm of Canterbury.

1. REASON AND FAITH

Saint Anselm[42] is clearly conscious of his attitude with regard to the relation of reason to faith. The *Monologium* was written especially at the request of certain monks of Bec who desired a model for meditation on the existence and essence of God, in which everything would be proved by reason and where absolutely nothing would be based on Scriptural authority.[43]

Two sources of knowledge are at the disposition of Christians, reason and faith. Against the excesses of some dialecticians, Anselm affirms that one must first become firmly established in faith, and, consequently, he refuses to submit Holy Scripture to dialectics. Faith is for a Christian the given point from which he is to start. The facts that he is to understand and the realities that his reason shall have to interpret are given to him by revelation; one does not understand in order to believe, but on the contrary, one believes in order to understand: *neque enim quaero intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam.*[44] Understanding of faith, in short, presupposes faith. But, inversely, Saint Anselm takes sides against the irreducible adversaries of dialectics. For him who begins by being firmly established in faith, there is no objection to striving to understand rationally what he believes. To object to this legitimate use of reason, of which the Apostles and Fathers have already said all that has to be said, is to forget, first, that truth is so vast and profound that mortals can never succeed in exhausting it; that the days of man are numbered, so that even the Fathers were not able to say everything they would have said had they lived longer; that God has never ceased and never will cease to enlighten his Church; last, not the least, it is to forget that between faith and the beatific vision to which we all aspire there is here below an intermediary which is the understanding of faith. To understand one's faith is to draw nearer to the very sight of God. The order to be observed in the search for truth is therefore the following: first, to believe the mysteries of faith before discussing them through reason; next, to endeavor to understand what one believes. Not to put faith first is presumption; not to appeal to reason next is negligence. Both of those faults must therefore be avoided.[45]

Such being the rule, it remains to be known just how far reason can actually go, in the interpretation of faith. One must believe in order to understand, but can everything one believes be made intelligible? Is faith which seeks knowledge assured of finding it? It can be said that, practically, Saint Anselm's confidence in reason's power of interpretation is unlimited. He does not confuse faith and reason, since the exercise of reason presupposes faith; but everything happens as though one could always manage to understand, if not what one believes, at least the necessity of believing it. Saint Anselm did not shrink from the task of proving the necessity of the Trinity and the Incarnation.

In order to realize Saint Anselm's exact position on this point, we must bear in mind certain definite conditions under which he took up his task. He had an excellent knowledge of Augustine, but none at all of Plotinus,

whose metaphysics alone would have enabled him to continue the work of his master along the same line. In the eleventh century philosophy proper was reduced to Aristotle's dialectic. No physics, no anthropology, no metaphysics, no purely rational ethics were known to the men of that period. To understand the sacred text was therefore first of all to seek understanding of it with the help of what resources a dialectician had at his disposal. Saint Anselm therefore did, with the philosophical technique then at hand, what Saint Thomas was to do over again in the thirteenth century after the discovery of the entire works of Aristotle. Arguing as a pure dialectician, Anselm proposed not to render the mysteries of faith intelligible in themselves, which would have been to suppress them, but to prove by what he called "necessary reasons" that rational inquiry well-conducted necessarily ends in supporting them. That was a high ambition, but it must not be forgotten that however strongly he might trust the power of reason, Saint Anselm never imagined that it would succeed in understanding mystery. To prove by logically necessary reasons that God exists, that he is one single God in three Persons, and that the incarnation of the Word was necessary to save mankind, is not to understand the secrets of divine nature or the mystery of a God made man for our salvation.[46] To understand a mystery would be much more than to understand its necessity.

2. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THE *Monologium*

The *Monologium*, where nothing is established on the strength of revelation, but on that of reason alone, rests entirely upon its demonstrations of the existence of God.[47] Taken in themselves, these demonstrations presuppose the acceptance of two principles: first, a principle which is given to us in experience as an observable fact, namely, that things are unequal in perfection; next, a sort of immediate intellectual evidence, namely, that things which possess a perfection in a higher or a lower degree, derive it from the same perfection taken in its supreme degree. In other words, the mainspring of these demonstrations will be that the relative always is a participation in the absolute, whose existence is therefore required by that of its participations.

The starting point of the first proof is the given fact that there is goodness in things. This fact cannot be denied, for indeed we desire things, and we only desire them because we judge them to be good. It is therefore a natural question, and almost an inevitable one, to ask: whence come all those things we consider good? Now, on the one hand, we experience by sense and we know through reason that there are many different types of goods; on the other hand, we know that these goods must have a cause, but we may well wonder whether each good thing has its own particular cause or whether there is not a single cause for all these goods. Now it is

absolutely certain and evident that all that possesses a perfection to a greater or less degree owes that perfection to the fact that it participates in one single and same principle. Everything which is more or less just is so because it participates more or less in absolute justice. Therefore, since all particular goods are unequally good, they can only be good by their participation in a single and same good. But this good by which everything is good can be only one great good. All the rest is good by it and it alone is good by itself. Now nothing of what is good by another is superior to what is good by itself. This sovereign good then surpasses all the rest to the point of having nothing above itself. That is to say, what is sovereignly good is also sovereignly great. There is, therefore, a primary being, superior to everything that exists, and it is him whom we call God.[48]

We can broaden the basis of this proof. Instead of arguing from the perfections noted in different beings, one can argue from the perfection they have in common, although in varying degrees, and which is being. As a matter of fact, everything which is has a cause; the only question arising with regard to the totality of things is, then, to know whether it is derived from several causes or from one single cause. If the universe has several causes, either they lead back to a single cause, or they exist by themselves, or they produce one another. If they lead back to a single one, it is evidently that sole cause which is the cause of the universe. If they exist by themselves, it is because they possess in common at least the faculty of existing by themselves, and it is this common faculty which causes them to be; they can therefore still be considered as coming under one same cause. There would be left only the third hypothesis, according to which these causes cause one another; but it is self-contradictory to admit that a thing exists in virtue of that to which it gives being. That is not true even of the terms of a relation, nor of the relation itself. The master and the servant are relative to one another, but each one does not exist in virtue of the other, and neither is the double relationship which unites them generated by itself, but it comes from the two real subjects between which it obtains. Thus, therefore, one single hypothesis remains acceptable; namely, that everything which exists, exists in virtue of a single cause, and that cause which exists by itself is God.[49]

The third proof bears on the degrees of perfection which things possess. It is enough just to cast a glance over the universe to note that the beings which constitute it are more or less perfect. This is an established fact to which no one can take exception. One could not be a man oneself and question whether horses are superior to trees, or men superior to horses. Now, granted that natures are superior to one another, one must admit either an infinity of beings, so that no being is so perfect that there is not one still more perfect; or else a finite number of beings, and consequently one being more perfect than all the rest. Now, to admit the existence of an infinite number of things is an absurd supposition. Therefore, there

necessarily exists a nature that is superior to all and inferior to none. True enough, still another supposition is possible. One might imagine that several natures, equal in perfection, occupy the peak of the universal hierarchy. But this hypothesis is no less absurd than the preceding one, for if these several natures are equal, they must be so in virtue of what they have in common; now, if what they have in common is their essence, then they have a common essence and are only one single nature, whereas, if what they have in common is something else than their essence, then this common element is another nature, superior to them and in which they participate.[50] This proof rests upon the impossibility of not ending a series by a single term, when the series is a hierarchy which includes a finite number of terms.

3. THE PROOF OF THE *Proslogion*

Anselm had always desired to find proofs of the existence of God as simple and as immediately evident as possible. The three demonstrations of the *Monologium* seemed to him, though valid, still too complicated. After protracted investigations he finally discovered a new one, whose only presupposition was the knowledge of the word "God" and of the only meaning that can be ascribed to it. As it is presented in the *Proslogion*, this proof is one more application of the general rule: "faith seeking understanding." In point of fact, such was the title which he himself had first given to his treatise and which he changed later on to that of *Proslogiom*.

We know at least the word "God"; we even believe that God exists, and that he is what we believe him to be, namely, a being than which no greater can be conceived. The question is to know whether or not what we believe to be true is true. In other words, can what we believe to be true be demonstrated in the natural light of reason?

This is not evident. In fact, some deny the existence of such a being. According to the testimony of Holy Scripture, "The fool has said in his heart, there is no God" (Ps. 13, 1). Yet, if we say: a being than which no greater can be conceived, even the fool understands what we say, and what he understands exists in his understanding, even if he does not understand it to exist in reality. It is indeed possible for a thing to exist in an intellect without that intellect knowing that the thing exists in reality. When a painter pictures to himself the work he is going to paint, he has it in his intellect, but he is not conscious of its existence, as he has not yet painted it; when he has painted his picture, on the contrary, he both has his work in his intellect and is conscious of its existence, since he has already made it. We can, therefore, convince the fool himself that, at least in his mind, there is a being than which none greater can be conceived, because, when he hears these words, he understands them and what he understands is in his intellect. Now that which is such that nothing greater can be conceived cannot exist only in the intellect. For indeed, to exist in reality is greater than to exist in the intellect only. If, then, that which is such that one can conceive nothing greater exists only in the intellect, that than which nothing greater can be conceived is that than which something greater can be conceived, which is contradictory. The being than which none greater can be conceived then necessarily exists both in the intellect and in reality.[51]

The principles on which this argument rests are as follows: 1) a notion of God given by faith; 2) to exist in thought is to be truly; 3) the existence of the notion of God in thought requires logically that one affirm that he exists in reality. Here again, indeed, we start from a fact, but from a fact which belongs to a special order, that of revelation. The whole abstract dialectic which unfolds here goes from faith to reason and returns to its point of departure, reaching the conclusion that what is proposed by faith is rationally intelligible. Moreover, our starting point is a notion. A certain idea of God exists in thought: there we have the given fact; now this existence, which is real, logically demands that God exist also in reality: there we have the proof. It comes about through a comparison of the thought being and the actual being which compels our reason to posit the second as superior to the first. As early as the middle ages, the decisiveness of that proof has been questioned, and during the very lifetime of Saint Anselm it met a shrewd contradictor in the person of the monk Gaunilon. Gaunilon raised two main objections. First, that we have no distinct notion of God from which to infer his existence; next, that one cannot rely upon existence in thought to prove existence outside of thought. As a matter of fact, to exist as an object of thought is not to have a true existence; it is simply to be conceived. Now, one can conceive a quantity of unreal or even impossible objects, which even though they are in thought, certainly have no existence outside of thought. They are only notions in the understanding which conceives them, and not at all realities. Why should it be otherwise with the idea of God? If we conceive the idea of the Blessed Isles, lost somewhere in the Ocean and full of inaccessible riches, it will not follow that these lands, conceived as the most perfect of all, also exist in reality. To which Saint Anselm replies that the passing from existence in thought to existence in reality is possible and necessary only when it is a question of the greatest being one can conceive. The notion of the Blessed Isles obviously contains nothing which forces thought to attribute existence to them. It belongs to God alone that one cannot think he does not exist.[52]

This demonstration of the existence of God is assuredly the triumph of pure dialectic operating on a definition. It derives its strength from a deep awareness of what is indeed unique in the notion of *being* taken in the absolute. Even those who object to the proof as such will no doubt

acknowledge that Saint Anselm took the right view of things in underlining the irresistible force with which the notion of absolute being, that is to say, of a being than which no greater can be thought, calls as it were for the affirmation of its existence by the thought that conceives it. An indication that this was a valid intuition can be seen in the vitality of which Saint Anselm's argument has given proof in the course of succeeding centuries. There have always been philosophers to take it up and refashion it in their own way, and its implications are so manifold that the sole fact of having rejected or admitted it almost suffices to determine the doctrinal group to which a philosophy belongs. Saint Bonaventure, Descartes, Leibniz and Hegel took it up again, each in his own way, whereas Saint Thomas Aquinas, Locke and Kant rejected it, each in his own way. What all those who accepted it have in common is the identification of real existence with intelligible being conceived by thought; what all those who condemn its principle have in common is the refusal to consider any problem of existence aside from an empirically given existent.

4. ATTRIBUTES OF GOD AND CREATION

Once the existence of God has been proven by any one of these proofs, it is easy to deduce his principal attributes. Since God is that which cannot not exist, he is Being *par excellence,* that is, the plenitude of entity. We, therefore, give him the title of *essentia,* and this term, which signifies "plenary entity," can be applied properly to God alone. That is why we have been able to prove that he exists even from the simple notion that we have of him: to say that *essentia* is not, would be to say that that whose very nature is to be, is not. On the contrary, nothing of what is not God is being in the full sense of the term; then all the rest, which is not God, and which nevertheless exists, must necessarily derive its being from God. How can one conceive this dependence of the universe with regard to God?

Notice first that to exist through oneself and exist through someone else are two different ways of existing; one does not possess being in the same way in both cases. In God, who alone exists through himself, essence and being are identical; his nature is, just as light shines. Just as the nature of light is not separate from the brilliance it diffuses, so divine nature is not separate from the being it enjoys. It is quite another thing with beings that derive their existence from others; their essence is not such as necessarily implies existence and, in order that their nature may exist, being must be conferred on it by God. It remains to be seen how God confers it.

Only two hypotheses are possible: either God is the productive cause of the universe, or he is the very matter from which the universe is made. If we admit the latter hypothesis, we implicitly admit that everything is

and being itself, that is to say, the prime entity; it is, and being comes from it, precisely for this reason that all that is participates in the simple entity itself." [83] In short, in a doctrine where being is act, and where act is form, all that is owes its being to the absolute act and to the absolute form, which is God. In this precise sense God is the form of all things.

Since there is otherness, it must needs proceed from unity. All things are one in God, but the divine Ideas, then the forms born of these pure and eternal substances, are at the origin of the multiplication of beings. Clarenbaud follows Boethius and Gilbert on this point. But he does not follow the "bishop of Poitiers" (i.e., Gilbert) on the problem of individuation,[84] no more than in his interpretation of the dogma of the Trinity.[85] His opposition to Gilbert is particularly interesting to note on the problem of the relation which obtains between genera and individuals. The nature of the universals was at stake in this controversy. Gilbert maintained that each man is man through his own humanity, whereas Clarembaud maintains that all men are men through one and the same humanity: *unam et eandem humanitatem esse qua singuli homines sunt homines.*[86] His "realism" of universals is therefore more accentuated than that of Gilbert. On the whole, Clarembaud seems to have been a much less adventurous metaphysician than his master Thierry of Chartres. The influence of his other master, Hugh of St. Victor, may at least partly account for his moderation, but the theological misadventures of Gilbert and of Abélard, which he quotes, would have been enough to warn him against unnecessary flights of metaphysical imagination.

4. JOHN OF SALISBURY

The manifestation most typical of the refined spirit of Chartres was John of Salisbury (about 1125-1180). The works of this Englishman, educated in France, who died bishop of Chartres, anticipate the Renaissance by both the quality of their style and the delicacy of their inspiration. In the *Polycraticus* and the *Metalogicon,* the long humanistic effort of Chartres finally blossomed into charming works. Nothing can give a more vivid impression of the diversity of the middle ages than to linger over the writings of that twelfth-century bishop who was a good writer, a man of parts and a fine scholar.[87]

John of Salisbury would not have agreed to distinguish wisdom from eloquence as William of Conches did. The type of culture he consciously desired to have revived was the *eloquentia* of Cicero and Quintilian, that is to say, the complete intellectual and moral formation of an upright man, but a man capable of expressing himself well. On philosophical grounds properly so-called, he time and again quotes as his authority the sect of Academicians. The great man whose style he strove to imitate and whose thought he admired was not Plato, nor Aristotle, but Cicero. Not that he

in any way professes a complete skepticism, but, as Cicero himself did, he begins by setting aside a certain number of acquired truths and he abandons all the rest to the sterile play of interminable controversies. To doubt everything would be an absurdity. The animals give proof of a certain intelligence; now man is more intelligent than the animal; therefore it is false that man is incapable of knowing. We can, in reality, derive certain knowledge from three different sources: the senses, reason, and faith. He who has not a minimum of confidence in his senses is inferior to animals; he who does not believe in his reason at all and doubts everything arrives at a point where he does not even know whether he doubts; he who refuses his assent to the obscure but certain knowledge of faith sets his face against the foundation of all wisdom. It is, therefore, ridiculous to be uncertain of everything and nevertheless to claim to be a philosopher. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the modesty of Academicians is, in most cases, the wisest example we could follow. In almost all disputed questions one must be content to reach probabilities. The philosophers wanted to measure the world and submit the skies to their laws, but they had too much confidence in the forces of their reason; they fell down therefore the moment they arose and, when they thought they were wise, they began to talk nonsense. Just as the men who raised the tower of Babel against God fell into confusion of language, so the philosophers who undertook against God that kind of theomachy that philosophy is, fell into confusion of systems. And therefore they are now scattered into the infinite multiplicity of their insanities and their sects of error, all the more miserable and deserving of pity as they were not aware of their very misery.

The Academicians, on the contrary, avoid these errors by their very modesty. They recognize their ignorance and know enough not to affirm what they do not know. Their moderation is precisely the quality which commends them to our esteem and should lead us to prefer them. One must hesitate in all matters where neither the senses, nor reason, nor faith give us incontestable certitude, and the list of such questions is a long one. We should reserve judgment on the substance, the quantity, the faculties, the efficacy and origin of the soul; on destiny, chance, free will, matter, movement, elements, the infinity of numbers, and the indefinite divisibility of quantity; on time and space; on the origin and nature of speech; on sameness and otherness, divisibility and indivisibility, the nature of universals, the origin and end of virtues and vices, whether one possesses all the virtues if he has one of them, whether all sins are equal and equally punishable; on the causes of phenomena, the ebb and flow of the sea, the floods of the Nile, the increase and abatement of humors in animals according to the moon's phases; on nature's various hidden secrets, on evil spells; on nature and its works; on the true nature and origin of those things which our reason cannot grasp, for instance: have

angels bodies, and of what nature? Or what is God? Many more questions of this sort are still unsolved for scholars. True enough, ignorant people know all the answers, but the modesty of the Academicians teaches us to reserve judgment.

It does not follow, however, that we should neglect to study these questions under the pretext that their definite solution must finally elude our grasp. Quite the contrary. It is ignorance that makes philosophy dogmatic, and it is erudition that makes the Academician. When one knows only one single system or one sole solution to some problem, he is naturally inclined to accept it. How could one choose, since he has no choice? Freedom of mind is proportional to knowledge, and that is why John of Salisbury took sides with the defenders of humanism, against the Philistines of his own time, the so-called "Cornificians."

A typical instance of the problems which John of Salisbury deemed insoluble is that of universals. Precisely because they could not answer it, the philosophers seized upon this difficult question, discussed it at length and, as they used words at random, they gave the appearance of maintaining different opinions and left their successors a wealth of controversial material. At the present time, John says, there are at least five solutions to this problem, a problem so old that the world itself has aged in striving to solve it, a problem over which more time has been lost than the Caesars have spent in conquering the world, and more money than ever filled the coffers of Croesus. According to some, universals exist only in the sensible and the singular; others conceive forms as separated after the manner of mathematical beings; others make of them either words or nouns; and, finally, still others identify universals with concepts. In fact, we know neither the nature nor the mode of existence of universals; but we can say, if not what their real condition is, at least the way in which we acquire them. The Aristotelian doctrine of abstraction enables us to solve this second problem, more modest than the first. To seek the real mode of existence of universals considered as things is an infinite and almost fruitless task, but to try to find what they are in the intellect is an easy and useful pursuit. What happens is that, considering the substantial resemblance of numerically different individuals, we obtain species; if we next consider the resemblances which obtain between different species, we have the genus. Our intellect achieves universals, then, by stripping individual substances of the forms and accidents by which they differ. Although they do not exist individually, universals can at least be thought individually, and although they do not exist separately, they can be conceived separately.

The nature of John of Salisbury's attitude is clear. This humanist has a taste for common sense and simple solutions, and a horror of mere hodge-podge and verbalism. John of Salisbury needs to feel sure of something before allowing himself to affirm it. Confronted with the logomachy of his contemporaries in the question of universals, he suspends his judgment after the fashion of Academicians, but not at all because of any taste for uncertainty. When he can see a reasonable way out of some labyrinth, he does not hesitate a moment to take it. Besides, John of Salisbury knows that philosophical speculation is no idle game. If the true God, he says, is the true Wisdom, then the love of God is the true philosophy. The complete philosopher therefore is not he who is content with a theoretical knowledge, but he who lives the doctrine he preaches; to follow the true precepts one teaches is truly to philosophize. *Philosophus amator Dei est:* in that appeal to love and piety lies the completion and consummation of this conception of life. John was a mind more delicate than powerful, but so fine, so rich and so perfectly cultured that its presence ennobles and graces in our thought the image of the twelfth century.

CHAPTER IV

PETER ABÉLARD

THE history of mediaeval philosophy cannot be reduced to that of the controversy concerning the nature of universals. Yet there is much to say in favor of such an interpretation. Up to the time when Avicenna, Averroes and Aristotle provided them with complete philosophical explanations of nature, the men of the middle ages had practically no other strictly philosophical problem to discuss than that of universals. Boethius had offered two solutions of it, the one according to the metaphysics of Plato, the other according to the metaphysics of Aristotle; but while Boethius himself knew both metaphysics, the men of the early thirteenth century knew neither one. What they could guess of them, through Chalcidius and Boethius on the one hand, and through the logic of Aristotle on the other hand, was not enough to provide their choice with a complete justification. At any rate, not one of these logicians has been able to reconstruct the psychologies and the metaphysics which, in the doctrines of their Greek predecessors, fully justified their epistemological conclusions.

This is the reason why, at the end of the twelfth century, John of Salisbury could denounce the striking sterility of these purely dialectical discussions. Each professor had figured out an answer to the problem. This answer was generally a word. After coining it, or accepting it, its defender would stick to it and fight for it with dialectical weapons. When he revisited the schools of Paris after an absence of twelve years, John says that he still found there the very same professors saying the very same things. None of them had either learned or unlearned anything—a striking

Aphrodisias, was to become a decisive factor in the evolution of mediaeval thought. History of philosophy, which aims to attribute to each philosopher his own doctrine, and no other one, is a comparatively recent discipline. Mediaeval scholars would seldom hesitate to ascribe to a philosopher the works of someone else, provided only they could find a way to reconcile their statements. The so-called *Theology of Aristotle* has long passed for an authentic production of the master. In point of fact, its content was borrowed from Plotinus' *Enneads*, Books IV-VI.[2] The second treatise, namely the *Liber de causis*, or "On Causes," which we have already seen quoted by Alan of Lille, was largely excerpted from the *Elementatio theologica*, or "Elements of Theology," of Proclus.[3] The most important consequence of this fact is that the Arabian philosophers have circulated, under the name of Aristotle, a mixture of Aristotle and Plotinus, who himself was very far from representing the pure doctrine of Plato. The Arabs have never felt the need to choose between these two philosophies. As a matter of fact, they never imagined that they were two philosophies. As has rightly been said: "They believed that there was only one philosophy, whose two masters were Plato and Aristotle." [4]

Like Christian faith, Islamic faith soon felt the need of an intellectual interpretation, be it only in order to correct the literal interpretation of the Koran upheld by the fundamentalists of those times. The early contacts of Islam with Greek philosophy gave rise to a philosophico-religious speculation which is represented by the "mutazilite" school. The "mutazilites" stressed the need of resorting to reason in the interpretation of revelation. They were especially concerned with establishing the absolute unity of God, to the point of refusing any distinction between his essence and his attributes. Moreover, they insisted on the justice of the divine will and refused to admit that good and evil were only such because God had willed them to be either good or evil. Last, not least, they fought against all anthropomorphic representations of God by consistently applying the negative method (*tanzih*), which consists in denying of God all the determinations that apply to his creatures. These positions had far-reaching applications. For instance, to submit the will of God to an intrinsic law of justice was implicitly to admit the existence of an objective good and of an objective evil which reason is able to discover and to which men have to conform their acts. In short, these Moslem theologians were endowing man with moral liberty.

The mutazilites were succeeded by another group, that of the "mutakallimoun," (from *halàm*, discourse) whose members were exactly those whom Thomas Aquinas was to call the *loquentes in lege Maurorum*, that is to say, the Moslem theologians. The "mutakallimoun" represent a theological reaction against the somewhat unorthodox activity of the "mutazilites." We shall have to recall later on the doctrine of Al Ash'ari who, after many years of teaching as a "mutazilite," publicly renounced his former attitude and built up a complete justification of the absolute freedom of God. His second doctrine finally became the orthodox theology of Islam, and it is still being taught today in some Mohammedan schools. This repudiation of Greek philosophy by orthodox theologians had for its consequence that some Arabic thinkers, without losing touch with religion, began to pursue philosophy for its own sake. In striking contrast with what was to happen in Western Europe, where the greatest contributions to philosophy were to be made by theologians, the greatest contributions to philosophy by Mohammedan thinkers have been made by philosophers. Such men as Alkindi, Alfarabi, Avicenna or Averroes, who were neither theologians nor even what the West would have called clerics, were not to be seen at the universities of Paris, of Oxford, nor, in fact, anywhere in Europe during the middle ages. On the other hand, no Moslem theologian ever succeeded in reinterpreting Greek philosophy in the light of the Koran, as Thomas Aquinas or Duns Scotus was to reinterpret Greek philosophy in the light of the Gospel. A curious consequence of this situation was that, since Islamic theology was progressively separating itself from Greek philosophy, up to the point of repudiating it, the great Christian theologians were to become the pupils of the Mohammedan philosophers much more than of the Mohammedan theologians. This is the reason why, dealing as we are with the speculation of Arabic thinkers as with one of the sources of mediaeval scholasticism, we have to pay more attention to the philosophers of Islam than to its theologians.[5]

I. ALKINDI AND ALFARABI

The first great Arabian philosopher among those whom the Christian world was to know is Alkindi, who lived in Basra, then at Baghdad, and died in 873.[6] He was an encyclopaedist, whose writings cover almost the whole field of Greek learning: arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, music, optics, medicine, logic, psychology, meteorology and politics. The middle ages knew but a small part of this extensive work. His treatise "On the Intellect" (*De intellectu*) deserves particular attention because it belongs in a well-defined family of philosophical writings. The origin of this family is the section of the *De anima* of Alexander of Aphrodisias that deals with the nature of the intellect, isolated from its context and published as a separate work under the title *De intellectu et intellecto* (i.e., "On Understanding and the Understood"). The object of this *De intellectu* was to clarify the meaning of the distinction introduced by Aristotle between the possible intellect (which receives intellection) and the agent intellect (which produces intelligible objects). In Aristotle himself, such a treatment of the problem of universals implied a complete theory of the soul and of human nature of which, up to the end of the twelfth century, the Latins knew nothing. All they knew about the problem was its logical

position, as they had found it defined in the introduction of Boethius to the *Isagoge* of Porphyry. The *De intellectu* of Alkindi could not fail to interest Latin translators because, in describing the operations of the intellect, it threw light on the nature of abstraction, the operation which produces universals. Two points deserve to be noted in Alkindi's treatment of the question. First, he claims to discourse in it on the intellect, "following the doctrine of Plato and of Aristotle" (*secundum sententiam Platonis et Aristotelis*). Secondly, he considers the agent intellect, or "intellect always in act," as an Intelligence, that is, as a spiritual being, or substance, distinct from the soul, superior to it, and acting on it so as to turn a soul intelligent in potency into a soul intelligent in act. Arab philosophy therefore admitted from the beginning, under the influence of Alexander of Aphrodisias, that there is only one agent intellect for all mankind, each individual possessing but a receptive power which the action of the agent intellect carries from potency to act. In other words, all our concepts flow into our individual souls from a purely spiritual being, or Intelligence, which is one and the same for all mankind.

The second great name in Arabian philosophy is Alfarabi,[7] who studied and taught at Baghdad, and died in 950. In addition to translations of, and commentaries on, Porphyry's and Aristotle's logical works, Alfarabi wrote treatises *On the Intellect and the Intelligible* (*De intellectu et intellecto*), *On the Soul, On Unity and the One,* etc. The same tendency, which prevailed in Alkindi, to deal with Platonism and Aristotelianism as with a single philosophy, is still at work in Alfarabi. Moreover, now is the time for us to remember that, although these men were philosophers, not theologians, they had a religion, namely Islam, which was not without influence on their philosophical speculation. What is more important still, their religion had something in common with Christianity. The Prophet had been careful to distinguish between the "infidels," properly so called, and those whom the Koran calls "the men of the Book," or of the Bible, that is the Jews and the Christians. Like the God of the Old Testament, the God of the Koran is one, eternal, all-powerful and creator of all things; before the Christians, the Arabian philosophers came up against the problem of reconciling the Greek conception of a necessarily existing universe, ruled by a strictly intelligible necessity, with the Biblical notion of a freely created world ruled by a free and all-powerful divine will.

Shortly before the time of Alkindi a Moslem theological school had strongly stressed the rights of the God of the Koran and of the Old Testament. According to Al Ash'ari (d. 936), the third reformer of Islam and the founder of the school of the Ash'arites, everything is created by the sole *fiat* of God, nothing is independent of his power, and good as well as evil only exist in virtue of his all-powerful will.[8] The metaphysical elaboration of this religious belief led Ash'ari and his disciples to a curious conception of the universe, which Thomas Aquinas was to know, at least in

a summary way, through Moses Maimonides and which he was to refute on the strength of his own philosophical notion of God. According to the Ash'arites, the world was made up of moments of time and points of space, connected together by the sole will of God, and whose combinations were therefore always liable to be altered by free interventions of the divine power. A matter composed of disjointed atoms, enduring in a time composed of disjointed instants, accomplishing operations in which each moment was independent of the preceding one and without effect on the following moment, the whole structure subsisting, holding together and functioning only by the will of a God who prevents it from relapsing into nothingness and quickens it by his efficacy—such was the world of the Ash'arites. These theologians have achieved a true "Moslem philosophy," in this sense at least that their conception of the universe was in deep agreement with the Koranic conception of God. A world as wholly innocent of intrinsic necessity as that of the Ash'arites was completely un-Greek; it was a perfectly plastic matter permanently open to the free interventions of Allah's all-powerful will. Because the God of the Old Testament was common to Christianity and to Islam, a similar tendency will sometimes affirm itself in the history of Christian philosophy. It can be recognized by the fact that it criticizes the Greek notion of "nature" as a thoroughly "pagan" notion, inseparable from those of natural necessity and of natural law, impossible to reconcile with the absolute freedom of the all-powerful Christian God. In the French seventeenth century, Malebranche's Occasionalism will be another attempt to reconcile the notion of a created world empty of all intrinsic efficacy with the Greek notion of natural and necessary laws.

No such thing is found in Alfarabi, but that great logician was also a profoundly religious spirit, and it is at least probable that this same sentiment inspired his epoch-making distinction of essence and existence in created beings. It marks a date in the history of metaphysics. Alfarabi, as M. Horten so aptly remarks, showed himself capable of adapting the overwhelming richness of Greek philosophical speculation to the nostalgic feeling for God that the Orientals have, and to his own mystical experience. Indeed, he himself was a mystic, a Sufi: "His notion of contingence is a turning point in philosophical evolution; essence and existence are distinct, that is to say, natural beings are contingent; they are not necessarily bound to existence; consequently, they can either possess it or be deprived of it and lose it. Since they are endowed with existence and form . . . natural beings must have received existence from some cause to which it belongs essentially and which, for that very reason, cannot lose it, that is, from God."

In order to formulate this distinction technically, Alfarabi resorted to a logical remark made by Aristotle: the notion of *what a thing is* does not include the fact *that it is*. Carrying that observation from the logical to

the metaphysical plane, Alfarabi declares, in his *Gem of Wisdom:* "We admit that essence and existence are distinct in existing things. The essence is not the existence, and it does not come under its comprehension. If the essence of man implied his existence, to conceive his essence would also be to conceive his existence, and it would be enough to know what man is, in order to know that man exists, so that every representation would entail an affirmation. By the same token, existence is not included in the essence of things; otherwise it would become one of their constitutive characters, and the representation of what essence is would remain incomplete without the representation of its existence. And what is more, it would be impossible for us to separate them by the imagination. If man's existence coincided with his corporeal and animal nature, there would be nobody who, having an exact idea of what man is, and knowing his corporeal and animal nature, could question man's existence. But that is not the way it is, and we doubt the existence of things until we have direct perception of them through the senses, or mediate perception through a proof. Thus existence is not a constitutive character, it is only an accessory accident." [9]

This important text marked the moment when the logical distinction introduced by Aristotle between the conception of essence and the affirmation of existence became the sign of their metaphysical distinction. The new doctrinal position thus defined is made up of three moments: a dialectical analysis of the notion of essence, which shows that the notion of existence is not included; the affirmation that, since it is so, essence does not entail actual existence; the affirmation that existence is adventitious to essence. In order not to confuse this important metaphysical move with later ones, it should be noted that the primacy of essence dominates the whole argumentation. Not for an instant is there any doubt that existence is a predicate of essence, and because it is not essentially included in it, it is considered an "accident." We are still far away from the Thomistic position, which will deny both that existence is included in essence and that it is accidental to it. With Thomas Aquinas, existence will become the "act" of essence, and therefore the act of being; we are not yet there, but we are on the way to it.

From this point of view, the mental universe of Alfarabi appears as similar to that of the thirteenth-century Christian theologians. It depends on a primary cause in its existence, in the movement which animates it and even in the essences which define the beings of which it is composed. Moreover, the source, or cause, of *what things are* is also the source, or cause, *of the knowledge we have of them.* In his *De intellectu et intellecto,* which frequently appears in mediaeval manuscripts after those of Alexander and of Alkindi, and before that of Albertus Magnus, Alfarabi distinguishes four meanings of the word "intellect": 1) the intellect in potency with regard to the knowledge it can acquire; 2) the intellect in act with regard to that knowledge while acquiring it; 3) the acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*), that is, the intellect considered as already possessed of that knowledge; 4) and finally, the agent intellect, a subsisting spiritual being, who presides over this sublunary world and confers both forms on its matter and actual knowledge on all its intellects. We should not imagine this separate substance as eternally busy providing either this piece of matter with a certain form, or that intellect in potency with some actual cognition. The agent intellect is immutable in his action as he is in his being. Eternally radiating all the intelligible forms, he does not care in what matters nor in what intellects they may happen to be received. When a certain matter has been conveniently prepared by prior forms to receive that of "man," a man is born; when an intellect has been conveniently prepared and trained to receive the intelligible form "man," it conceives the essence of man. The diversity of effects produced by the eternally uniform action of the agent intellect is simply due to the fact that the matters and intellects which come under it are not all, nor always, similarly disposed to receive it. Let us add that this Intelligence is not the supreme cause. Other Intellects rise in tiers above it according to a hierarchical order, and all are subordinated to the First, who resides in his inaccessible solitude. Man's ultimate end is to be united, through intellect and love, to the separate agent intellect, who is the immediate immovable mover and the source of all intelligible knowledge for the world in which we live.[10] The Prophet supremely realizes this union.

Alfarabi was also interested in political philosophy and he dreamed of a world-wide society including all the nations of the earth. Yet, according to him, this terrestrial city could not be in itself its own end; perfect as one may assume it to be, it would remain only a step toward the superterrestrial city and its bliss. On leaving this world, the troops of the living go to join the troops of the dead and are intelligibly united with them, each uniting with those whom he resembles, and by this ceaselessly renewed union of soul to soul, the joys of the dead are fostered, increased and indefinitely enriched. The doctrine of Alfarabi, no less striking by the force of its expression than by the originality of its thought, deserves to be studied for itself. Avicenna probably owed him much more than we imagine; yet, as a matter of fact, and be it only by reason of his remarkable literary fecundity, Avicenna has exercised a much stronger influence on the evolution of mediaeval philosophy than Alfarabi, not only in Mohammedan countries but even in the Christian world.

2. AVICENNA

The influence of Avicenna on mediaeval philosophies and theologies is only one of the many aspects of the all-pervading influence of Aristotle. Yet, his own interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine was so personal on many

answers necessary beings such as God or the separate Intelligences; secondly, non-necessary truth, that is to say, truth about objects whose existence is only possible, or, at least, not impossible. If we consider intelligible objects in their state of separation from matter, then our knowledge of them will apply to essences, irrespective of the matters in which these happen to subsist; if, on the contrary, we consider them in the matters wherein they happen to subsist, then, again, their consideration becomes a twofold one. For indeed, we can consider them together with their own particular matter, for instance the unity of air, the plurality of the elements, etc.; or else we can consider them apart from any particular matter, as we do, for instance, when we speak of aggregation or of segregation with respect to bodies in general.

The division of philosophy follows that of its objects. Its first part deals with those objects which are involved in motion and whose existence depends on that of their proper matters: it is called "natural science." Its second part deals with those objects which exist in matter, but which our understanding can consider apart from matter: it is the science of number, the intellectual "discipline" *par excellence* (i.e., mathematics). The third part deals with those beings which are separate from motion and from matter both in themselves and in our understanding; we call it *scientia divina*, that is "divinity."

Our quest for truth deals with essences, that is to say, with the natures of things. Essences are to be found in three different conditions: in themselves, in concrete things, or in our intellect. Considered such as they are in themselves, they constitute the proper object of metaphysics; considered such as they are in singular things, they constitute the proper object of natural science, or physics; considered such as they are in our intellect, they constitute the proper object of logic. In other words, the proper object of logic is to study what happens to essences in consequence of the fact that they are in our intellect. Many things happen to them, in consequence of this fact, which would not happen if they only existed either in themselves or in the singular individuals which make up the objects of physics. Concepts, judgments, propositions, reasonings, inquiries in order to discover unknown truths by means of already known ones would simply not exist if there were no intellects to perform such operations. These all are about the essences of things, but they do not belong to these essences as such. The essence of man, for instance, is not a concept, nor a definition; it is that of which our intellect can form the concept or the definition. Obviously, we need a science dealing with all these intellectual determinations added to essences by the various operations of the mind. We need it because it provides us with an instrument which, if we use it correctly, will preserve us from error in our quest for truth. In itself, this instrument is a science. It is the science of how to go from what we already know to what we still do not know. There have been many discus-

sions as to whether logic is an instrument of philosophy (an art), or one of its parts (a science). Such discussions are futile because there is no contradiction between these two possibilities. In fact, logic is both an instrument of philosophy and a part of philosophy. It is that part of philosophy whose proper object it is to study and to direct the operations of the mind.

In its content, this logic follows the general lines of that of Aristotle, not however without interpreting some of its theses from the point of view of the metaphysics of Avicenna himself. Its starting point is the distinction between simple apprehensions (*intentiones,* i.e., concepts), and composite enunciations (i.e., judgments). "Man" is a simple apprehension; "man is an animal" is a complex enunciation. Simple apprehensions do not imply any assent; we just conceive them. Complex enunciations are always attended by assent (*credulitas*), in this sense that we are bound either to believe them as true or to disbelieve them as false. Because such enunciations are either affirmations or negations, they are attended by truth or by error. Assent is therefore distinct from simple intellection. I understand the simple apprehensions of "whiteness" and of "accident"; unless I do, I cannot unite them in any judgment; but I cannot say that "whiteness always is an accident" without assenting to the truth of this proposition. If it is neither true, nor probable, nor false, an enunciation does not deserve its name; it is just words.

The true function of nouns is to signify concepts. When we use a noun to signify what a certain essence is, this noun is a predicate. Predication does not say that the essence of the subject is the essence of the predicate. For instance, in saying that "a triangle is a figure" I do not mean to say that the essence of the triangle is the essence of the figure. I only mean to say that, such as I am considering it just now, the thing called "triangle" is the thing called "figure." Predicates are of three different sorts. Some are "essential," that is to say, constitutive of a certain essence or quiddity. For instance, "figure" is an essential predicate of "triangle," because it is of the essence of a triangle to be a figure. Other predicates are inseparable accidents, or concomitants; such determinations follow from the essence, or quiddity, although they do not constitute it. For instance, it is of the essence of the triangle to be constituted by three sides, but the fact that its angles are equal to two right angles is only a concomitant inseparable from its essence. In this sense, as Aristotle had already said, it is an "accident" (*Metaph.,* IV, 30, 1025 a 30-33). Other concomitants, or accidents, are separable; for instance, whiteness with respect to triangle. The Avicennian application of this distinction to "existence," introduces into the logic of Aristotle a metaphysical notion of being borrowed from Alfarabi. Aristotle had only said that since a demonstration can prove only one thing at a time, the reasoning which proves the essence of a thing does not also prove its existence; in short, "what man is, is one thing, and the fact that man exists is another thing" (*Post.*

a body to be that which it is. For instance, in a wooden bed, wood is the matter, and the shape which turns wood into a bed is its form.

The first and most universal of all physical forms is that which makes matter to be a body (*corpus*). It is called the form of corporeity (*forma corporeitatis*). This form is to be found in all bodies, together with other forms. It gives them extension according to the three dimensions of space. The influence of Avicenna can often be detected in a thirteenth-century scholastic theology, owing to the presence of this form of corporeity. In doctrines where "corporeity" remains present under the higher forms (animality, rationality, etc.), the form of corporeity entails the plurality of forms in physical beings. Each being then is made up of a matter plus at least two forms, that of corporeity and, for instance, that of animality. In any case, as Avicenna says, the form of corporeity is prior to all the other forms of physical genera and species, which can never be separated from it (*Sufficientia*, I, 2).

Matter never is without the form of corporeity, but it always has other forms. Taken in itself, it is called *hyle* (matter); taken as endowed with its specific form (*forma specialis*), or with its accidental forms (whiteness, position, etc.), it is called a subject (*subjectum*); taken as common to all physical beings, it is called element.

Apart from these intrinsic principles, bodies have two extrinsic ones. The efficient cause impresses the forms into their matters and it thus constitutes composite beings that act by their forms and undergo by their matter the actions of other forms. The final cause is that on account of which forms have been impressed into their respective matters. Since, in physics, these principles of nature are considered in their absolute generality, they can be said to be the common natural principles, that is, the principles common to all natural beings. For this reason, Roger Bacon and other scholastics will call the physics of Avicenna the *communia naturalium*.

Privation is often quoted as another physical principle, and rightly so, but it should not be understood as something superadded to matter; it is matter itself considered as lacking any one of the formal determinations which it is able to receive. Thus understood, privation is the very aptitude of matter to receive. It is its receptivity. This aptitude is not a desire; it is the mere possibility, inherent in a subject, to receive further formal determinations and perfections.

The efficient principle common to all natural beings is called "nature." Nature is the intrinsic force, or energy, in virtue of which natural beings perform their motions and operations, without choice and in a necessary way. Souls are natures; forms are natures; in short all internal energies are natures, or spring from natures (I, 5). Every natural being, then, has a matter, a form which determines its essence, a nature which causes its motion, and accidents which are its extrinsic determinations. In simple

of Avicenna is due, not to some intervention of the First Cause, but to the matter which enters the structure of the sublunary world, and whose intrinsic imperfection often prevents the form from fully achieving its natural end (IX, 3-5).

The world of Avicenna is not ruled by a particular providence intending the welfare of each individual being. Yet, since it necessarily follows from a perfect cause, it is good, at least on the whole, and even particular imperfections are there in view of the common good. Floods are bad, but the presence of water in the world is in itself a good thing. Fires are dangerous, but fire itself is excellent and, by and large, the world is better with it than without it. There is providence, then, in this sense that the universe is as good as it can possibly be (IX, 6). Besides, since evil is but the privation of the good, just as blindness is but the privation of sight, it has really no cause. And let us not forget that, frequent as it is, evil is much less common than good; otherwise, since non-being would overcome being, there would be no world.

The ultimate end of man is what it had to be in a universe thus conceived. The religious law given by the prophet Mohammed announces the resurrection of bodies, but this is a matter of faith; it cannot be demonstrated by philosophy. The same revelation promises fleshly pleasures to the good and corporal punishments to sinners, as sanctions to be received after death in future life, but philosophers know better. They are expecting a much higher felicity, which consists in the union of their possible intellects with the supreme truth. The perfection and blessedness of the rational soul is to become an intelligible world, that is to say, a contemplation of the universal order of beings known in its intelligible necessity. Those who begin to philosophize during the present life do not cease to seek for knowledge after the death of their bodies. They then continue to do what they have done up to then, only they do it much better than was possible for them while they still were in their bodies. Like paralytics suddenly cured of their disease, souls relieved from their bodies can at long last achieve what had always been the end of their desire. Such is their ultimate end and supreme beatitude, to be conjoined with the lowest separate Intelligence, which is for man the source of all light. Naturally, moral life is a necessary preparation for this reward (IX, 7). And not only moral life, but also political life, including the respect of the religious law established by the Prophet. For indeed, prophecy and revelation teach the same truth as philosophy, only they teach it under a form accessible to the imagination of all men. In the prophetic mind, revelation and philosophical knowledge are one. Religious cult and philosophical speculation are therefore tending toward the same end (X, 3).

The deeply religious inspiration of the doctrine is obvious. Even apart from this, it contained many elements which could not fail to interest the thirteenth-century Christian theologians. A universe of essences distinct

from their existence was a good technical description of a created universe. A human soul substantially distinct from its body, immortal in virtue of its own substantiality and open to the illuminations from on high in virtue of its total immateriality, was eminently suitable to those theologians who, while anxious to maintain the tradition of Saint Augustine, desired to restate it in the language of Aristotle. Last, not least, a universe whose cause was the Necessary Being, a pure existent without essence or quiddity, was exactly what was needed by men whose God was much less the Prime Mover of Aristotle than the WHO IS of the Old Testament. All these positions will be re-interpreted by the Christian theologians of the thirteenth century. On the other hand, the same Christian theologians could not fail to realize the fact that the God of Avicenna, although ontologically separated from merely possible beings by his own necessity, still remained tied up with them in a necessary way. From the very fact that the Necessary Being is, the Avicennian universe of finite beings necessarily follows and, except that accidents occur owing to the presence of matter, it must necessarily be that which it is. Where there is no free choice in God, there is none in man. Avicenna has thus confronted Christian theologians with the problem of reinstating liberty in a world created by a necessary being. We shall see, in due time, how the greatest among them successfully performed this task.

3. AVERROES

However careful he was to leave to revealed theology an open door, Avicenna did not succeed in placating the theologians. Obviously, he was a philosopher before anything else. Among the theologians who opposed his doctrine, one at least must be mentioned because, instead of weakening it, he strengthened its influence. Al Gazali (Algazel), who died about 1111, wrote several important works (*Restoration of Religious Knowledge, Destruction of Philosophers*) none of which was familiar to the mediaeval Latin world. On the contrary, the scholastics have known well his treatise *On the Intentions of the Philosophers,* wherein he contented himself with exposing the doctrines of Alfarabi and of Avicenna, which he intended to refute later on. As a consequence, the scholastics have considered him as a faithful summarizer (*abbreviator*) of the men he wanted to refute[13] and the history of his influence in the Latin world coincides with that of Avicenna's. The steady theological opposition met by Moslem philosophers did not stop the development of philosophy, but it may have been one of the reasons why it migrated from the East to Spain, where it was represented by Avempace, Ibn Thofail and especially by Averroes.

Avempace (Ibn Badja, d. 1138), an Arab living in Spain, equally versed in the sciences and philosophy, left treatises on logic, a book *On the Soul,* the *Guide for the Solitary* and a work *On the Connection of the Intellect with Man* (quoted by Albert the Great under the title *Continuatio intellectus cum homine*). This title clearly suggests what was then the chief problem for the philosophers: to establish contact between rational individuals and the separate agent Intelligence from which they draw their beatitude. *The Guide for the Solitary* was a sort of soul's itinerary toward God, or rather toward the agent Intelligence by which man communicates with the divine world. This doctrine therefore assumed that it was possible for man to work his way up progressively from the knowledge of things to the knowledge of a substance separated from matter. Ibn Badja thought that such was the case. The aim of a science is to know the essences of its objects. From the essence of each object, we can abstract another; and if this latter had one we could extract it in turn; but as one cannot go on to infinity, it must come to a knowledge of an essence which has not in itself any other essence. Such is the essence of the separate Substance, on which our knowledge depends. Note that in such a doctrine the knowledge of any intelligible whatever straightway reaches a separate substance. These reasons, which assimilate the knowledge of an essence abstracted from the sensible to that of an intelligible substance, appeared frivolous to Saint Thomas Aquinas; however Avempace will have the honors in a chapter of the *Contra Gentiles* (III, 41): *Hoc autem quaestionem habet,* Saint Thomas is to admit: that is a question. From time to time, in Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and still others, we also come across a certain Abubacer. He is Abou Bekr ibn Thofaïl, born in Cadiz about 1100, died in Morocco in 1185, a man of encyclopaedic knowledge, like all those Arabs whose learning so far exceeded the knowledge of the Christians of their times. Abubacer's doctrine, like that of Ibn Badja, seems to have been known by the Christians of the thirteenth century particularly through the criticism directed against it by Averroes in his *De anima.* For them he was the philosopher who had identified the possible intellect of man with imagination (*phantasia*). Once suitably prepared, the latter could receive intelligible forms, so that no other "intellect" was required. The Latins were not acquainted with Abubacer's philosophical novel, the *Hayy ben Yaqdhân,* in which he showed how a man living in solitude can rise progressively, through the study of the sciences and the contemplation of the true, up to the knowledge of God and to bliss.[14]

The greatest name in Arabian philosophy, along with Avicenna, is Averroes (*Averrois,* Ibn Rochd), whose influence spread, in many directions, throughout the duration of the middle ages, then in the epoch of the Renaissance and up to the very threshold of modern times. He was another Spanish Arab. Born in 1126 at Cordova, he studied theology, jurisprudence, medicine, mathematics and philosophy. For several years he held the office of a judge, while writing a considerable number of personal works on medicine, astronomy, and philosophy. Some of his commentaries on Aristotle, which earned him, during the middle ages, the title of "Commentator," have come down to us in three different accounts. The Arabian

originals of these works are now partly lost, but we know them through their Latin translations. They bear the names of great and lesser commentaries, the shortest of them being paraphrases or "epitomes." Averroes died in 1198 at the age of seventy-two.[15]

A. *Philosophy and Religion*

One of Averroes' most influential efforts was his attempt to determine the mutual relations of philosophy and religion. He was well aware of the presence of a large number of philosophical and theological sects, whose perpetual dissensions were permanent danger for philosophy as well as for religion. In fact, it was essential to safeguard the rights and liberty of philosophical speculation; but on the other hand, one could not dispute the fact that theologians had some reason to be uneasy in seeing the free discussion of texts from the Koran spread through all quarters.[16] Averroes attributed all the difficulty to the fact that access to philosophy was authorized for minds incapable of understanding it; he saw the remedy in an exact definition of the various levels of comprehension of Koranic texts accessible to different minds, and in the prohibition given to each mind to go beyond the degree accessible to it.

The Koran is truth itself, since it results from a miracle of God, but, as it is intended for mankind as a whole, it must contain what will satisfy and convince all minds. Now there are three categories of minds, and three corresponding kinds of men: first, men of demonstration, who demand demonstrative proofs and insist on attaining knowledge by going from the necessary to the necessary by the necessary: second, dialectical men, who are satisfied with probable arguments: third, men of exhortation, for whom oratorical arguments suffice which call upon the imagination and the passions.

The Koran is addressed simultaneously to these three kinds of minds, and that is what proves its miraculous character; it has an exterior and symbolic meaning for the uninstructed, an interior and hidden meaning for scholars. Averroes' main point is that each spirit has the right and the duty to understand and interpret the Koran in the most perfect way of which it is capable. The one who can understand the philosophical meaning of the sacred text should interpret it philosophically, for its most lofty meaning is the true meaning of revelation, and each time there appears any conflict between the religious text and demonstrative conclusions, it is by interpreting the religious text philosophically that harmony should be re-established.

Two consequences follow immediately from this principle. The first is that a mind should never seek to raise itself above the degree of interpretation of which it is capable; the second is that one should never divulge to inferior classes of minds the interpretations reserved for superior classes. The error into which philosophers have fallen consist precisely in the untimely communication of superior knowledge to inferior minds; as a result of this we have seen arise hybrid methods which mix oratorical art, dialectics and demonstration and are the inexhaustible source of heresies. It is advisable therefore to re-establish in all its exactness the distinction of the three orders of interpretation and teaching: at the peak, philosophy, which gives absolute knowledge and truth; immediately below that, theology, the domain of dialectical interpretation and of mere probability; and at the bottom of the scale, religion and faith, which should be left carefully to those for whom they are necessary. Thus are brought together and graded the three degrees of intellection of one single and same truth.

In such a complex position, conflicts of jurisdiction are inevitable. What is to be done when, on a definite point, philosophy teaches one thing and faith another? What did the Commentator himself really think? The answer is hidden in his most secret conscience. Averroes never broke away from the Moslem community; he never allowed himself the slightest attack against religion, and his very doctrine forbade him to do anything that might weaken a religious faith necessary to the social order; he recognized the reality of prophecy and put the Prophet at the peak of human knowledge, since, in the Prophet's mind, religion and philosophy coincide. Yet, when all is said and done, there is no doubt that Averroes considered philosophical truth as the highest type of human truth. When philosophers and simple believers affirm the same thing, for instance, that there is a supreme felicity for man, the philosophical notion of this beatitude is vastly superior to what revelation says about it. In the doctrine of Averroes, there is absolutely nothing that philosophy does not know better than simple faith, and those who assimilate his position to that of Thomas Aquinas, which has been done, should also remember that, according to Averroes, theology is the worst type of speculation precisely because it is neither faith nor philosophy, but, rather, a corruption of both.

Taken in itself, the work of Averroes was a conscious effort to restore in its purity the philosophy of Aristotle and of his legitimate successors. True enough, it retains a good deal of the Platonism which Alexander of Aphrodisias, among others, had injected into the authentic doctrine of Aristotle; it excludes those aspects of the Platonic tradition which could easily harmonize with religion (e.g., the cosmogony of Plato's *Timaeus*). The thirteenth-century scholastics were not to overlook this aspect of his thought.

Strangely enough, very few men have been more influential than Averroes in shaping the popular notion of mediaeval philosophy which is now currently received as historical truth. In fact, it was Averroes' firm and absolute conviction that philosophical truth and the philosophy of Aristotle were one and the same thing. The formulas in which he expressed his admiration for the Stagirite are well known, and in fact they deserve to be known, for the exclusive cult of Aristotle which they express is a dis-

less, his influence on the Christian thought of the middle ages has been considerable. A Jewish theologian, Maïmonides shared with the Christian theologians their faith in the Old Testament; he therefore had to solve before they did the problem of making it harmonize with true philosophy, and they profited by his example, even when they did not follow him. What many of them retained of his teaching was the fact that, on a number of points, philosophy alone is incapable of attaining the truths contained in revelation. This might well be the most important lesson they learned from him. The criticism directed by Maïmonides against the "kalam," that is, Moslem theology as he knew it, rested on his conviction that theologians have no right to call "philosophical" pseudo-rational arguments whose sole merit it is to agree with the teaching of religious faith. In this respect, Maïmonides has been both an inspiration and a model to Thomas Aquinas.[44]

If we compare the Jewish twelfth century with the Christian, we shall immediately perceive what superiority Jewish thought owed to its close intercourse with Arabian philosophy. In Avicenna, and especially in Averroes, the Jewish philosophers found a whole technical equipment of concepts borrowed from the Greeks, which it only remained for them to utilize. What would have come of it had the powerful mind of an Abélard found itself, through the play of circumstance, the heir to the treasures accumulated by Greek speculation? But Abélard had to use all his lucidity and penetration to reconstruct, from incomplete documents, a substitute for the Aristotelian theory of abstraction. On the one hand, all philosophy already given; or, the other hand, a dialectic turned into an incomplete or uncertain metaphysics. We now are approaching the time when Christian scholasticism is in turn to find itself confronted with those riches hitherto unknown to it. Will it have enough vitality to assimilate them, or will it, on the contrary, unable to dam their flood, allow itself to be swamped by them? Such is the significance of the truly dramatic movement and conflict of ideas which developed at the heart of Christian thought during the first half of the thirteenth century, and whose historical importance is such that even today we continue to feel its repercussions.

soon to put to good use. His still shorter tractate *On Unity*,[5] so full of Boethius that it was attributed to him, blends the Platonism of this Latin writer with those of the school of Chartres, and of Gabirol's *Source of Life*. This booklet is full of striking formulas: *unitas est qua quaeque res una est, et est id quod est* (unity is that by which every thing is one, and is what it is); again: *quidquid est ideo est quia unum est* (all that which is, is, because it is one); and again: *omne esse ex forma est* (all being comes from form). All these principles were common to all the Platonisms, Christian or otherwise, which were to seize upon the scientific world of Aristotle, to take possession of it and reorganize it from within.

The word "complex" has been aptly suggested to describe such doctrinal positions. A doctrinal complex is a more or less organic whole, made up of interrelated theses which are frequently found united despite the diversity of their respective origins. For instance, the Greek notion of entity (*ousia*), is common to practically all theologians before the time of Thomas Aquinas; it comes to them from Plato and Plotinus through Saint Augustine, but it often expresses itself in the language of Boethius (*quod est* and *quo est*), and, after Denis the Areopagite, it sometimes blends with the metaphysics of the One. Still later on, the brand of Platonism proper to Avicenna will add a new feeder to the common Platonic stream. The treatise of Gundissalinus *On Unity* is such a syncretic combination of elements united together by their common neoplatonist inspiration.

What the Latins needed more than anything else was a cosmology, that is, a scientific and metaphysical description of the structure of the universe. All they had at their disposal, before reading Avicenna, was a partial knowledge of the *Timaeus*. True enough, the *Celestial Hierarchy* of Denis presupposed a complete doctrine of the emanation of beings from the One, only its mediaeval readers could not guess it. As soon as they began to read Avicenna, what the Latins retained first was his metaphysical cosmology. All the Platonism diffused through the twelfth century found in it a system of the universe which gave its view a scientific consistency. There is no known instance of a Christian writer accepting the doctrine of Avicenna wholesale and as an absolute philosophical truth. In other words, there does not seem to have been a Latin Avicennism as there is going to be a Latin Averroism in the second half of the thirteenth century, and still more evidently later on. Many Christians have followed Avicenna as far as they could get along with him, but when it came to positing a separate Intelligence as the cause and the ultimate end of man, they had to part company. The Christians owed it to their faith either to push beyond this separate Intelligence to go as far as God, or else to identify it with God. They tried both.

The treatise of Dominicus Gundissalinus *On the Soul* (*De anima*) is an

meetings of the Faculty of Arts, or the general meetings of the university, and to act as their president.

The two main methods of teaching were lectures and disputations. Lecture should be understood in its etymological meaning of "reading." The masters were all expected to read prescribed authors before their students and to explain these texts by appropriate commentaries. In the Faculty of Arts of the University of Paris, most of the reading material was provided by the writings of Aristotle, the list of the prescribed readings varying, however, according to the fluctuations of the church's attitude toward the Philosopher. At the end of the thirteenth century, practically all his writings were on the prescribed list. In the Faculty of Theology, the prescribed readings were Holy Scripture and the *Book of Sentences* of Peter Lombard. Concerning the latter text, the master would often invite his students to read it and content himself with discussing specially selected topics suggested by the book. As time went on, the commentaries became less and less continuous, until they ultimately assumed the form of a series of "questions."

A Disputed Question (*quaestio disputata*) was a formal exercise which occupied an important place in the regular teaching of the universities. A thesis was chosen by the masters; objections could be raised against it, either by himself or by his students, not excluding occasional guests. A younger teacher (*baccalarius*) then upheld the thesis by appropriate arguments and answered the question (*respondens*). The master had always a right to intervene in the discussion and the final conclusion was his. On his next lecturing day, the master could take up again the subject matter of the preceding dispute. He would then restate the thesis, make a choice of arguments against it, announce his own decision, justify it himself as if he were the *respondens* and finally refute the objections. If he wrote it himself, this lecture became a *Quaestio disputata;* if one of the listeners wrote it for him, it became the "reportation" of a Disputed Question. Since the master was free to determine the number of these disputes, he could decide to hold enough of them, within a year or even more, so as to discuss completely the different aspects of one and the same question. Hence the remarkable series of disputed questions found, for instance, in the works of Saint Thomas Aquinas (*Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, etc.*), or of Matthew of Aquasparta (*Quaestiones disputatae de fide, humana cognitione, etc.*).

Apart from these disputes, held in the class of a certain master at his own convenience and for his students, there were public disputations. Each master was free to hold them or not, and they were such an ordeal that not all masters cared to do so. These public disputes had to take place about the second week of Advent and the third or fourth weeks of Lent. Anybody could submit a question on any subject; hence their name of "Quodlibetic Questions" (*Quaestiones de quolibet,* or *quodlibe-*

tales). Naturally, the master could turn down certain questions as unsuitable for discussion. The dispute then followed the usual routine, with this difference however, that any number of masters could intervene in the discussion. In some cases, their number was large. Over and above these lectures and disputes, there were academic sermons preached by masters before the university; in some of these sermons, general questions pertaining to theology, sometimes even to philosophy, could be debated at length and the history of philosophy or of theology has often to learn from them.

If we consider the course of studies and the conferring of degrees (which, like universities, seems to be a mediaeval innovation), it appears that, despite numerous local variations and many irregularities in Paris itself, the complete and typical career, in the eyes of the university people of the middle ages, was that of the Parisian master. According to the statutes of Robert of Courson in 1215, at least six years of study and twenty-one years of age were required for anyone teaching the liberal arts, and at least eight years of study and thirty-four years of age for theology. A student in arts first passed his baccalaureate (B.A.), then his licentiate's degree, following which he gave his first lecture and received the title of master of arts (M.A.). If he then wished to become a theologian, he passed three more baccalaureates: biblical (*baccalarius biblicus*), sententiary (*baccalarius sententiarius*), complete bachelor (*baccalarius formatus*). After this, the young theologian had to beg, and to obtain from the Chancellor, leave to teach theology. If and when it had been granted, he could give his first lecture (*principium*) and thus receive the title of master in theology. The number of the chairs of theology being limited (twelve in 1254) not all masters could have one. A master provided with a chair was a full professor (*magister regens*). The Dean of the Faculty of Theology of Paris was the elder among those of the full professors who were secular priests.

The teaching methods of the universities exercised a deep influence on the technique of theological and philosophical thinking. It became more and more technical according to the rules of the dialectics of Aristotle. The "question" (*aporia*) is the typical expression of this method. All the main products of this school teaching are either isolated disputed questions or aggregates of disputed questions ordered according to some organic plan. Naturally, variations were always possible. From time to time, a mediaeval master could write a continuous opuscule, or treatise, in the more traditional form used by the Fathers of the Church. Yet, by and large, the "question" remained, up to the end of the middle ages, the favorite mode of exposition of personal thought for the masters of the university. It was the living cell of school teaching.[22]

Since the reading of certain books was compulsory in both faculties, the commentaries of the master could be written by him and circulated

teaching as it was given at Paris; their masters were interchangeable and, like the scholastic Latin they used, their spirit was practically the same. All these universities shared in the doctrinal unity of the Catholic Church. Nevertheless, they seem to have undergone a twofold evolution. In the beginning, these universities were made out of masters and students, that is, of men. They had no special buildings, no libraries, no endowments, no personnel. Especially from the fifteenth century on, they progressively established themselves on a more solid material basis. Spiritually speaking, they underwent a still deeper change. Instead of remaining Church institutions, they progressively became national ones. This change became unavoidable from the time when many centers of learning were created, in different European countries, by local authorities or local princes whose protection mediaeval schools had to buy at the price of their academic freedom. Yet, the same tendency seems to have spontaneously germinated in the University of Paris itself, especially in its Law School, as early as the thirteenth century, on the occasion of the political difficulties arising between the Holy See and the French kings. The transition from the old universalist University of Paris to our modern type of nationalistically-minded modern universities, has been a slow and steady one. Without despairing of the future, those of us who still believe in the absolutely universal value of intellectual culture, and of truth, must look for their golden age in the past.

CHAPTER III

EARLY THIRTEENTH-CENTURY THEOLOGIANS

GUNDISSALINUS' effort to assimilate the teaching of the Arabian philosophies but recently discovered had clearly revealed the difficulty of the undertaking and what risks Christian faith ran in it. Pope Gregory IX's warning to the theologians of Paris (July 7, 1228), to teach a theology pure of worldly learning (*sine fermento mundanae scientiae*), without any mixture of philosophical figments (*non adulterantes verbum Dei philosophorum figmentis*), was practically impossible to follow in a university where these figments had to be taught. To back up and return simply to the old liberal arts seemed desirable to many, but was averred impossible. Since nothing could stop the flow of philosophical studies, the theologians attempted at least to dam it up.

I. PARIS: W. OF AUVERGNE

Little is known even yet of the first efforts in this direction. The earliest seem to date from the end of the twelfth century, such as the *Commentary*

proprie vel naturam lucis habens). Propagation or manifestation, it is all one. Augustine had already said, after Saint Paul (Ephes., 5, 13), that all manifestation is light; moreover, light is not only life, but also "exemplary force," as is seen from the fact that the forms of things only appear in light. Once these principles are posited, one can deduce a hierarchy of distinct substances, ranging from the noblest to the humblest according to whether their light is more or less separated from matter: God, the pure Intelligences, human souls as movers of their bodies, bodies in which light shades off into heat, and in which it causes life and movement, until it peters out in inert matter.

The *Memoriale* is, if not exactly a *de fluxu entis,* at least a picture of the universal illumination to which Denis, Augustine, Gundissalinus and Gabirol all contributed something. The main current of Parisian speculation took, about 1230, a different direction. Not that the light-metaphysics disappeared then from Paris; on the contrary, it is clearly visible in Saint Bonaventure. Traces of it are generally to be found everywhere the Augustinian doctrine of the necessity of God's illumination of the soul for the cognition of truth is maintained.

2. OXFORD

It is an accepted view that while logic was dominant in France, scientific studies were flourishing in England. There is a sense in which this is undoubtedly true. Ever since the end of the twelfth century there had been in England men endowed with scientific interests and aptitudes, the like of whom could not be found in France during the early years of the thirteenth century. But the Parisian masters in theology were not slow in making some use of Aristotle. The *Summa aurea* of William of Auxerre (1215-1220), Roland of Cremona (1229-1232), Philip the Chancellor (*Summa de bono,* 1230-1236) William of Auvergne (*De universo* and *De anima,* 1231-1236) all bear witness to their awareness of the fact that there was such a thing as pagan philosophy. At that time, no such theological development seems to have taken place in England. Yet, as will be seen, Robert Grosseteste was pursuing there an entirely different type of theological work, which put to good use all the resources of optics and of mathematics.

The explanation for this difference is to be found in the work of Adelard of Bath, of Daniel of Morley, of Alfred of Sareshel and several other late twelfth-century English scholars who spread the new Arabic learning in their country. Although the scientific value of some of their writings seems to have been somewhat overrated (for instance, in the case of Alexander Neckam) they certainly created a tradition of learning far superior in these matters to anything that could then be found on the continent.[39]

When we consider scholars and writers no longer interested in the

By fine-spun reasoning, Grosseteste thinks he can prove that the result of this infinite self-multiplication of form and matter must needs be a *finite* universe. His main argument is that "the multiplication of a simple being an infinite number of times must produce a finite quantity." For indeed an infinite quantity exceeds a simple being, not only by infinity, but by infinity times infinity.[44] At any rate, light, which is simple, must extend matter, which is equally simple, until it reaches the limit of its propagation. Thus is formed a finite sphere, wherein matter is at the ultimate limit of rarefaction on the edges, becoming thicker and denser, on the contrary, the nearer it is to the center. After this first movement of expansion which sets the limits of the universe, central matter remains capable of further rarefaction. This is the reason why corporeal substances are endowed with activity.

When the whole possibility of the rarefaction of light (*lux*) is exhausted, the exterior limit of the sphere constitutes the firmament, which in turn reflects a light (*lumen*) toward the center of the world. It is the action of that reflected light (*lumen*) which successively generates the nine celestial spheres, the lowest of which is the sphere of the Moon. Below this lowest celestial sphere, inalterable and immovable, are spread in order the spheres of the elements: fire, air, water and earth. The earth concentrates within itself the actions of all the superior spheres; that is why the poets call it Pan, that is, the Whole; for all the superior lights are gathered in it and the virtues of all the spheres can be "educed from it into act and operation." It is Cybele, the common mother from whom all the gods can be procreated.[45]

Robert Grosseteste's principal merit is not, perhaps, to have imagined this cosmogony of light; he must be lauded still more for having chosen that conception of matter because it allowed the application of a positive method to the study of natural sciences. Before his pupil, Roger Bacon, and with a clarity which leaves nothing to be desired, he affirms the necessity of applying mathematics to physics. There is an extreme utility in considering lines, angles and figures because, without their help, it is impossible to know natural philosophy: *utilitas considerationis linearum, angulorum et figurarum est maxima quoniam impossibile est sciri naturalem philosophiam sine illis*. Their action makes itself felt in the whole universe and in each of its parts: *valent in toto universo et partibus ejus absolute*.[46] That is why Grosseteste wrote his opuscule *On Lines, Angles and Figures*. In it he defines the normal mode of propagation of natural forces, which follows a straight line, either directly or according to the laws of reflection and refraction. As to figures, the two it is indispensable to know and to study are the sphere, because light multiplies spherically; and the pyramid, because the most powerful action that a body can exert on another is the one which starts from the whole surface of the agent to concentrate on one single point of the patient. The essential part of physics

sublunary world. And there is particular nature, which is the ruling virtue of each particular species as well as of each one of the individuals it contains. From the point of view of the operations of nature, the more universal goes first: nature proceeds from substance to body, then to animal. But from the point of view of nature's intention, the particular goes before the universal: nature does not stop at producing animal, it produces horse, or rather "horses," that is, not only a species, but completely determined individuals. What is true in philosophy is equally true in theology. Each individual is more noble than its own universal (*singulare est nobilius quam suum universale,* II, 95). Now, Bacon says, since I deal with all matters in view of theology (*quia omnia quae tracto sunt propter theologiam,* II, 95), let us observe that God has not made this world for man in general, but for individual persons; God has not created mankind; he has redeemed, not man in general, but singular persons; he has not prepared beatific vision for universal man, but for a certain number of personally chosen men. All this shows that "the singular is better than the universal." This is what Aristotle says in the First Book of his *Posterior Analytics:* Farewell, *genera* and *species!* How could they bring about anything? They are monsters (II, p. 95).

This is a point which Bacon intends to enforce because he knows that the rank and file are against it. Ignorant persons, he says, love universals (*homines imperiti adorant universalia,* II, 86). Hence their ceaseless questions about what turns species into individuals. This is the big and insoluble problem of the principle of individuation. In fact, it is a foolish question. Since the intention of nature is to produce individuals, nature itself, which makes individuals, is the cause of individuation. When such people ask us what can be the cause of individuation, since neither the species nor something added to the species can cause it, we should ask them in turn what is the cause of universality, since neither the individual nor something added to the individual can cause it! Theirs is a silly question, because it supposes that an individual can be caused by nothing else than a species, plus something. Singulars are made up of singular constituents just as universals are made up of universal constituents. God makes things as they should be: a man according to his nature and a donkey according to its own, a universal nature if many individuals are to agree in it and a singular nature if it is to be that of only one single individual. There is indeed a great deal of nonsense in this problem they raise about individuation (II, 101).

This is a good example of how a doctrine can be at the origin of several other ones. The plurality of forms, as Bacon conceives it, anticipates the similar position of Duns Scotus. At the same time, his insistence on the singularity of all that is real will find an echo in many early fourteenth-century doctrines, most of them opposed to Scotism. The remark of Bacon,

(XI, 160): namely, the essence, or quiddity, which is the complete reality of every being (X, 207-208).

In investigating being and its causes, metaphysics has to posit a non-caused cause whose proper effect is *esse*, being (XII, 89-95). God is the first eternal efficient cause; acting by his will, he is the source whence all beings flow according to their natural order (VII, 57). He is one and eternal; great by his power, which is identical with the infinity of his essence; generous, as one who gives without needing to receive anything (VII, 57-61). Since he is perfect, God is endowed with knowledge: not, however, a knowledge derived from things, but one which is their cause (VII, 78 and 84-85). Although his knowledge is identical with his essence, God knows not only himself, but all beings (VII, 88), whose ideal forms are eternally contained in him. His cognition of other things is achieved through that of their formal principles, or exemplars (VII, 93), in which they are known more truly than in themselves (VII, 95). Possible beings are as well known to him as actual ones. Let us note that, since possibles are included in their eternal exemplars, they are not mere non-beings (VII, 98).

The word "exemplar" signifies a form present in the mind of an artisan.[22] As a principle of cognition, it is called "Idea," or "species." As a principle of operation, it is called "form"; as a principle of both cognition and operation, it is called "exemplar" (VII, 111). In God, there is only one exemplar, neither created nor made, in whose unity the multiplicity of all possible beings is contained (VII, 112-115).

God is immobile; he moves all things because he is their ultimate end (VII, 139-140). He can move them all because he knows them all through his own substance, which is the Idea of all that is (VII, 148). It is therefore an error to posit, under the sphere of the moon, a separate substance such as the "giver of forms" of Avicenna, at least if we understand it as a natural and necessary cause of all motions and cognitions in the sublunary world. Like Albert the Great, Roger Bacon maintains that God is the agent intellect of all that is, so much so that, in comparison with him, man is merely "possible." No doubt, angels have in themselves intelligible forms, but these are not the very forms which are to be found later on either in matter or in our intellects (XII, 62). All forms ultimately come from the divine Ideas, through the will and power of God. Angels can help us in knowing; they even are, with respect to our intellect, active separate substances, because our own intellect has not enough natural light; in this sense, it is fitting that angels should irradiate our intellect, according to their will, in order to help us in acquiring merits (X, 37). Nevertheless, speaking in his own name as well as on behalf of the whole tradition, Bacon maintains that God is the prime and universal cause of all created forms, such as these are found either in actual existence or in human cognitions.

scientific knowledge and, in particular, of the most perfect of all sciences, experimental science.

Experimental science (*scientia experimentalis*), whose name seems to appear for the first time in the history of human thought under the pen of Roger Bacon, prevails over all the other kinds of knowledge by a triple prerogative. The first is that, as we have said, it engenders a complete certitude. The other sciences start from experiences considered as principles and deduce their conclusions from them by way of reasoning; but if they wish to have in addition the complete and particular demonstration of their own conclusions, they are forced to seek it from experimental science. This is what Roger Bacon proves at great length in a series of chapters devoted to the theory of the rainbow. The second prerogative of that science is that it can take up at the point where each of the other sciences ends and demonstrate conclusions that they could not attain by their own means. An example of discoveries that are found at the limit of the sciences without being either their conclusions or their principles is the increased length of human life, which will crown medicine, but which speculative medicine alone could not achieve. The third prerogative of experimental science is not relative to the other sciences, but consists in the proper power which enables it to peer into the secrets of nature, to discover the past, the future and to produce so many marvelous effects that it will secure power to those who possess it. This is what the Church should take into consideration, in order to be sparing of Christian blood in its struggle against the unbelievers. This science would enable us to foresee the perils that will attend the coming of Anti-Christ, perils which it would be easy for the Church to prevent, with the grace of God, if the princes of the world and the popes would favor the study of experimental science and carry on the search for the secrets of nature and of art.[29]

Roger Bacon's *Opus majus* does not present itself as an exposition of Christian wisdom, for the learning necessary to it still remains to be acquired. Bacon only intends to urge the pursuit of research, and especially the practice of experiment. This is the theme he goes over tirelessly: here reasoning does not prove anything, everything depends on experience (*Nullus sermo in his potest certificare, totum enim dependet ab experientia*). Beyond describing this method, of which he is sure, Bacon can give us only samples of its fecundity. This accounts for the encyclopedic character of his main work, in which we come across successively: the analysis of the conditions required for a serious study of scientific languages, an exposition of the mathematical method with examples of its application to sacred and profane sciences, a treatise on geography, a treatise on astrology and its uses, one on vision, a description of the experimental method and an ethical doctrine borrowed from Seneca and other ancient moralists. All these speculations attest a very extensive erudition, a lively taste for concrete

The only Masters of Arts teaching philosophy as if there were no theology, in the first half of the thirteenth century, were the logicians, not at all because they themselves were not interested in theological problems (for many of them became theologians) but because, by reason of its abstract nature, logic afforded few opportunities to deal with properly theological questions. Since it dealt with beings of second intention, logic was not a *scientia realis;* because they were not handling reality, its teachers had a free hand. Moreover, the teaching of logic had been part and parcel of mediaeval learning ever since the discovery of Boethius, whose work had been continued by Abbo of Fleury, renewed by Abélard and perfected by his successors. Discussions about logic should be conceived as distinct from the metaphysical controversies about the nature of universals which had developed around the *Isagoge* of Porphyry. Logic *qua* logic was henceforward at stake, and the Faculty of Arts was the proper place to study it.

In his *Battle of the Seven Arts,* Henry of Andelys has named several logicians well known in his own times, but of whom we know very little. The armed forces of Dame Logic were under the command of Pierron of Courtenay, "a very learned logician," whose lieutenants were John le Page, Pointlane of Gamaches and Nicole (lines 51-56). We do not know who Pierron of Courtenay was, but both Pointlane of Gamaches (*Pungensasinum*) and John le Page (*Johannes Pagus, Pagius*) have been identified.[34] They had certainly been Masters of Arts and, consequently, professors of logic, but our documents also attribute to them commentaries on the *Sentences,* and consider them as theologians. Nevertheless, John le Page seems to have written a treatise in logic: *Appellationes seu syncategoremata,* a subject matter which called for few properly philosophical developments.

An extremely precious document discovered by M. Grabmann[35] enables us to form an opinion about the kind of teaching given at the Faculty of Arts in the second quarter of the thirteenth century (*ca.* 1240). The Introduction to this interesting treatise clearly defines its object: "The number and difficulty of the questions, especially those asked at examinations, are a burden all the heavier because they are exceedingly widespread and arise from various disciplines without having any order or continuity about them. With this in mind, we thought it would be useful to present a sort of résumé of those questions with their answers, and to explain what was most important to know, following a certain continued order and beginning with what philosophy is, whose name is common to all these disciplines." The author then begins with a series of definitions, the knowledge of which is still precious to those who read nowadays the philosophical or theological works of the middle ages. *Philosophia* designates the search for and discovery of causes, the outcome of the love of knowledge; *scientia* designates a *habitus* of the soul, that is, the firm possession of a certain knowledge; *doctrina* is the communication of knowledge by the master, in the schools, by means of teaching; *disciplina* expresses the spiritual link between the master and the pupil; *ars* signifies the method of exposition and the technique of a science; *facultas,* the last, emphasizes the facility of elocution and expression, the alertness of mind and the resources to be drawn from a science, somewhat as we give the name *facultates* to acquired wealth. Following these indications, the handbook classifies the various sciences, or branches of philosophy, which it divides into natural philosophy, whose principle is nature studied in its various degrees of abstraction (mathematics, physics, metaphysics); moral philosophy, whose domain is subject to the will; rational philosophy, whose principle is reason. Next come the indications of books, principally those by Aristotle, in which these sciences are set forth, and the questions habitually propounded at examinations. By far the larger part of the question bears on "rational philosophy," which is here divided into grammar, rhetoric and logic. In grammar, the classical textbooks of Donatus and Priscian are used and great importance is ascribed to speculative grammar. On the contrary, comparatively few questions deal with the philosophy of nature and metaphysics; a larger number deal with ethics. If this document represents the real situation obtaining at the Parisian Faculty of Arts between 1230 and 1240, we may safely conclude that, up to that date, the center of gravity of its philosophical teaching was speculative grammar, logic and ethics. The repeated interdictions to teach the other books of Aristotle, in 1210, 1215, and even as late as 1231, certainly exercised a delaying influence on the spread of the new philosophical learning. But another cause contributed to the same result. Professors of logic had been plentiful ever since the early twelfth century, whereas there were no masters prepared to teach biology, physics, astronomy, psychology or metaphysics. In these domains, there was no school tradition. The remarks made later on by Bacon, when he remembered the early efforts of "few" and often discouraged masters, who wrote nothing, to teach these difficult texts, throw a vivid light on the situation then obtaining. His own teaching of the philosophical and scientific writings of Aristotle did not begin earlier than 1240. Apart from always possible discoveries, there is little hope for us to gather precise information concerning the early attempts to teach the scientific books of Aristotle at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Paris.

Not so with logic. The *Introductions to Logic* by William of Sherwood, an English master in Paris during the first half of the thirteenth century (d. after 1267), seem only to have survived thanks to a unique Paris manuscript which has recently been edited.[36] The circulation of this introductory work seems, therefore, to have been somewhat restricted, perhaps because of the extraordinary success of the slightly later but

simple faith, then, is to render "intelligible" this "credible" by adding reason to it. As he says in the first question of the Prologue to his commentary on the *Sentences:* the subject matter of theology is the believable turned into intelligible owing to an addition of reasoning (*credibile, prout tamen credibile transit in rationem intelligibilis, et hoc per additamentum rationis*). To study what may be called the "philosophy of Saint Bonaventure" is first of all to abstract from his theological speculation the rational elements which he intentionally added to faith in order to achieve its understanding. Here again, as in the case of all his contemporaries, abstraction entails no separation. The connecting link between faith and reason is love. The human soul is destined to enjoy the infinite good which is God. This supreme good is now confusedly and obscurely grasped by man through faith; for a rational being, nothing is more desirable than to understand what he firmly believes and loves; thus, because theology is born of an effort to understand faith, a new rational speculation arises from it.

A. *God*

This theological speculation finds itself confronted with different objects. Some exceed the power of human reason and belong to theological speculation alone because they necessarily require faith at the origin of argumentation. When the starting point either is, or includes, an act of faith, philosophy can still be put to good use by the theologian, but his conclusions are irrelevant to philosophy. On the contrary, when natural reason can grasp a certain object, then, even though it may be offered to man as a "credible," this object retains the formal reason of "intelligible" as common to all objects of rational speculation. To express in concrete terms this general attitude, let us say that, in the mind of Saint Bonaventure, faith leads the way and reason is its fellow traveler. At a certain point, reason has to stop, because it ceases to see what faith is still able to grasp. Up to that point, however, reason is able to see, in its own light, something of what revelation offers us to believe. The larger part of these naturally knowable truths included in theological learning are related to God and to man, that is, to man and to his ultimate end.

Saint Bonaventure's doctrine can be characterized as an "itinerary of the soul toward God," or, rather, up to him. It teaches "how man goes to God through other things." Accordingly, his outlook on man and things will be dominated by a twofold tendency; first, to conceive the sensible world as the road that leads to God; next, to conceive man as a creature naturally open to the divine light and God as revealing himself to man through the whole gamut of his illuminations. The mystical trend of the doctrine is immediately apparent to the reader of Saint Bonaventure; it accounts for his effort to retain as much as he could of the doctrines of Augustine and of Denis even while speaking the language of Aristotle.

not without reason designated by the name "Augustinism." Although he combined Ibn Gabirol with Saint Augustine, it was really from the philosophical elements present in Augustine's doctrine that the principles of Bonaventure's conception of God were borrowed, together with his conception of human knowledge and the nature of things. But, even after having redistributed between their numerous sources all the elements of that synthesis, the existence of a spirit of Saint Bonaventure and an attitude truly personal to him must still be recognized. One frequently imagines, in reading his *Opuscules* or even his *Commentary on the Sentences,* a Saint Francis of Assisi gone philosopher and lecturing at the University of Paris. The confident ease and deep emotion with which Brother Bonaventure discovers in things the very visage of God, closely resemble the sentiments of Francis, reading like an illuminated manuscript the beautiful book of nature. And no doubt, sentiments are not doctrines, but it happens that they engender doctrines. To that permanent emotion of a heart that feels itself near to God we owe the refusal to follow up to its very final consequences the philosophy of Aristotle, and the persistent maintenance of an intimate contact between creatures and their creator.

D. *The Bonaventurian School*

Representatives of this doctrinal complex are to be found everywhere in the second part of the thirteenth century, at Paris, Oxford and in Italy. These university centers were communicating at that time, as one did not leave Christendom in going from one to the other. Augustinians belonged to all the religious Orders, but most of them were Franciscan Brothers, and it is the members of this group that we are to study. Some of their names are still for us only the symbols of important works, largely unedited and consequently not well known, whose meaning will perhaps appear some day to be quite different from what we suppose it to be.

Such a surprise, however, is hardly to be expected with regard to Eustachius of Arras (d. 1291). This disciple of Saint Bonaventure gives the appearance, at least in the texts already published, of a resolute partisan of the doctrine of divine illumination.[25] To explain our knowledge of bodies, he admits that their substantial form can attain the intellect through the senses. This invites us to imagine that, in spite of his Aristotelian terminology, the substantial forms of which Eustachius speaks, differed only slightly from forms as Bonaventure conceived them.

Another disciple of Saint Bonaventure, Walter of Bruges (d. 1307), left a *Commentary on the Sentences* (Bks. I, II, IV) that is almost entirely unpublished, and important *Disputed Questions,* which give evidence of his fidelity to the principles of Saint Augustine. He himself declared that he trusted more to Augustine and Anselm than to the Philosopher, and this statement is in keeping with the few published texts we already have

at our disposal. The hylomorphic composition of spiritual substances (souls and angels), direct knowledge of the soul by itself, the doctrine of divine illumination, the immediate certitude of the existence of God, are so many Bonaventurian theses that Gauthier must have taught at Paris about 1267-1269, and which belong—all of them—to the Augustinian complex.[26]

The work of Saint Bonaventure's famous Italian disciple, Matthew of Aquasparta,[27] is also largely unpublished, but it has been better studied than the works of Walter of Bruges. Matthew had a clear mind, and if not in his commentary on Peter Lombard which seems to be an immature work,[28] at least in his admirably constructed disputed questions, he often clarifies points which Bonaventure had left unsettled. Faithful as he is to his master, there are nevertheless many points on which Matthew goes his own way. For instance, he stresses the unity of the human composite more forcefully than Bonaventure had done.[29] On the whole, however, his doctrine is mainly a development of that of his great predecessor.

The end of human knowledge is not speculation, but love.[30] Matthew knows well the various doctrines of the intellect.[31] He himself thinks, with Aristotle, that the soul is created as a tablet on which nothing is written, but he looks for a conciliation between Aristotle and Augustine (p. 285) and he seems to find it (naturally enough) in Avicenna (p. 286), who, like Augustine, admits a certain activity of the sensitive powers. The soul itself makes its sensations; it progressively purifies the species from sense to imagination, and when the species is in its supreme state of purity, it is, so to speak, ready for the intellect. Averroes calls it "the intention understood in potency." The agent intellect then transforms it into the possible intellect and makes it to be understood in act.[32] And this, Matthew concludes, is what the Philosopher calls to abstract.

It cannot be doubted that Aristotle is here providing a new language for what nevertheless remains the doctrine of Augustine. The fact becomes evident in the texts where Matthew describes our cognition of purely intelligible objects (p. 49) when these are present to the soul and seen in the light of the divine illumination. On this point, his doctrine is an amplified restatement of that of Saint Bonaventure.[33] There is no better witness to its authentic meaning than Matthew of Aquasparta. So far as we can judge from the now-known texts, the rest of the doctrine moved within the same circle as that of his Franciscan colleagues, but it would not be wise, with the scanty information at our disposal, to be too assertive on this point.[34]

The remarkable interest some Franciscan theologians took in the Arabian *Perspectivae* (treatises on optics), notably in the one by Alhacen, is easily explained. The science of light, optics taught the laws of that sensible light which symbolized in their eyes the invisible light with which God illuminates every man who comes into this world. Nothing was more

same accord between theology and philosophy that one always finds between cause and effect. The best way to reveal their fundamental agreement is to start with principles which are recognized and avowed by all. This is the reason why Ramon proposes the list of notions which figure on his tables, as principles common to all disciplines, self-evident, and without which there could be neither science nor philosophy.[59] These principles are: goodness, greatness, eternity or duration, power, wisdom, will, virtue, truth and glory; difference, agreement, contrariety, principle, means, end, greater, equality, smaller. All beings are either implied in these principles, or develop according to their essence and their nature. Ramon Lull adds to his list—and therein lies the secret of the *Great Art*—the rules which allow the correct combining of these principles; he even invented revolving figures which made it possible to combine them more easily, and all the combinations that Lull's tables make possible precisely correspond to all the truths and all the secrets of nature that the human intellect can attain in this life.

The rules which control all the possible combinations of those principles are a series of general questions applicable to all that is, for instance: what, why, how, which, when, where, and others of the same kind. As to the operations which enable us to relate particular things to universal principles by means of rules, they assume logical and metaphysical notions which Lull seems to put on the same level as the rest and to consider as equally evident. In a dialogue in which we see Lull convince an exceptionally docile Socrates, the Greek philosopher accepts as naturally evident propositions from which immediately results a demonstration of the Trinity. For instance, Lull considers as one of the rules of his art that human intelligence can rise above the verifications of the senses and even correct them; he also asks Socrates to admit that reason can criticize itself, with God's help, and sometimes recognize in itself the reality of a divine influence, whose effects it feels even though it cannot understand it. Socrates willingly admits that the intellect transcends the senses and must sometimes even transcend itself in recognizing the necessary existence of things which it does not understand.[60] Lull's art largely consists in begging ahead of time the principles from which the expected agreement must necessarily follow. But the technical processes thanks to which he believed he could teach the uninstructed and convince the unbelievers contained the germ of an idea which had quite a future. Those revolving tables on which Lull inscribed his fundamental concepts are the first attempt of that "combinative Art" that Leibniz, who remembered his mediaeval predecessor, also failed to constitute. It is by no means certain that the project of Ramon Lull is dead.

The influence of the *Doctor Illuminatus* was felt along other lines, at least one of which deserves to hold our attention. It is an old Christian idea that God revealed himself in two books, the Bible and the Book of

the World.[61] Scotus Erigena's "theophanic" universe, the *liber creaturarum* of William of Auvergne and Saint Bonaventure, in fact the whole symbolism of the Lapidaries and the Bestiaries, without forgetting the symbolism that decorated the porches of mediaeval cathedrals or shone in their windows, were so many testimonials of a general confidence in the translucency of a universe in which the least of all beings was a living token of the presence of God. If, as is commonly believed, he was associated with the Franciscan Order, Lull had not far to look to make acquaintance with this universe. Saint Francis of Assisi and Saint Bonaventure had lived in no other one. Let us recall Saint Bonaventure's words: "the created world is like unto a sort of book in which the Trinity which made it is read," and let us compare them with those in which, speaking of himself, Lull describes that illumination he had one day in the solitude of Mount Randa: "It seems as though a light had been given him with which to discern the divine perfections, as to some of their properties and their mutual relationships, with all the connections there are between them . . . By that same light, he knew that the whole created being is nothing but an imitation of God" (*eodem lumine, cognovit totum esse creaturae nihil aliud esse quam imitationem Dei*). Obviously the illuminations of the "Illuminated Doctor" and of the "Seraphic Doctor" coincide. It can also be seen how the vision of Ramon Lull became the very foundation of his doctrine: the Great Art is possible only if, all creatures being so many images of God, or at least his more or less remote imitations, their fundamental properties, and the mutual relations of these properties, enable us to know the nature and attributes of God. Inversely, if the Great Art is possible, the method which permits us to combine the perfections of creatures in all possible ways should yield at the same time all possible combinations of the perfections of God. Let us grant, however, that when it is used to this end, the science of things becomes theology, but this is what Lull had wanted it to be from the very beginning.

CHAPTER II

SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGIANS IN ENGLAND

THE doctrinal continuity of the Franciscan School initiated by Alexander of Hales and promoted by Saint Bonaventure should not be construed as meaning that each religious order had its own theology. First, the Franciscan Order has never dedicated itself to the promotion of only one theology; Bonaventure, Duns Scotus, even Ockham, have always found Franciscan supporters. Secondly, up to the rise of Thomism, a large number of common theological positions were upheld by both Dominicans

With the exception of Robert Grosseteste, who heads the list of famous Oxonians, the great English masters of the thirteenth century belong to one of the two great Mendicant Orders. The study of the English secular masters is still much less advanced than that of their Parisian colleagues. Very little is known of Robert of Winchelsea (d. 1313), the author of theological questions; of Henry Wile (d. 1329), who left Questions *De anima,* or of Gilbert Segrave (d. 1316), of whom Leland remarked that his works were often met, in Oxford libraries and elsewhere, but none of which have been identified. The only one of these English secular masters who recently came out of obscurity is Simon Faversham (d. 1306), whose Questions on the *Categories* and on Book III *De anima* were recently published.[83] These are the clear and concise notes of a professor well-informed on the Greek and Arabian commentaries of the works he discusses, and whom his moderate opinions do not involve in any adventures. He carefully avoids Averroism, betrays no inclination toward Augustinism, and generally stresses, in his Questions *De anima,* solutions analogous to Saint Thomas Aquinas'. Ever since about 1270, but still more markedly by the end of the thirteenth century, it becomes impossible to interpret the philosophical or theological positions of the mediaeval masters without taking Thomism into consideration.

CHAPTER III

THOMAS AQUINAS

I. THE THOMISTIC REFORMATION

No two doctrines of the masters we have studied so far can be said to be identical, but they all had in common a certain number of fundamental positions, or, at least, they all shared in common a limited number of possible doctrinal positions among which they made their choice.

Among these positions, one at least has been maintained by all the masters we have studied, and this without a single exception, since it includes even Albert the Great. It is the definition of the soul as a spiritual substance. This was the unanimous opinion of all. Taken in itself, the soul is a substance. Naturally, since man is one, this substance implies, in its very essence, some sort of relation to its body. Some would call it a "unibility," others a love or an inclination; still others preferred to say that soul is, secondarily, the act and perfection of its body, but not one of them would uphold the view that the very essence of this substance was to be the form of a body. The origin of their position is well known. It is the definition of man given by Plato in the *Alcibiades,* and inherited from him, through Plotinus, by Saint Augustine: man is a soul that uses a body. To the extent that all the masters we have studied are indebted to

Augustine, directly or indirectly, for their notion of the soul, they all are Augustinians.[84]

In the doctrine of Augustine himself, this position entails several other ones. In noetics, the active nature of sense perception conceived as an act of the soul rather than a passion; the possibility for such a spiritual substance to receive from God the complement of light it needs in order to form necessary judgments about purely intelligible objects; an intrinsic aptitude to know itself directly and by a sort of immediate experience. Among these corollaries, one at least has been maintained by all masters before Saint Thomas Aquinas, namely, the doctrine of the divine illumination conceived as a light required for the perfect cognition of necessary truth over and above the natural light of the changeable intellect of man. Even those among the theologians anterior to Saint Thomas who accept the distinction between the possible intellect and the agent intellect, not without interpreting it sometimes in curious ways, unanimously agree in positing, over and above the active intellect of man, a superagent Intellect which is none other than the Interior Master of Saint Augustine or the Intelligible Sun of the *Soliloquies*. Peter of Spain, so far as we know, is the only one who, having expressed himself on the subject, neglected to add to the separate agent Intelligence of Avicenna the illuminating God of Augustine. The reason for this probably is that he was writing a *De anima*, not a metaphysics. All the others, William of Auvergne, Roger Bacon, John of la Rochelle, Albert the Great, Fishacre, Kilwardby and naturally the whole Bonaventurian school, have upheld, under some form or other, the doctrine of divine illumination as a divine light superadded, in true natural cognitions, to the natural light of the human intellect. To the extent that this was an authentically Augustinian doctrine, they all were Augustinians.[85]

Nor is this all. To posit the soul as a substance, either complete or quasi-complete in itself, leaves open this other question: what is the relation of this spiritual substance to the matter of its body?

Concerning matter itself, a large number of these masters, but not all, posit a universal matter of which they say two things: 1) since it has been created by God, it is not nothing: hence a tendency to attribute to matter a minimum of intrinsic actuality proportioned to the minimum of being it has; 2) since mutability is the distinctive mark of created being, matter should be identified with the pure possibility of change, that is, with the very mutability inherent in all that is. These two notions are authentically Augustinian in origin. On the first point, Augustine says that matter is "almost nothing" (*prope nihil*) and, consequently, not absolutely nothing. Keeping in mind the disciples of Mani, he stresses the fact that matter has been created by God; he calls it "the non-formed matter of things" which already "was" (*iam erat*): an "almost nothing" which necessarily is, since it is good (*Conf.*, XII, 18, 28-22, 31). On the second point, Augustine clearly teaches that God has created, in his Word, "the unformed matter of creatures both spiritual and corporeal" (*Conf.*, XII, 20, 29); this is the "mutability" created by God, which is present in all beings, either permanent like "the eternal household of God," or else transitory like corporeal beings. In some texts, however, Augustine went further than this. The statements of Augustine concerning matter are open to two interpretations: 1) matter was made "creatable," that is, transmutable into form; 2) matter was created as a pure mutability determinable by forms. In both cases, there was in Augustinian matter an incipient seeking toward form, the very "positive privation" which the Augustinians were to uphold against the mere absence of form attributed to matter by Aristotle. The Stoic doctrine of seminal reasons, accepted by Augustine, was not a necessary consequence of this position, but it harmonized with it. Even those converts to Aristotle who gave up the seminal reasons usually maintained in matter a sort of positive passivity very different from the total passivity of Aristotelian matter. At any rate, all the scholastics who either maintained the seminal reasons, or refused to deprive matter of all actuality, can be truly said to have kept faith with the deepest inspiration of Saint Augustine. To this extent they can be called Augustinians.[86]

Naturally, no early scholastic reproduced the doctrine of Augustine in its entirety. Many other influences combined with his own in order to give rise to the theological doctrines of the thirteenth century, but these fundamental positions are all Augustinian and they dominate the rest as the *forma totius* perfects, unifies and orders its whole. The objection that the term "Augustinian" should point out pure Augustinianism is perfectly tenable. Then there never was a single Augustinian, apart from Augustine himself; nor should we say that there ever was a single Aristotelian since the death of Aristotle, nor even a single Thomist since the death of Thomas Aquinas. As to the other objection, that there can have been no Augustinianism until there was an Aristotelianism to oppose it, it rests upon the assumption that no doctrinal position can be held as true so long as nobody opposes it as false, which is not evident.[87]

If the existence of any real Augustinianism in the middle ages can be rightly denied, it is on a different ground, and, this time, Aristotle is truly responsible for it. His logic spread in all the Christian schools a dialectical ideal of exposition which progressively invaded theology. Even Saint Anselm of Canterbury, who expressly affirmed that he had said nothing that could not be found in the writings of Augustine, used a dialectical mode of exposition that little resembled the free and supple digressions so frequent in the works of his master. Beyond this simple problem of intellectual style, there was a deeper one. What is a "doctrine," or a teaching? On this point, the Aristotelian notion of "art," and still more that of "science," progressively invaded the minds of the masters

and their schools. Already in the twelfth century, we heard a grammarian affirming that, if a master does not assign the "causes" for grammatical constructions, he does not "teach." Since causes are principles, minds trained in logic would naturally infer that, in order to teach theology, the first thing to do was to lay down theological principles and to use them as the causes of theological conclusions. Such is the reason why, even before Thomas Aquinas, William of Auxerre had posited the articles of faith as the principles from which theological conclusions should be deduced. Thus understood, theology was becoming a science teachable in the same way as all the other arts or sciences, but, at the same time, it was becoming very different from the teaching of Saint Augustine. Instead of rooting itself in the personal experience of the theologian, theology assumed the shape of an objective exposition and interpretation of the saving truth, as impersonally teachable as any other art or science. In this respect, Thomas Aquinas has brought the work of his predecessors up to its point of perfection, but with regard to the very content of theology, he has done something entirely different. His intention was not to make theology still more learned than Albert the Great had already made it. It was first to eliminate from it all learning irrelevant to the exposition and intellection of the saving truth, then to integrate in theology the relevant learning even if, in order to do so, it was necessary to reform certain commonly held positions and to reinterpret certain philosophical principles. Insofar as Christian faith itself was concerned, Thomas Aquinas never intended to touch it. The magnificent elaboration of Christian dogma left by Augustine to his successors was likewise taken up by Thomas Aquinas and integrated by him in his new synthesis. On the contrary, always with a pious respect for his great predecessor, yet fearlessly, Thomas felt free to reinterpret and, wherever it was necessary, to replace with a truer philosophy the purely philosophical elements integrated by Augustine in his own theological synthesis. His reason for doing so was simple. Philosophy is not necessary for human salvation; it is not even necessary for theology to resort to philosophy, but, if it does, the philosophy it uses should be the true philosophy. When a theologian has good reasons to think that Augustine did not make use of the best possible philosophy, he should not hesitate to change it.

Because Thomas Aquinas did so, his reformation of theology entailed a reformation of philosophy. There is no reason not to call it an Aristotelian reformation, for indeed, on many points, Thomas Aquinas substituted for the doctrines borrowed from Plotinus by Augustine, other doctrines which he himself was borrowing from Aristotle. Two points, however, should be kept in mind. First, the philosophical reformation achieved by Thomas Aquinas is a moment in the history of theology before being one in the history of metaphysics. Secondly, even on the level of pure philosophy, his doctrine cannot be understood as a further

stage in the progressive discovery of Aristotle by the Latins. Thomism was not the upshot of a better understanding of Aristotle. It did not come out of Aristotelianism by way of evolution, but of revolution. Thomas uses the language of Aristotle everywhere to make the Philosopher say that there is only one God, the pure Act of Being, Creator of the world, infinite and omnipotent, a providence for all that which is, intimately present to every one of his creatures, especially to men, every one of whom is endowed with a personally immortal soul naturally able to survive the death of its body. The best way to make Aristotle say so many things he never said was not to show that, had he understood himself better than he did, he could have said them. For indeed Aristotle seems to have understood himself pretty well. He has said what he had to say, given the meaning which he himself attributed to the principles of his own philosophy. Even the dialectical acumen of Saint Thomas Aquinas could not have extracted from the principles of Aristotle more than what they could possibly yield. The true reason why his conclusions were different from those of Aristotle was that his own principles themselves were different. As will be seen, in order to metamorphose the doctrine of Aristotle, Thomas has ascribed a new meaning to the principles of Aristotle. As a philosophy, Thomism is essentially a metaphysics. It is a revolution in the history of the metaphysical interpretation of the first principle, which is "being."

We are living in times so different from those of Thomas Aquinas that it is difficult for us to understand how philosophy can become theology and yet gain in rationality. This, however, is exactly what happened to philosophy in the *Summa theologiae*, when Thomas changed the water of philosophy to the wine of theology. Thomas always considered himself a theologian. Up to the last years of his life he kept faith with the teaching of Augustine forcefully restated in the injunction of Gregory IX to the theologians of the University of Paris. In his own view, he was not only a theologian, but a monk who had no right to indulge in philosophical activities except in the spirit of his religious vocation. "The philosophers," Thomas says, "made profession of studying Letters in view of acquiring secular learning, but what chiefly befits a religious is to study those Letters that pertain to the learning that is *according to godliness*, as is written in the Epistle to Titus, i, 1. As to the other branches of learning, they are not suitable objects of study for a religious whose whole life is dedicated to the divine service, except insofar as their study is related to sacred learning." [88] Whereupon Thomas immediately quotes Augustine in support of his assertion. Thomas intended to do exactly the same thing as all the other theologians of his time, only he did it differently. Then, naturally, the question arises: since he was a theologian, and such a strict one, how could he have anything to do with philosophy? His own notion of the nature of theology will be the answer to this difficulty.

2. THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

The question is often asked why a historian of philosophical doctrines should take an interest in the works of a theologian? One of the answers is that he should not, because theological speculation presupposes faith in revelation which the philosopher has not to take into account in his reasoning. Another answer is that he should, because, in the particular case of Thomas Aquinas, we are meeting a theologian so careful to distinguish between faith and reason that the philosophical elements included in his theology can be extracted from it and considered apart without undergoing any modification in nature or in content.[89]

These two opposite conclusions rest upon the same assumption, that in any theological reasoning one at least of the premises is accepted by faith. If this were true, either one of two consequences would necessarily follow. Since Thomas Aquinas was a theologian, all that he said was theological, and since theological conclusions rest upon premises accepted by faith, what Thomas has said is irrelevant to philosophy. Or else, since in many cases Thomas does not argue from any premise that can be said to be *de fide*, we are justified in concluding that, in these cases at least, he is speaking as a philosopher, not as a theologian.

The true nature of the distinction there is between philosophy and theology is a matter to be settled between philosophers and theologians. All that a historian can say is that, in the mind of Thomas Aquinas himself, their distinction was not as simple as it is sometimes supposed to be.[90] With all theologians, Thomas affirms that, supposing the free will of God to save mankind as a whole, it was necessary that the knowledge required for human salvation should be revealed to men. This is evident in the case of those saving truths which escape the grasp of natural human reason. But even when it was within the grasp of natural human reason, saving truth had to be revealed because, otherwise, most men would have remained ignorant of it. Few men are gifted for metaphysical or ethical studies; even those who have the necessary gifts have to wait up to the later part of their life before reaching conclusions in these lofty matters, and who knows at what age he will die? Above all, even those philosophers who live long enough to reach these conclusions, never or seldom do it without some admixture of error.[91]

A first consequence follows from these facts. To the extent that it pertains to the sacred teaching imparted to man through revelation (*sacra doctrina*) theology must deal with some philosophically knowable truths, namely, those whose knowledge is required for the salvation of any man; for instance, God exists, he is one, he is incorporeal, etc. Since they have been in fact revealed to men, these truths were revealable, but the formal reason of the "revealable" extends even beyond the limits of the actually revealed; it includes the whole body of human natural knowledge inasmuch as it can be considered by the theologian in the light of revelation and used by him in view of its end, which is the salvation of man in general. This leaves intact, within theology, the formal distinction between natural knowledge and supernatural knowledge, but it includes them both under a still wider formal reason since "revealables" comprise the whole body of natural cognitions considered as being at the disposal of the theologian in view of his own theological end which is the salvation of man.[92]

If this be true, the unity of theology is that of an organic whole whose parts are united under one single formal reason. Naturally, it first includes what God has actually revealed (whether it be naturally knowable or not). It also includes what the theologian deduces, as a necessary consequence, from the actually revealed truth (theologians often call this the "virtually" revealed). Moreover, it includes all the material provided by logic, the sciences of nature and metaphysics, to the extent that it is taken up by the theologian and incorporated by him into his work. He alone is judge of this extent. Just as it is the soul that builds itself a body, so also theology builds itself the philosophical body which it needs in order to promote the saving work of the sacred teaching.

This notion of theology and of its unity had to be cleared up on two accounts. First, because it was that of Thomas Aquinas himself, and since we are dealing with his doctrine, it is of great historical importance. Secondly, it is our only justification for considering the purely rational conclusions of Thomas Aquinas apart from the theological whole in which they belong. There is no philosophical writing of Thomas Aquinas to which we could apply for an exposition of the truths concerning God and man which he considered knowable in the natural light of human reason. His commentaries on Aristotle are so many expositions of the doctrine of Aristotle, not of what might be called his own philosophy. As a commentator, Thomas could add to the text something of his own, but this was not his principal intention. We may find fragmentary expositions of his own philosophical conceptions in some particular treatises, for instance in the *De ente et essentia*. Generally speaking, however, we must resort to his theological writings in order to find them fully developed, but following a theological order. This is the only mode of historical existence they have and, whatever order of exposition he might have chosen to follow in philosophy, the theology of Thomas Aquinas remains for us the only place where his own rational view of the world is to be found.

Although, taken in itself, it also escapes the competency of the simple historian, still another question may legitimately be asked: what point is there, for a history of philosophy, in considering philosophy in this theological condition? To this question, there are two historical answers. First, it is a fact that philosophical speculation did find itself in this

condition during the middle ages. Secondly, it is another historical fact that, in the eyes of mediaeval theologians, its integration with theology was eminently favorable to the purification and progress of philosophical knowledge.[93] Whether the upshot was a truly favorable one or not is a point on which anybody is free to entertain his own opinion, provided he knows the history which he makes bold to judge; in any case, his conclusion can only be that of a philosopher, not of a historian.[94]

3. GOD

Like all theologies the doctrine of Saint Thomas[95] is dominated by his own notion of God. Like all Christian theologians, he knew that the proper name of God was I AM WHO AM, or HE WHO IS (Exod. 3, 14), but even for men who agreed on the truth of this divine name, there remained a problem of interpretation. Modern philology has a right to investigate the question; naturally, it will find in this text what can be found in any text by means of grammars and dictionaries alone. This is not negligible but, philosophically speaking, it seldom amounts to much. Even with such a limited aim in mind, the grammarians have already achieved amazingly different results. What we are concerned with is very different. Our own problem is to know what meaning the Christian masters have attributed to this famous text. Most of them agreed that it meant: I am Being. But what is being? To Augustine, "who was imbued with the doctrines of the Platonists," being was eternal immutability. To John Damascene, absolute being was an "infinite ocean of entity." To Saint Anselm, it was that whose very nature it is to be: *natura essendi.* In all these cases, the dominating notion was that of "entity" (*essentia*). In the mind of Thomas Aquinas, the notion of being underwent a remarkable transformation; from now on, and so long as we will be dealing with Thomas Aquinas, the deepest meaning of the word "being" will be the act pointed out by the verb "to be." Since, in common human experience, to be is to exist, it can be said that, in the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, being has received the fullness of its existential meaning. In order to avoid all possible confusions with some modern uses of the word "existence," let us add that, in every being, "to be," or *esse,* is not to become; it is not any kind of projection from the present into the future. On the contrary, because it is act, "to be" is something fixed and at rest in being: *esse est aliquid fixum et quietum in ente.*[96] In short, this act is the very core of all that is, inasmuch precisely as what is, is a being.

As Thomas Aquinas understands him, God is the being whose whole nature it is to be such an existential act. This is the reason why his most proper name is, HE IS. After saying this, any addition would be a subtraction. To say that God "is this," or that he "is that," would be to restrict his being to the essences of what "this" and "that" are. God "is,"

absolutely. Because "what" a thing is usually receives the name of "essence," or of "quiddity" (its "whatness"), some say that since he is "being only" (*esse tantum*), God has no essence or quiddity.[97] Thomas Aquinas does not seem to have favored this way of expressing the purity of the divine act of being. He prefers to say that the essence of God is his *esse.* In other words, God is the being of which it can be said that, what in other beings is their essence, is in it what we call "to be." All the attributes of God are either deducible from this true meaning of his name, or qualified by it.

In our human experience, a "being" is "something that is," or exists. Since, in God, there is no something to which existence could be attributed, his own *esse* is precisely that which God is. To us, such a being is strictly beyond all possible representation. We can establish *that* God is, we cannot know *what* he is because, in him, there is no what; and since our whole experience is about things that *have* existence, we cannot figure out what it is to be a being whose only essence is "to be." For this reason, we can prove the truth of the proposition "God is," but, in this unique case, we cannot know the meaning of the verb "is." [98] Such is the Thomistic meaning of the classical doctrine of the ineffability of God.

Unknowable in himself, at least to us and in this life, God can be known by man imperfectly, from the consideration of his creatures. Two things at least are known of him in this way: first, that he is entirely unlike any one of his creatures; secondly, that he is in himself at least what he has to be in order to be their cause. For this reason, our knowledge of God is said to be "analogical"; we know that God is, with respect to the universe, in a relation similar to that which obtains, in our human experience, between causes and their effects. Such a cognition is not purely negative, since it enables us to say something true about God; it is not wholly positive, and far from it, since not a single one of our concepts, not even that of existence, properly applies to God; we call it "analogical" precisely because it bears upon resemblances between relations, that is, upon proportions.[99]

This notion of God as the absolute act of being flows from the demonstrations of his existence. To demonstrate it is both possible and necessary. It is necessary because the existence of God is not immediately evident; self-evidence would only be possible in this matter if we had an adequate notion of the divine essence; the essence of God would then appear to be one with his existence. But God is an infinite being and, as it has no concept of him, our finite mind cannot see existence as necessarily implied in his infinity; we therefore have to conclude, by way of reasoning, that existence which we cannot intuit. Thus the direct way apparently opened by Saint Anselm's ontological argument is closed to us; but the indirect way which Aristotle has pointed out remains open. Let us therefore seek in

sensible things, whose nature is proportioned to our intellect, the starting point of our way to God.[100]

All the Thomistic proofs bring two distinct elements into play: 1) the existence of a sensible reality whose existence requires a cause; 2) the demonstration of the fact that its existence requires a finite series of causes, and consequently a Prime Cause, which is what we call God. Because movement is immediately perceptible to sense knowledge, let us start from the fact that movement exists. The only superiority of this "way" with respect to the other ones, is that its point of departure is the easiest to grasp. All movement has a cause, and that cause must be other than the very being that is in motion; when a thing seems to be self-moving, a certain part of it is moving the rest. Now, whatever it is, the mover itself must be moved by another, and that other by still another. It must therefore be admitted, either that the series of causes is infinite and has no origin, but then nothing explains that there is movement, or else that the series is finite and that there is a primary cause, and this primary cause is precisely what everyone understands to be God.

Just as there is motion in sensible things, there are causes and effects. Now what has just been said of the causes of movement can also be said of causes in general. Nothing can be its own efficient cause, for in order to produce itself, it would have to be anterior, as cause, to itself as effect. Every efficient cause therefore presupposes another, which in turn presupposes another. Now, in this order of causes, in which each higher one is the cause of the lower, it is impossible to go on to infinity, otherwise, there would be neither a first efficient cause, nor intermediate causes, and the effects whose existence we perceive could not possibly exist. There must therefore be a first efficient cause of the series, in order that there may be a middle and a last one, and that first efficient cause is what everyone calls God.

Now let us consider beings themselves. As we know them, they are ceaselessly becoming. Since some of them are being generated, while others are passing away, it is possible for them to be or not to be. Their existence then is not necessary. Now the necessary needs no cause in order to exist; precisely because it is necessary, it exists of itself. But the possible cannot account for its own existence, and if there were absolutely nothing but possibility in things, there would be nothing. This is to say that, since there is something, there must be some being whose existence is necessary. If there are several necessary beings, their series must be finite for the same reason as above. There is therefore a first necessary being, to whose necessity all possible beings owe their existence, and this is what all men call God.

A fourth way goes through the hierarchical degrees of perfection observed in things. There are degrees in goodness, truth, nobility and other perfections of being. Now, more or less are always said with reference to a term of comparison which is absolute. There is therefore a true and a good in itself, that is to say, in the last resort, a being in itself which is the cause of all the other beings and this we call God.

The fifth way rests upon the order of things. All natural bodies, even those which lack knowledge, act for an end. The regularity with which, by and large, they achieve their end, is a safe indication that they do not arrive at it by chance and that this regularity can only be intentional and willed. Since they themselves are without knowledge, someone has to know for them. This primary Intelligent Being, cause of the purpose there is in natural things, is the being we call God.[101]

Since God is first from all points of view and with respect to all the rest, he cannot enter into composition with anything else. The cause of all other beings can enter into composition with none of them. Consequently, God is simple. His simplicity itself has many consequences. Because corporeal bodies are in potency with respect to both motion and being, they are not simple; hence God cannot be corporeal. For the same reason, since he is pure act, God is not composed of matter and form. He is not even a subject endowed with its own form, essence or nature. Divinity is something that God *is*, not that he *has*.[102] But what is such a being which *is* all that he can be said to be, and *has* nothing? He is WHO IS. Since God *is* what other beings only *have*, there is in him no distinct essence to unite with the act of being. This unique being, the only one whose whole essence it is "to be," is so perfectly simple that it is its own being.[103]

If this direct argument seems too abstract to satisfy the intellect, let us remember the conclusions of each one of the five "ways." All particular beings owe their existence to the Prime Cause. Consequently, they receive existence. In other words, what they are (i.e., their essence) receives from God the existence which it has. On the contrary, since the Prime Efficient Cause does not receive its own existence (otherwise it would not be prime) there is no sense in which it can be said to be distinct from it. If there were such a thing as a pure and absolute "fire," it would not *have* the nature of fire, it would *be* it. Similarly, God is not really "being"; he is the very act of what we call "to be." He does not share in it, he is it. Naturally, since we have no experience of this unique being, our mind is unable to conceive it and our language has no perfectly fitting words to express it. From the very first moment we attempt to say what God is, we must content ourselves with saying that he is not in the same way as other things are. As has already been said, we do not know what it is for God "to be";[104] we only know that it is true to say that God is.

The metaphysician thus joins, by reason alone, the philosophical truth hidden in the name that God himself has revealed to man: I AM WHO AM (Exod. 3, 14). God is the pure act of existing, that is, not some essence or other, such as the One, or the Good, or Thought, to which might be

attributed existence in addition; not even a certain eminent way of existing, like Eternity, Immutability or Necessity, that could be attributed to his being as characteristic of the divine reality; but Existing itself (*ipsum esse*) in itself and without any addition whatever, since all that could be added to it would limit it in determining it. If he is pure Existing, God is by that very fact the absolute Plenitude of being; he is therefore infinite. If he is infinite Being, he can lack nothing that he should acquire; no change is conceivable in him; he is therefore sovereignly immutable and eternal, and so with other perfections that can be fittingly attributed to him. Now, it is fitting to attribute all of them to him, for, if the absolute act of existing is infinite, it is so in the order of being; it is therefore perfect.[105]

Such is the cause of the many deficiencies of the language in which we express him. This God whose existence we affirm, does not allow us to fathom what he is; he is infinite, and our minds are finite; we must therefore take as many exterior views of him as we can, without ever claiming to exhaust the subject. A first way of proceeding consists in denying everything about the divine essence that could not belong to it. By successively removing from the idea of God movement, change, passivity, composition, we end by positing him as an immobile, immovable being, perfectly in act and absolutely simple; this is the way of negation. But one can take a second way and try to name God according to the analogies obtaining between him and things. There is necessarily a connection, and consequently a resemblance, between cause and effect. When the cause is infinite and the effect finite, it obviously cannot be said that the properties of the effect are found in it such as they are in the cause, but what exists in effects must also be pre-existent in their cause, whatever its manner of existing. In this sense, we attribute to God all the perfections of which we have found some shadow in the creature, but we carry them to the infinite. Thus we say that God is perfect, supremely good, unique, intelligent, omniscient, voluntary, free, and all-powerful, each of these attributes being reduced, in the last analysis, to an aspect of the infinite and perfectly single perfection of the pure act that God is.[106]

4. CREATION

In demonstrating the existence of God by efficient causality, we establish at the same time that God is the creator of the world. Since he is absolute and infinite, God has within himself virtually the being and perfections of all creatures. The way in which finite being emanates from the universal cause is called creation. With respect to this problem, three points should be noted. First, the notion of creation is not intended to account for the existence of this or that particular thing, but of the

totality of what exists. In the second place, creation can only be the very gift of existence: there is nothing, neither thing, nor movement, nor time, and behold creature appears, the universe of things, of movement and of time. To say that creation is the emanation *totius esse*, is to say that to create is an act which, apart from the creator himself, presupposes nothing. It is *ex nihilo*. In the third place, if, by definition, creation presupposes no matter, it does presuppose, equally by definition, a creative being which, because it is itself the pure act of being, can cause finite beings to exist.[107]

Once these conditions are propounded, the possibility of a creation becomes conceivable, and we see that it must be free. In fact, the pure act of being would not lack anything if the world did not exist, and it is not increased by anything if the world exists. The existence of creatures is, therefore, radically contingent in relation to God, and that is what we mean in saying that, if it happens, creation is a free act. Now it can happen, for, if we posit God as pure act, not only of thought as Aristotle did, but of being itself, the three conditions required for a true creation are realized: it is the production of the very existence of all that is, it is a production *ex nihilo*, and the cause of that production is in the perfection of the divine act of being. The connection between creature and creator, as it results from creation, is called participation. It must be noted at once that, far from implying any pantheistic signification, that expression, on the contrary, aims at removing it. Participation expresses both the bond uniting the creature to the creator, which makes creation intelligible, and the separation which prohibits them from intermingling. To participate in the pure act or the perfection of God is to possess a perfection which was pre-existent in God, but it is not to be "a part of" what one participates in; it is to derive and to receive being from another being, and the fact of receiving being from God is the best proof that its receiver is not God.[108]

Thus creation is placed infinitely below the creator, so far below him that there is no real relation between God and things, but only between things and God. The world comes into being without any change happening in the divine essence; and yet the universe did not come out of God by a sort of natural necessity, but is manifestly the product of an intelligence and a will. All the effects of God are pre-existent in him, but since he is an infinite Intelligence, and his intelligence is his very being, all his effects are pre-existent in him according to an intelligible mode of being. God knows, therefore, all his effects before producing them, and if he happens to produce them because he knows them, it is therefore because he has willed them. The simple sight of the order and finality reigning in the world is sufficient to show that it is not blind nature which produced things by a sort of necessity, but an intelligent providence which freely chose its works.[109]

It is equally conceivable from this angle how a single being could

directly and immediately produce a multitude of beings. Certain Arabian philosophers, especially Avicenna, believed that from one cause can come only one effect. From this they concluded that God must create a first creature which creates in turn another, and so on. But Augustine had long since given us the solution of the problem. Since God is pure intelligence he must possess within him all the intelligibles, that is to say, the forms which will later be the forms of things, but which, so far, exist only in his thought. These forms of things which we call Ideas, are preexistent in God as the models of things to be created and as the objects of divine knowledge. In knowing himself, not as he is himself, but as he can be participated in by creatures, God knows Ideas. The idea of a creature is therefore the knowledge God has of a certain possible imitation of his perfection by a creature.[110] And so it is that without lessening the divine unity, a multiplicity of things can follow from God.

It would still remain to be seen at what moment the universe was created. The Arabian philosophers, Averroes in particular, claim they are interpreting the authentic thought of Aristotle by teaching that the world is eternal. In this doctrine, God remains the primary cause of things, but he is an infinite and immutable cause which, existing from all eternity, also produces its effect from all eternity. Others, on the contrary—and Saint Bonaventure was one of them—claim to demonstrate rationally that the world did not always exist. Agreeing with Albert the Great on this point, Thomas considers that both sides can call up likely arguments in favor of their theses, but neither hypothesis is susceptible of demonstration. Whatever may be the solution he wishes to establish, a theologian can seek the principle of his demonstration only in things themselves or in the divine will that created them; now neither in one case nor the other does our reason find the basis for a veritable proof. To demonstrate is, in fact, to start from the essence of a thing to show that a certain property belongs to that thing. Now if we start from the essence of things contained in the created universe, we shall see that all essence, taken in itself, is indifferent to all consideration of time. The definitions of the essence of heaven, of man, of stone, are intemporal like all definitions; they give us no information on the question of knowing whether heaven, man or stone are or are not, have always or have not always existed. We can therefore find no help in the consideration of the world. But we shall not find any more help in the consideration of the primary cause, which is God. If God *freely* willed the world, it is absolutely impossible for us to demonstrate that he *necessarily* willed it in time rather than in eternity. The sole basis for our opinion is that God made his will manifest to us by revelation upon which faith is founded. Since reason cannot conclude, and since God has informed us, we must believe that the world began, but we cannot demonstrate it and, strictly speaking, we do not *know* it.[111]

If the universe owes its existence to an intelligent cause, and moreover a perfect one, the result is that the imperfections of the universe cannot be imputed to its author. To create the world was to produce a certain amount of perfection and a certain degree of being; but evil is nothing properly speaking; it is much less a being than an absence of being; natural evil derives from the ontological limitation essential to any creature, and to say that God created not only the world but the evil in it would be to say that God created nothingness. In reality, from its very first moment creation bridged an infinite gap between God and things, but it did not suppress it, because the gap cannot be suppressed. The resemblance of the world to God is inevitably deficient. No creature receives the total plenitude of divine perfection because perfections pass from God to creatures only by effecting a sort of descent. The order according to which this descent is effected is the very law which regulates the intimate constitution of the universe: all creatures are ordered according to a hierarchical scale of perfection, going from the most perfect, which are the angels, to the least perfect, namely, material things, in such a way that the lowest degree of each superior species borders on the highest degree of each inferior species.[112]

5. MAN

At the summit of creation are the angels. They are incorporeal and even immaterial creatures; Saint Thomas, therefore, does not grant to other theologians that every created thing is composed of matter and form. Yet, since they are creatures, even angels are not simple. In order to place the first degree of creation as close as possible to God, Saint Thomas is willing to grant angels the highest perfection compatible with the state of creature; now simplicity accompanies perfection; angels must therefore be conceived as being as simple as it is possible for a creature to be. This simplicity could obviously not be total, for if the angels were absolutely free of all composition they would be the pure act of being, that is God. Since the angels have received existence from God, they are therefore, like all creatures, composed of their essence and their existence. This composition is enough to place them infinitely below God, but the angels include no other one. They have no matter, therefore no principle of individuation in the ordinary sense of the word; each angel is less an individual than a species, forming by himself alone an irreducible degree in the descending scale that leads to the body; each of them receives from the immediately superior angel intelligible species that are the first parceling out of the divine light, and each of them adapts this illumination, by dimming it and breaking it up, to the immediately inferior angelic Intelligence.[113]

In this downgrade hierarchy of creatures the appearance of man, and

consequently of matter, marks a characteristic degree. Man still belongs to the series of immaterial beings through his soul, but his soul is not a pure Intelligence as the angels are. It is an intellect because it is still a principle of intellection and can know a certain type of intelligible; but it is not an Intelligence, because it is essentially the act and form of a body. The human soul is an intellectual substance indeed, but one to which it is essential to be the form of a body and with it to constitute a physical compound of the same nature as all compounds of matter and form, namely, a "man." This is why the human soul is at the lowest degree of intelligent creatures; it is the furthest removed from all the perfections of the divine intellect. On the other hand, insofar as it is the form of a body, it dominates and prevails over it in such a way that the human soul marks the confines and a sort of horizon between the kingdom of pure Intelligences and the domain of corporeal beings.[114]

In a sense, this doctrine complicates the structure of man; in another sense it simplifies it. In Thomism, there is in man (as in all corporeal beings) a twofold composition. First, that of soul and body, which is but one more particular case of the general composition of form and matter in corporeal beings. Because it is a form, the human intellect makes matter become that of a human body and it makes man himself to be "what" he is. In the order of "whatness," which is that of essence and quiddity, form is supreme. There is no form of the form. The human intellect is the highest formal act in virtue of which a certain being is a man and because of which all its operations are human operations. Secondly, since it is a created being, there is in man a composition of essence and existence. True enough, it is through the form "soul" that existence comes to all the component elements of a human being, including the living cells of his body, but before giving existence, the soul receives it from its own created act of being. For this reason, each corporeal being, including man, is the seat of a twofold composition: that of matter with form, that of essence with its act of being.[115] In this structure, *esse*, the act of being, is the keystone of the whole. It is the act of even the form; consequently, it is the act of acts and the perfection of the formal perfections.[116]

At the same time he was complicating finite being, Thomas was simplifying it. The introduction of the composition of being and essence in angels, permitted him to eliminate their hylomorphic composition without attributing to them the absolute simplicity of God. On the other hand, in introducing the notion of the act of being, Thomas was eliminating the plurality of forms in the composite. So long as there is no *actus essendi* distinct from the form, there is no reason why a being should not include a plurality of substantial forms held together and ordered by the highest one. True enough, even in the doctrine of Aristotle, where there is no composition of essence and *esse*, there was a pressing invitation to attribute only one substantial form to each actually existing substance, but to

understand in this way the unity of man was to condemn the human soul to perish with the composite of which it is the form. The Aristotelian unity of the substantial form could not apply to a soul immediately created by God in the body and separable from it. How can the human soul be the sole substantial form of its body if, as Thomas does in the *De ente et essentia*, it is to be counted among the separate substances: *"in substantiis separatis, scilicet in anima, intelligentiis et causa prima"* (ch. 5)? So long as there was no act of the substantial form, theologians were bound to hesitate a long time before eliminating the other forms. On the contrary, as soon as Thomas posited *esse* as the act of the form, it became possible and necessary to eliminate the other ones. It became possible because, after the death of its body, the intellective soul still remains a substance composed of its essence and its act of being; hence it still can "subsist." It became necessary because, since form was to be conceived as the proper receiver of its act of being, the composition of *esse* with several distinct substantial forms would have given rise to several distinct actually existing beings. The radical elimination of the *binarium famosissimum*, i.e., hylomorphism and the plurality of forms, was not due to a more correct understanding of the metaphysics of Aristotle but to the introduction, by Thomas Aquinas, of a new metaphysical notion of being.

To each manner of being, its manner of knowing corresponds. By becoming the immediate form of a body, the human soul loses its Augustinian aptitude to the direct apprehension of the intelligible. No doubt there still remains in us some faint glimmer of the divine rays; we still participate in the irradiation of which God is the source, since we end by finding in things the trace of the intelligible that was active at the time of their formation. The agent intellect each human soul possesses is the natural power by which we come nearest to the angels. Yet our intellect does not provide us with innate intelligible species; it cannot even directly receive them from the Separate Substances, nor from God; itself a form, it feeds on other sensible forms. Its highest function is the cognition of primary principles; these are pre-existent in us, at least virtually, and they are the first conceptions of the intellect. It is the perfection of the agent intellect to contain them virtually and to be capable of forming them, but it is also its weakness to be able to form them only in connection with our perception of sensible things. The origin of human knowledge is therefore in the senses; it results from a collaboration between material things, senses and intellect.

Itself a compound of a matter and form, man is only one among an enormous number of natures, that is to say, of material bodies each one having its form. The element which particularizes and individualizes these natures is the matter of each one of them; the universal element they contain is their form; knowing must therefore consist in isolating from

from principles by means of necessary syllogistic reasoning. This is so true that even his theology has taken up the general form of an Aristotelian science made up of conclusions deduced from principles. Only, in the case of theology, the principles are accepted on the strength of divine revelation, whereas, in scientific knowledge, properly so-called, the principles are accepted on the strength of sensible and of intellectual evidence. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that even though Thomas Aquinas made his own the Aristotelian technique of logical demonstration, he himself has interpreted it and used it in his own way, with the transcendent liberty of a theologian who keeps the whole body of human knowledge permanently available for the work of salvation. Thomas Aquinas has done more than assimilate the body of known philosophical truth; he has deeply transformed it through his new interpretation of the first principle, namely, "being."

6. THE END OF MAN

All form is naturally active. In a being devoid of knowledge, form is inclined only toward the complete realization of that being. In a being endowed with intelligence, the inclination can tend toward any one of the objects it apprehends, and this is the source of free activity and will. The proper object of the will is good as such; whenever the intellect presents some image of it, the will tends spontaneously to embrace it. Fundamentally, what the will seeks above all these forms of good it pursues, is the good in itself in which all these particular forms of good participate. If the human intellect could offer to us, as a known object, the Sovereign Good Himself, our will would cleave to it at once, and seize it with an immovable grip which would also be the most perfect liberty. But we do not directly see the supreme perfection; we are therefore reduced to trying, by an incessantly renewed effort of the intellect, to determine those among the forms of good offered to us which are bound to the Sovereign Good by a necessary connection. And therein—at least here on earth—consists our very liberty. Since unshakable adherence to the Sovereign Good is denied us, our will can never choose except between particular forms of good; how to determine the particular goods we should choose, and, knowing them, how to determine our acts in view of these ends, is the fundamental problem of morality.[118]

The motion of the will moving itself and all the other powers of the soul toward a certain object is its "intention." The proper object of intention is a certain end. If, in order to reach an end, it is necessary first to desire certain means, one and the same intention runs through our successive volitions of the different means; this intention wills the means in view of the end and, consequently, there is only one intention for the means and for the end.

Since human acts deal with singular cases and objects, a deliberation is always necessary to establish the appropriate means required in view of the end. This deliberation (*consilium*) terminates in a choice (*electio*) and in the consent, or approval, given by our will to that choice. This is, therefore, a complex operation in which the intellect and the will share in different ways.[119] Through repeating similar moral choices we progressively form moral habits (*habitus*) whose effect it is to facilitate the corresponding acts. When these habits are morally good, they are called virtues; when they are morally bad, they are called vices. The formation and development of the moral personality of each human individual is one with the acquisition of his own virtues and, unfortunately, of his own vices.[120] Since the problem is one of personal dispositions, of education and of self-discipline, the deliberate acquisition of moral virtues and of moral vices is the very history of every moral being.

Being a rational animal, man should rule his conduct according to the laws of reason. He does it by correctly using his intellect whose speculative function it is to know the true and whose practical function it is to know the good. Like the speculative intellect, the practical intellect has its own principles. The first one is that we should desire what is good and avoid what is evil. What is good, for a rational being, is what agrees with its rational nature and, consequently, with reason. Every act that is conformable to reason, is good; every act that disagrees with reason, is evil. Virtue, then, is a permanent disposition to act conformably to the prescriptions of practical reason. We need intellectual virtues in order to grasp the principles of human conduct (Intelligence), to deduce from these principles the correct conclusions (Science), and even to relate both principles and conclusions to the first principles and causes (Wisdom). All these are virtues of the intellect. Naturally, since morality is to be found in acts, there must also be moral virtues properly so-called, whose seat is the will. The three fundamental ones are justice, which regulates our acts every time the rights of other men are concerned; temperance, which represses passions; and force, which enables the will to comply with the commands of practical reason. An exceptionally important intellectual virtue, however, is prudence. It is the progressively acquired habit of correctly solving particular moral problems. For indeed each concrete particular problem is a distinct case, different from all other ones because particular circumstances are never twice identically the same. The prudent man is the one whose practical judgment is so sound that he can advise both himself and those who consult him in their practical moral problems.[121] He decides what it is best to do, given the circumstances of the case, judged in the light of the principles of speculative reason and of their rationally deduced consequences. From beginning to end "moral virtue holds its goodness from the rule of reason."[122]

These rules, however, do not merely say what seems to be right or

wrong according to our own preferences. They are laws, that is to say, commandments of reason prescribing what is required for the common good. The eternal law is the dictate of the divine providence, and therefore of the divine reason, governing the perfect community which we call the universe. Inasmuch as man is subject to this eternal law of divine providence, there is in him an imprint of it which is called natural law. Moreover, inasmuch as he is a rational creature, man is subject to the eternal law in a particularly excellent way. He does not simply undergo it, as all natural beings do, he also knows it and wills it. In man, therefore, "the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law." As to human laws, they are so many prescriptions of human practical reason, promulgated by men vested in authority and in charge of insuring the common good of cities. Since they are human, these laws too, when they are just, are so many participations of the divine law. Every moral fault, or every sin, is before anything else a violation of the law of nature, and through it, a violation of the laws prescribed to nature by the divine reason.[123]

Whether man knows it or not, his love for the good and his pursuit of happiness are, in fact, two unconscious expressions of a natural desire for God which nature alone is unable to fulfill. Thus the total destiny of man reveals itself as early as this life in his permanent and fecund anxiety for a beyond. There is for man a relatively supreme good toward which he should tend during his earthly life; the proper object of ethics is to let us know what it is and to facilitate our access to it. To know and dominate our passions, to eradicate vices, to acquire and preserve virtues, to seek happiness in man's highest and most perfect operation, that is to say, in the consideration of truth through the study of speculative sciences, this is the real beatitude, however imperfect, to which we can lay claim here below. But our speculative knowledge, even imperfect as it is, is sufficient to allow us to divine and confusedly desire what it lacks. It leads us to the existence of God, but it does not allow us to attain his essence. How could a soul which knows itself to be immortal because it is immaterial not place in an otherworldly future the end of its desires and its true Supreme Good?[124]

7. THOMISM AT THE CROSSWAYS

The doctrine of Thomas Aquinas surprised his contemporaries. He was not a promoter of scientific learning like Albert the Great or Robert Grosseteste. To him the scientific knowledge of nature was in Aristotle, whose doctrine he had learned, commented upon and accepted, on the whole, in logic, physics, astronomy, biology, psychology, metaphysics and ethics. Even in his theology, which he could not borrow from Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas had accepted the general notion of science, the empiricism

and the intellectualism of the Philosopher. The Aristotelians of his time naturally considered him an ally, and indeed, he was one of them.

This is so true that the representatives of the traditional theology could not help resenting his attitude on many points. They had no objections to his using the notions of matter and form; Augustine had used them too, after Plotinus; but they did not like the Aristotelian definition of matter as pure potentiality: this made the efficient causality of secondary causes look too much like a creation. They also resented his application of the notion of form of the body to the definition of the human soul; how could the soul be an independent substance, if it was assimilated to other perishable material forms? The consequences of this new definition of the soul were doubly disturbing. In noetics, it entailed an empirical intellectualism, restricting the data of intellection to sense knowledge only and eliminating the supplement of light which the Augustinian soul used to derive, even in natural cognition, from the divine light. In metaphysics, it made it difficult to add to the proofs of the existence of God based upon physical creatures, those which Augustine had drawn from the existence of created intellectual effects, especially the divine nature of created necessary and immutable truth. Because the handmaid whose services were required by the new theology was no longer the same, the household was looking strangely different. The controversies about the unity or plurality of substantial forms, incidental to the new definition of the soul, were soon to manifest the importance of the philosophical and theological interests at stake in the discussion.

Nor was this all. In a way, the Aristotelians were about as much disturbed as the Augustinians by the new theology. On two points, at least, Thomas Aquinas was following his own way, which was neither that of Augustine nor that of Aristotle. For deep-seated reasons, these two points were those which had been defined many centuries ago by the *noverim me, noverim te* of Saint Augustine: God and man. To the pure Self-Thinking Thought of Aristotle, and to the Dear Eternity of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas had substituted the Pure Act of Being, or *Purum Esse*. This was the same Christian God as that of Augustine; his traditional attributes remained the same, but because the God of Thomas Aquinas was philosophically different from those of Aristotle, and even of Saint Augustine, the relation of the world to him was conceived by Thomas in a new way; in short, the notion of being was becoming a new one. At the same time as a new theology was making its appearance, a new metaphysics was being offered to the meditation of the philosophers. From this point of view, the philosophy of Aristotle was finding itself, with respect to the Thomistic notion of *esse*, in the relation of matter to form, and Aristotelian metaphysics, too, was receiving a new act of being. The consequences of this event can hardly be calculated. Turned into the "proper receivers" of the act of being, the Aristotelian forms were becoming Thomistic forms;

the unity of compound substances was becoming a Thomistic unity; the human soul could now become a substantial form without losing its own substantiality nor the immortality which it held from its actuation by its own act of being; directly related to God in his very *esse*, which is in him the first effect of the Prime Cause, the man of Thomas Aquinas knew himself as a subsisting and enduring individuality, known and willed by a God whose supreme act of being included in its unity the Ideas of all its freely created effects; the global governance of the Aristotelian world was thus being replaced with a particular providence without impairing the laws of nature or their normal necessity. It is no wonder that while the representatives of the traditional theology were feeling dubious about the Thomistic notion of man, those of the Aristotelian metaphysics should take exception to the Thomistic notion of being. Because Thomas Aquinas had tackled the fundamental problems in metaphysics, things began to move even before his death. The extraordinary flowering of philosophical speculation which we shall observe between 1277 and about 1350 can be considered, from more than one point of view, as an after-effect of this theological and metaphysical reformation.

CHAPTER I

LATIN AVERROISM

As HAS already been said, the discovery of the Greek philosophical universe was for the Latins an epoch-making event. From a certain point of view, its history coincides with that of the progressive discovery of Aristotle. By Aristotle, we should understand the doctrine of Aristotle as interpreted by his various commentators, including such theologians as Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. Since, even today, historians still hesitate on the authentic meaning of Aristotelianism, it is no wonder that, in the thirteenth century, there was disagreement on its interpretation.

Roughly speaking, two main interpretations of Aristotle attracted the attention of the masters in philosophy and theology up to about 1260-1265, namely, those of Avicenna and Averroes. These were two different philosophies, and everybody knew it because Averroes himself had often blamed Avicenna for arbitrarily departing from the authentic teaching of the Philosopher. From about 1261 on, a third Aristotle entered the schools with the commentaries of Thomas Aquinas. Like the preceding ones, this new Aristotle presented himself as the true one. Inspired, to a large extent, by older commentaries, including that by the Christian John Philoponus, the new interpretation eliminated many elements which Avicenna and Averroes had added to the letter of the Philosopher; at the same time, it offered a version of his doctrine which, often as historically justifiable as the preceding ones, was better adapted to the demands of Christian theology. To speak of an Avicennian, an Averroistic or a Thomistic Aristotle is to point out three different interpretations of a fourth one.[1] There was, however, this difference between them, that the Avicennian interpretation of Aristotle was the philosophy of Avicenna and that the Averroistic interpretation of Aristotle was the philosophy of Averroes, whereas the Thomistic interpretation of Aristotle was not the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Included in his own philosophy, the Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas was not co-extensive with it.

From this point of view, the influence of Averroes would have raised no particular problem without the definite position it implied concerning the relationship of philosophy and theology. Aristotle, Avicenna and Averroes were all considered "philosophers" by the "theologians"; but, of the three, only Averroes had stressed the fact that philosophy should be kept apart from theology, and since he had blamed Avicenna for blending his so-called philosophy with religious beliefs, his Christian readers could not ignore his attitude on this point. Many Christian masters used Averroes as the best literal commentary on Aristotle at their disposal; their situation was that of a modern professor of history of philosophy trying

call demonstration within the very domain reserved for reason. It is understood that the Trinity or other dogmas of this kind cannot be rationally demonstrated. But in what is ordinarily considered as demonstrable, there must also be a distinction between the demonstration taken as it is possible in itself and the demonstration taken as it is possible for us in the present state of our human condition. For some reason or other, our intellect which, by its very nature, should be capable of intellectual intuition, finds itself restricted to abstractive cognition. Even the whole range of being *qua* being is no longer accessible to it. Since the sole kind of being which it directly grasps is sensible being, the philosophers naturally mistook sensible being for being itself, with the consequence that they attributed to being itself characters which are proper to sensible being only. Hence, we find in the mind of Duns Scotus a general appreciation of the work of the "philosophers" which affects his own doctrinal positions. The science of sensible being naturally leads to a metaphysical doctrine of universal necessity, whereas the consideration of being *qua* pure being leads to a metaphysics of the radical contingency of finite being. Theologians have, for the same reason, been liberated by theology from the limited outlook which was naturally that of the philosophers. The liberation of metaphysics is achieved in Scotism by the new task imparted to it by the theologian: to demonstrate by philosophical reasons the existence of the Infinite Being.

The philosophical consequences of this new situation were manifold. After Scotus, a new importance is attributed to the notion of infinite. In theology, there appears a marked tendency to withdraw from the competency of the metaphysician all the problems whose ultimate answer hangs on the infinity of the divine being. Philosophers can know that there is an infinite being, but concerning the essence of God precisely *qua* infinite, only the theologians have something to say and this only to the extent that revelation provides a starting point for their speculation. Because he considers finite beings in the light of Infinite Being, the theologian knows that God is absolutely omnipotent; that he is free to create or not, and to act through secondary causes or not; that he is omnipresent to all creatures and free to set up any moral code he pleases so long as it deals with rules of human conduct whose relations to his own essence are not necessary ones. Nothing of what depends on the free decisions of this absolutely free God is philosophically deducible. The very condition of some natural beings falls under this rule. What does not belong to them strictly in virtue of their essences cannot be deduced from their nature; consequently, it is no object of philosophical demonstration. The immortality of the human soul is a point in case. Philosophical reasons may show it to be probable, and even more probable than its contrary, but they cannot demonstrate it as a necessary conclusion.[70]

be proved that God is present everywhere by his essence, or that God is all-powerful, at least in the absolute sense that he can immediately and by himself alone cause what he causes through the agency of secondary causes. In short, the philosophers who examined these problems with the help of reason alone were never able to rise to the Christian notion of a free God. They stopped at a necessary primary cause, necessarily and eternally producing a primary and unique effect, which effect in turn necessarily produced several others, in virtue of the mixture of necessity and possibility included in each of them. From the primary being to our sublunary world, everything is interlinked by a series of necessary causal relations, which do not entail the presence of the Primary in the distant consequences of his act, but on the contrary, exclude the possibility of his intervening by a free and immediate act, as the Christian God can always do. There was, therefore, about the time of Duns Scotus, a criticism of natural theology wholly independent from the principles of William of Ockham. And no wonder. If the conclusions of philosophy were identical with those of Aristotle, how could philosophy prove the existence and nature of the Christian God?

However, it was not in the direction of this criticism of natural theology that Scotism was later to evolve. The disciples of the Subtle Doctor applied themselves to the task of completing the master's theological synthesis and to defending it against its opponents. For some of them, like Antonius Andreas (d. 1320), whose writings are still mingled with those of Scotus himself, it is difficult to determine their personal contribution.[73] Literary history has not yet done its work on this point. For others, such as the Provençal Franciscan Francis of Meyronnes (d. after 1328), their originality is already more easily discernible.[74] Among his numerous writings should be mentioned the commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge,* on the *Categories,* on Aristotle's *Perihermenias* and *Physics;* a *Commentary on the Sentences, Quodlibeta* and a series of treatises, almost all of them important for the study of his philosophical thought: *On the Univocity of Being, On Transcendentals,* etc. Francis of Meyronnes knew Duns Scotus personally, and was his student during the master's sojourn in Paris from 1304 to 1307; he undoubtedly remained his disciple, but a disciple who himself took on the aspect of a master. A celebrated Scotist of the fifteenth century, William of Vaurouillon (d. 1464), after having recalled, in the oratorical style of the time, the famous "triad of Doctors": Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, Duns Scotus, immediately adds a second: Francis of Meyronnes, Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome. In this same text William of Vaurouillon criticizes Francis for his peculiar habit of always dividing and arguing on four points, even when three were enough. Three good points, William says, are better than four bad ones.

Faithful to the univocity of being and to the formal distinction, those two bastions of Scotism, Francis interpreted in his own way the theory of the "intrinsic modes of being," which occupies so central a place in Scotus' theology. In full agreement with his master's ontology, Francis identifies being with entity (*essentia*) to which he attributes an extensive series of intrinsic modes. The essence of God is first posited as entity (*essentia*); in the second moment, it is posited as "this particular entity"; in the third moment, as this here "infinite entity"; in the fourth moment, as the actually existing infinite entity. Existence, therefore, in God as in all the rest, is nothing other than an intrinsic mode of essence. Taken literally, this position entails the curious consequence, that the essence of God, taken purely as essence, does not immediately include existence. This does not mean that God is not by his own essence (*ens per se*) but that his existence is a modality of his essence, not that very essence taken as such. That was going astray from Duns Scotus along an authentically Scotist road. On the other hand, Francis of Meyronnes abandoned his master on two important points. He absolutely refused to admit that divine Ideas were not formally identical and absolutely co-eternal with God. Francis expressly went back to Saint Augustine on this point, and William of Vaurouillon, as a good upholder of Scotist orthodoxy, was to reproach him sharply for this infidelity to Duns Scotus. This first point was, moreover, linked in his mind to a second one. Francis of Meyronnes refused to make of the Idea a simple "secondary object" of divine knowledge, because he himself attributed more reality to it than that of a simple object of cognition (*ens cognitum*). As he conceived it, the divine Idea seemed to possess a "being of essence" analogous to the one Duns Scotus had criticized in Henry of Ghent.

One sentence from Francis of Meyronnes, to which P. Duhem has drawn attention, shows what evolution was then taking place in the general conception of the universe. It is found in his *Commentary on the Sentences,* lib. II, dist. 14, q. 5: "A certain Doctor says that, if the earth were in movement and the heavens at rest, that arrangement would be better. But this is disputed because the diverse movements of the celestial bodies could not be accounted for." The movement of the earth was therefore already no longer considered by everyone to be an absurdity, but obviously Francis of Meyronnes remained faithful to the old doctrine, and it is a pity he did not name the unknown Doctor.

The essential features of Scotism are found in another member of a group of Franciscans whose work dates from the fourteenth century. In his *Commentary on the Sentences,* John of Bassoles (d. 1347) upholds the reality of genera and species, in the sense Duns Scotus meant it,[75] that is to say, not as universals (for universality, or predicability as such, is the work of the intellect), but as distinct realities constitutive of essences (*Genus et differentia dicunt distinctas realitates in eadem essentia ejus quod est per se in genere*). Animality and rationality signify

tude, signs of which were beginning to multiply toward the end of the fourteenth century.

CHAPTER III

DISINTEGRATION OF SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY

"Scholasticism begins to get interesting after Thomas Aquinas." Quoting this remark of Hans Meyer, P. Bayerschmidt adds that, "by his inspired conception of philosophy and theology, Thomas Aquinas put to his time questions which touched the spirit of the West like a magic wand and stimulated it to push research to the utmost." This is perfectly true, only it does not mean that, in making his contemporaries and successors think in a deeper metaphysical way, Thomas Aquinas succeeded in winning them over to his own doctrinal positions.

In a letter of May 20, 1346, to the masters and students of the University of Paris, Pope Clement VI blamed some of them for "disregarding and despising the time-honored writings of the Philosopher as well as of the other ancient masters and commentators whose text they should follow so far as it does not contradict the Catholic faith." The atmosphere was then very different from that of the early thirteenth century. The philosophical authority of Aristotle was so firmly established about 1350 that even the popes made it a duty for the Parisian masters to follow his doctrine. The importance of this peculiar Aristotle was, historically speaking, not only considerable but, in a sense, decisive. Augustinianism, Averroism, Scotism, Ockhamism have opposed Thomism from without, but ever since 1270, this "Aristotle not contrary to faith" had begun to oppose Thomas Aquinas within the so-called Thomistic school itself. In the fourteenth century, after a short period of hesitation, all the Dominicans became Thomists in virtue of the fact that they were Dominicans, but some of them were also good Aristotelians and their effort to keep faith with this double allegiance resulted in the birth of an Aristotle that was neither Averroes, nor Thomas Aquinas, nor even Aristotle himself, but, precisely, an "Aristotle not contrary to faith." This attempt to purify Thomism from Thomas Aquinas by replacing the metaphysics of the Angelic Doctor with that of a moderate Aristotelianism was headed for a brilliant future; its triumph will last as long as that of Cajetan. In the fourteenth century, it brought about the disintegration of Thomism in the Dominican school and the disintegration of Scotism in the Franciscan school. In short, it caused the disintegration of the thirteenth-century scholastic theology.

This hesitation is noticeable, at the beginning of the fourteenth century, even among certain Dominicans that the discipline of the Order should

position is that it takes the notion of infinity seriously, that is, otherwise than as meaning a finite reality exceedingly greater than the other ones. Between the true infinite and anything finite, there is no proportion.

First of all, the infinite is a maximum; as an absolute maximum, it is one (since nothing can be either added to, or subtracted from it); since it is unity, it is entity (because unity and being are convertible); if the absolute maximum is one, it is all; if it is all, all things are in it and all things are by it; it is wholly uncontracted (restricted to the form of any particular being). For the same reason, since it is all, nothing else can oppose the infinite; it has therefore no contrary; in consequence, this maximum is also a minimum. In short, the infinite is the absolute and perfect coincidence of contraries (I, 2).

Nicholas was fully aware of the import of this new notion, especially in regard to its methodological consequences. In this order, the new notion of infinity entailed nothing less than a revolution. All the mediaeval philosophies and theologies had been swayed by the Aristotelian principle of contradiction. Anybody inviting Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant, Duns Scotus, Ockham or Nicholas of Autrecourt to argue from this principle, or in conformity with it, was assured of a favorable answer. Nicholas of Cues sees in this universal agreement on the absolute validity of the principle of contradiction the common illusion, not of nominalism only, but of Aristotle and all his followers. In his *Apology for Learned Unknowing*, he expressly protests against the "present predominance of the Aristotelian sect, which considers the coincidence of opposites a heresy, whereas its admission is the starting point of the ascension to mystical theology" (p. 6). In short, the new doctrine demanded the rejection of the dialectics of Aristotle. In Nicholas' own mind, there was nothing new about this demand. He was inviting his contemporaries to return to Hermes Trismegistos, Asclepius and Denis the Aeropagite. Many had done this before him, but nobody had realized that to do it completely entailed the rejection of the Aristotelian dialectics of the principle of contradiction. Nor did Nicholas imagine that many would listen to his advice. Speaking of the Aristotelians, Nicholas remarks that it takes a sort of miracle, something like a religious conversion, to see one of them reject Aristotle in order to rise up to something better (*Apol.*, p. 6). Philosophically speaking, Nicholas was positing contradiction and its progressive overcoming as the proper way toward truth. Instead of carefully avoiding it as fatal to philosophical thinking, Nicholas exhorted his readers to enter the thickness of a reality whose very essence, since it is permeated with the presence of the infinite, is the coincidence of opposites. Before finding another philosophy remotely resembling this one, at least in its attitude toward the principle of contradiction, one would have to wait for the nineteenth century and for the method of Hegel.

In Nicholas of Cues, however, the philosopher is not in quest of a supreme

concept virtually including all concept; his intention is to drown all conceptual distinctions in the unity of mystical intuition. Not to achieve perfect conceptualization, but to overcome it, is his own ideal. This result can be achieved provided we remember that finite and sensible beings, such as they are given to us in concrete experience, are, in a way, so many moments included in the unfolding of the Infinite, which is God. But this statement calls for some precisions.

Among the adversaries of the doctrine, John Wenck pointed out at once that the teaching of the *Learned Unknowing* was headed for a confusion of God and creatures, that is, for what we today call pantheism.[81] In fact, what Nicholas says becomes pantheistic as soon as one forgets the nature of infinity. In the doctrines of Denis, Maximus Confessor and Scotus Erigena, there could be no confusion of being between God and creatures for the simple reason that God is above being. Since God *is not*, no creature can share in his *being*. For the same reason, in Nicholas' own doctrine, the finite cannot possibly be the infinite. To participate in the infinite is to be finite. If it did not somehow share in what is the cause of all, the finite would be nothing at all. Moreover, in this doctrine, there is no sense in asking such questions. So long as he has not yet reached the contemplation of God, the dialectician may well ask them; but then he is arguing about something he does not know. If, instead of attempting to triumph in what he says about a knowledge which he has not, the same dialectician strove to acquire it, he would realize that, when that knowledge is there, nothing can be said about it (*Apologia*, pp. 7-8). All this business about confusing God with creatures ceases to make sense once the finite order of contradictory notions has been overcome. It does not apply to the Infinite which is not the sum total of all finites plus a great many possible ones, but, rather, the ineffable coincidence of the maximum and the minimum.

The true method that leads to learned unknowing is therefore possible, but it is entirely different from the usually received ones. Far from confusing God with creatures, it first posits that finite and infinite are incommensurable; as has been said, there is no "proportion" between them. Where there is no proportion, no precise cognition is possible; the precise relation of equality, or of adequacy between intellect and thing, which philosophers require for the possibility of truth, is necessarily relative to the degree of unity that belongs to the thing. Whether it be an individual, a species, a genus, a moment in time or a place in space, no two finite beings are so similar or equal that an infinite number of higher degrees of similitude or equality between them does not remain possible. However equal, the measure and the measured remain always different. Where there is absolute unity, neither measure nor things to be measured are left. Consequently, precise truth is impossible. "The quiddity of the things, which is the truth of beings, is inaccessible

in its purity; all philosophers have investigated it, but nobody has discovered it such as it is; and the deeper we shall steep ourselves in this ignorance, the nearer we will find ourselves to truth" (*Apologia,* I, 3). In order to make clear the peculiar nature of the presence of the infinite to finite realities, Nicholas often resorts to examples borrowed from geometry. Had he followed this line of thought as a mathematician, he would have found himself very near the modern notion of the mathematical infinite, but his own intention only was to show that all things are to the maximum as the infinite line is to finite lines. When he comes to the concrete applications of his principle, Nicholas falls back upon Denis rather than upon mathematics (op. cit., I, 16-17). For indeed the problem then is: what is it, for a finite being, to participate in unity, and therefore in being? It is to be posited in a being whose measure is defined by its distance from the maximum (I, 18). God is this maximum; since, precisely *qua* maximum, he is the minimum, God is the simultaneous mutual implication (*complicatio*) of all things, even the contradictory ones (*Deum esse omnium complicationem, etiam contradictoriorum,* I, 44). In the first place, this accounts for the possibility of the divine providence. Secondly, it shows the reason why, according to Denis, negative theology is the only kind of language that fits the absolute transcendency of the maximum (I, 26). Thirdly, it invites us to reform our usual notion of the universe.

Philosophers say that the world is finite. If we call universe all that is not God, they are right. Only God is infinite; so the universe is finite; but since, on the part of God, an infinity of larger and larger created worlds remain possible, we had better say that the world is neither infinite nor finite; it is "infinite in a privative sense," that is to say, in this sense that its matter cannot extend beyond its limits. Its being is "contracted" by the condition of its nature. This is the only way there is for us to conceive some sort of proportion between the universe and God (II, 1).

For God, to create all things is to be all things (II, 2, p. 66). For creatures, to be created is to participate in God, not by taking up a "part" of him (since the infinite has no parts and is out of proportion with the finite, p. 67), but by imitating him as images reflect an object in a mirror. In this case, however, there is not even a mirror. To the extent that language is here possible, creatures are just images. If he ever read this, Berkeley must have felt interested (*sicut imago speciei in speculo—posito quod speculum, ante aut post, per se et in se nihil sit;* II, 2, p. 67).

Let us then posit the maximum. It involves everything by mode of reciprocal implication. It involves even motion, which is a serially ordered rest (*quies seriatim ordinata*). Keeping in mind that this ordered rest is in the maximum by mode of implication, we can conceive actual motion as its explication: *motus igitur est explicatio quietis.* Time is nothing but an ordered presence, for the now is present, the past has been

present, the future shall be present. So past and future are the explication (unfolding) of the present, just as the present is the implication of all present times, either in what we call past or in what we call future. In a similar way, "God is implicating all things in this sense that all things are in him; he is explicating all things in this sense that he is in all things" (II, 3, p. 70). This is about all we can know concerning this problem, namely, that creation is an unfolding or explication of God. The how of this escapes us. For indeed, since God is all, the creature is nothing. Remove God from creature, there is nothing left. If we say that God is *in* the creature, then the plurality of things arises from the fact that "God is in nothingness." And indeed, a creature is not to God even what an accident is to a substance. How could we comprehend the presence of God in what is not in any way a being? It is impossible. Creatures are to God in the same relation as its images are to our own face when they multiply in a series of mirrors (II, 3; pp. 71-72). Only let us remember that, in the case of creatures, there is not even a mirror.

As can be seen, this is the very type of a universe in which "everything is in everything." The old saying of Anaxagoras, *"quodlibet esse in quolibet"* suits Nicholas of Cues perfectly (II, 5). The whole universe is in everything in a contracted way and since Nicholas adds that every actually existing thing "contracts" within itself the universe, it is hardly a joke, after saying that "everything is in every thing"; to add: "and inversely." It would be somewhat intricate, to follow Nicholas in his description of the "various degrees of contraction of the universe" (II, 6). This part of his theology is ultimately related to one of the most obscure parts of the doctrine of Nicholas, the notion of matter. Seldom clear, this notion is particularly difficult to define here because, if God is everything, he must also be matter, a conclusion which Nicholas only avoids by establishing that, strictly speaking, absolute matter does not exist.

What could absolute matter be? Nothing more than absolute possibility. Now absolute possibility is God. God is not absolute possibility by privation of all forms, as was the case with matter in ancient philosophies; he is the infinite possibility of all things because, in himself, all things are himself in act. Now, among the possibles, absolute possibility is least capable of actual existence. Even the ancients, when they defined matter as absolute possibility, regularly added that, for this very reason, it was practically nothing. Infinitely actual inasmuch as they are God, the possibles are almost nothing inasmuch as they are themselves. Outside of the pure possibility which is identical with the pure actuality of God (coincidence of opposites) pure possibility without actuality of its own cannot exist. Every particular possibility, then, is contracted by an act. God is the cause of this act and since it has a cause, the existence of every contracted possibility is contingent. Consequently its act too is

contingent. In short, just as its act is contracted by possibility, possibility is contracted by its act (II, 8). There is no such thing as absolute matter in things because God alone is the coincidence of absolute actuality and absolute possibility.

After studying the school of Chartres and on entering the new Aristotelian world of the thirteenth century, it looked as though we had left behind us a mental universe gone beyond recall. One cannot even imagine how completely out of date a lecture by Thierry of Chartres would have sounded at the thirteenth-century Faculty of Arts of the University of Paris. In fact, it would have been impossible. Yet, at the end of the fifteenth century, Aristotelianism itself was in turn reaching the term of its course. It was going in circles. Then Nicholas went back to Chartres. The critical edition of his *Learned Unknowing* abounds in references to Thierry of Chartres, to Gilbert of la Porrée, to Clarenbaud of Arras, John of Salisbury and others whose inspiration was akin to his own doctrine. Nicholas went still farther back into the past, to the sources of these latter sources: Chalcidius, Macrobius, Asclepius, Hermes Trismegistus were names familiar to him, and since their Platonism agreed with the doctrine of Denis the Aeropagite, Nicholas could not doubt that they were substantially right. At the end of an age which is commonly described as having been swayed by Aristotle, this cardinal of the Holy Roman Church calmly decided that the logic of Aristotle, inspired by the present condition of man, was no fitting instrument to investigate a universe created by the infinite God of Christianity. Instead of a logic made to separate, Nicholas wanted a logic made to unite, for indeed, no other one could successfully apply to a universe in which everything is in everything. Aristotle himself had known this truth (*Metaph.*, III, 5, 1009a, 27) but he had discarded it as one of those antiquated positions which philosophy outgrows in the course of its progress. But to Nicholas, who was reading it almost twenty centuries after Aristotle had reported it, the doctrine of Anaxagoras appeared as full of life, still well worth exploring and teeming with possibilities. Ideas never die; they are ageless and always ready to revive in the minds which need them, just as ancient seeds can germinate again when they find a fertile soil.

3. GREEK PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIANITY

The fourteen centuries of history whose development we have attempted to summarize were dominated by two distinct influences, Greek philosophy and Christianity. Every time educated Christians came in contact with Greek philosophical sources, there was a blossoming of theological and philosophical speculation. Ancient Rome had produced no philosophy.

The Ciceronian tradition, which never disappeared from the horizon during the middle ages, played an extremely important part in the history of Western civilization, and, through Petrarch, it became a decisive factor in bringing about the revival of classical humanism, but one does not see any philosophical doctrine whose origin could be traced back to any Roman writer. Cicero, Seneca, even Lucretius have been busy popularizing ideas of Greek origin; they did not add anything important to their sources. The philosophical sterility of ancient Rome seems to be a fact. It accounts for this other fact, that the men of the middle ages never found in the Latin classics more than secondary sources of information incapable of initiating a new philosophical movement.

The ignorance of the Greek language, very general in the West after the fall of the Roman Empire, had for its result a severance of the Latins from the perennial source of Greek thought in the Western world. From the fourth century on, the role of the translators became extremely important. Practically every notable event in the history of Western thought in the middle ages is tied up with the presence of a man who had studied in Greece, or who knew Greek and had translated some Greek philosophical writings, or who had had access to such translations. Marius Victorinus translated Plotinus into Latin: we are indebted to him for making possible the doctrine of Saint Augustine. Then nothing happened up to the time of Boethius, but Boethius translated the *Organon* of Aristotle and he knew the Platonism of Alexandria; hence the whole history of mediaeval logic and even, owing to the theological opuscules of Boethius, a large section of the Latin theologico-philosophical speculation in the West up to the end of the twelfth century. Then again nothing happened until the Greek writings of Denis the Aeropagite exploded in the ninth century Latin world. The immediate result was the *Division of Nature* by Scotus Erigena, a doctrinal synthesis to which nothing compares between the ninth and the twelfth centuries. Even the works of Saint Anselm of Canterbury, whose dialectical genius is beyond discussion and whose philosophical gifts are evident, betray a certain metaphysical dryness probably due to the fact that, apart from logic, his main source in philosophy was Augustine instead of being the Greek source of Augustine. After Anselm, the twelfth century school of Chartres draws its inspiration from Chalcidius and other Platonic sources; Abélard feeds on the Greeks through Boethius; Bernard of Clairvaux opens the great tradition of Western speculative mysticism on account of his familiarity with the Greek theology of Gregory of Nyssa. Last, not the least, the arrival of Aristotle's encyclopedia at the end of the twelfth century, read either in itself or in its interpretations by Avicenna and Averroes, initiates the flowering of Christian speculation which we call scholasticism. The Philosopher *par excellence* was a Greek; the author of the *Elements of*

Theology was a Greek; seen from this point of view, the philosophical speculation of the middle ages appears as a sort of appendix to the history of Greek philosophy.[82]

But there is another side to the picture. Something happened to philosophy during the fourteen centuries which we call the middle ages. The easiest way to see what happened to it is to remember the general view of the world propagated by the last Greek philosophers and to compare it with the interpretation of the world common to the founders of modern philosophy, namely, Descartes, Malebranche, Leibniz, Spinoza and Locke. In the seventeenth century, the commonly received philosophical notions of God, of the origin of the world, of the nature of man and of his destiny are strikingly different from those which the middle ages had inherited from the Greeks. Strict monotheism, an undisputed truth in the minds of all the metaphysicians of the thirteenth century, is only one of the points in case. In its content, the metaphysics of Descartes was much more a continuation of the metaphysics of the scholastics than of the Greeks. He himself was a Christian and it is no wonder that his philosophy continued, in a most original way, the tradition of the Christian theology of the middle ages. True, Descartes called it a philosophy, and it certainly was one, but the upshot of his *Meditations on Prime Philosophy* was to confirm by a new method all the main conclusions already established in metaphysics by Augustine, Anselm, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus: the existence of one single God, infinite in being and in power, free creator of heaven and earth, conserving the world by his all-powerful will and acting as a Providence for man whose soul can be proved to be spiritual in nature. With Descartes, Malebranche and Leibniz, the point of departure of modern philosophy coincides with the point of arrival of mediaeval theology. Even Spinoza cannot be fully accounted for without taking into account the speculation of the middle ages. To overlook what happened to philosophy in the thirteenth century is to deprive the history of Western thought of its continuity and, by the same token, its intelligibility.

This duality of nature explains the existence of two historical perspectives on the development of mediaeval speculation. Some historians prefer to follow its philosophical axis. The literary history of the progressive rediscovery of the Greek philosophical sources then becomes of paramount importance; from the end of the twelfth century on, Aristotle figures as the leading character in the play; Averroes and his followers then become, despite their occasional errors, the representatives of philosophy *qua* pure philosophy in the middle ages, or, at least, of the purely philosophical spirit from the thirteenth century up to the beginning of modern times. This is not only a perspective legitimate in itself, but one which answers an incontrovertible reality. It coincides with the very perspective adopted by the first modern philosophers on mediaeval speculation.

of the Church and by scholastics does not fall under the competence of their historian. The least that a historian can say about this, however, is that apart from their ignorance of the facts, there is no excuse for those who describe the middle ages as a long period of philosophical stagnation. It might have been one. The Catholic Church could have condemned all philosophical speculation, including the very study of philosophy, as opposed to Christian faith. The Christian priests and monks could have been forbidden by the Church to indulge in such studies, to open schools and to teach doctrines that had been taught by pagans at a time when the gospel had not yet been preached to the Gentiles. The popes could have condemned all efforts to achieve any understanding of faith by means of philosophical speculation. Only no such thing happened during the middle ages; in fact the very reverse took place between the times of Justin Martyr and those of Nicholas of Cues. It is not a good thing to judge fourteen centuries on the ground of their historical misrepresentation.[83]

The intrinsic value of this Christian philosophy in the middle ages is a point for every philosopher to decide in the light of his own judgment. Most of them have their own opinion about it, but this opinion is not always founded upon a first-hand knowledge of the doctrines at stake. Now there is an excellent excuse, if not for judging what one does not sufficiently know, at least for not sufficiently knowing it. Life is short and the history of philosophy is growing longer every year. But if any Christian master felt the same indifference with respect to the history of scholasticism, he would be less easily excusable, because this is his own personal history or, at least, that of his own personal philosophical tradition. This tradition is not a dead thing; it is still alive and our own times bear witness to its enduring fecundity. There is no reason why this fecundity should come to an end. On the contrary, it can be expected to exhibit a new vitality every time it will re-establish contact with its authentic methods and its true principles, whose permanent truth is independent of time. The only object of the history of Christian philosophy, apart from being a history like all the others, is to facilitate access to the perennial sources of Christian speculation.

If, on the whole, this history has not completely misrepresented its object, it can be said that the treasure of Christian philosophy in the middle ages exhibits an amazing wealth of still incompletely exploited ideas. But even leaving them aside, this history should convey to its readers an invitation to establish personal contact with at least three main schools of thought which no Christian philosopher can afford to ignore. Augustine will introduce him to a metaphysical method based upon the data of personal introspection; Duns Scotus will introduce him to a metaphysical universe of essences; Thomas Aquinas will tell him what happens to such a universe when existence is added to essences as

a further metaphysical dimension. Had they bequeathed to us nothing more than these three pure philosophical positions, the scholastics would still remain for all Christian philosophers the safest guides in their quest for a rationally valid interpretation of man and the world.

At this point, our philosophical problem arises once more: how can a speculation be rational and philosophical if it is tied up with religious beliefs? Here again, history as such has no competence to answer the question. It knows, however, that far from sterilizing philosophical speculation, this alliance of two distinct orders of thought has given philosophy a new life and brought about positive philosophical results. The history of the influence of Christianity on the development of modern philosophy, quite independently of scholasticism and sometimes even in reaction against its methods, would be another field of investigation. From what little is already known of it, it appears that objectivity in judgment and freedom from settled intellectual prejudices are not the exclusive property of pagan philosophers, that reason is not always found at its best on the side of what is commonly called rationalism, and that, at any rate, the range of intelligibility is incomparably wider than that of reason. This is a lesson which only the frequentation of the true philosophical master minds can teach us. Why should we feel afraid of living in their company? No real master will ever invite us to listen to himself, but to the truth of what he says, such as we ourselves can see it in our own minds. In these matters, nothing can replace personal experience, and none can be more precious than this one if it is true to say, with Thomas Aquinas, that the "highest felicity of man consists in the speculation through which he is seeking the knowledge of truth."

II

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADGM. *Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters,* Festgabe M. Grabmann, Münster i. W., 1935 (Beiträge, Supplement, III).

AFH. Archivum Franciscanum Historicum. Quaracchi (Italy).

AFP. Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum. Rome.

AHDL. Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge. Paris.

AJT. American Journal of Theology.

ALKM. Archiv für Literatur und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters.

AN. The Ante-Nicene Fathers of the Church.

APA. Acta Pontificiae Academiae Romanae S. Thomae Aquinatis. Rome.

AST. Analecta sacra Tarraconensia. Barcelona.

Beiträge. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Münster i. W.

BET. C. P. Farrar and A. P. Evans, *Bibliography of English Translations from Medieval Sources,* New York, 1946.

CF. Collectanea Franciscana. Rome.

CUP. *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis,* by H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, 4 vols., Paris, 1889-1897.

CSEL. Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum. Wien.

DHGE. Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastique. Paris.

DTC. Dictionnaire de théologie catholique. Paris.

DTF. Divus Thomas, Fribourg (Switzerland).

DTP. Divus Thomas, Piacenza (Italy).

FS. Franziskanische Studien. Paderborn (the American journal will be quoted by its full title: *Franciscan Studies*).

GCFI. Giornale critico della filosofia italiana. Florence.

GCS. Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte. Leipzig.

GDP. Fried. Ueberwegs *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie;* II, *Die patristische und scholastische Philosophie,* 11 ed., by B. Geyer, Berlin, 1928.

GLOLIT. P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique . . . ,* 2 vols., Paris, J. Vrin, 1925, 1935.

GLOREP. P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au* XIII siècle, 2 vols., Paris, J. Vrin, 1933, 1934.

HLF. Histoire littéraire de la France.

HTR. The Harvard Theological Review. Cambridge (Mass).

JPST. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie (now continued by DTF.).

JQR. The Jewish Quarterly Review.

JTS. Journal of Theological Studies. London.

MAN. M. Manitius, *Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters,* 3 vols., Munich, 1911, 1923, 1931.

MAP. Mélanges Auguste Pelzer. Louvain, 1947.

MG. M. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben* 2 vols. Munich, 1926, 1936. A third volume is announced.

MM. Mélanges Mandonnet; études d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale du moyen âge. 2 vols. Paris, 1930.

MS. Mediaeval Studies. Toronto.

MSR. Mélanges de science religieuse. Lille (France).

NPN. A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Church.

NRT. Nouvelle revue théologique. Tournai (Belgium).

NS. New Scholasticism. Washington.

apolis (Nablous) of pagan parents; a convert to Christianity before 132; died a martyr in Rome under prefect Junius Rusticus (163-167). Wrote a *First Apology* to Emperor Hadrian (152); *Dialogue with Trypho* (155); *Second Apology,* to Marcus Aurelius (*ca.* 161); *On the Resurrection* (fragments, date unknown).—EDITIONS. Greek and Latin transl., PG., vol. 6. Otto, S. Justini . . . *Opera quae feruntur omnia,* 3 ed., 5 vols., Jena, 1876-1877. Greek text only, A. W. Blunt, *The Apologies of Justin Martyr,* Cambridge, 1911. Greek and Latin, G. Rauschen, *S. Justini Apologiae duae,* Bonn, 1911. Greek and French, G. Archambault, 2 vols., Paris, 1909. English transl. AN., (Buffalo), I, 159-272 (*Apologies* and *Dialogues*); 294-299 (*On the Resurrection*); 305-306 (*Acta S. S. Justini et Sociorum*). A. L. William, *The Dialogue,* SPCK., N.Y., 1930. T. B. Falls, *Saint Justin Martyr: The first Apology, The second Apology, Dialogue with Trypho, Exhortation to the Greeks, Discourse to the Greeks, The Monarchy,* N.Y. (Christian Heritage), 1949.—BIBLIOGRAPHY. C. Clemen, *Die religionsphilosophische Bedeutung des stoisch-christlichen Eudemonismus in Justins Apologie,* Leipzig, 1890. J. Rivière, *S. Justin et les Apologistes du IIe siècle,* Paris, 1907. Pfättisch, *Der Einfluss Platons auf die Theologie Justins des Martyrers,* in Forschungen zur christl.-Literatur und Dogmengeschichte, Paderborn, 10, 1910. A. L. Feder, *Justins des Martyrers Lehre von Jesus Christus dem Messias und dem Menschengewordenem Sohne Gottes,* Freiburg i. Br., 1906 (important). A. Puech, *Les Apologistes . . .,* 46-147 (important). M. J. Lagrange, OP., *Saint Justin, philosophe et martyr,* Paris, 1914. C. C. Martindale, *St. Justin the Martyr,* London, 1921. E. Goodenough, *The Theology of Justin Martyr,* Jena, 1923 (bibliography, 295-320). G. Bardy, *Saint Justin et le Stoicisme,* RSR., 13 (1923) 491-510; 14 (1924) 33-45. G. Bardy, art. *Justin (saint),* DTC., 8 (1925) 2228-2277 (bibliography). A Casamassa, *Gli Apologisti e i Polemisti del II secolo,* Roma, 1935. W. von Lövenich, *Das Johannes—Verständnis im zweiten Jahrhundert,* Giessen, 1932 (Justin, Gnosis, Irenaeus: important). J. Champonier, *Naissance de l'humanisme chrétien,* Bulletin G. Budé, 1947, 58-68. M.-M. Sagnard, OP., *Y a-t-il un plan du Dialogue avec Tryphon?* Mélanges de Ghellinck, I (1951) 171-182.—BET., 2323-2330.

[9] See Tatian, *Address to the Greeks,* 25; AN., (Edinburgh), III, 30.

[10] *Dialogue with Trypho,* I; AN., (Buffalo) 1, 194. Cf. "Philosophy is, in fact, the greatest possession and most honorable before God, to whom it leads us and alone commends us; and these are truly holy men who have bestowed attention on philosophy" (*Dialogue,* 2; AN., I, 195). Yet, philosophical knowledge should be one, and not divided into sects as has been done by schools (*Dialogue,* 2, 195). Above all, philosophy should not be the privilege of the happy few but, owing to revelation, it should be accessible to all (*I Apology,* 60; I, 183. *II Apology,* 10, 191-192). Note that Justin's Christianity is absorbing Greek philosophy, not inversely.—G. Bardy, *La conversion au Christianisme durant les premiers siècles,* Paris, 1947, pp. 127-129.

[11] *Dialogue,* 2; AN., I, 195. Justin had really been a Platonist before his conversion: *II Apology,* 12; AN., I, 192.

[12] *Dialogue,* 8; AN., I, 198; we are quoting from this translation.

[13] *I Apology,* 46; AN., I, 178.—Philosophers partially share in the *Logos;* the Christians partake of the whole Logos: *I Apology,* 5; *II Apology,* 5, and 8.—General interpretation of Justin's attitude in B. Seeberg, *Die Geschichtstheologie des Justins des Märtyrers,* ZKG., 58 (1939) 1-81.

[14] *II Apology,* 10; AN., I, 191, and 13, I, 193. For instance, the Christians can claim for their own what Plato has said in the *Timaeus* concerning creation, providence, the Son of God "placed crosswise in the universe," etc.; or what the Stoics have said of the future destruction of the world by fire; or what the philosophers and poets have said of rewards or punishments in future life. In such cases, the Christians "seem to say the same things," but they say them better. Besides, let us not forget his own statement: "We claim to be acknowledged, not because we say the same things as these writers said, but because we say true things" (*I Apology,* 23; AN., I, 170).

EXHORTATION TO THE GREEKS. Of unknown origin; printed among the works of Justin (PG., 6, 241-312); probably written about the beginning of the III century (O. Bardenhewer, *Patrology,* 53).

65-90. *Pour l'histoire d'Alexandrie,* Vivre et Penser 2 (1942), 80-109. W. Völker, *Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus* (Texte und Untersuchungen, 57), Leipzig, 1952.—Engl. transl., BET., 990-997.

[3] *Exhortation,* ch. XII, AN., I, 106-110.

[4] Relation of the *Exhortation* to the *Instructor,* in *Instructor,* I, 1; Stählin, I, 89-91 and AN., I, 113-114.—The Instructor as educator and physician: I, 5-6; St. I, 96-121. On faith as the perfection of knowledge, I, 6; St. I, 107, line 14. The Instructor as a judge: I, 8-9; St. I, 126-142 (AN., 155-173) and I, 12; St. 148-150 (AN., 181-183).—Practical rules of moral conduct (eating, drinking, laughter, clothing, cosmetics, etc.) Bk. II, and Bk. III, ch. 11 (AN., I, 313-331).

[5] *Quis dives salvetur,* ed. Stählin, III, 159-191.

[6] *Miscellanies,* I, 1; St. II, 13, lines 1-14 (AN., I, 349-351).—On the meaning of *Miscellanies* (or *Stromata*), see VII, 18; Stählin, III, 78, l. 19—79, l. 8 (AN., II, 489).

[7] Faith is sufficient, I, 9; St. II, 28. VI, 10; St. 471, 30-472, 7. VIII, 1; St. III, 80, l. 4-5, where Christianity is said to be the only philosophy worthy of the name (AN., I, 379-383; II, 349-351; 490-491).—Christian hostility against philosophy, I, 2; St. II, 13, l. 14-16 and 14, l. 13-19 (AN., I, 360-361).—Philosophy and arts given to man by God, I, 4 (AN., I, 364-365), and VI, 17; St. II, 513, l. 23—514, l. 5 (AN., II, 399-401).—The words of Matthew, 7, 7, and of Luke, 11, 9, as an invitation to philosophize: VIII, 1; St. III, 80, l. 9-10 (AN., II, 490).—Philosophical aptitudes are a gift of God, I, 4; St. II, 16-17 (AN., I, 365).—Philosophy was to the Greeks what the Law had been to the Jews: VI, 5; St. II, 451-453 and VI, 7; St. 459-463 (AN., II, 326-328 and 335-339).—J. T. Muckle, *Clement of Alexandria on Philosophy as a Divine Testament for the Greeks,* The Phoenix (Journal of the Classical Association of Canada) 5 (1951) 79-86.

[8] "And, in general terms, we shall not err in alleging that all things necessary and profitable for life came to us from God, and that philosophy more especially was given to the Greeks, as a covenant peculiar to them, being, as it were, a stepping-stone to the philosophy which is according to Christ . . . ," *Miscellanies,* VI, 8 (AN., II, 342).—The "philosophy according to Christ" is sometimes called by Clement "the Barbaric philosophy," that is the philosophy of the Barbarians as opposed to the philosophy of the Greeks: *Miscellanies,* V, 14; St. II, 389, 23. II, 13; St. II, 36, 10. He also uses "Barbaric theology": II, 13; St. II, 36, 29. More references in the Index to Stählin's edition, vol. IV, 792-793.

[9] Philosophy the handmaid of theology: *Miscellanies,* I, 5; St. II, 17-21 (AN., I, 366-370). Same doctrine in Philo: H. A. Wolfson, *Philo,* I, 2; 87-163.

[10] The collaboration of faith and reason is possible on account of the unity of human thought. The world is saturated with a "prudence" (*phronesis*) which, in the human soul, receives different names according to its different operations. As seeking to know the first causes, it is "intellection" (*noesis*); as trying to demonstrate the intuitions of the intellect, it becomes Knowledge, Science, Wisdom; as accepting the teaching of God without striving to understand it, it is "faith" (*pistis*); as applying itself to sensible things, it begets "true opinion," "experience" and the practical arts: *Miscellanies,* VI, 17; St. II, 511, lines 25-512, line 6 (AN., II, 397).—Faith as criterion of philosophical truth, *Miscellanies,* II, 4; St. II, 120, lines 26-27 (AN., II, 9). Faith begets "wisdom, understanding, intelligence, knowledge," according to pseudo-Barnabas. How philosophy is perfected by faith, *Miscellanies,* VI, 7; St. II, 459, line 25—460, line 4 (AN., II, 335-339). On true gnosis as an intellectual comprehension of all, including what seems incomprehensible, *Miscellanies,* VI, 8; St. II, 465, l. 18—467, l. 6 (AN., II, 343-344).

[11] Noetic. God prescribes to man to seek in order that he may find (Matt. 7, 7; Luke, 11, 9). To find is to know; in order to know, we must define terms (*blictri,* which means nothing, is no object of demonstration; *Miscellanies,* VIII, 2; St. III, 81, l. 12 (AN., II, 491); the starting point is nominal definition, whence we proceed to real definition; all demonstrations bring about assent on points dis-

themes will reappear in the doctrine of John Scotus Erigena (IX cent.).

[42] Origenism survived in the school of Alexandria in the teaching of DIDYMUS THE BLIND (*ca.* 310-395): PG., 39, the whole volume. Another Origenist was EVAGRIUS PONTICUS (*ca.* 345-399): fragments in PG., 40; 1219 ff. His *Gnosticus*, perhaps a witness to the survival of Clement's influence, is unfortunately lost. See Bardenhewer, *Patrology*, 307-310.

PART TWO

CHAPTER II. THE LATIN APOLOGISTS

[43] TERTULLIAN, born at Carthage *ca.* 160; converted to Christianity *ca.* 190-195; married (cf. *Ad uxorem*) and yet, according to Saint Jerome, a priest (*De viris illustribus*, 53). At a later date, he joined the sect of the Montanists (206) and left the Church (213), but he broke away from Montanism and founded the church of the Tertullianists. He died about 240. Works in PL., 1-2. Fr. Oehler, *Tertulliani quae supersunt omnia*, Leipzig, 1853-1854. Critical edition in CSEL., Wien; vol. 20, 1890: *De spectaculis, De idololatria, Ad nationes, De testimonio animae, Scorpiace, De oratione, De baptismo, De pudicitia, De jejunio adversus psychicos, De anima;* vol. 42, 1906: *De patientia, De carnis resurrectione, Adversus Hermogenem, Adversus Valentinianos, Adversus omnes haereses, Adversus Praxean, Adversus Marcionem libri quinque;* vol. 69, 1939: *Apologeticum;* vol. 70, 1942: *De praescriptione haereticorum, De cultu feminarum, Ad uxorem, De exhortatione castitatis, De corona, De carne Christi, Adversus Judaeos.*—A new edition of all the Latin patristic texts, up to Bede, is announced under the title: *Corpus christianorum;* vol. I, *Tertulliani Opera*, Part 1; M. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1953. The complete collection will comprise 175 volumes. English transl., *The Writings of Tertullian*, AN., vols. 11 (Edinburgh, 1869); 15 (1870); 18 (1870). A. Souter, *On Baptism, Against Praxeas, On the Resurrection of the Flesh*, SPCK., N.Y., 1920. Same author, *The Apology*, Latin and English transl., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1917. R. Arbesman, E. J. Daly, E. A. Quain, *Tertullian, Apologetical works*, N.Y. Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1950 (*Apology, The Testimony of the Soul, To Scapula, On the Soul*).—BET., 3592-3601.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. P. Monceaux, *Histoire littéraire de l'Afrique chrétienne*, I, 178-461. G. Esser, *Die Seelenlehre Tertullians*, Paderborn, 1893. A. D'Alès, *La théologie de Tertullien*, Paris, 1905. J. P. Waltzing, *L'Apologeticum*, Louvain, 1910 (Introduction). P. de Labriolle, *La crise Montaniste*, Paris, 1913. R. E. Roberts, *The Theology of Tertullian*, London, 1924, J. Morgan, *The Importance of Tertullian in the Development of Christian Dogma*, London, 1928. J. Lortz, *Tertullian als Apologet*, Münster i. W., 2 vols. 1927, 1928. C. de L. Shortt, *The Influence of Philosophy on the Mind of Tertullian*, London, 1933. G. Bardy, *La latinisation de l'Eglise d'Occident*, Irenikon, 14 (1937) 3-20, 113-130; same author, art. *Tertullian*, DTC., 15 (1943) 130-171. V. Morel, *Disciplina. Le mot et l'idée représentée par lui dans les oeuvres de Tertullien*, RHE., 40 (1944-1945) 5-46.

[44] P. Monceaux, *Histoire littéraire de l'Afrique chrétienne depuis les origines jusqu'à l'invasion arabe*, 7 vols., Paris, Leroux, 1901-1923; still fundamental.—More general in outlook: R. Payne, *The Fathers of the Western Church*, New York, 1951.

General remark concerning the Latin Patrology of Migne. Although its texts do not measure up to the requirements of modern philology, it remains an extremely precious collection of mediaeval texts from the origins up to the end of the twelfth century. Before using it, consult P. Glorieux, *Pour revaloriser Migne. Tables rectificatives*, Mélanges de Science Religieuse, 1952, Supplement.

[45] *On Prescription against Heretics*, 7; tr. P. Holmes, AN.; vol. 15, 9-10.—J.-L. Allie, *L'argument de prescription dans le droit romain, en apologétique et en théologie dogmatique*, Ottawa, 1940 (cf. Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa, 6 (1937) 211-225; 7 (1938) 16-28). J. K. Stirnimann, *Die Praescriptio Tertullians im Lichte des römischen Rechtes und der Theologie* (*Paradosis* 3), Freiburg (Switz.) 1949.

[46] *On Prescription*, 13; AN., 15, 16-17; contains the so-called "Symbol of Tertullian," in fact, one of the oldest redactions of the Christian Creed.—The same juridical spirit pervades the *Apology* of Tertullian (*Apologeticum*), whose purpose it is to prove that, legally speaking, if the Christians are innocent of the crimes with which they are commonly charged, they should be tolerated; now, in fact, they are innocent of those crimes; hence anti-Christian laws should be abrogated. H. F. Hallock, *Church and State in Tertullian*, Church Quarterly Review, 119 (1934-1935) 61-78.

[47] A. d'Alès (*La Théologie de Tertullien*, 33-36) rightly speaks of the "rational character of Christian faith" in Tertullian's doctrine; the reason which Tertullian derides is that of the philosophers, who are, "so to say, the patriarchs of the heretics" (*On the Soul*, 3; AN., 15, 416. *Against Hermogenes*, 8; AN., 15, 67). But one cannot speak of the "philosophical" character of Christian faith in Tertullian. Tertullian resorts to reason in defending faith, but reason has for him no other function than to understand Scripture: "Whoever gives ear will find God in them; whoever takes pains to understand, will be compelled to believe" (*Apolog.* 18; AN., 11., 88). He does not mean: to understand their rational meaning, but rather to understand their Greek version by "the seventy-two interpreters."—On the importance of the notion of "tradition" in the early history of Christian thought, D. Van den Eynde OFM., *Les normes de l'enseignement chrétien dans la littérature patristique des trois premiers siècles*, Gembloux (Belgium) 1933.

[48] GOD is naturally known by a "naturally Christian soul" (*Apolog.*, 17; AN., 11, 87), in this sense that it bears the mark of its creator. He is one, and a spirit, but even the spirit is material according to Tertullian. To be a "spirit" is not to be "immaterial." Cf. "Quis negabit Deum corpus esse, etsi Deus spiritus est?" ("Who will deny that God is body, even though he be spirit?" *Adversus Praxeam*, 7; AN., 15, 346). There is no getting around this text; besides, it perfectly fits Tertullian's doctrine of the materiality of the soul. The Word is likewise a "spirit," begotten by the Father. Before the creation, the Word was the internal thought, or discourse, of the Father (*ratio, sensus, sermo, logos*); also his Wisdom (Prov. 8, 22); before producing the world, God uttered his Word, as the instrument of his works (*Adv. Prax.*, 4-6; AN., 15, 339-344). There is, in God, unity of substance, but trinity of "persons" (note the appearance of the term *persona*, in *Adv. Prax.*, 18; AN., 15, 372). The Word is uttered, begotten under his perfect form, when God says: "Be light made" (Gen. i, 3). Cf. *Adv. Prax.*, 12; AN., 15, 357; *Adversus Hermogenem*, 18; AN., 15, 79-81. Little is said about the Holy Ghost, who proceeds from the two other Persons, yet is not clearly conceived by Tertullian as distinct from the Son (*Adv. Prax.*, 26; AN., 15, 392-395).—MAN is body and soul, but the soul itself is nothing if it is not a body, more fluid and subtle than the external body through which it spreads and whose form it takes: *nihil enim, si non corpus*. Being material like the body, the soul can benefit by the food we eat. Some object to this that the food of the soul is wisdom, which is immaterial, but there are plenty of perfectly robust Barbarians! The Stoics are right in teaching that both souls and the arts by which souls are nourished are likewise material (*On the Soul*, ch. 6-9; AN., vol. 15, 420-430). Yet the soul is simple (ch. 10); its only multiplicity is that of its functions; it is "spirit," not because it is not a body, but because it breathes, or "respires"; it is called *animus* (mind, *Nous*), inasmuch as it knows (ch. 12; AN., 15, 423); despite what Plato says to the contrary, sense knowledge is quite reliable (*On the Soul*, 17; AN., 15, 444-449) and the distinction introduced by him between the intellect and the senses is responsible for certain errors of the Gnostics (*On the Soul*, 18; AN., 15, 450). Created by God, the soul is transmitted to the child as a fragment of the soul of the father, and, thereby, it carries with itself, from generation to generation, both the image of God (hence, the "naturally" Christian soul) and original sin. Transmigration, of course, is an absurdity. Recapitulation of the doctrine of the soul in *On the Soul*, 22; AN., 15, 462.—The best edition of *On the Soul* is J. H. Waszink, *Q. S. F. Tertulliani De anima. Edited with Introduction and Commentary*, Amsterdam, 1947. On the doctrine, *Die Seelenlehre Tertullians*, Paderborn, 1893. H. Koch, *Tertullianisches* III-IV, TSK., 104 (1932) 127-159; 105 (1933)

283-286. P. Allard, art. *Basile (saint)* DTC., 2 (1923) 441-455. L. V. Jacks, *St. Basil and Greek Literature,* Cath. Univ. of America, Washington, 1922. Y. Courtonne, *Saint Basile et l'Hellénisme,* Paris, 1934. M. M. Fox, *The Life and Times of Saint Basil the Great as Revealed in His Works,* Cath. Univ. of Amer. Press, Washington, 1939 (bibliography, IX-XV).—On the social and economic doctrines of Saint Basil: A. Dirking, *Sancti Basilii Magni de divitiis et paupertate sententiae quam habeant rationem cum veterum philosophorum doctrina,* Münster i. Westf., 1911. S. Giet, *Les idées et l'action sociales de St. Basile,* Paris, 1941. G. F. Reilly, *Imperium and Sacerdotium According to St. Basil the Great,* Cath. Univ. of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1945.—On the teaching of the Fathers on these questions: Ign. Seipel, *Die Wirtschaftsethischen Lehren der Kirchenväter,* Wien, 1907., and Th. Sommerlad, *Das Wirtschaftsprogramm der Kirche des Mittelalters,* Leipzig, 1903.—Influence of Plotinus upon Basil's theology, P. Henry, *Les états du texte de Plotin,* Louvain, 1938. B. Pruche, *Basile de Césarée. Traité du Saint Esprit,* Paris, 1947, pp. 57-62; 92, n. 1; 137, n. 4; 212, n. 5. Cf. B. Pruche, *L'originalité du traité de saint Basile sur le Saint-Esprit,* in RSPT., 32 (1948) 207-221. B. Altaner, *Augustinus und Basilius der Grosse. Eine Quellenkritische Untersuchung,* RB., 60 (1950) 222-239.—On the Latin translation of Basil's *Hexaemeron* (used by Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram,* I, 18), B. Altaner, *Eustathius, der lateinische Uebersetzer der Hexaemeron-Homilien Basilius des Grossen,* ZNW., 39 (1940) 161-170. Probable date of the translation, *ca.* 400.

[74] *Against Eunomius,* I, 10; PG., 29, 536.

[75] The nine homilies *On Hexaemeron* are the work of an educated Christian of the fourth century, but neither a scientific work, nor even an exposition of Basil's learning. We should read them as "homilies," delivered at the rate of one a day, before an audience of Christians including simple workers whom their daily salary hardly sufficed to maintain (*Hexaemeron,* III, 1; PG., 29, 53 A; NPN., 8, 65). Basil's method is different from that of Origen (III, 9; 73-76; NPN., 8, 70): few mystical interpretations; frequent moral interpretations, and these always based upon the strict literal meaning of Scripture: "When I hear *fish,* I understand *fish;* plant, fish, wild beast, domestic animal, I take all in the literal sense" (9, 1; 188 B; NPN., 8, 101). Hence the large amount of positive information on plants, animals and natural phenomena which he has gathered in his sermons. On one point, however, there seems to be an influence of Origen (*De principiis,* II, 1, 3): Basil thinks that before the beginning of our world, there was another order of things suitable to the nature of pure Intelligences, and that God has added our world to it, as "both a school and a training place where the souls of men should be taught, and a home for beings destined to be born and die" (I, 5; PG., 29, 13; NPN., 8, 54).—On the sense of "beginning," as "first movement," or else as the instantaneous act of creation: I, 6; PG., 15 C.—Why the earth is immobile at the center of the world: I, 9-10; PG., 29, 21-25.—On the creation of matter: II, 1-3; PG., 29, 28-36.—Evil is not created, because it is not an entity, but the evil condition of the soul opposed to virtue: II, 4-5; PG., 29, 36-41.—On the firmament: III, 4; PG., 29, 60-61.—Against astrology; VII, 5-7; PG., 29, 128-133.—Optical proofs of the prodigious size of the Sun and Moon (because God made two "great" luminaries: Gen. i, 16): VI, 9-11; PG., 29, 137-148.—On animals, *Hom.* VII, VIII (against the transmigration of souls). Note, VIII, 4, the moral lesson drawn from the "king of bees" as to the best way to choose a king; NPN., 8, 97.—The history of social and economic doctrines should take into account three important *Homilies,* PG., 31, 261-328; and *Homily II in PS. 14,* PG., 29, 263-280 (on usury).

[76] Gregory of Nyssa (Gregorius Nyssenus), younger brother of St. Basil; birth date unknown; taught rhetoric; probably married; entered the ecclesiastical orders; made a bishop of Nyssa by his brother Basil (371); deposed and exiled by an Arian Council in 375; came to Nyssa in 394; date of death unknown. Works in PG., 44-46.—The main sources of information concerning his philosophical views are: *On the Formation of Man* (PG., 44, 125-256); *In Hexaemeron* (PG., 44, 61-124); *Dialogue with Macrina on the Soul and the Resurrection* (PG., 46, 12-160); *The Life of Moses* (PG., 44, 297-430); fifteen *Homilies on the Canticle of Can-*

is the work of faith in Christ," I, 62, 1087 B. Cf. IV, 11, 1121 B C.—On Ideas: source of the terms *existentialitas, vitalitas,* etc., from the Greek *ontolès, zoôtes,* etc., IV, 5, 1116: Cf. Plotinus, *Enneads,* III, 5, 9.—On the general history of some technical Latin terms in philosophy and theology, C. Arpe, *Substantia,* Philologus, 94 (1940) 64-67. J. de Ghellinck, *L'entrée d'essentia, substantia et autres mots apparentés dans le latin médiéval,* Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi. Bulletin Du Cange, 16 (1941) 77-112; *Essentia et substantia,* op. cit., 17 (1942) 129-133. E. Gilson, *Notes sur le vocabulaire de l'être,* MS., 8 (1946) 150-158.

[11] Saint Ambrose (340-397). Works in PL., 14-17. More important for the history of theology than for that of philosophical ideas. A comparison of his *Hexaemeron* with the similar work by Saint Basil, which he knew, shows how little interested Ambrose was in abstract speculation. He is interested in facts for the moral lessons they suggest (*Hexaemeron,* I, 6, 20. I, 6, 22-23. II, 2, 7. VI, 2, 8.). For instance, the Apostles were fishermen; then, morally speaking, man is a fish (V, 6, 15). He does not trust the philosophers (*De fide,* I, 5. I, 13. IV, 8; *De incarnatione,* IX, 89). Traces of Plotinus have been detected by P. Courcelle, *Recherches sur les Confessions de saint Augustin,* Paris, 1950, pp. 106-138: the God of Exod. 3, 14, is being itself, that is that which always is (*In Ps.,* 43, 19). God is entity (*essentia, ousia*), a word which means "always existing" (*De fide,* III, 15). Another group of Plotinian notions is found in *De Isaac et anima* (VII, 60-61, evil is non-being; VII, 65, on virtues and vices; VII, 78-79, on the spiritual flight of man toward his Father and true homeland); also in the *De bono mortis* (death is not an evil, I, 1 and IV, 13; the soul uses its body, VII, 27; the soul is life, consequently it is immortal, IX, 42, etc). All these philosophical notions will be taken up by Augustine; whether he was indebted to Ambrose for them is hard to say; what is certain is that Augustine learned from Ambrose to interpret Scripture in a spiritual sense, *Confessions,* VI, 4, 6 (cf. II Cor. 3, 6); Ambrose invited Augustine to read, not Plotinus, but Isaiah (*Conf.* IX, 5, 13). The fact that Ambrose wrote a *De philosophia* does not warrant any conclusion; the treatise is lost, and we do not even know up to what point it was for, or against, philosophy.—R. Thamin, *Saint Ambroise et la morale chrétienne au IVe siècle. Etude comparée des traités "Des devoirs" de Cicéron et de saint Ambroise,* Paris, 1895. P. de Labriolle, *The Life and Times of St. Ambrose,* St. Louis, Mo., 1928. J. R. Palanque, *Saint Ambroise et l'empire romain . . .,* Paris, 1933. L. M. Zucker, *S. Ambrosii De Tobia;* a commentary with an introduction and translation, Cath. Univ. of Amer., Washington, D.C., 1933. N. E. Nelson, *Cicero's De officiis in Christian Thought,* Ann Arbor (Mich.) 1933. Homes Dudden, *S. Ambrose, his Life and Times,* Oxford, 1935, 2 vols. (bibliography, II, 714-724). G. Ferretti, *L'influsso di S. Ambrogio in S. Agostino,* Faenza, 1951. Cl. Morino, *Ritorno al paradiso di Adamo in S. Ambrogio. Itinerario spirituale,* Rome, Tip. Pol. Vat., 1952. Th. Deman, *Le 'De officiis' de S. Ambroise dans l'histoire de la théologie morale,* RSPT., 37 (1953) 409-424.—BET., 178-191.

On the so-called "collectivism" of Ambrose and other Fathers, O. Schilling, *Der Kollektivismus der Kirchenväter,* TQ., 114 (1933) 481-492. S. Giet, *La doctrine de l'appropriation des biens chez quelques uns des Pères. Peut-on parler de communisme?* RSR., 1948, 55-91. Cf. M. B. Schwalm, art. *Communisme,* DTC., 3 (1923) 574-596.

[12] Saint Augustine (Aurelius Augustinus), Nov. 13, 354-Aug. 28, 430, born at Tagasta (Hippo Regius, Souk Aras, Tunisia), son of Saint Monica who taught him the elements of Christian faith: existence of a divine providence of the world, Christ saviour of men, future life with rewards or punishments (*Conf.,* I, 9, 14. III, 4, 8. VI, 16, 26). Studied at Carthage (370); had a son from the woman with whom he was to live for fifteen years (372); in 373, he was initiated to the doctrine of Mani (215-276), who had taught a dualistic conception of the world and a Gnostic doctrine of salvation (to know in order to believe). While teaching Latin grammar and literature at Carthage, he wrote the now lost treatise *De pulchro et apto* and progressively lost his faith in the doctrine of Mani, which he gave up in 382. Augustine then became a disciple of the moderate skepticism professed by Cicero. He then went to Rome as a professor of eloquence (383). At Milan, he

Dei, I-XIII, v. 40, 1899; XIV-XXIV, v. 40, 1900.—*De consensu evangelistarum,* v. 43, 1904.—*De fide et symbolo, De fide et operibus, De agone christiano, De continentia, De bono conjugali, De sancta virginitate, De bono viduitatis, De adulteriis conjugiis, De mendacio, Contra mendacium, De opere monachorum, De divinatione daemonum, De cura pro mortuis gerenda, De patientia,* v. 41, 1900.—*Psalmus contra partem Donati, Contra epistulam Parmeniani, De baptismo,* v. 51, 1908.—*Contra litteras Petiliani, Epistula ad Catholicos de secta Donatistarum, Contra Crescentium,* v. 52, 1909.—*De unico baptismo, Breviculus collationis cum Donatistis, Contra partem Donati post gesta, Sermo ad Caesariensis ecclesiae plebem, Gesta cum emerito Donatistarum episcopo, Contra Gaudentium,* v. 53, 1910.—*De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum, De spiritu et littera, De natura et gratia, De natura et origine animae, Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum,* v. 60, 1913.—*De perfectione justitiae hominis, De gestis Pelagii, De gratia Christi et peccato originali, De nuptiis et concupiscentia,* v. 42, 1902.—The best Latin edition of the *Confessions* is that of M. Skutella, Teubner, Leipzig, 1934.

English Translations. *The Works of Aurelius Augustinus,* ed. M. Dodds, Edinburgh, 16 vols., 1871-1876. Reprinted with suppressions and additions (*Soliloquies* in vol. VII) in NPN., P. Schaff, New York, Christian Literature Co., 14 vols., 1886-1890.—A new translation is included in the collection published by "The Fathers of the Church," New York; 10 vols. of Augustine already published (1952); the vols. 6 and 7 contain *The City of God.*—Several translations of the *Confessions,* among which the classical Pusey translation often reprinted since 1838. Extracts from *On the Free Will,* II, 1-17, in R. McKeon, *Selections,* I, 11-64. J. H. S. Burleigh, *Augustine: Earlier Writings,* London, 1953 (The Soliloquies, The Teacher, On Free Will, Of True Religion, The Usefulness of Belief, The Nature of the Good, Faith and the Creed, On Various Questions Bk. 1; vol. VI of the new Protestant series: The Library of Christian Classics).—An ample choice of translated texts is found in W. J. Oates, *Basic Writings of Saint Augustine,* 2 vols. Random House, New York, 1948.—BET., 426-485; Index, 466.

Introductions.—E. Portalié SJ., art. *Augustin (saint),* DTC., 1 (1923) 2268-2472 (the best introduction). J. Martin, *Saint Augustin,* 2 ed., Paris, 1923 (a large quantity of well-chosen references). E. Przyvara, *An Augustine Synthesis,* New York, 1936. E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin,* 2 ed., Paris, 1943. A. C. Pegis, *The Mind of St Augustine,* MS., 6 (1944) 1-61. V. J. Bourke, *Augustine's Quest of Wisdom. Life and Philosophy of the Bishop of Hippo,* Milwaukee, 1945. F. Cayré, AA., *Initiation à l'étude de saint Augustin,* Paris, 1947. F. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy,* II, 40-90.—Cosmology, P. Duhem, *Le système du monde,* II, 393-494.—Cultural background, H.-I. Marrou, *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique,* 2 ed. Paris, 1949.—Manichaeism, H.-C. Puech, *Le manichéisme, son fondateur* Paris, 1949.—Influence: M. Grabmann, *Der Einfluss des hl. Augustinus auf die Verwertung und Bewertung der Antike im Mittelalter,* MG., II, 1-24; *Des heiligen Augustinus Quaestio de Ideis (De diversis quaestionibus 83, qu. 46) in ihrer inhaltlichen Bedeutung und mittelalterlichen Weiterwirkung,* MG., II, 25-34; *Augustins Lehre von Glauben und Wissen und ihr Einfluss auf das mittelalterliche Denken,* MG., II, 35-62.—Chronology of Augustine's writings: M. Zarb OP., *Chronologia operum Sancti Augustini,* Angelicum, 10 (1933) 359-396, 478-512; 11 (1934) 78-91.

[15] He Who Is (Exod. 3, 14) is being itself (*essentia,* entity); in its absolute sense, it only can be predicated of God, *De Trinitate,* V, 2, 3, PL., 42, 912; cf. E. Gilson, *Introduction,* Paris, 1943, 27-28; *Le Thomisme,* Paris, 1945, 75-76; *Philosophie et incarnation selon saint Augustin,* Montreal, 1947. A. M. Dubarle, *La signification du nom de Iahweh,* RSPT., 34 (1951) 17-21.—On the notion of God, J. Nörregaard, *Augustins Bekehrung,* pp. 142-156. Jak. Barion, *Plotin und Augustinus. Untersuchungen zum Gottesproblem,* Berlin, 1935.

[16] Being is equated with eternity and immutability in countless texts; for instance, *Sermo* VI, 3, 4; PL., 39, 61. *Confessions,* VII, 11, 177; VII, 20, 26; IX, 10, 24; XI, 6, 8.—Among the other attributes of God, Augustin quotes: "supreme, excellent, supremely powerful, all-powerful, most merciful and most just, most secret and most present, most beautiful

of the soul, and therefore of man, is memory (*cum animus sit etiam ipsa memoria,* X, 14, 21); hence the typically Augustinian equation: man, soul, memory, and vice versa, "Ego sum qui memini, *ego animus*" (X, 16, 25). The unity of man does not prevent the threefold hierarchical order: body, soul vivifying body, God vivifying soul (X, 20, 29). The whole structure of the doctrine is at stake; on the strength of the Augustinian notion of man, the soul has to look inside itself in order to find God: "et ecce intus eras et ego foris, et ibi te quaerebam et in ista formosa, quae fecisti, deformis inruebam. Mecum eras, et tecum non eram" (*Conf.* X, 27, 38).

[28] *De Trinitate,* X, 10, 13-16; PL., 42, 980-982. Compare Descartes, *Meditationes,* II; ed. Adam-Tannery, vol. VII, pp. 27-28.

[29] *Epist.,* 166, 4; PL., 33, 722.—On the soul as intermediary between the Ideas and its own body, *De immortalitate animae,* XV, 24; PL., 32, 1033.

[30] *De immortalitate animae,* VII, 12; PL., 32, 1027. Cf. IX, 16; PL., 32, 1029, and XII, 19; PL., 32, 1031.—For a comprehensive study of the notion of man in Augustine, E. Dinkler, *Die Anthropologie Augustins,* Stuttgart, 1934.

[31] *De quantitate animae,* XXIII, 41; PL., 32, 1058. *De quantitate animae,* XXV, 48; PL., 32, 1063. Cf. Plotinus, *Enneads,* IV, 4, 20.—These sense cognitions, and the corresponding intellectual notions, are expressed by words; on this point, K. Kuypers, *Der Zeichen-und Wortbegriff im Denken Augustins,* Amsterdam, 1934.

[32] On memory, *De musica,* VI, 2-9; PL., 32, 1163-1177. Cf. the classical chapters of *Conf.* X, 8-19; PL., 32, 784-791.—The notion of memory plays an important part in noetic. Because he cannot accept the pre-existence of the soul, Augustine must reject the position of Plato, according to whom cognitions are innate, in this sense that to know an intelligible truth is to remember having seen it in a former life. Yet, since no intelligible knowledge comes from without, there must be some sense in which it is true to say, with Plato, that to learn is to remember. This sense is provided by the doctrine of the divine illumination. Memory thus becomes the deepest hidden recess of the mind, in which God dwells by his light, and where he teaches us as our "internal Master." To learn and to know intelligible truth is, therefore, to remember, in the present, the everlasting presence of the divine light in us. This doctrine of memory will have important consequences in the speculative mysticism of the fourteenth century. See *De Trinitate,* XIV, 7, 9; PL., 42, 1043. XIV, 15, 21; PL., 42, 1052. XV, 21, 40; PL., 42, 1088.—On the Augustinian interpretation of Plato's reminiscence, *Retractationes,* I, 4, 4; PL., 32, 590.—On the self-knowledge of the soul, J. Geyer, *Die Theorie Augustins von der Selbsterkenntnis der menschlichen Seele,* ADGM., 169-187.

[33] *De magistro,* PL., 32, 1193-1220. *De libero arbitrio,* II, 2-12; PL., 32, 1241-1260. *Enarratio in Ps. 41,* 6-8; PL., 36, 467-469. The famous formula: "ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab inferioribus ad superiora," is found in *Enarratio in Ps. 145,* 5; PL., 37, 1887.—The noetic of Augustine and his proofs of the existence of God are inseparable because God is proved to exist as cause of truth in the human intellect. The many historians who have interpreted this part of his doctrine can be situated with respect to two extreme tendencies: 1) to stress the Plotinian aspect of the position; 2) to show that after all, there is a fundamental agreement between Augustine and Thomas Aquinas on this point. Those who attempt to steer a middle course are naturally blamed by the tenants of the two extreme tendencies.—Examples of the first position, J. Hessen, *Die Begründung der Erkenntnis nach dem hl. Augustinus,* Münster i. W., 1916 (Beiträge, 19, 2); same author: *Die unmittelbare Gotteserkenntnis nach dem hl. Augustin,* Paderborn, 1919. B. Kälin, *Die Erkenntnislehre des hl. Augustinus,* Sarnen, 1920; same author, *St. Augustin und die Erkenntnis der Existenz Gottes,* DTF., 14 (1936) 331-352. Examples of the second position, Ch. Boyer SJ., *L'idée de vérité dans la philosophie de saint Augustin,* Paris, 1921. F. Cayré, *Le point de départ de la philosophie augustinienne,* Revue de philosophie, 36 (1936) 306-328, 477-493. For an example of the usual sterility of discussions on this point, Année théologique, 5 (1944) 311-334. Interesting remarks in J. Pépin, *Le problème de la communication des consciences chez Plotin et saint Augustin,* Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 55 (1950) 128-148.

[34] The divine Ideas of equality, order, justice and, generally speaking, of righteousness under all its forms are the immutable rules of action just as the other Ideas are for things the causes of their natures and of their intelligibility. In this sense, there is a moral illumination as well as an intellectual one. Augustine speaks of the "lights of virtues" (*lumina virtutum*) in several texts; for instance, *De libero arbitrio,* II, 19, 52; PL., 32, 1268. Cf. II, 10, 29, 1256-1257. On this part of the doctrine: *Contra Julianum Pelagianum,* IV, 3, 17; PL., 44, 745. *Sermo* 341, 6, 8; PL., 39, 1498.

[35] The principle which dominates this position is the identity of "number" and "wisdom", whence there follows that moral life should be "ordered" according to the light of the same "eternal law" which has created the physical world according to number, weight and measure. See *Epistola 140,* 2, 4; PL., 33, 539. Cf. *De libero arbitrio,* I, 8, 18; PL., 32, 1231, and I, 15, 32; PL., 1238-1239. *In Joannis evangelium,* 19, 5, 12; PL., 35, 1549-1550.

[36] *De libero arbitrio,* II, 18, 48; PL., 32, 1266, and II, 18, 49-50; PL., 32, 1267-1268. Cf. *Retractationes,* I, 9, 6; PL., 32, 598.

[37] PELAGIUS, born in Great Britain *ca.* 350/54, died between 423/29. The best introduction is: G. de Plinval, *Pélage, ses écrits, sa vie et sa réforme,* Payot, Lausanne, 1943 (bibliography pp. 9-11). Same author, *Recherches sur l'oeuvre littéraire de Pélage,* Revue de philologie, 60 (1934) 9-42. C. Martini, *Quattuor fragmenta Pelagio restituenda,* Antonianum, 13 (1938) 293-334. G. de Plinval, *Vue d'ensemble sur la littérature pélagienne,* Revue des études latines, 29 (1951) 284-294. The essentials of Pelagius' position are summed up in ch. 13 of his *Libellus fidei:* "We say that it is always in man's power both to sin or not to sin, so that we may always be declared to have free will" (in G. de Plinval, *Pélage . . .* , p. 310, n. 3). His doctrine was an effort to eliminate grace as a distinct gift added by God to free will. In other words, according to him, free will was grace, because it was the very gift by which God had made man capable of achieving his own salvation.

[38] On the various meanings of the words *liberum arbitrium* and *libertas,* see E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin,* ch. III, 3. This important historical problem, which announces the later controversy between Molinism, and even Jansenism, plus the various theologies of the Reformers, cannot be discussed without actually taking sides in the dispute. Despite what has been objected to it, we still are of opinion that a beginner in search of an honest introduction to the problem, will find it in the article of Portalié, DTC., I (1923) 2375-2408.

[39] *De civitate Dei,* 19, 13; PL., 41, 640-641.—On the definition of nations as associations of men linked together by a common love: *De civitate Dei,* 19, 24; PL., 41, 655.—On peace as the common goal of all societies: *De civitate Dei,* 19, 12; PL., 41, 637-638.—The whole doctrine summed up in one sentence: *De civitate Dei,* 19, 131; PL., 41, 640.

[40] Main source: *De civitate Dei,* XIX; PL. 41, 621-658.—On the problems related to the *De civitate Dei,* see J. N. Figgis, *The Political Aspects of St. Augustine's City of God,* London, 1921 (bibliography, pp. 118-122).—On the place of the doctrine in history: H. Scholtz, *Glaube und Unglaube in der Weltgeschichte,* Leipzig, 1911. J. H. S. Burleigh, *The City of God, a Study of St. Augustine's Philosophy,* London, 1944. H. Eibl, *Augustinus von Götterreich zum Gottesstaat,* Freiburg i. Br., 1951. E. Gilson, *Les métamorphoses de la Cité de Dieu,* Louvain-Paris, 1952. A. Lauras and H. Rondet, *Le thème des deux cités dans l'oeuvre de saint Augustin,* Etudes augustiniennes, Paris, 1953, 99-160.

[41] R. Arnou, DTC., 12, 2294-2390; bibliography, 2390-2392.—On the Platonist elements in Saint Augustine, see Portalié, in DTC., I, 2327-2331. E. Ugarte de Ercilla, *El platonismo de S. Agustin,* Razon y Fè, 95 (1931) 365-378; 96 (1931) 182-189; 98 (1932) 102-118. E. Hoffmann, *Platonism in Augustine's Philosophy of History,* Philosophy and History (R. Klibanski and H. J. Paton edd.) Essays presented to Ernst Cassirer, Ox-

Alcibiades, Gorgias, Crito, Timaeus, as other sources of the same doctrine: II, 7; 127-128).

[81] *De statu animae,* Epilog.; 196. Cf. II, 2; 103.

[82] BOETHIUS. Manlius Severinus Boethius, born *ca.* 480; studied philosophy in Athens; minister to King Theodoric (510); disgraced for political reasons, sentenced to death and executed in 524 or 525. The *Consolation of Philosophy* was written by Boethius while he was in jail.—On his philosophical formation, R. Bonnaud, *L'éducation scientifique de Boèce,* Speculum 4 (1929) 198-206.

The writings of Boethius are divided into four groups:

1) Logic: two commentaries on the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, one on the translation by Marius Victorinus, another on a new translation by Boethius; translation of Aristotle's *Perihermeneias* (*De interpretatione*), with two commentaries, one for beginners, another one for advanced readers; translations of Aristotle's *Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Sophistic Arguments* and *Topics.* These four translations will remain unknown up to the middle of the twelfth century; after their discovery, they will constitute the "new logic" (*logica nova*) as opposed to the "old logic" (*logica vetus*).—2) Sciences: the *Arithmetic* (*Institutio arithmetica*) and the *Music* (*Institutio musica*) are adaptations of Greek originals by Nicomachus of Gerasa; he certainly wrote a *Geometry,* after Euclid, but the treatise now printed under his name is perhaps not the true one (MAN., I, 28).—3) The *Consolation of Philosophy* (quoted as CP.,) certainly authentic and his masterpiece; although strictly philosophical, its Christian inspiration cannot be doubted (Scripture, Origen, Augustine are used, though not quoted).—4) Theological tractates: *De sancta Trinitate, Utrum Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus de divinitate substantialiter praedicentur. De persona et duabus naturis in Christo. Quomodo substantiae, in eo quod sint, bonae sint cum non sint substantialia bona* (commonly called, after Boethius himself, PL., 64, 1311 A: *De Hebdomadibus*). The authenticity of these treatises is generally accepted since the discovery of a text of Cassiodorus attributing four of them to Boethius (MAN., I, 35).—Spurious works: *On Catholic Faith* is doubtful, E. K. Rand, *Der dem Boethius zugeschriebene Traktat De fide catholica,* Jahrbücher für klassische Philologie, 26, 1901, Supplementband; in his later edition of the text (Loeb Clas. Libr. I, 52) Rand has withdrawn his own objections, but without decisive reasons. The *De unitate et uno* belongs to Gundissalinus: P. Correns, *Die dem Boethius zugeschriebene Abhandlung des Dominici Gundissalvi de Unitate,* Münster i. W., 1891 (Beiträge, I, 1). The *De definitione* seems to belong to Marius Victorinus: H. Usener, *Anecdota Holderi,* Bonn, 1877, 59-66.

EDITIONS. Uncritical edition of the complete works in PL., 63-64. The Latin translations of *Analytica priora, Analytica posteriora, Topica, Sophistici elenchi* (PL., 64, 639-672; 609 ff; 1007 ff) cannot be safely used under their present form: M. Grabmann, *Aristoteles im zwölften Jahrhundert,* MS., 12 (1950) 124. On the contrary, the text of the *Posterior Analytics,* as printed in the Basel edition of 1546, is the translation by Boethius, not by James of Venice: C. H. Haskins, *Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science,* Cambridge, Mass., 1924, pp. 231-232.—*Arithmetic, Music, Geometry,* G. Friedlein, Leipzig, 1867. *Perihermeneias,* C. Meiser, Leipzig, 2 vols., 1877, 1880. *In Isagogen Porphyrii Commenta,* Schepss & Brandt, CSEL., 48, Wien, 1906.—*De consolatione philosophiae,* A. a Forti Scuto (Fortescue) London, 1925. English transl. of the *Consolation* by H. R. James, London-New York, 1906 (New Universal Library). English transl. of Bk. IV-V by A. C. Pegis, *The Wisdom of Catholicism,* 161-202.—*Theological Tractates,* text and English transl. by H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand, London—New York, 1918 (Loeb Classical Library). R. McKeon, *The Second Edition of the Commentaries on the Isagoge of Porphyry,* in *Selections,* N. Y. 1928, I, 70-99.—BET., 705-717.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. L. Cooper, *A Concordance of Boethius. The Five Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy,* Cambridge (Mass.) 1928.—Aug. Hildebrand, *Boethius und seine Stellung zum Christentum,* Regensburg, 1883. K. Bruder, *Die philosophische Elemente in der "Opuscula sacra" des Boethius,* Leipzig, 1928. H. J. Brosch, *Der Seinsbegriff bei Boethius,* Innsbruck, 1931. R. Carton, *Le christianisme et l'augustinisme de Boèce,* Mélanges augustiniens, Paris, Rivière, 1931, 243-299. On his Greek sources: J. Bidez, *Boèce et Porphyre,* Revue belge

countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us." In short, Thomas does not refuse to speak of a separate intellect, provided that: 1, it be God; 2, that its illumination of the soul be identified with the creation, in man, of the natural light of reason. The verbal nature of this concession is verified by *S.T.*, I, 84, 5, where the Augustinian doctrine of the divine illumination, *understood in its Augustinian sense,* is eliminated. On the individuality of the agent intellect, I, 79, 5. On intellectual cognition by mode of abstraction from images, I, 85, 1 and 2. *C.G.*, II, 77. The abstractive nature of human knowledge applies even to our cognition of the soul, *S.T.*, I, 87, 3. *De veritate,* X, 8.— One of the most perfect texts of Thomas concerning his own interpretation of the divine illumination is *In Boethium De Trinitate,* I, 1.—D. Lanna, *La teoria della conoscenza in S. Tommaso d'Aquino,* Firenze, 1913 (bibliography). M. Baumgartner, *Zur thomistischen Lehre von den ersten Prinzipien der Erkenntnis,* Festgabe Hertling, Freiburg i. Br., 1913, 241-260. Same author, *Zum thomistischen Wahrheitsbegriff,* in Baeumker Festgabe, Münster i. W., 1913, 241-260. A. Hufnagel, *Intuition und Erkenntnis nach Thomas von Aquin,* Münster i. W., 1932. A. Gardeil, *La perception de l'âme par elle-même d'après saint Thomas,* Mélanges thomistes, 219-236. E. Gilson, *Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance,* Paris, 1938. G. B. Phelan, *Verum sequitur esse rerum,* MS., 1 (1939) 11-22. G. van Riet, *L'épistémologie thomiste,* Louvain, 1946. E. J. Ryan, *The Role of the Sensus communis in the Psychology of St. Thomas,* Carthagena (Ohio) 1951. G. P. Klubertanz, *The Discursive Power. Sources and Doctrine of the Vis Cogitativa According to St. Thomas Aquinas,* St. Louis, 1952 (extensive bibliography on the noetic of Thomas Aquinas, 331-346). P. Hoenen, *Reality and Judgment According to St. Thomas,* Chicago, 1952.— On the notion of "mental word": B. Lonergan SJ., *The Concept of Verbum in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas,* Theological Studies (Baltimore): 7 (1946) 349-392; 8 (1947) 35-79, 404-444; 10 (1949) 3-40, 359-393.

[118] General structure of the world, *C.G.*, III, 1. Everything acts in view of an end, III, 2 (either known or not known). This end is the good, III, 3. Consequently, it is God (III, 17), who, since he himself *has* no end, *is* the ultimate end of all beings and operations, III, 18. For all things to act in view of God is to assimilate themselves to God, that is to make themselves as similar to him as is compatible with their natures (*Deo assimilari*); they resist corruption because they love to be: now God is *Esse;* they operate in view of some good: now God is *Bonum,* III, 19. Natural causality is an effort (conscious or not) to imitate the creative fecundity of the supreme *Esse,* III, 21. To sum up, things imitate God to the extent that they are and that they cause; this is, for them, to participate in the divine being, in the divine goodness and therefore in the divine will, III, 22. This applies to beings deprived of knowledge, III, 24. As to intellectual substances, their end is to know God by means of their intellect (*intelligere Deum*) III, 25. Consquently, man's felicity cannot consist in an act of the will, but in an act of the intellect, III, 26. The cognition of God by faith is not sufficient to give beatitude, III, 40. Even if it were possible to us, the cognition of the separate Intelligences (III, 45), or the self-knowledge of the soul by intuition of its own essence (III, 46) would not give us full beatitude. Only the intellectual cognition of God can fulfill our obscure desire, and since such cognition is not possible in this life (III, 47-48), man must order all his activities in view of another life. In this sense, nature is ordained to grace, which radically transcends it.— All human operations are caused by both intellect and will; will is the natural appetite of an intellectual being; it necessarily wills the good in general (*S.T.*, I, 81, 1), but not what is not the absolute good, *S.T.*, I, 82, 2. Since the good cannot be desired unless it be known, the intellect is more noble than the will, *S.T.*, I, 82, 3. Morality consists in ordering all human acts in view of the true good, which is the true end, I-II, 18, 4-7; and this not only as a general intention but taking account of all the circumstances that determine any particular act, I-II, 18, 10. Where practical reason is wrong, the will is wrong, I-II, 19, 6. The goodness of intention determines that of the will (I-II, 19, 7) in this sense that, if the intention is wrong, the will is wrong, but wrong decisions of the will can be made even with a good intention, I-II, 19, 8.— Among countless contributions to a widely

discussed problem, L. E. O'Mahony, *The Desire of God in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas,* London, 1929. St. Vallaro OP., *De naturali desiderio videndi essentiam Dei et de ejus valore ad demonstrandam possibilitatem ejusdem visionis Dei quidditativae,* Angelicum, 11 (1934) 133-170.—B. J. Diggs, *Love and Being. An Investigation into the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas,* New York, 1947. Ch. Hollencamp, *Causa causarum. On the Nature of Good and Final Cause,* Québec, Université Laval, 1949 (important for the history of Thomism).

[119] The act by which we will a means is not the same as the act by which we will the end (*S.T.*, I-II, 8, 3), but intention runs through the will of the means and that of the end, I-II, 12, 3. Choice (*electio*) is an act of the will preceded by rational cognition, I-II, 13, 1. It is the choosing of means in view of the willed end, I-II, 13, 3. It is proper to human acts, I-II, 13, 4. Deliberation (*consilium*) is a rational inquiry into the best means to achieve a willed end, I-II, 14, 2 and 4. Consent (*consensus*) is the approval given by our appetitive power to the rational conclusion of deliberation (I-II, 15, 1) concerning the appropriate means in view of a willed end, I-II, 15, 3. The will can sway the acts of reason, I-II, 17, 6.—The texts of Thomas Aquinas on voluntary action sometimes refer to a work of Aristotle called *On Good Fortune;* many other masters, for instance Duns Scotus, have quoted it. It is a Latin translation of Aristotle's *Ethica Eudemica,* Bk. VII, ch. 14, joined to a Latin translation of *Magna Moralia,* Bk. II, ch. 8, and circulated under the common title, *Liber de bona fortuna.* See Th. Deman, *Le Liber de bona Fortuna dans la théologie de saint Thomas d'Aquin,* RSPT., 17 (1928) 38-58.—On the history of the doctrine before Thomas Aquinas (Alexander Neckham, John Blund, Alexander of Hales) and on its influence (Giles of Rome, anonymous commentaries on *Ethics*), O. Lottin, PEM., III, 606-675.—Selcted texts and commentaries in E. Gilson, *Moral Values and the Moral Life,* translated by L. R. Ward CSC., Saint Louis, 1941.

[120] On moral habits (*habitus*), *S.T.*, I-II, 49, 2 and 4. Intellectual and moral virtues, *S.T.*, I-II, 58, 2.—P. de Roton, *Les Habitus, leur caractère spirituel,* Paris, 1934.

[121] On intellectual virtues, *S.T.*, I-II, 58, 4-5. Cf. E. Gilson, *Wisdom and Love in Saint Thomas Aquinas, Marquette* Press, Milwaukee, 1951. L. B. Geiger OP., *Le problème de l'amour chez saint Thomas d'Aquin,* Montréal, 1952, pp. 56-67.

[122] *S.T.*, I-II, 64, 1, ad 1.

[123] Divine law, natural law, human law, *S.T.*, I-II, 90, 1-4 and 91, 1-5. For a detailed study of these different types of law, I-II, 93 (eternal law), I-II, 94 (natural law), I-II, 95 (human law). On human law and personal moral conscience, I-II, 96, 1-6.—For a modern appreciation of the doctrine, Huntington Cairns, *Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel,* Baltimore, 1949, pp. 163-204. Origins, meaning and influence of the doctrine, O. Lottin, PEM., II, 11-100.

[124] ETHICS. A. G. Sertillanges OP., *La philosophie morale de saint Thomas,* Paris, 1916. J. Pieper, *Die ontische Grundlage des sittlichen nach Thomas Aquinas,* Münster i. W., 1929. M. Wittmann, *Die Ethik des hl. Thomas von Aquin in ihrem systematischen Aufbau dargestellt und in ihren geschichtlichen, besonders in den antiken Quellen erforscht,* Munich, 1935. On practically all problems related to the ethics of Thomas Aquinas in relation with its historical environment, consult O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles,* especially vols. II-III, Louvain, 1948-1949; cf. R. Gauthier, Bulletin Thomiste, 8 (1947-1953) 60-86. H. V. Jaffa, *Thomism and Aristotelianism. A Study of the Commentary by Thomas Aquinas on the Nicomachean Ethics,* Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952.—V. J. Bourke, *Ethics. A Textbook in Moral Philosophy,* New York, Macmillan, 1951.

SOCIOLOGY. R. Linhardt, *Die Sozialprinzipien des hl. Thomas von Aquin . . .,* Freiburg i. Br., 1932. E. Kurz, *Individuum und Gemeinschaft beim hl. Thomas von Aquin,* Munich, 1932. L. Lachance, *Le concept de droit selon Aristote et saint Thomas,* Paris, 1933. C. Riedl, *The Social Theory of St. Thomas Aquinas,* Philadelphia, 1934. I. Th. Eschmann OP., *Bonum commune melius est quam bonum unius. Eine Studie über den Wertvorrang des Personalen bei Thomas*

what entity expresses abstractly. They really predicate the same thing. Not so with "what" and "whatness" (*quid* and *quiddítas*). The "what" signifies the whole essence of the thing, taken in the concrete; the "whatness" (*quiddítas*) only signifies the formal element by which the thing is what it is, 522. Essence and existence signify the same things as being and entity, that is to say the whole essence of the thing; their sole distinction is *in modis dicendi;* what existence signifies by mode of act, essence and entity signify by mode of habitual and quiet possession, 525; that existence (*esse*) signifies the whole essence of the thing, is proved by both reason and authority. In fact, the first reason of Dietrich is an authority: "Prima rerum creatarum est esse" (*De causis,* 4): consequently, *esse* signifies the whole essence of the thing and not existence considered as an accident: "Therefore, existence is identically the essence of the thing, nor can it be said that the essence is something into which existence can be infused or instilled," 526. His whole argumentation rests upon the assumption that there is nothing more noble than essence; consequently, since creation is the noblest of actions, its term must be the noblest of effects; now, this effect is *esse;* consequently, *esse* must needs mean essence: "Ergo esse est idem quod essentia," 526; "Esse significat totam essentiam cujusque rei," 527. Dietrich then argues from Boethius to the same effect, 528-530; then from Aristotle, and even from Augustine. Part II is entirely directed against the sophistic reasons of those who maintain the real distinction of essence and existence. No being can be understood apart from its existence, 532. This is so true that, if man does not exist, even the proposition "man is man" becomes false. To say that man is man if there is no man is just as false as to say: man reasons, if there is no man, 533; "homo est homo" signifies "homo hominat," which is false if there is no man, 533.

[20] BERTHOLD OF MOSBURG (of Mosburch); his unpublished commentary is to be found in ms. Vat. lat. 2192. Berthold calls Proclus "the most excellent disciple of Plato," on the same rank as Plotinus. On the use made of Proclus by Nicholas of Cues, R. Klibanski, *Ein Proklosfund . . .*, 25-29: M. Grabmann, *Die Proklosübersetzungen . . .*, MG., II, 421.

[21] MASTER ECKHART, OP. H. Denifle, *Meister Eckharts lateinische Schriften und die Grundanschauung seiner Lehre,* ALKM., 2 (1886) 417-652; (text of prologues to *Opus tripartitum, Opus propositionum,* Commentaries on Genesis, Exodus, Ecclesiasticus, Wisdom); *Das Cusanische Exemplar lateinischer Schriften Eckeharts in Cues,* 673-687. G. Théry, *Edition critique des pièces relatives au procès d'Eckhart, contenues dans le manuscrit 33b de la bibliothèque de Soest,* AHDL., 1 (1926) 129-268. Fr. Pelster, *Ein Gutachten aus dem Eckehart-Prozess in Avignon,* ADGM., 1099-1108; text 1109-1124. GLOREP., I, 180-185.—Intended editions of the complete works: Eckhart, *Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke,* Stuttgart, 1936 ff. R. Klibanski, *Super oratione dominica;* II, H. Bascour, *Opus tripartitum;* III, A. Dondaine, *XIII Quaestiones Parisienses,* 1934, 1935, 1936.—Meister Eckhart, *Die lateinischen Schriften:* I, 1, *Prologi; Exp. libri Genesis et Exodi.* I, 2; *Exp. libri Exodi.* III, 1-4, *In Johannem.* IV, 1-3, *Sermones.* V, *Opera minora,* 1-2. To be continued. W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart.—Partial editions. Still necessary: F. Pfeiffer, *Deutsche Mystiker des 14. Jahrhunderts,* II, Leipzig, 1857. G. Théry, *Le commentaire de Maître Eckhart sur le Livre de la Sagesse,* AHDL., 3 (1928) 325-443 and 4 (1929) 233-392. E. Longpré, *Questions inédites de maître Eckhart OP. et de Gonzalve de Balboa O.F.M.,* RNSP., 29 (1927) 69-85. J. Quint, *Deutsche Mystikertexte des Mittelalters,* Bonn, 1929. B. Geyer, *Magistri Echardi quaestiones et sermo Parisienses,* (Floril. patrist., 25) Bonn, 1931. French transl., *Maître Eckhart, Traités et sermons,* transl. by F. A(ubier), introd. by M. de Gandillac, Paris, 1942. English transl., C. de B. Evans, *Meister Eckhart,* London, 1924 (transl. of Pfeiffer's edition, minus some texts).—BIBLIOGRAPHY. O. Karrer, *Meister Eckhart, das System seiner religiöse Lehre und Lebenweisheit,* Munich, 1926. M. Grabmann, *Neuaufgefunden Pariser Quaestionen Meister Eckharts und ihre Stellung in seinem geistigen Entwicklungsgange,* Munich, 1927 (Abhandlungen d. Bayer. Akad., 32, 7). J. Koch, *Meister Eckhart und die jüdische Religionsphilosophie des Mittelalters,* Jahresbericht der Schlesischen Gesellschaft für vaterländische Kultur, 1928. G. della Volpe, *Il misticismo speculativo di maestro Eckhart nei suoi rapporti storici,* Bologna, 1930. E.

Henry of Ghent, the reliability of sense cognition; consequently he denies the necessity of any Augustinian illumination to insure the possibility of absolutely certain natural knowledge, but he adds that the general motion of our intellect by the divine light is its motion by these "intelligible quiddities." The divine intellect has pure and simple being; these quiddities only have in it a "relative being" (*secundum quid*), namely, an "objective being," or being of known object (*esse objectivum*); the same quiddities "move our intellect to the knowing of sincere truths," *Op. Ox.*, I, d. 36, q. unica, n. 10. There is therefore a trace of the Augustinian cognition "in rationibus aeternis" left in the noetic of Duns Scotus. This distinction will become a center of active controversies. W. Alnwick will deny it as unintelligible; Francis of Mayronnes and John of Ripa will reinforce it and consequently ascribe more entity to the Ideas; outside of the school, it will be judged as an attempt to subordinate the Ideas to God: ROBERT WALSINGHAM (Carmelite, d. after 1312): B. M. Xiberta, *De scriptoribus scholasticis saeculi XIV ex Ordine Carmelitarum,* Louvain, 1931, pp. 128-129.— Origin of the notion: A. Maurer, CSB., *Ens diminutum: a Note on its Origin and Meaning,* MS., 12 (1950) 216-222; cf. M. Hubert OP., Bulletin Thomiste, 8 (1951) 243.

[66] On the formal distinction, see note 63.

[67] The noetic of Duns Scotus is in sharp reaction against the doctrine of Henry of Ghent. The reliability of sense knowledge is firmly maintained against Henry; as a consequence, the Augustinian illumination can be, if not eliminated, at least reduced to the general influence of the divine Ideas upon the human intellect: *Op. Ox.*, I, d. 3, q. 4, a. 5. This is one of the most perfect questions ever written by Duns Scotus. — Intellectual cognition requires the possible intellect, the agent intellect, an object and the species; intellection consists in the production, by the agent intellect, of a "representative being" endowed with actual existence, which formally represents the universal *qua* universal. This form is the intelligible species. Received in the possible intellect, it causes intellection: *Op. Ox.*, I, d. 3, q. 6, n. 8. Cf. *Rep. Par.*, I, d. 3, q. 4, n. 4. Cf. P. Minges, *J. D. Scoti doctrina,* I, 146-181. J. Kraus, *Die Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus der natura communis,* Paderborn, 1927. H. Klug, *Die Lehre des sel. Duns Scotus über die Seele,* PJ., 36 (1923) 131-144; 37 (1924) 57-75. O. Lacombe, *La critique des théories de la connaissance chez Duns Scot,* RT., 35 (1930) 24-47, 144-157, 217-235. S. Belmond, *Le mécanisme de la connaissance d'après Duns Scot,* France Franciscaine, 13 (1930) 285-323. T. Barth, *Duns Scotus und die ontologische Grundlage unserer Verstandeserkenntnis,* FS., 33 (1951) 348-384.—Duns Scotus has sharply contrasted intuitive cognition, whose proper object is the existing singular perceived as existing, and abstractive cognition whose proper object is the quiddity, or essence, of the known thing: *Op. Ox.*, II, d. 3, q. 9, n. 6. In Duns Scotus, the intuition of a nonexisting thing is a contradiction, *Rep. Par.*, III, d. 14, q. 3, n. 12: "Contradictio est igitur, quod sit cognitio intuitiva in genere proprio, et quod res non sit." Many texts collected in S. J. Day, *Intuitive Cognition, a Key to the Significance of the Latter Scholastics,* Saint Bonaventure, N.Y., 1947. E. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot,* pp. 425-427, 430-431, 548. P. C. Vier OFM., *Evidence and its Function according to John Duns Scotus,* Saint Bonaventure, N.Y., 1951.

[68] Matter is created, and since it can be the term of an act of creation it must be "a reality distinct from the form" and something "positive," *Op. Ox.*, II, d. 12, q. 1, n. 11; Scotus refers to Augustine, *Confessions,* XII, 7, 7. Besides, if matter had no reality of its own, distinct from the form, there would only be one principle of generation and, consequently, no generation, *Op. Ox.*, ibid., nn. 13, 16. Since it has its own entity, matter has its own existence; without ever discussing the problem in itself, Duns Scotus denies the composition of essence and existence, *Op. Ox.*, IV, d. 11, q. 3, n. 46. The *esse* superadded to essence appears to him as a "fiction." The finite being is in virtue of its composition of matter and form. In man, the prime form of matter is the form of corporeity; the other forms (vegetative, sensitive, intellective) are all one substantial form without losing their formal distinction in the unity of the highest one (intellective soul). Here, as in other similar cases, the distinction of formal entities within one and the same whole does not prevent it from preserving the

1519, 1530). Note the answers of John, a supporter of the possibility of actual infinity, to the objections of his pupil and adversary on this point, Louis Coronel. John Mair is considered a terminist. A long list of practically unknown late masters is found in the article of H. Elie, *Quelques maîtres de l'Université de Paris vers l'an 1500,* AHDL., 25-26 (1950-1951) 193-243; pupils of John Mair, 212-228; pupils of his pupils, 228-236.

[80] Nicholas of Cues (Nicolaus Cusanus, de Cusa). *Nicolai de Cusa Opera,* critical edition of the complete Latin works, Meiner, Leipzig, 1934 and ff., seven volumes published to date (1953), including, I, *De docta ignorantia* (1932), II, *Apologia doctae ignorantiae* (1932, we are quoting from this edition); *Directio speculantis seu de non aliud,* 1934; *Idiota, De sapientia, De mente, De staticis experimentis* (1937); *De beryllo* (1940); *De catholica concordantia* (no date).—A different series is: *Cusanus Texte; I. Predigten;* I., *Dies Sanctificatus,* by E. Hoffman and R. Klibanski, Heidelberg, 1929 (Sitzungsberichte, 1928/29, 3); 2/5. *Vier Predigten im Geiste Eckharts,* by J. Koch, Heidelberg, 1937 (Sitzungsberichte, 1936/37, 2).—A reprint of the Paris 1514 edition has been published by A. Petzelt, *Nicolaus von Cues,* Stuttgart, vol. I, 1949 (includes *De docta ignorantia, De conjecturis, De Deo abscondito, De quaerendo Deum, De filiatione Dei, De dato Patris luminum, De Genesi, Apologia doctae ignorantiae, Idiota, De sapientia, De mente*).—English transl., *The Vision of God* (*De visione Dei*), by E. G. Salter, London-Toronto, Dent; N.Y. E. P. Dutton, 1928. French transl., M. de Gandillac, *Oeuvres choisies,* Paris, 1942.—Bibliography. The classical introduction is E. Vansteenberghe, *Le cardinal Nicolas de Cues,* 1921. On the doctrine, Lenz, *Die docta ignorantia . . .,* Wurzburg, 1923. J. Hommes, *Die philosophischen Grundlehren des N. Cusanus . . .,* München, 1926. M. de Gandillac, *La philosophie de Nicolas de Cues,* Paris, 1941; German translation, after revision by the author, 1952. Important biographical notes in J. Koch, *Nicolaus von Cues und seine Umwelt,* Heidelberg, 1948.—P. Rotta, *Il cardinale Nicolò di Cusa,* Milan, 1928. B. Jansen, *Nicolaus Cusanus, philosophus antinomiarum,* Gregorianum 11 (1930) 380-397. H. Bett, *Nicholas of Cusa,* London, 1932. P. Mennicken, *Nikolaus von Kues,* Leipzig, 1932. J. Neuner SJ, *Das Gottesproblem bei Nikolaus von Cues,* PJ., 46 (1933) 331-343. H. Rogner, *Die Bewegung des Erkennens und das Sein in der Philosophie des Nikolaus von Cues,* Heidelberg, 1937. R. Lazzarini, *Il "De ludo globi" e la concezione dell'uomo del Cusano,* Roma, 1938. M. Feigl, *Vom incomprehensibiliter inquirere Gottes im I Buch von De docta ignorantia des Nikolaus von Cues,* DTF., 22 (1944) 321-338. P. Wilhert, *Das Problem der coincidentia oppositorum . . .,* J. Koch, *Nikolaus, von Cues als Mensch,* in *Humanismus, Mystik und Kunst in der Welt des Mittelalters,* ed. by J. Koch, Leiden-Cologne, 1953.

[81] John Wenck of Herrenberg, Rector of the University of Heidelberg in 1435, 1444, 1451; his opuscule against Nicholas of Cues has been discovered and published by E. Vansteenberghe, *Le "De ignota litteratura" de Jean Wenck de Herrenberg contre Nicolas de Cues,* Münster i. W., 1910 (Beiträge, 8, 6). After observing how hard it is to refute a man who believes in the coincidence of opposites (p. 21), John reduces the positions of Nicholas to the already censured doctrine of Eckhart (pp. 19, 24-26, 30) and proceeds to a theological condemnation rather than to a philosophical refutation.

[82] This is one of the main reasons why the sixteenth-century Renaissance was a continuation of the Christian civilization of the middle ages. The so-called "discovery" of classical Latin literature was the discovery of the Latin classics preserved by the mediaeval masters of Grammar; Petrarch's career covers the fourteenth century: he is contemporary with Ockham (E. Gilson, *La philosophie au moyen âge,* 720-730); the same remark applies to Boccaccio (1313-1375); as to the discovery of Plato, who was just as much of a Greek as Aristotle, but no more, it gains momentum with the translations of the Dialogues by Leonardo Bruni Aretino (1369-1444; op. cit., 736-738). Even Marsilio Ficino, commonly hailed in histories of literature as the herald of the Platonism of the Renaissance, was a continuator of the progressive rediscovery of Greek thought which is one of the fundamental elements of the history of Christian philosophy in the middle ages. Moreover, he was full of scholastic theology. His historians are beginning to realize that

this is true of his early writings; see the remarkable article by P. O. Kristeller, *The Scholastic Background of Marsilio Ficino, with an Edition of Unpublished Texts,* Traditio, 2 (1944) 257-318. Compare Ficino's *Theologia Platonica de immortalitate animorum,* dedicated to Lorenzo de Medici (1449-1492), with the *Summa contra Gentiles* of Thomas Aquinas: Ficino, Bk. II, ch. 4; *CG.* I, 43.—Bk. II, 5; *CG* I, 15.—Bk. II, 6-9; *CG.* I, 44-49. We fully agree that Ficino intended to be a Platonist; our only point is that, in trying to make Plato *Christianae veritati simillimum,* he was simply continuing the history of Christian thought in the middle ages.

G. Toffanin, *Storia dell' Umanesimo dal XIII al XVI secolo,* Napoli, 1933. N. Sapegno, *Il Trecento,* Milano, 1934. E. Gilson, *Les Idées et les Lettres,* Paris, 1932, 171-196; *Philosophie médiévale et humanisme,* in *Héloise et Abélard,* 1 ed. only, Paris J. Vrin, 1938, 225-245; *Le moyen âge et le naturalisme antique,* ibid., 183-224, and AHDL., 7 (1932) 5-37. A. J. Festugière OP., *Studia Mirandulana,* AHDL., 7 (1932) 143-250; text of the *De ente et uno,* 208-224; French transl. 225-250. English transl. by V. M. Hamm, Marquette University Press, 1943. The *De ente et uno* of Pico della Mirandola (1491) is the only fragment that is left of his unfinished *Symphonia Platonis et Aristotelis.* On the fundamental agreement between Ficino and Pico della Mirandola ("sublimem Picum complatonicum nostrum") see the important Preface of Ficino to his own translation of Plotinus: "Totus enim ferme terrarum orbis a Peripateticis occupatus in duas plurimum sectas divisus est, Alexandrium (Alex. of Aphrodisias) et Averroicam . . ." AHDL., 7 (1932) 190, note. Plato and Plotinus are called upon, one more, to stop the spreading of a flood of impiety which "the mere preaching of faith" is unable to contain.

[83] H. Heimsoeth, *Die sechs grossen Themen der abendländischen Metaphysik und der Ausgang des Mittelalters,* 2 ed., Berlin, 1934. E. Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience,* New York, 1937; *Being and Some Philosophers,* 2 ed., Toronto 1952; *Les recherches historico-critiques et l'avenir de la scolastique,* Antonianum, 26 (1951) 40-48. A. D. Sertillonges, *Le christianisme et les philosophies,* 2 vols. Paris, 1939, 1942.

715 - Thames

380: pendant

379 - hundredth in Thames?

317: hundredth Peter - the Wild

381: Eltons